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INTRODUCTION
Isidor Wallimann and 
Michael N. Dobkowski 
Millions have died from poverty, millions from war and, as will 
become evident in this book, millions have been victims of genocide. 
While the social sciences have long been concerned with poverty-its 
effects, causes, and prevention-much less attention has been given to 
the nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into war and 
the destruction of human lives. Attempts to increase our understanding 
of the nature of social conflicts and ways to de-escalate them (e.g., 
Kriesberg 1973) are part of a relatively recent endeavor to use social 
science insights for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace. 
Still, despite the growing number of individuals and research institutes 
devoted to "peace research," efforts to successfully destroy life through 
war far outweigh those to preserve it. When it comes to genocide, the 
situation is even more precarious. Although genocide has been a recur-
ring social phenomenon and has become ever more devastating in terms 
of lost human life as we have moved into the twentieth century, little 
effort has been spent in assessing its causes in the hope of better pre-
venting it It is as if events of genocidal proportions have-for whatever 
psychological or sociological reasons-been suppressed and excluded 
from the researchers' agenda. Yet, it is our opinion that genocide, like 
poverty, war, and all other events and processes destructive of human 
life, should gain top attention from scholars. With this collection of 
essays, we wish to enhance and facilitate this process in the hope that 
knowledge and "scientific" effort will increasingly be directed toward 
and serve the preservation of life. 
If such scholarly efforts are to contribute to the improvement of the 
human condition by preserving life, in the case of genocide we can no 
xii Introduction 
longer conceive of it as a random (although relatively rare) historic phe-
nomenon. Instead, we are compelled to look for patterns which lead to 
and are associated with these annihilations. Difficult as it may be to ac-
cept such a notion, we must also look upon the history and nature of so-
cieties giving rise to genocides as man-made and thereby influenceable. 
Any other perspective would preclude the human agency necessary to act 
preventively. Thus, postulating that the social and historic circumstances 
making genocide possible are man-made, and that genocides, far from 
being random events, may be associated with certain social patterns, we 
must begin to penetrate the circumstances under which human beings 
have been annihilated in the past so that we can establish criteria for the 
prevention of similar destructions in the future. 
This volume is divided into two parts. The first part contains contri-
butions of a general nature. They are primarily concerned with defini-
tions, typologies, and explanations of genocide. The essays in the sec-
ond part focus more heavily on special aspects of the phenomenon. On
the one hand, they illuminate processes or special characteristics asso-
ciated with a particular genocide. On the other hand, they attempt to test 
specific hypotheses or to explain the emergence of a given event of 
genocide. Ultimately, both the more general and the specific articles 
complement and draw from each other. In no way can they be treated as 
mutually exclusive. Both parts, we believe, bring us a step further in the 
"scientific" analysis and understanding of genocide as a modem social 
and historical phenomenon. 
Any disciplined analysis of genocide requires that certain definitional 
issues and problems be clarified. Even if such problems cannot imme-
diately be resolved, they must nevertheless be articulated. This we have 
attempted to do at the outset. Here the discussion centers around such 
issues as the groups that should be subsumed under any discussion of 
victims of genocide. In addition to racial groups, for example, should 
the annihilation of ethnic, religious, economic, or political groups also be 
included in a definition of genocide? Other points concern the question 
of numbers killed, intent, and plan. How many or what percentage of 
members of a group must be destroyed before an event should be called 
genocidal? Must this destruction be intentional or should any com-
parable destruction, intentional or not, be categorized as genocide? The 
important question also arises concerning when, if at all, war is genocide 
and genocide is war. 
Not unrelated to definitions of genocide is the attempt to classify 
events of genocide. In fact, classifications and typologies are a neces-
sary prerequisite if genocide is to be understood and explained at all. 
Again, we have chosen to place contributions aiming to develop and 
justify typologies of genocide in Part I, which investigates how geno-
cides have varied throughout history and to what extent this variance 
may have been "caused" by differences in modes of production; differ-
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ences in warfare; economic competition; the tendency to accumulate eco-
nomic power and wealth; differences in state power; the need to maintain 
political control; or bureaucratization, ideology, and technology. 
In many ways, typologies imply explanation because events of geno-
cide are grouped according to criteria which in themselves can serve as 
explanation. Nevertheless, the first part of this volume also includes 
contributions which focus, aside from any explanatory power inherent in 
typologies, on more general explanations of genocide. Thus, it is dis-
cussed how genocide could be a technique of dealing with surplus popu-
lations, implying that if the rise of surplus populations could be pre-
vented genocide might not occur. Other endeavors look for an expla-
nation of genocide in the existence of severe social cleavages, and in the 
outright support of (or lack of constraints placed on) totalitarian regimes 
by other nations. Also, it is postulated that the inability to carry through 
structural social and political readjustments induces genocide, particu-
larly when drastic changes might be called for as a result of defeat in 
war, national independence, revolution, and so on. Finally, it is sug-
gested that we should begin to understand modern genocides not as 
examples of a rather impersonal process of technological rationality, or 
as the results of structurally induced crises, but rather as acts of societal 
madness. The entire notion of purposeful intentionality is critically 
explored. 
More specific studies characterize Part II. By focusing on the cor-
ruption of the law as it preluded genocide, by examining the Jewish 
Holocaust, and by looking at other instances of genocide such as the 
Armenian case or the "genocide" perpetrated against the Aborigines in 
connection with colonialism and imperialism, it is possible to improve 
our understanding of mass death. In addition, the question of the 
uniqueness or universality of genocide(s) can fruitfully be dealt with in 
this manner. For should the Holocaust, for example, prove to be 
unique, the criteria making it thus can be drawn upon as explanatory 
variables for a better understanding not only of the Holocaust but also, 
by inference, of other examples of mass death. Thus, it is postulated 
that the Holocaust is unique because of its scope, its unprecedented 
involvement of the legal and administrative apparatus, the horrible treat-
ment meted out to the individuals to be annihilated, and the concerted 
ideological campaign directed against the population targeted for destruc-
tion. Yet these destructions do not occur in a vacuum. In as much as it 
is individuals who carry out these atrocities, it also is important to pose 
certain questions on the social psychology level. For example, which 
ideology, mind sets, and personalities must already exist or be created 
for individuals or even major segments of a society to feel unashamed 
and justified in being part of an extermination enterprise? 
It has been suggested that middleman minorities, due to their peculiar 
position, and to the cleavages and conflicts in which they partake or be-
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come involved, are particularly likely to be discriminated against. Could 
it be that, since such discrimination has often assumed high levels of 
intensity, middleman minorities are therefore likely to become victims of 
genocide? Is there a connection between middleman minority status and 
genocide? For, should such a connection exist, we may have come a 
step closer to understanding the phenomenon and possibly being able to 
devise ways of preventing it. 
Given the issues and questions raised in this collection, where do we 
go from here? What points need further clarification, and what problems 
still are to be solved? Admittedly, they are many, and if we, as editors, 
now enter the discussion by pointing out some of the issues we believe 
need further attention, we are fully aware of the selective nature of our 
attempt. Yet, we maintain that these issues are pressing and important. 
They concern the connection between genocide, surplus population, eco-
nomic gain, and middleman minorities, and the question of intentionality 
as it pertains to genocide. 
We believe that it is of great importance to further investigate the con-
nection between genocide and the presence or absence of surplus popula-
tions, just as it has been important to investigate the evolution of so-
cieties, their stratification systems, and the corresponding existential con-
ditions in a manner that includes population size in relation to available 
resources (Lenski 1966). However, in studying the connection between 
genocide and surplus population, we need not necessarily confine our-
selves solely to the question of how so-called surplus populations have 
been and are being eliminated. We can equally inquire how society has 
"constructively" rather than "destructively" dealt with surplus popula-
tions throughout history. For instance, we can study, as Mizruchi 
(1983) shows, how potentially troublesome surplus populations, far 
from being annihilated, have been socially controlled and regulated. 
Thus, by inference, ways might be found which preempt genocidal 
strategies of surplus population management. 
Whenever the notion of surplus population is being used, it is im-
portant to distinguish between absolute and relative surplus population, 
something Lenski and Mizruchi fail to do. For a portion of the society 
may appear to us as superfluous while in fact it is not. Appearances can 
be misleading and superficial; our observation that some people can no 
longer maintain themselves or lack sufficient integration into the eco-
nomic system may tempt us to conclude that a surplus of people exists. 
However, taking appearances for reality has more often than not been a 
source of great error. If, as is the case in capitalist societies, for in-
stance, millions go hungry, are unemployed, underemployed, or on 
welfare while factories run at much lower than full capacity and land 
remains uncultivated or inappropriately used, the problem is not one of 
having too many people. The problem lies instead in the structure of the 
economy and the entire mode of production and distribution. The ap-
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parent surplus population is, under these circumstances, only relative, 
not absolute, and should not even be called a surplus population. This 
term itself tends to blame the victims, i.e., those negatively affected by 
the politics inherent in a given mode of production. It tends to single 
them out as the problem's source, overlooking the real sources of the 
apparent overpopulation located in the economic system as a whole. In 
short, the problem of relative surplus population is one of political 
economy, not one of individuals reproducing at a rate faster than eco-
nomic means can be made available. Even if one were able to show that 
a society or segments thereof reproduce in excess of what can be pro-
duced to maintain everyone, it must be kept in mind that fertility rates 
themselves are influenced by existing economic conditions. This can be 
observed in those cases in which some elements of the population who 
are marginalized economically distribute their risks by increasing the 
number of offsprings. All this goes to demonstrate that so-called surplus 
populations are rarely absolute. Should the presence of a relative surplus 
population, therefore, be connected with events of genocide, it follows 
that in order to prevent the latter, structural economic changes preventing 
the rise of relative surplus populations must be brought about. 
The present tradition (see, for instance, Rubenstein 1983) of linking 
relative surplus population with genocide postulates that this surplus 
population consists of the chronically unproductive and generally unem-
ployable who, in times of crisis, might be eliminated. Since large-scale 
elimination has been witnessed under Joseph Stalin as well as under 
Adolf Hitler, it is concluded that these genocides served as a means to re-
duce or eliminate the existing relative surplus population perceived to be 
problematic. It is our opinion, however, that the population eliminated 
in both cases should not be characterized as chronically unproductive and 
generally unemployable, and when they showed such "traits," as in part 
was the case in Germany, this was the result of a policy that systemati-
cally cut Jews off from economic activity. What we are confronted with 
here, therefore, seems to be a problem involving the categories em-
ployed. This problem deserves further attention and scrutiny. The 
following questions must be asked: Why were other groups not elimi-
nated who readily appeared as superfluous, i.e., as chronically unpro-
ductive and generally unemployable? Why should the relative surplus 
population be eradicated indirectly? What can be gained, and who bene-
fits (politically and economically) from an elimination of middleman 
minorities or otherwise situated economically integrated segments of a 
population in order to "solve" the relative surplus population problem? 
In a larger economic and political context, what could be the function of 
generating "vacancies" by eliminating groups that would not usually be 
called chronically unproductive or generally unemployable? Why is it 
that programmed and planned annihilation, historically speaking, seems 
to be directed more often against economically integrated non-wage labor 
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groups (such as middleman minorities) while wage laborers, the margin-
alized, and the poor of all ages seem to perish without explicit effort and 
intention on the part of the remaining society? 
The related idea that only intentional or planned massive destruction 
of human lives should be called genocide can also be a very difficult and, 
in our opinion, an inadequate notion. As such it has the tendency to 
gloss over structural violence which through various mechanisms can be 
equally as destructive of human life as many an intentional and planned 
program of annihilation. In addition, the presence of structural violence 
promotes the use of planned violence. The problem here lies not in the 
difficulty of demonstrating what intentionality means psychologically 
speaking, but rather in the neglect of those processes of destruction 
which, although massive, are so systematic and systemic, and that there-
fore appear so "normal" that most individuals involved at some level of 
the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical 
decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their actions. What 
prevents people from stepping outside of their particular situations and 
from reflecting upon the consequences of their actions or inactions? Has 
society, a product of human activity, become so objectified, so alien to 
its source, that its creators feel no part of its operation, feel no possibility 
of affecting its course of movement? Why is it that individuals do not 
seem to be able to reflect upon the processes that have made them 
anonymous actors, cogs in the system, and that have nudged many of 
them to participate in genocide? 
In a world that historically has moved from domination based pri-
marily on the will of given individuals (in the Middle Ages, for example) 
to one in which individuals are dominated by anonymous forces such as 
market mechanisms, bureaucracies, and distant decision making by com-
mittees and parliaments, the emphasis on intentionality almost appears 
anachronistic. To be sure, we are not suggesting that the individual actor 
qua actor, be it Eichmann, a Turkish nationalist, or a soldier sitting in a 
missile silo, is not responsible and should not be held accountable for his 
or her actions. Neither do we say that they would not be capable of 
making existential decisions. People do have a choice. Neither are we 
suggesting that a specific nation or group engaged in genocide is in-
volved in a process that has a degree of inevitability about it, hence 
mitigating the issue of accountability. Rather, we are pointing to the fact 
that in the modern age, the issue of intentionality on the societal level is 
harder to locate because of the anonymous and amorphous structural 
forces that dictate the character of our world. Technically speaking, 
individuals have a will and retain the capacity to use it, but how often is 
their agency the product of their will and intentions? Where in these 
market mechanisms and decision-making processes lies the origin of in-
tent, and whose intentions are being carried out? If, as a result of world-
wide market involvement and market pressures, slaves in the eighteenth 
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century began to be worked to death within some seven or eight years, 
down from a much longer life expectancy, where can the plan for this 
large-scale destruction of members of the black race be located? And 
why was there no serious reflection on the part of slaveholding society 
concerning the long-run economic consequences for the slave system as 
a whole, to say nothing of the humanitarian and moral considerations, 
dictated by the waste of such a cruel and seemingly "irrational" system? 
And where was the rest of the world? Ideology, racism, and the availa-
bility of surplus labor to exploit, be it in the American South or in the 
Nazi slave labor camps, are certainly operative and important factors, but 
they are only partial explanations. 
These are important questions since they force us to probe more 
deeply and fundamentally into the nature of social structures and sys-
tems. Aside from the presence or absence of intentions and plans, it 
must be investigated which forms of social organization are more likely 
to guarantee the preservation rather than the systematic destruction of 
lives through structural violence. Which forms of social organization 
also make it less likely for a massive genocide to occur? Along these 
lines it can be hypothesized that the less a society is permeated by 
structural violence, the lower will be the likelihood of genocide and mass 
destruction, for societies with lower levels of structural violence are also 
less likely to allow for planned large-scale genocide. The less individ-
uals' lives are ruled by anonymous forces, i.e., the less they are subject 
to structural violence of any kind, the less likely it is that they will 
become involved as perpetrators in an event of genocide. Conversely, in 
societies where all are perpetrated upon, all become perpetrators in one 
way or another. Therefore, freedom from structural violence and the 
anonymous forces that dominate modern man seems to be one pre-
condition for overcoming our age of genocide. For, if in history we 
have increasingly moved to more frequent and massive forms of 
genocide as anonymous and impersonal domination increased, it follows 
that, aside from personal domination and intentions, the structural domi-
nation -- that anonymous domination exerted by the character of an entire 
social system-would have to be reversed. Not necessarily eliminating 
genocide resulting from personal domination or the exercise of that 
power (by dictator, tyrant, king, tribal chieftain, for example), this 
reversal may contribute to the mitigation of the massive and frequent 
genocides that have been part of the landscape of modern human inter-
course. Making genocide by definition dependent on the existence of 
any intention and plan to destroy lives, therefore, seems historically and 
politically too limiting. 
What is required, then, is a greater degree of reflection upon and 
awareness of the anonymous societal forces that frame and propel our 
existence so that we can begin the arduous task of eliminating the struc-
tural violence that leads to domination, inequality, and the possibility of 
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genocide. Ultimately what seems to be needed is a society that can 
provide an equal access to power and resources for all with a minimum 
degree of personal or structural coercion. We are fully aware of the uto-
pian nature of our suggestions and recognize that such a world order 
may never be achieved. Nevertheless, we stress our conviction that ef-
forts in this direction must begin. We believe that the clarification of this 
predicament must be attempted so that the struggle to eliminate structural 
violence and domination can be initiated. Correct action requires under-
standing. Whatever progress is made in this pursuit, be it modest or 
radical, will contribute to diminishing the possibility that in the future we 
will engage in genocide, this most pernicious of anti-life-affirming 
behaviors. 
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PART I 
Conceptualizing, 
Classifying, Defining, and 
Explaining Genocide: 
Some Macro Perspectives 

1 
A TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk
INTRODUCTION
To begin with, such a title requires an explanation. Why would any-
one try to construct a typology of genocide? The great majority of 
serious studies that deal with genocide deal with a single case, usually 
the Holocaust, less often with the Armenians in Turkey, and very rarely 
with other cases. In doing a study of a single case no typology is re-
quired, either because the case is treated as a unique event, or because 
the argument involves the internal sequence of circumstances that led to 
the genocide. 
The need for some method of classification becomes apparent only 
when one is trying to deal with a large number of cases comparatively. 
In fact, in so doing one even becomes aware of the need for a rather 
rigorous and unambiguous definition; how else will one decide which 
cases belong in the study and which ones really represent a quite differ-
ent phenomenon and thus should not be included? But even after this 
first step has been taken, the question arises whether all of the cases that 
do meet the criteria of the definition should be considered as falling into 
one large group. This question tends to answer itself after some pre-
liminary work on some of the cases has been done. It is quickly appar-
We want to thank Norman Cohn, Helen Fein, Leo Kuper, and Anton 
Zijderveld for discussing our work on genocide with us, though they are not 
responsible for the contents of this chapter. An earlier version of this paper 
was presented at the Seventeenth World Congress of Philosophy, August 21-
27, 1983, held in Montreal, Canada. 
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ent that genocides occur in quite different societies, under vastly varying 
circumstances, confronting quite different people, and resulting in dra-
matically different outcomes. Thus, treating all such cases as if they rep-
resented an undifferentiated phenomenon seems unlikely to lead to the 
kinds of results that are the aim of scholarly research. What we need is 
to group together those cases that appear to have some crucial charac-
teristics in common. If we can fit all observed cases into one of several 
such classes, then we can talk about a process of classification, the end 
result of which will be a typology. 
The textbooks on research methods tell us that the classes in a typolo-
gy must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such a requirement is 
difficult enough to meet but is not sufficient. We are not interested in 
imposing on our data some typology for the sake of order and neatness. 
A typology is a tool of research; unless it can be used as a tool in the 
analysis of the data, it is merely a frill that looks elegant but leads neither 
to meaning nor to explanation. If our aim is to satisfy such require-
ments, then the question arises as to what to use as a basis of building a 
typology. It soon appears that typologies could be built around several 
criteria. Thus, one could look at minority-majority relations within a 
society as well as power relations between societies; one might classify 
genocides by the means employed as well as by the results achieved; or 
one could consider causes as well as intentions. No doubt other bases 
for developing a typology could be added. And good reasons for using 
any of these could probably be developed. The choice will depend on 
the kinds of questions we want to explore. But the answer is really 
based on a hunch about the nature of the research to be undertaken. The 
very word "research" tells us that we are entering the realm of the un-
known; if we knew the answers beforehand, we would not be searching 
for them. Thus, the adequacy of any particular typology can only be 
assessed in terms of the research results it helps to produce. 
The typology to be proposed here is based on the hunch that intent is 
one such crucial criterion. If a definable group of people was almost or 
wholly eliminated, but nobody intended this to occur, is this genocide? 
Some definitions of genocide do not include the intent of the perpetrator. 
However, the case made here is that such events, although equally 
regrettable, are not genocides and therefore should be called something 
else. This leaves us with the task of trying to classify the kinds of inten-
tions of the perpetrators and leads directly to a major difficulty: how 
does 9ne prove or inf er intent? 
One of the major reasons for engaging in the study of genocide from a 
historical and comparative perspective is to find out whether some kinds 
of societies are more likely to commit genocide than others. From this 
perspective, it seems that a typology based on intent might have a great 
deal of analytic utility. However, there are two problems with the cri-
terion of intent: first, it is rarely easy to get good evidence on conscious 
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intent and, second, intent may be either explicit or implicit. However, 
the criterion of intent seems so important, and other criteria for con-
structing a typology seem to yield so little analytic gold, that these diffi-
culties will simply have to be dealt with to the best of our ability. With 
these remarks in mind, the present chapter will discuss the need to ex-
amine events within the context in which they occurred, examine the 
reasons why genocidal events have been largely ignored in the literature 
until the middle of the twentieth century, and propose a typology of 
genocide. 
THE BRUTISHNESS OF THE PAST 
AND COLLECTIVE DENIAL 
Our study of genocide has forced us on many occasions to confront 
the brutishness of most human societies in the past and the changing 
value placed on human life. It was not very long ago that many human 
societies sacrificed human beings to propitiate the gods, to protect the 
living against their displeasure, and to reassert the corporate unity of so-
ciety. Human sacrifice existed throughout the ancient world, buttressed 
by religions that promised a good life in the afterworld to the sacrificial 
victim as well as the favor of the gods in this world for those who 
carried out the ritual slayings. The most recent discovery by archeolo-
gists excavating at Carthage of the remains of 6,000 inf ants sealed in 
individual sacrificial urns gives credence to the reports of commentators 
in the ancient world that the Carthaginian aristocracy gave its youngest 
sons to the priests for sacrifice to win the favor of the gods of war. In 
many societies human sacrifice continued until the society embraced an 
ethic that ennobled the individual in this world and adopted a code of be-
havior that placed this new ethic above the need to satisfy the grim appe-
tite of the old gods for human blood.1 Nigel Davies, who traces this 
change among the ancient Hebrews, credits them with transforming the 
"concept of life-giving ... into that of self-giving." He contends that 
once the ancient Hebrews came to see God as good and just, human 
sacrifice ceased entirely.2 
Yet even in those societies which abandoned human sacrifice, daily 
life was coarse and brutal for all but the very few. The great French his-
torian Fernand Braudel reminds us that famines and epidemics were so 
common that "they were incorporated into man's biological regime and 
built into his daily life."3 In Western Europe, which was favored by na-
ture, "famine only disappeared at the close of the eighteenth century, or 
even later. "4 Sixteenth-century European towns worked out elaborate 
stratagems to divert armies of starving peasants from their gates. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, France and England developed new 
institutions to control the poor displaced peasants who flocked to their 
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cities and to harness their labor. The physically fit poor of Paris were 
often chained together in pairs and forced to clean the drains, while the 
poor of London were held in poorhouses under the new authority of the 
Poor Laws and put to work at menial labor. Conditions for the mass of 
the people were even worse, according to Braudel, in China and India, 
where famines struck more frequently and with greater severity than in 
Europe. 
Peasants in Europe who reacted to their misery by stealing food or 
property felt the full vengeance of the law. Death or maiming were the 
usual penalties until the late Middle Ages. Medieval penalties for such 
crimes were codified in the German Empire in the Constitutio Criminalis 
Carolina of 1532, which was representative of European practice. After 
specifying such penalties as hanging in chains, beheading or burial alive, 
and impaling for the graver crimes, the Carolina takes up less serious 
crimes such as theft. For these offenses it "prescribes afflictive punish-
ments-flogging, pillorying, cutting off the ears, chopping off the fing-
ers, cutting out the tongue-usually accompanied by a sentence of ban-
ishment. "5 In Western Europe, following the enormous population 
losses of the Thirty Years' War and the start of the effort to populate 
overseas colonies, human life came to be more highly valued. In the 
mid-seventeenth century, England and France moderated their use of 
capital punishment in cases of crimes against property. 6 As the number 
of executions in England diminished, the English turned to the transpor-
tation of convicts to the colonies for terms of labor as indentured ser-
vants. 7 At the same time, France and other Mediterranean countries 
found it increasingly useful to sentence physically fit convicted felons to 
life sentences as oarsmen on naval galleys. (The argument in this para-
graph follows Langbein, chapter 2.) 
This coarseness and brutality of human existence throughout much of 
history was a subject that hardly ever appeared in the curricula of our 
schools. The good news was reported; the bad news was not. The 
great massacres of the past lay beyond the range of the telescopes de-
signed to focus upon evidence that justice always triumphed. In high 
school and university-level textbooks, Athens flourished, but the massa-
cre of the men of Melos was barely mentioned. The Romans destroyed 
Carthage and Corinth, but the fate of their peoples was not discussed. 
The authors of history textbooks hardly ever reported what the razing of 
an ancient city meant for its inhabitants. In other words, the fate of 
millions of human beings who died unnatural deaths as defenseless 
civilians was invisible. 
Our review of the history of mass extermination and its neglect has 
led us to the conclusion that until very recently scholars participated in a 
process of pervasive and self-imposed denial. Many factors entered into 
the process of collective denial. Throughout most of recorded time, it 
was the victors who wrote the history of their conquests, and even the 
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victims of mass extermination accepted their fate as a natural outcome of 
defeat. The idea of human rights is relatively new in Western society; 
even today, many parts of the world still emphasize duties more than 
rights. The Enlightenment tradition of viewing human beings as in-
herently good and rational also played a part in the denial, as did the rise 
of nationalism. The slaughter of people of other races, religions, and 
nationalities barely offended anyone's sensibilities. 
It took the shocks of the twentieth century to reverse the process of 
collective denial; the gap between practice and ideals simply became too 
great to support the intellectual foundations of such denial. The Jews 
who survived the Holocaust refused to accept meekly the Nazis' assault 
on their right to exist. They recorded their experiences for posterity. At 
the end of World War II, the victorious Allied powers tried and executed 
top Nazi leaders judged guilty of crimes against humanity, an action 
which created a new interest in the history of crimes against civilians. 
Parochialism and nationalism were undermined by the spread of the 
democratic ideal after the war and the increasing sophistication of the 
mass of the people that resulted from greater access to higher education. 
Increasingly, journalists in the West have cast themselves in the role of 
adversaries to the holders of power and as spokesmen for the underdog 
in national and international affairs. Emboldened by this freer, more 
sympathetic atmosphere, other victims of past exterminatory campaigns 
-the Ukrainians the Armenians, and the Gypsies-have begun to tell 
their stories. Ultimately, even scholars awakened to the paucity of 
studies examining and analyzing the phenomenon of mass extermination 
in history. 
A REVIEW THE LITERATURE
When we began our work on genocide in 1978, we could count on 
the fingers of one hand the number of scholars who had written 
comparatively about genocide. A small group of writers, taking up the 
challenge of Raphael Lemkin's work, contributed to this literature.s The 
pioneering scholarly study of genocide published by Lemkin in 1944, 
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, established a definition of genocide 
which laid out the approximate boundaries of the concept and identified a 
number of specific historical events within its perimeter. Lemkin defined 
genocide as the coordinated and planned destruction of a national, re-
ligious, racial, or ethnic group by different actions through the destruc-
tion of the essential foundations of the life of the group with the aim of 
annihilating it physically or culturally. What we call ethnocide was a 
form of genocide in Lemkin's all-inclusive definition. After the war, the 
French coined the term ethnocide to deal with the extermination of a 
culture that did not involve the physical extermination of its people. 9 
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Writing as news of the Nazis' depredations flowed in from Europe, 
Lemkin defined genocide to include attacks on political and social insti-
tutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of the group. Acts directed against individuals because they 
were also members of a group came within his definition of genocide. 
These included killing the members of the group or the destruction of 
their personal security, liberty, health, and dignity. 
Lemkin incorporated a three-part typology of genocide based on the 
intent of the perpetrator in The A.xis Rule in Occupied Europe. The aim 
of the first genocides-which he situated in antiquity and the Middle 
Ages-was a total or nearly total destruction of nations and groups. In 
the modem era, Lemkin argued, a second type of genocide emerged, 
involving the destruction of a culture without an attempt to physically 
annihilate its bearers. Nazi genocide comprised the third type of geno-
cide in Lemkin's analysis. It combined ancient and modem genocide in 
a hybrid version characterized by the Nazi strategy of selecting some 
peoples and groups for extermination in the gas chambers and others for 
ethnocidal assimilation and Germanization. What Lemkin did not realize 
was that twentieth-century genocide was increasingly becoming a case of 
the state physically liquidating a group of its own citizens. Had he paid 
more attention in his 1944 book to the case of the Armenian genocide of 
1915 or the genocide of the German Jews, this facet of modem genocide 
might have played a more prominent role in his analysis. 
Until the early 1970s, there was almost no scholarly comparative 
output on genocide. Since then, several authors have produced books 
and articles renewing serious theoretical discourse on the subject. Hervé
Savon's typology, which appeared in his book Du Cannibalisme au 
Genocide, consists of genocides of substitution, devastation, and elimi-
nation. These types of genocide take their meaning from the outcome of 
genocidal killings. 10 While Savon's work revived interest in the prob-
lem of genocide, his typology based on outcomes fails to illuminate the 
events leading up to the genocide and the possible methods of inter-
rupting the process. 
In 1976, Irving Louis Horowitz tackled the subject in a short volume 
titled Genocide which he revised and reissued in 1980 under the title 
Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power. As the new title suggests, 
Horowitz views genocide as a fundamental policy employed by the state 
to assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society. His 
discussion of the role of the state in genocide and his critique of the 
failure of modem social science to tackle the most pressing social issues 
of the day ring true. 
Horowitz devises a continuum of modem societies in which the level 
of state-induced repression of the right to dissent and to be different is 
the key variable. 11 This continuum ranges from genocidal societies at 
one extreme, through less repressive and more liberal societies, to per-
A Typology of Genocide 9 
missive societies at the other extreme. Horowitz' typology is based pri-
marily on twentieth-century cases. His approach focuses on outcomes 
and does little to explain the process whereby an authoritarian state 
resorts to genocide, nor does it account for pre-twentieth-century 
genocides. Moreover, as Horowitz himself admits, a typology based on 
internal repression cannot explain by itself those genocides conducted in 
foreign countries. 
Vahakn Dadrian, who followed Lemkin in emphasizing the intent of 
the perpetrator, published a somewhat confusing typology at about the 
same time that Horowitz' book appeared. He posits five types of geno-
cide: (1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator's aim; 
(2) latent genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended con-
sequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental 
spread of disease during an invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed 
to punish a segment of a minority which challenges a dominant group; 
(4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to obtain control of economic 
resources; and (5) optimal genocide, characterized by the slaughter of 
members of a group to achieve its total obliteration, as in the Armenian 
and Jewish holocausts. Dadrian's lumping together of intended and 
unintended genocide serves to weaken the rigor of his typology. It 
seems to us that Dadrian has blended together the motives of the per-
petrators, unintended outcomes, ethnocide, and non-genocidal massa-
cres.12 We learned a great deal from his discussion of the importance of 
perpetrator intent but have not been able to use his typology effectively in 
our work. 
Helen Fein included two thoughtful pages on types of genocide in her 
1979 book on the Holocaust, Accounting for Genocide.13 Before the 
rise of the nation-state, Fein argues, there were two types of genocide: 
genocides intended to eliminate members of another faith and genocides 
designed to exterminate other tribes because they could not be subdued 
or assimilated. In her view, the nation-state has given birth to three new 
types of genocide: in the first, the state commits mass extermination to 
legitimate its existence as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant 
group; in the second, the state kills to eliminate an aboriginal group 
blocking its expansion or development; and, in the third, the state reacts 
spontaneously to rebellion by totally eliminating the rebels. 
Understandably, there are omissions and gaps in Fein's typology, 
which is only incidental to her major task. She does not provide a place 
for mass exterminations intended to instill terror in others to facilitate 
conquest, or for mass killings to further economic enrichment. These 
are categories that we have found helpful in our work. 
Leo Kuper has contributed more to the comparative study of the over-
all problem of genocide than any scholar since Raphael Lemkin. In his 
1981 monograph on the subject, Kuper wrestles with the problems of 
genocidal process and motivation. His discussion of past genocides 
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clusters the motives of the perpetrator around three categories: (1) geno-
cides designed to resolve religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2) 
genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing em-
pire; and (3) genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideolo-
gy.14 Kuper is especially concerned with the increasing frequency of 
genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides occur 
within nation-states that have the character of plural societies, the 
creation of new plural societies during the period of colonization and 
decolonization becomes of particular significance for his analysis. 
Under the heading of "related atrocities," Kuper discusses two groups 
which are excluded under the U.N. definition of genocide. 15 These are 
the victims of mass political slaughter and attempts to decimate an eco-
nomic class. He examines three exterminations in this category: in 
Stalin's Russia, the decimation of the peasants, the Party elite, and the 
ethnic minorities; in Indonesia, the slaughter of Communists in 1965; 
and in Cambodia, the mass murders of the Kampuchean government led 
by the Khmer Rouge. Kuper concludes that each of these cases would 
have been labeled genocide if political groups had been protected by the 
U.N. Convention. 
In examining a large number of cases, Kuper insists on the need to 
refer to specific conditions in each case. He does not think that it is 
possible to write in general terms about the genocidal process. "The 
only valid approach would be to set up a typology of genocides" and to 
analyze the genocidal process in each type and under specific con-
ditions.16 
Kuper's book is the most useful contribution to the literature on 
genocide thus far, but we have two major problems with it. One, 
because he does not have a rigorous definition of genocide, he includes a 
number of cases in his discussion which have no salient characteristics in 
common. This is a serious handicap in attempting a comparative study 
of genocide. Although Kuper is aware of this problem, instead of 
excluding certain cases of large-scale killing, he includes them under the 
category of genocidal massacre and related atrocities. Two, in his analy-
sis, he treats plural societies as particularly vulnerable to genocide. We 
think that the plural character of a society is at best an intervening 
variable. It is new states or new regimes attempting to impose con-
formity to a new ideology that are particularly likely to practice genocide. 
When tensions between the traditional society and the new regime 
escalate, it is the plural character of a society which is most likely to 
provide the social cleavages that define the perpetrator and victim 
groups. 
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A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
In order to distinguish genocide from the various misfortunes that 
befall people, it is important to include the criterion of planning and 
intent to destroy in its definition. The most widely accepted definition of 
genocide is that contained in the 1948 United Nations Convention on 
Genocide: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental hann to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.17 
While this definition certainly does include the criterion of intent, it does 
not cover the extermination of political and economic groups-an exclu-
sion made necessary in order to assure the passage of the Convention. 
In our own work, we have broadened the United Nations definition to 
include political and economic groups. 
We propose to use this amended United Nations definition in our 
work although it has serious shortcomings: it does not adequately define 
the victim groups; it includes acts which we would consider ethnocide 
rather than genocide; and it obfuscates the distinction between geno-
cides, massacres, and wartime casualties. However, since this definition 
is the most widely known one and since no better definition has been 
devised, we shall use it for the time being. But in our usage, we shall 
exclude those killings which are not the deliberate physical extermination 
of a defenseless group, in whole or in part. 
In devising a typology of genocide, we had no difficulty in deciding 
that it should be based on intent, but the actual categories posed a much 
harder problem. We have tried a number of typologies only to discard 
them later. When we examined actual cases, it turned out that almost all 
of them could fit into more than one category and thus required decisions 
as to what should be considered the dominant intent. The present 
typology is offered as a heuristic device and not as a final product. It 
may well be modified as a result of our own further research or in re-
sponse to such critiques as interested readers are prepared to contribute. 
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We have classified genocides in terms of those committed (1) to elimi-
nate the threat of a rival; (2) to acquire economic wealth; (3) to create 
terror and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology. In look-
ing at actual cases, the motives tend to be more complex than such a 
relatively simple scheme allows for; therefore, we have assigned cases 
to one of these types on the basis of what we consider to have been the 
dominant intent of the perpetrator. 
We do not know when the first genocide occurred. It seems unlikely 
that early man engaged in genocide during the hunting and gathering 
stage. While we have no direct evidence, this seems a reasonable as-
sumption because men lived in quite small groups and overall population 
densities were extremely low (1 per 10 km 2 of habitable terrain accord-
ing to the estimates ofMcEvedy and Jones).18 
After the discovery of agriculture, the world divided into nomads and 
settlers. This marked the start of systematic conflict in the form of food 
raiding by the nomads. The nomads quickly learned to raid their settled 
neighbors at harvest time for their food stores; however, they had no 
interest in exterminating them because they planned to repeat their raids 
in subsequent years. The settlers may have had much better reason to do 
away with the nomads, but they had neither the means nor the skills to 
do so. 
As the settlers improved their agricultural techniques and produced 
significant surpluses, they were able to support cities, rulers, and ar-
mies. They accumulated wealth and engaged in significant trade. With 
these developments, the scene changed dramatically. Conflicts arose 
over wealth, trade, and trade routes. Wars were fought over the access 
to wealth and over the control of transportation networks (to use a 
modem term). At first, these conflicts were probably in the nature of 
brigandage and robbery. Soon they escalated to wars between city-
states. However, these warring peoples soon discovered that their vic-
tories were mostly temporary: the defeated peoples withdrew long 
enough to rebuild their resources and their armies, and then tried to re-
coup their losses and to avenge their defeat. This pattern became so 
common that it soon appeared that the only way to assure a stable future 
was to eliminate the defeated enemy once and for all. People that were 
not killed during or after the battle were sold into slavery and dispersed. 
This elimination of a potential future threat appears to be the reason for 
the first genocides in history. 
Genocides of this first type seem to have been common throughout 
antiquity, especially in the Middle East, where trade routes between 
Asia, Africa, and Europe crossed. The Assyrians were expert practi-
tioners; about a number of the peoples whom they vanquished we know 
little more than their names.19 When the empire of the Hittites was 
destroyed, it was done so efficiently that not even the location of their 
capital was known until an inspired German archeologist unearthed it 
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almost by accident in the nineteenth century.20 Perhaps the best-known 
example of this type of genocide is the destruction of Carthage.21 The 
so-called Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome lasted well over a 
century (264-146 B.C.) and were fought mostly over the control of the 
Mediterranean trade and economy. These wars were incredibly costly in 
terms of material and lives, even by modern standards. After Rome just 
barely won the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), it decided that 
Carthage had to be eliminated once and for all. Those who were not 
killed in the Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) were sold into slavery, and 
the city was destroyed. Looking at the available evidence from an-
tiquity, one might even develop a hypothesis that most wars at that time 
were genocidal in character. 
The evidence from antiquity is often contradictory, ambiguous, or 
missing. Such evidence as we have consists almost exclusively of 
written materials that were produced either by the victims or by the per-
petrators; in those rare cases where we have accounts from both sides, 
they tend not to confirm each other's evidence. It may well be that as yet 
undiscovered evidence will shed new light on how and why entire 
peoples have disappeared. Such disappearances in themselves are not 
evidence of genocide because they may have been due to a variety of 
processes, from migration to assimilation. However, if we should ever 
develop an archeology of genocide, we may acquire more conclusive 
proof of what happened to the populations of cities that were destroyed 
and to whole peoples that have disappeared. One case illustrating such 
possibilities is the extermination, reported by Iranian historians, of 
whole populations by the Mongols under Genghis Kahn; these reports 
were thought to be exaggerated because they originated from the victims. 
They gained renewed credibility, however, when archeologists un-
earthed the pyramids of skulls that Iranian historians had described. 22 
The second type of genocide is one committed primarily to acquire 
economic wealth. It probably also originated in antiquity. People look-
ing for greater wealth than their own territory could provide found it in 
the possession of others. When such wealth was in the form of fertile 
land and other primary resources, it could not be carried off as loot, but 
could only be acquired by occupying the land and enslaving and/or exter-
minating the indigenous population. This type of genocide has con-
tinued to occur throughout history up to the present day. It has often 
been associated with colonial expansion and the discovery and settlement 
of new parts of the world. The Tasmanians23 disappeared in the same 
way that some of the peoples of the interior of Brazil are disappearing 
today.24 
The third type of genocide is a somewhat later invention and was 
associated with the building and maintaining of empire. To conquer 
others and to keep them subjugated requires large armies and a perma-
nent investment in a large occupying force. Genghis Khan probably 
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deserves credit for realizing that the creation of terror is far more efficient 
as well as more effective.25 He offered his prospective conquests the 
choice of submitting or of being exterminated. If they did not submit, 
the threat was ruthlessly carried out. Although there were never more 
than about 1 million Mongols, using these methods Genghis Khan was 
able to establish an empire that comprised most of the then known world 
from China to Central Europe. 
These three types of genocide have largely disappeared from history 
for the simple reason that modem states have become so large that it is 
no longer possible for the victor to exterminate the defeated enemy. 
They persist, particularly genocides committed for economic reasons, 
only in cases where the victim population consists of a relatively small 
tribe living in relative isolation. In the twentieth century, several such 
cases have been reported in South America. 
The fourth type of genocide is quite different from the first three and 
is also of much more recent origin. It is based on the implementation of 
a belief, a theory, or an ideology. When conformity is enforced by 
church or state, deviation from the dominating belief system is, in ex-
treme cases, punished by extermination. It is in this fourth type of 
genocide that the definition of the group becomes problematic because 
the victim group is defined by the perpetrator; since the perpetrator's 
definition is derived from his belief, theory, or ideology, the group may 
be a real one or it may be a pseudo-group that has no existence outside 
the perpetrator's particular conceptual framework. Similarly, the devia-
tion that the victim group is accused of may be real or it may be imagi-
nary, taking the form of a pseudo-conspiracy or an imagined social pol-
lution which threatens the survival of the regime, the state, or the church. 
The combination of these two variables, the group and what it is 
accused of, leads to the following four sub-types: 
In the first sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are real. 
Thus, the victims of the Albigensian Crusade were a real group of 
heretics who were accused by the Papacy of a real deviation-the Cathar 
Heresy. 
In the second sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are 
inventions of the perpetrator. The first occurrence of this phenomenon 
was the Great Witch-Hunt of the Middle Ages. We consider this a case 
of genocidal massacre rather than genocide; however, it is instructive 
because today we would all agree that there were no covens of witches 
flying to meetings with the Devil on the tops of mountains, that there 
were no pacts with the Devil to overthrow Christendom, and that no 
witch ever had intercourse with the Devil. Although neither the groups 
nor the accusations of conspiracy had a basis in reality, their horrible 
consequences were real enough. Accused witches were tortured to ex-
tract confessions on the basis of which they were then burned at the 
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stake. (We are fortunate that in the twentieth century a nation-state's 
belief in the Devil seems to decrease with the increase in its national 
debt).26 
In the third sub-type, a real group is falsely accused of conspiracy. 
The Turkish genocide against the Armenians in 1915 illustrates this type. 
In contrast to the demonic witches, the Armenian people were a real 
group, based on a common language and religion many centuries old. 
But the Turkish charges of conspiracy against the state were wildly exag-
gerated. While there certainly were Armenian separatist organizations 
who cooperated with the Russians during World War I, their supporters 
were few and their ability to influence events was small. Yet the Turkish 
government attacked virtually the entire Armenian population when it 
launched its deportation and killing operations. 
In the fourth sub-type, a pseudo-group is accused of a real con-
spiracy. This would be the case where the state had evidence of a real 
opposition without being able to identify its members. It might then 
accuse a pseudo-group and victimize it because its members are already 
unpopular with the regime. This is a form of scapegoating that is well 
known in other contexts. Such a pseudo-group can then be identified 
only through the definition imposed on it by the perpetrator. While such 
victimization does occur frequently enough, we can think of no actual 
case that has reached genocidal proportions. 
Genocide associated with the implementation of a belief, a theory, or 
an ideology-our fourth type-had its origins in the Middle Ages but 
has become much more frequent in the twentieth century. The rising 
importance of theories and ideologies has produced a revival of accusa-
tions of pseudo-conspiracies which has resulted in much more frequent 
persecutions of real and pseudo-groups; some of these have resulted in 
horrible genocides and genocidal massacres. We are only too familiar 
with the horrors committed in Ottoman Turkey,27 in Stalin's Russia,28 
and in Hitler's Germany.29 One of the things that is different about this 
fourth type of genocide is its result for the perpetrator: For the first 
three types, it can be argued that genocide produced tangible benefits for 
the perpetrators; in the case of the fourth type, it seems clear that 
genocide was carried out in spite of tremendous costs to the perpetrators, 
costs that can be measured in economic, political, and developmental 
terms. 
A NOTE ON METHODS
The definition of concepts and the design of a typology are an 
essential part of any research enterprise. However, they are essential 
only in making sense of the data. In the study of genocide, the data 
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present a set of particularly difficult problems. This is not the place for 
exploring these problems in detail. However, four kinds of problems 
should be mentioned that make such study especially difficult: 
1. The evidence is by its very nature difficult to obtain because throughout 
most of history relevant records either were not kept or did not survive; 
2. Where records do exist, they either originate with the perpetrators or with 
the victims, but rarely do we find records from both; 
3. When we do have records from the perpetrators and the victims, they are 
often so divergent that it is difficult to decide what actually did occur, and 
the intentions of the perpetrator may be the most difficult evidence to 
discover; and 
4. The reliability of the records presents another problem, especially in the 
premodem period. Thus, we have evidence for genocides that occurred 
but were not reported; but we also have those that were reported but never 
occurred. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
In our century, the increasing prevalence of the conditions leading to 
type four genocide is becoming a matter of serious concern to those of us 
who care about human rights. If we look at societies from Horowitz' 
perspective, then we must ask how they deal with deviance and non-
conformity. It seems to us that the crucial dimension in a society's 
handling of deviants is the way it defines and maintains their member-
ship in the society itself. This is not a purely conceptual distinction, 
because it has wide-ranging consequences not only for the victims but 
also for the way the world responds to the victims and the perpetrators. 
Insofar as a given society responds to its deviants and dissenters with 
something other than tolerance and permissiveness, the first question to 
be asked is whether such groups are defined as continuing members of 
the society or whether they are deprived of such membership. Loss of 
membership can be implemented in only two ways, that is, by deporta-
tion or by extermination. Any other form of repression or punishment 
implicitly acknowledges the victim's continuing membership. 
Torture and harassment are ways of physically punishing "deviant" 
groups and individuals. But punishment is incidental to intimidating and 
terrorizing the rest of society: when victims remain at large or eventually 
rejoin their erstwhile groups, their membership in society remains 
unquestioned precisely because they are intended to serve as a dire warn-
ing to other actual or potential "deviants." It is also precisely because 
they have retained their membership and their citizenship that it is pos-
sible to take action on their behalf under various human rights legis-
lations and conventions. 
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Deportation and extermination pose a different problem. In the case 
of deportation, the victims may be helped by being granted a new mem-
bership status and the associated civic rights in another society that is 
willing to welcome them. However, in the case of extermination 
assistance is, by definition, too late to help the victims. Thus, in these 
cases any meaningful action would have to address the search for 
methods of early warning and prevention. Such a search faces daunting 
problems of theory and practice. Prediction and early warning of mass 
exterminations and deportations have barely been raised as a theoretical 
problem, and a great deal of work remains to be done before any such 
prediction can be made with some assurance of correctness. But even 
after such theoretical problems are solved, there still remains the practical 
problem of the sovereignty of the perpetrator. The history of the United 
Nations, with all of its conventions, stands as mute testimony to the 
discouragement of those of us who still believe in the worth and dignity 
of all human beings. 
Against this background, it is understandable that human rights 
activism addresses itself to torture and harassment much more than to 
deportation and extermination. With respect to torture and harassment, 
much more is known about help for the victims and the possibility of 
prevention. Success, when achieved or seen as attainable, reinforces 
further activism. No such encouragement seems to be available to those 
concerned with genocide and deportation. While mass deportations 
seem to be decreasing due to growing populations which are too large to 
transport, the spread of the nation-state, and the disappearance of rela-
tively empty territories, genocides in the twentieth century seem to have 
been increasing in number and in scope. (To cite just one example, 
while it was possible for England, France, Spain, and Portugal to expel 
the Jews at different times, it was not possible for Hitler to expel the 
millions of Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories.) 
In discussing the persecution and extermination of individuals and 
groups, it is important to remember the distinction between theory and 
practice. Many countries have declared judicial torture to be illegal; an 
even larger number of countries have signed the United Nations Conven-
tion on Genocide. Yet this has clearly not meant that either practice has 
disappeared or even diminished. There is a huge gap between decla-
rations of good intentions and their application and realization. 
The twentieth century has seen a tremendous increase of new states, 
the majority of which are ruled by one-party totalitarian or military re-
gimes. Totalitarian or military regimes usually have to deal with dissent-
ing groups, which leads inevitably to various forms of repression and 
persecution, and, with increasing frequency, to genocidal massacres and 
to outright genocide.30 Such states are particularly prone to engage in 
what we have called type four genocides, that is, genocides based on the 
implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology. 
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Individual activists and protest groups, assisted by several inter-
national conventions on human rights, have learned a great deal about the 
various ways of assisting the victims of persecution in different coun-
tries. Such help, while not always successful, is usually initiated by 
specific reports of incarceration and torture while the victims are alive. 
Similar reports of killings and genocides do not elicit the same kind of 
action for the obvious reason that the victims are already beyond help. 
Why are human rights efforts not more successful? The first reason 
is that the very notion of human rights is foreign to most cultures of the 
world. It is often seen as another Western export that is being imposed 
on the rest of the world from outside. Implementation of human rights 
legislation is possible only in a democratic regime based on the rule of 
law. Where military and/or totalitarian regimes are in power, the whole 
notion of human rights is a contradiction in terms. The second reason is 
that the nation-state is both the guardian and the violator of human rights. 
Therefore, action from within is either impossible or fruitless, and action 
from without conflicts with the much too widely accepted definition of 
sovereignty. A further consequence of military and authoritarian regimes 
is that they can control access to and distribution of information, with the 
result that violations may not even become known or that proof may not 
be accessible. The third reason is that international bodies and inter-
national agreements, largely supported by the West, continue to exist 
mostly for symbolic reasons. Their continued existence is dependent 
upon the degree to which they serve the interests of all sides. However, 
their efficacy will remain largely symbolic because no supra-national 
body exists that can enforce their terms. The participants are sovereign 
nations that will not accept any diminution of their sovereignty, es-
pecially when they are also the offenders. 
For these reasons, human rights actions will have to continue to rely 
on publicity and on shaming campaigns, where these are successful. In 
addition, their mission should be to spread the ideology of human rights 
and to encourage and support research into the conditions and situations 
which seem to increase or decrease the probability of human rights 
violations in various countries. 
Any worthwhile activism with regard to genocide will have to be 
radically different from other human rights efforts. In order to be of help 
to the potential victims, it will have to focus solely on prevention. Theo 
van Boven, the former Director of the United Nations Division of 
Human Rights, has recently made a similar plea with regard to political 
assassinations and extra-judicial executions. However, in order to pre-
vent such lethal crimes, we would have to be able to predict their occur-
rence-something that our present state of knowledge does not yet 
permit. Thus, any efforts at preventing future genocides will have to 
start with the kind of research capable of yielding predictive indicators 
that would then allow concerted efforts at prevention; in addition, re-
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search will be needed to uncover those conditions and techniques of 
external pressure that are likely to be the most effective means of pre-
vention. 
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HUMAN  DESTRUCTIVENESS
AND POLITICS:
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS 
AN AGE OF GENOCIDE 
Roger W. Smith 
We can no longer choose our problems; they choose us. 
Albert Camus 
Genocide has existed in all periods of human history, but prior to the 
contemporary period it was rare except as an aspect of war, or, in the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, as an aspect of development. To a 
large extent genocide also appeared in a form specific to a given period 
--conquest, religious persecution, colonial domination. In the twentieth 
century, however, genocide has been a common occurrence; moreover, 
the forms it has taken are diverse and spring from different motives: 
there has been a convergence of destructive forces in our period. 
Camus called the twentieth century an age of murder, but it is, more 
precisely, an age of politically sanctioned mass murder, of collective, 
premeditated death intended to serve the ends of the state. It is an age of 
genocide in which 60 million men, women, and children, coming from 
many different races, religions, ethnic groups, nationalities, and social 
classes, and living in many different countries, on most of the continents 
of the earth, have had their lives taken because the state thought this 
desirable. Such an age should perhaps be condemned out of hand, but it 
must also be understood: for we have to live as well as die in that world, 
and, to be realistic, a great many persons alive today have contributed to 
that genocide, mainly through passivity, but often through more active 
involvement. 
There have been other ages of genocide-Assyria engaged in geno-
cide almost annually for several hundred years and turned deportation 
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and forced labor into routine instruments of public policy, and millions 
of lives were taken in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in the name 
of progress. Yet there are unique aspects to genocide in the twentieth 
century-the scale, the range of victims, the technology, the variety of 
genocidal forms, even the motives-that set it apart from earlier ages of 
human destructiveness. It is these that this chapter will explore, but 
without neglecting elements of repetition and continuity in the politics of 
death. 
I 
Genocidal precedents exert pressure, yet each occurrence of genocide 
is separate: the specific victims, perpetrators, motives, methods, and 
consequences differ. Nevertheless, each genocide is related to all others 
in certain ways. Genocide must be legitimated by tradition, culture, or 
ideology; sanctions for mass murder must be given by those in authority; 
the forces of destruction have to be mobilized and directed; and the 
whole process has to be rationalized so that it makes sense to the perpe-
trators and their accomplices.1 Victims, however else they may differ, 
will be vulnerable to attack and will be perceived as lying outside the 
universe of moral obligation. They will be dehumanized: "Cargo, cargo" 
is the way Franz Stangl described his victims at Treblinka; "Guayaki," a 
term meaning "rabid rat," is how the Paraguayans refer to the Aché 
Indians. 2 They will be viewed not as individuals but only as members 
of a despised group, blamed for their own destruction, and held account-
able in terms of the ancient notion of collective and ineradicable guilt. 
Then, too, there is the ever present cruelty; this must be discussed at 
greater length, however, since it is often either ignored or misunder-
stood. 
One is tempted to say that in the contemporary period genocide is a 
crime of logic, whereas in earlier ages it was a crime of passion. But 
this would distort both the present and the past: much gratuitous cruelty 
accompanies genocide today, and most of the genocide from the twelfth 
century B.C. forward has been premeditated, a rational instrument to 
achieve an end. What is proper, though, is to recognize that because 
much contemporary genocide aims at the total elimination of a group, 
which even with modern means of destruction takes time, sheer passion 
is not likely to sustain the participants beyond the initial destruction.3 
Thus, the fabricators of genocide today have created the image of an 
"ideal killer": the "dispassionate, efficient killer, engaged in systematic 
slaughter, in the service of a higher cause. "4 Nevertheless, all genocide, 
over and above the actual killing of persons, appears to contain a large 
measure of cruelty. Not all of this is gratuitous, however. Some of it in 
earlier society stemmed from the sheer exhilaration of power that accom-
panied destruction, or was calculated to create terror or to exact retribu-
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tion; more recently (though this also occurred in earlier societies), some 
cruelty has been ritualistic, expressive of good triumphing over evil, as 
in the slaying of the Indonesian Communists. 5 In many respects, then, 
the brutality that accompanies genocide is culturally patterned. In more 
modem, secular cultures, however, there is little or no support for tor-
ture, as opposed to the taking of lives, yet much sadistic behavior still 
occurs. Here the cruelty can perhaps be understood as the dehumani-
zation-loss of compassion, psychic numbing, detachment-that results 
from the prolonged participation in mass slaughter. 6 But however one is 
to explain it, cruelty is everywhere the twin-not the father--of 
genocide. 
There is another element that is found in many genocides, though 
there are important exceptions in earlier ages: the refusal to accept re-
sponsibility for one's acts. The refrain is familiar: we knew nothing, 
we only obeyed orders, it was God's will, we were defending our-
selves, they had it coming. On the other hand, while most twentieth-
century genocide has been preceded by crisis or great frustration, this 
seems not to be the case historically, except perhaps where religious 
genocide has occurred. Indeed, the relationship between crisis and 
genocide is almost the opposite of what some scholars have taken it to 
be.7 And even in the twentieth century, crisis has not always existed: 
the Indians of Paraguay, Brazil, and Peru, for example, have been 
destroyed out of cold calculation of gain (and in some cases, sadistic 
pleasure) rather than as the result of economic or political crisis. While 
context and situation are. important, genocide is never an accidental 
feature of society. 
II 
Genocide is almost always a premeditated act calculated to achieve the 
ends of its perpetrators through mass murder. Sometimes, however, 
genocidal consequences precede any conscious decision to destroy inno-
cent groups to satisfy one's aims. This is most often the case in the early 
phases of colonial domination, where through violence, disease, and 
relentless pressure indigenous peoples are pushed toward extinction. 
With the recognition of the consequences of one's acts, however, the 
issue is changed: to persist is to intend the death of a people. This pat-
tern of pressure, recognition, and persistence is typically what happened 
in the nineteenth century. Today, however, when indigenous groups 
come under pressure, the intention to destroy them is present from the 
outset; there are few illusions about the likely outcome. The distinction, 
then, between premeditated and unpremeditated genocide is not decisive, 
for sooner or later the genocidal is transformed into genocide. 
Rather than being simply an expression of passion, genocide is a 
rational instrument to achieve an end. While these ends have varied from 
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perpetrator to perpetrator and, to a large extent, by historical period, they 
have typically included the following: revenge, conquest, gain, power, 
and purification/salvation. From these we can construct a grammar of 
motives which, in effect, asks the perpetrator: What are you trying to do 
and why is it so important that you are willing to sacrifice thousands, 
even millions of lives (including those of children) to achieve it? For-
mal, but nevertheless useful, answers to these questions are contained in 
the different types of genocide, arranged in terms of the grammar of mo-
tives. Classified in this manner, the pure types of genocide are retribu-
tive, institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic, and ideological.s 
Retributive Genocide 
Retribution may play a role in all genocide, but it does so mainly as a 
rationalization: it is a way of blaming the victim. Though it draws from 
the vocabulary of justice and of judicially administered punishment, 
genocide destroys persons most often for what they are rather than for 
anything they have done. In this sense, retribution flows from the de-
humanization that has been fastened to the victims before they are at-
tacked. As a principal motive in genocide, retribution is rare, but it does 
seem to figure prominently in accounts of conquerors like Chingis-khan 
(Genghis Khan).9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the "Con-
queror of the World," as he called himself, differed in his actions when 
inspired by revenge than he and others did when they engaged in the 
institutional genocide associated with warfare until about the fifteenth 
century. 
Institutional Genocide 
Institutional genocide was the major source of politically sanctioned 
mass murder in the ancient and medieval worlds. The massacre of men, 
the enslavement of women and children, and, often, the razing of towns 
and the destruction of the surrounding countryside, were universal as-
pects of conquest: genocide was embedded in the very notion of war-
fare.10 As such, no explicit decision had to be made to commit genocide 
-it had become routinized. In part, institutional genocide was moti-
vated by the desire to create terror, to display one's power, and to 
remove the possibility of future retaliation. But it was also due to a 
failure of political imagination: genocide was a substitute for politics. 
Instead of ruling a city or territory, extracting tribute from it, and perhaps 
even incorporating it into one's own system of power and authority, the 
society was devastated. By the late medieval period this practice had 
largely ended in the West (indeed, it had begun to change with the 
Romans, who understood that only through politics could one build an 
empire), yet it became a prominent part of the Crusades and was made all 
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the more deadly because of religious passion.11 In any case, institu-
tional genocide continued in the East with figures like Timur Lenk until 
the fifteenth century. For some 500 years thereafter, the genocide of 
conquest disappeared. It is possible, however, that both guerrilla war-
fare and the use of nuclear weapons signify a revival of this early form 
of genocide. If the means are different, the motives seem not that 
dissimilar, and the consequences include both widespread devastation 
and the massive taking of innocent life by those in authority. 
Utilitarian Genocide 
If utility played a role in institutional genocide, it became particularly 
prominent in the genocide of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
when colonial domination and exploitation of indigenous peoples in the 
Americas, Australia, Tasmania, parts of Africa, and elsewhere became 
pronounced. It has continued in the twentieth century, especially in 
Latin America, where Indians have been subjected to genocidal attacks in 
the name of progress and development. Apart from the more sadistic 
aspects of this kind of destruction, the object has been Indian land-for 
the timber it contains, the minerals that can be extracted, and the cattle it 
can feed-and, at the turn of the century, Indian labor to harvest, under 
conditions of forced labor, the sap of the rubber tree.12 
Richard Rubenstein has recently argued that development leads to a 
population "surplus," which in turn leads to programs to eliminate the 
superfluous population.13 What is happening with the remaining indige-
nous population of Latin America, and what was the fate of millions in 
various areas of the world earlier, has nothing, however, to do with a 
surplus population (whatever that is, for Rubenstein never defines his 
basic term). They are being killed, were killed, because of a combina-
tion of ethnocentrism and simple greed. The basic proposition contained 
in utilitarian genocide is that some persons must die so that others can 
live well. If that proposition no longer claims a large number of lives, it 
is because the previous genocide was so effective and the remaining 
tribes so small, with at most a few thousand members each. Yet pre-
cisely because of the tenacity of the assaults against them, and the small 
size of the groups, utilitarian genocide, although somewhat rare in the 
twentieth century, tends to be total. 
Monopolistic Genocide 
Most genocide prior to the twentieth century was external-it was 
exacted of groups that lived outside one's territorial boundaries. There 
are some important exceptions-most of which are connected with reli-
gious persecution-but for the most part genocide was directed outward: 
its goals were conquest and colonial exploitation. Today almost all 
26 Roger W. Smith
genocide is domestic-groups within one's borders are destroyed. 
Again there are exceptions-Hitler committed both domestic and external 
genocide-but most examples of genocide in the twentieth century have 
been directed inward. Issues that were not at stake in external genocide 
are central today: who belongs, who is to have a voice in the society, 
what is to be the basic shape of the community, what should its purposes 
be? 
While these questions obviously lend themselves to ideological solu-
tions, the genocide that has emerged as a means of shaping the basic 
structure and design of the state and society has been more inclusive than 
that. Examples of such attempts come from those that are ideologically 
motivated (Cambodia), those that are not (Pakistan), and those that com-
bine elements of both (Armenia). In fact, whatever the shape of the 
regime, the most frequent source of genocide in the twentieth century has 
been the struggle for the monopolization of power. While issues of 
international dominance, of the distribution of power, of who rules can 
be raised in any political system, they have been crucial to conflicts that 
have emerged in Pakistan, Burundi, Nigeria, and other societies that 
have pervasive cleavages between racial, religious, and ethnic groups. 
These plural societies are in large part a legacy of nineteenth-century 
colonialism, but their genocidal struggles take place today within the 
framework of self-determination.14 Having been subjected to colonial 
exploitation and genocide, these societies now butcher themselves. 
Ideological Genocide 
Most genocide in the twentieth century has not been ideological but, 
where it has, the results have been catastrophic: ideology under modern 
conditions tends toward holocaust.15 Most genocide in the past was also 
not ideological: it was an instrument not for the restructuring of society 
according to some blueprint of the mind, but for gaining, on the ideal 
plane, revenge, and on the more tangible one, booty, women, territory, 
public slaves, or the exploitation of "native" labor and resources. 
Ideology, in the form of religion, did contribute to human destructive-
ness-it provided rationalization to the Spanish for conquering and 
enslaving Indians, it formed the background for repeated attacks on 
Jews, and was one, but only one, ingredient in the so-called wars of 
religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, 
the Inquisition, which is sometimes cited as an example of genocide, 
was nothing of the kind: cruel as it was, the Inquisition took the form of 
a judicial inquiry, with those suspected of either heresy or of insincere 
belief receiving scrutiny; those convicted (and not all were) were burned 
en masse, but they were tried as individuals.16 Nevertheless, some 
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genocide before the twentieth century certainly was ideological: the 
destruction of unholy cities in ancient Israel and of the Albigensians in 
the thirteenth century. The Crusades also to some extent had a religious 
basis, though many other elements (political ambition, desire for material 
acquisitions) became entangled in it In all these cases, however, the aim 
was essentially conservative: genocide was used to protect and defend a 
particular religious faith, not as contemporary ideology is, to transform 
society. With us the attempt has been to eradicate whole races, classes, 
and ethnic groups-whatever the particular ideology specifies-in order 
to produce a brave new world free of offensive human material. 
At the heart of contemporary ideology is what Camus called a "meta-
physical revolt" against the very conditions of human existence: plurali-
ty, mortality, finitude, and spontaneity.17 It is, as it were, an attempt to 
re-establish the Creation, providing for an order, justice, and humanity 
that are thought to be lacking. At the same time that it strives for a kind 
of salvation, it is often motivated by a profound desire to eliminate all 
that it perceives as being impure-be it race, class, or even, in the case 
of the Khmer Rouge, cities. The revolt is metaphysical, but it is also 
deeply moral in an ancient way: the rejection of the unclean, the fear of 
contamination. How else explain the constant references in Nazism to 
purification and the Cambodian references to the cleansing of the people? 
When one attempts to bring about a "perfect" society, much of the hu-
man material must be jettisoned; and since humans are going to be killed 
for what they are rather than for what they have done, the most primi-
tive, but still basic, moral category surfaces, that of the unclean, the im-
pure. Indeed, one contemporary philosopher suggests that the "dread of 
the impure and rites of purification are in the background of all our feel-
ings and all our behavior relating to fault. "18 When defilement is under-
stood ideologically, it is literally true, as Paul Ricoeur notes in a different 
context, that "we enter into the reign of Terror." 19 Yet it is possible to 
substitute one symbol of evil for another; in the Soviet Union the idea of 
guilt, especially the objective guilt of class origins, assumes the role 
played elsewhere by defilement. At bottom, ideology turns politics into 
a variety of the sacred. Yet holocausts are born, not in the name of God, 
but of biology, history, and peasant simplicity. 
Tendencies, however, are not necessarily results; holocaust is not a 
matter of deduction. Ideology seldom exists in a pure form: its rela-
tionship to culture is of particular importance. Does the culture reinforce 
the ideology, as in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, or does it come 
into conflict with it, as in Italy and Cuba? That culture can humanize and 
restrain ideology gives hope; that it does not always succeed and may 
even buttress ideology is part of the contemporary uncertainty about the 
future of genocide in its most extreme form, holocaust. 
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III 
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A recent study of genocide begins with this statement: "The word is 
new, the crime ancient." This should read, "The word is new, the 
phenomenon ancient," for while the slaughter of whole groups has 
occurred throughout history, it is only within the past few centuries that 
this has produced even a sense of moral horror, much less been thought 
of as "criminal." Indeed, from ancient times to well into the sixteenth 
century, genocide was not something that men were ashamed of, felt 
guilt for, or tried to hide; it was open and acknowledged. Massacre, 
deportation, forced labor, the transfer of children from one group to 
another, torture-all are laid out in the Bible, in the official records and 
monuments of empires, in epic and dramatic poetry, in histories and 
memoirs. The early Hebrews, the Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans, the 
Church with its heretics, the Crusaders, the Mongols, and the Spanish in 
America-each went to great lengths to leave public records of their acts 
of human destructiveness. Some went further-they boasted of the 
number of persons killed, the amount of booty gained, the prisoners 
deported for forced labor, the terror their attacks had inspired.20 In 
Assyria public festivals were held in celebration of the destruction of yet 
another people, with prisoners slaughtered as an offering to the gods. 
Stelae, bas-reliefs, obelisks, monuments of every sort were then erected 
by the king to commemorate his deeds.21 Like us, but for different 
reasons, the kings thought that no act of genocide should be forgotten. 
But one does not have to look only at the Assyrians: similar accounts of 
revelling in destruction could be taken from the memoirs of the 
Crusaders and others. 22 
In the twentieth century, however, no country has acknowledged that 
it engaged in genocide. Monuments have sometimes been raised for 
victims, but not by perpetrators to commemorate their deeds. Turkey not 
only did not acknowledge publicly that it killed over 300,000 Armenians 
between 1895 and 1908 and over a million between 1915-1917, but even 
sixty years later it still denies that genocide was committed: people were 
relocated as a wartime security measure and some died in the war, but 
that, it says, is all. Nazi Germany attempted to hide its own massive 
destruction of the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and other groups, including 
those Germans who were, for reasons of health, considered unfit to live. 
The most noble chapter in German history, according to Heinrich 
Himmler, would never be written.23 Civil war, the destruction of 
terrorists, or the repulsion of external invasion are the terms used by 
contemporary regimes to describe their genocidal activities. The United 
Nations, moreover, has only once detected an instance of genocide 
(despite the fact that its own trucks were used in Burundi to transport 
victims to their death) and that was of Communist China before it was a 
member of the United Nations.24 While the Khmer Rouge was destroy-
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ing the lives of 3 million of the inhabitants of Cambodia and turning 
others into refugees, it consistently denied that it had engaged in geno-
cide; rather, it accused other countries of major rights violations. Occa- 
sionally, the leaders of a country have admitted privately what was 
talcing place, and years after the event some examples of genocide have 
been lamented by a new leadership--for example, Nikita Khrushchev's 
condemnation of Stalin's destruction of various nationality groups and, 
especially, the members of the Party.25 Yet he also mentioned with 
approval the destruction of the kulaks. So genocide in the twentieth cen-
tury, while justified in the eyes of its perpetrators, is not open and is not 
acknowledged except privately, or for reasons that reject some genocide 
but fully endorse other examples of it. 
In the twentieth century, we find genocide to be horrifying, morally 
unjust, and criminal, yet we go on committing it. For us the formula 
goes something like this: It never happened, and besides, they deserved 
it. Prior to the sixteenth century, when the Spanish in America began to 
have doubts about killing men whose souls they claimed they wanted to 
save, the formula would have read: We did it, and they deserved it.26 
Even so, responsibility could still be assigned to a god or, better yet, the 
victim. But with us, as genocide has become more repugnant, as it has 
come to seem unthinkable, it has actually become commonplace. Con-
temporary man deals in bad faith as well as death. 
IV 
The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is staggering and helps 
to account in part for the sense of the incomprehensible and the unreal 
that conditions contemporary responses to genocide. Although genocide 
has claimed many victims throughout history, in terms of scale, there has 
never before been a century like ours: in less than one hundred years 
some 60 million persons have been murdered to meet the needs of the 
state. And with the exception of the destruction of small groups of 
indigenous peoples, or the admonitory genocide (a version of the 
struggle for power) that claims the lives of several hundred persons, 
genocide in the twentieth century almost never claims less than 100,000 
victims-that is the minimum, and the scale quickly goes up from there. 
Turkey destroyed the lives of a million or more Armenians; Nazi 
Germany destroyed 6 million Jews, but it is often forgotten that it went 
on to murder other groups as well, so that a reasonable estimate for the 
total number of its victims, apart from war deaths, is 16 million; Palcistan 
slaughtered 3 million Bengalis; Cambodia brought about the death of 3 
million persons; and the Soviet Union first destroyed 20 million peasants 
in the 1930s and then went on to take hundreds of thousands of other 
lives in the 1940s with its assaults on various nationality groups 
suspected of disloyalty. 
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In some ways, of course, it is a mistake to discuss numbers of 
victims. Every life and every group is unique, and deaths can thus never 
be compared. Also, numbers have the effect of dissolving the solidarity 
that victims might otherwise feel for each other; instead of sensing a 
common plight, questions of who has suffered the most come to the 
fore.27 And numbers lead us into thinking that genocide is defined by 
some magic number of victims, whereas legally and morally that is not 
what genocide means. Nevertheless, numbers do indicate the massive-
ness of the problem of genocide in the current period. They can also 
help us to see some qualitative differences between genocide as it is prac-
ticed now and as it was until at least the nineteenth century, which in its 
often total assault on indigenous peoples began to resemble the twentieth 
century, with its attempts to annihilate groups as a whole. 
Genocide for most of its history has been local-the conquered city, 
the particular group of Muslims or Jews before one, the Indians within 
easy reach of exploitation. It was also segmental-except for groups of 
heretics or, occasionally, out of desire for revenge, there was no attempt 
to destroy an entire group (all Jews, all Muslims, all members of a 
particular race or class). The reason usually given for both the local and 
segmental quality of genocide prior to the nineteenth century is that 
dominant groups lacked the means: the instruments of violence were 
limited and the means of communication and transportation difficult at 
best. While this is true, it also misses an important point: genocide pre-
viously had afinite quality to it; there was no aspiration to eliminate a 
group totally. In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, for ex-
ample, still viewed genocide as rooted in a finite world: tied to appetite, 
limited in its goals, a world without demand for totality or infinity.28 
But contemporary theories of genocide (Hannah Arendt, Erich Fromm, 
Albert Camus) characteristically present a radically different image of 
genocide, coinciding with a changed set of experiences with human de-
structiveness. It remained for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to 
generate both the means and the desire to destroy entire groups. 
v 
Genocide of any magnitude requires a sizable number of participants, 
but it does not necessarily follow that a large increase in victims requires 
an equally large increase in perpetrators. This partly depends on the 
technology of destruction that is employed (some forms are, so to speak, 
labor-intensive, others less so); on whether the victims are concentrated 
in one area or must be rounded up over a large territory; and on the 
extent to which the victims are able to resist. It also depends on what 
might be called the style of destruction. Some regimes, such as that of 
Idi Amin, concentrate the task of destruction in the hands of specially 
created units, with almost no participation by wider segments of society. 
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Others, such as Turkey, deliberately involve the army, local officials, 
selected tribal and ethnic groups, and in the case of both Turkey and 
Indonesia, large numbers of peasants. The decision to involve a large 
number of groups is not due primarily to the availability of technology, 
but to certain political objectives. In acting as Turkey and Indonesia 
have, the regime satisfies the passions and greed of elements of the 
society, thus building support for its actions; destroys the victim group 
in the most vicious way possible in order to emphasize the subhumanity 
of the dominated; and, by plunging a large part of the population into 
murder, binds them to the regime.29 In other cases still, such as that of 
Nazi Germany, the intended magnitude of destruction is so great, and the 
victims so scattered, that most social and political institutions are har-
nessed to one overriding aim-the taking of lives.30 
The large-scale genocide of the twentieth century does require numer-
ous participants, but the extent to which this is true varies from case to 
case. The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is unprecedented 
with regard to victims; with regard to the percentage of the population 
that participates in the actual process of destruction, it would appear to be 
no greater than in previous ages of genocide. But given the frequency of 
genocide in this century, this means that an enormous number of our 
contemporaries, with the support and permission of political authority, 
have committed mass murder. 
VI 
At all times, genocide has claimed a wide range of victims, but in the 
twentieth century it has become more extensive. Before our own period, 
victims came from one or more of the following categories: those 
subjected to conquest, those destroyed for religious reasons, and those 
exploited in a colonial relationship. Only a small number of these were 
killed because of who they were. 
Until the early modern period, one was typically subjected to geno-
cide simply because of where one was. Most of the victims of genocide 
in the past became such because they were on a conqueror's line of 
march. They died or were enslaved because they were there, not be-
cause of any special selection process that singled them out in terms of 
race, religion, political convictions, or the like. They were victims of 
institutional genocide. On the other hand, victims of religious genocide, 
though few in number, were chosen because of who they were: their 
views and practices were considered a threat to unity and truth. And 
with the beginnings of colonial domination in the sixteenth century, a 
much larger set of victims was killed because of who its members were 
(they came from a different race and a less technologically advanced 
culture) and what they had (land, gold, labor power). They became vic-
tims of utilitarian genocide. 
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In the twentieth century the range of victims has greatly increased; 
moreover, almost all of them have been selected for genocide because of 
who they are, because in the eyes of the stronger group (whether 
majority or minority) they do not deserve to live. The victims, otherwise 
so different, have only three attributes in common: for historical, situa-
tional, or ideological reasons they have been defined as beyond the circle 
of moral obligation and thus as inhuman; they are vulnerable to geno-
cidal attacks, whether sporadic or sustained, selective or indiscriminate; 
and if they do survive, they often carry a greater burden of guilt than the 
victimizers do for attempting to take their lives.31 The diversity and 
range of those who have fallen victim to genocide in this century can be 
suggested by the simple device of naming names and listing categories: 
Armenians, Gypsies, Jews, Slavs, Bengalis, Cambodians, Tibetans, 
Hutus, lbos, Chinese, Achés; Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Muslims; 
Communists, non-Communists; kulaks, intellectuals, workers, stone age 
hunters, national groups, homeless peoples; persons who are black, 
brown, red, yellow, white; the sick and the well; those who resist and 
those who are compliant; those who are killed because of their race, 
religion, ethnicity, physical condition, political opinions, class origins, 
or stage of historical development 
Falling victim to genocide has been so widespread and varied in the 
twentieth century that few groups can be reasonably sure that they will 
not be next. Even the most powerful nations-those armed with nuclear 
weapons-may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, inten-
tionally, insanely) to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not 
only each other, but mankind itself, sealing the fate of the earth forever 
with a final genocidal effort. Human history would assume this form 
(though it would never be written): mankind would have moved from 
the mortality of the individual (who could be murdered or, like Abraham, 
"die old and sated with life") to the genocidal destruction of human 
groups (large or small, completely or incompletely) to the extermination 
of the species itself.32 The will to genocide, which began as the will to 
power, revenge, wealth, salvation, would have become (what perhaps in 
some deep sense it had been all along) the will to nothingness. 
VII
All the elements of the technology of death that we associate with 
twentieth-century genocide-bureaucracy, modern communications, 
rapid transportation, even the concentration camp in a primitive form-
had emerged by the late nineteenth century. But apparently the first to 
perceive the possibilities of this new technology to eliminate a whole 
group of persons numbering in the millions was the ruling clique in 
Turkey, which in 1915 began the systematic extermination of the 
Armenians, an extermination that is the prototype of genocide in the 
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twentieth century. It was premeditated, centrally planned (though carried 
out by local officials to a large extent), and intended to be total. It was 
also, to the extent possible, to be carried out without the knowledge of 
the outside world. As Michael Arlen notes, "The  Armenian genocide 
was based on the imperfectly utilized but definitely perceived capacities 
of the modem state for politically restructuring itself, which were made 
possible by the engines of technology." In fact, he suggests, "In vir-
tually every modem instance of mass murder, beginning, it appears, 
with the Armenians, the key element ... which has raised the nu-
merical and psychic levels of the deed above the classic terms of mas-
sacre has been the alliance of technology and communications. "33
If modern forms of technology do not cause genocide, they facilitate 
it, extend its range, sustain its actions, and make it possible to destroy 
huge numbers of victims in a relatively short time. Yet it appears that 
Hitler's gas chambers were developed not only for the sake of ef-
ficiency, but to reduce the moral and psychological burdens that his 
soldiers had experienced in shooting large numbers of women and 
children on the Eastern Front.34 The means that contemporary bureau-
cracy develops to destroy whole groups are calculated not only to kill, 
but to neutralize any sense of guilt or responsibility for what is done. 
Ideology can help overcome any feeling of revulsion or any sense of 
guilt, but only a few of those who are part of the apparatus of destruction 
may be ideologically motivated. More decisively, modern forms of 
organization can distance most persons from the actual killing and can 
routinize the work which supports the killing.35 Most bureaucrats in 
Germany, for instance, "composed memoranda, drew up blueprints, 
signed correspondence, talked on the telephone, and participated in 
conferences." Yet, as Raul Hilberg indicates, they "could destroy a 
whole people while sitting at their desks. "36  Routinization reduces the 
occasions on which moral questions can arise and encourages the job 
holder to focus on the technical details of his work rather than on its 
meaning.37 Moreover, the sharp division of labor fragments the act of 
destruction-those who decide to commit genocide, those who organize 
it, and those who carry it out are not the same persons; no one, 
therefore, accepts responsibility for the final result. Finally, because of 
the hierarchical structure of the organization, everyone can insist, not 
insincerely, that they were only obeying orders.38 If organization, com-
munications, transportation, and various new implements of violence 
(among them the gas chambers) have played central roles in the tech-
nology of genocide, their capacity to reduce moral awareness has also 
been important. 
Nevertheless, highly developed organization and sophisticated means 
of destruction are not always employed in the twentieth century: often 
there is a mixture of the primitive and the modern. Indian tribes are 
hunted, like any other prey, in Latin America, but are also bombed from 
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the air; they are given sugar laced with arsenic and blankets that contain 
the bacilli of fatal diseases, but are also relocated to reservations that are 
little more than concentration camps. In Turkey and Indonesia, socially 
induced hate and dehumanization are substituted for the bureaucratic 
neutralization of moral responsibility. In Cambodia, ideology allows the 
cadres of the Khmer Rouge to destroy parents in front of their children, 
to desecrate age-old religious institutions, and, in place of means of 
destruction that distance the perpetrator from the victim, to resort to 
direct and brutal means of disposing of the "impure" portions of the 
population: beating persons to death with hoes, driving nails into their 
heads, and carving them open with knives. And in Uganda, victims 
would often be strangled slowly and then killed with a sledgehammer 
blow to the chest; thereafter, they would be driven in trucks for hours to 
a river where they were thrown to crocodiles.39 
While the capacity for organization varies-the Young Turks were 
more efficient than the Sultan, the Nazis more sophisticated in the pro-
duction of mass deaths than either-the use of a low level of technology 
to destroy hundreds of thousands of victims is done by choice in the 
twentieth century. Cambodia did have bullets; peasants armed with ritual 
knives was not the most efficient means of destruction available in 
Indonesia. Rather, the technology chosen was a mirror of the purposes 
of the perpetrators (to inflict as much suffering as possible, to gain 
support for the regime by satisfying the appetites of groups long hostile 
to the victims) and the culture of the particular society (to invoke the 
symbolism of an autonomous peasant society, which when it kills uses 
hoes, or, with Indonesia, emphasizes the ritual triumph of good over 
evil). 
The technology of genocide in the twentieth century thus offers the 
perpetrator a choice of means that can be tailored to a specific situation. 
This kind of choice in itself makes contemporary genocide unique, as 
does its enormous capacity to destroy human life. 
Prior to the twentieth century, however, there was little choice in the 
technology of mass death. For several thousand years the technology of 
genocide was relatively static. Weapons used were hand-held (clubs, 
swords, bows) and could be used only in close contact with the victim. 
The introduction of firearms increased the efficiency of killing and made 
the work of destruction less physically tiring, but it still involved direct 
contact. Yet if I am correct in thinking that there were few, if any, moral 
barriers to genocide until the sixteenth century, this proximity to the 
victim would not have generated the burdens it would for us. It is odd, 
then, that those who stress the distancing from violence that is required 
for contemporary man to destroy his fellows have not explored the more 
direct, and bloody, genocides of the past.40 The work was slow and 
tiring; it went on for days; and in the end, sometimes literally wading in 
blood, one knew what one had done.41 
Human Destructiveness and Politics 35 
They were able to carry out these acts (which an Eichmann would not 
have had the stomach for) because, like us, they tended to obey orders, 
but mainly because-and here they are unlike us-they were not bur-
dened with moral inhibitions against killing those outside the group. The 
ancient Hebrews, for example, did not worry about killing those who 
had betrayed the faith, but only about ritual defilement-whether, say, a 
man had had sexual intercourse before going into the herem (a term 
usually translated "holy war," but which means "a pact with the deity by 
which everything animate was devoted for destruction").42 
In addition to various weapons of the sort mentioned, fire was used to 
destroy large groups. This was one of the favorite methods of the 
Spanish in America, but was also used by the Crusaders. Another tech-
nique, later used by Stalin, was to induce starvation: prisoners were 
locked up without food and left to die; crops were burned; and, not 
uncommonly, the available crops were seized and used by the dominant 
group, allowing the producers to die in a genocidally induced famine. 
All of the techniques of destruction in use before the twentieth century 
were relatively primitive compared to what is available to us. Yet, given 
the finite goals of earlier genocide, smaller populations, and the absence 
of moral restraints, it was sufficient unto the day. 
VIII
In the end, though, it is the concentration camp that is the symbol of 
the technology of evil in the twentieth century. It is here, in the world of 
the dying, that the Nazis, Stalinists, and those like them pursue their 
beliefs that everything is permitted and everything is possible, and thus 
aim at the total domination of man, stripping him initially of everything 
except his body, and finally of even that. Yet we know from Bruno 
Bettelheim, Alexsander Solzhenitzyn, and Elie Wiesel, and thousands of 
other survivors, that the attempt fails; under sustained assault and the 
most grotesque conditions, human beings can still maintain decency, can 
share with others, and can continue to respect life.43 One looks for 
parallels to the concentration camps, but, as Hannah Arendt indicates, 
there are none: "Forced labor in prisons and penal colonies, banishment, 
slavery, all seem for a moment to off er helpful comparisons, but on 
closer examination lead nowhere."44 Whether the camps serve as places 
of detention, forced labor, or extermination (the usual classification, but 
misleading since most inmates do, after all, die in the camps), they are 
places in which "punishment is meted out without connection with 
crime . . . exploitation is practiced without profit, and . . . work is 
performed without product. "45 It is here that one confronts what Arendt 
calls "radical evil": an absolute evil that cannot be punished, forgiven, or 
comprehended in terms of any recognizably human motives. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the metaphor of pain and endless torment that 
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most of us fall back on is one that secular society knows only at second 
hand and abstractly, the image of Hell. In fact, it is through the medieval 
depiction of Hell, where 
The very weeping there forbids to weep, 
And grief finding eyes blocked with tears 
Tums inward to make agony greater 
that the literary critic George Steiner believes we can begin to grasp the 
horror and meaning of the concentration camp. 46 For it is here that we 
find the "technology of pain without meaning, of bestiality without end, 
of gratuitous terror .... In the camps the millenary pornography of 
fear and vengeance cultivated in the Western mind by Christian doctrines 
of damnation was realized. "47 Quite true, yet the comparison is 
dangerously flawed: for Hell, as traditionally understood, was a place of 
justice, and neither those readied for mass execution in Treblinka nor 
those left to a Darwinian struggle against exhaustion and gradual 
starvation in Kolyma deserved their fate. 
The fact that the analogies fail is not without its own significance. 
For the failure of imagination indicates that we are in the presence of a 
unique form of human destructiveness, one that in itself separates the 
twentieth century from all that has gone before. 
IX 
The twentieth century, then, is an age of genocide. Moreover, in 
terms of the number and range of victims, the variety of forms that 
genocide has taken, the urge toward total destruction of whole groups, 
the elaborate technology that facilitates death and eases conscience, the 
concentration camp, and the radical evil that is inseparable from it, it is a 
unique age of genocide. But to speak of "uniqueness" in the context of 
political death is, at bottom, to call attention to the acuteness of the 
problem; it is, in human terms, to indicate the necessity of finding means 
to prevent further genocide. The massiveness of genocide in this 
century, however, makes us feel that the task of prevention is futile. 
Despair stands in the way of action, knowledge leads to a sense of 
hopelessness. Yet we know from Sören Kierkegaard that despair is a 
sin, whether against God or man, and sin exists to be overcome. We 
cannot bring back to life the dead of this century or those who have been 
victims of political mass murder throughout the ages, but we can act. It 
is not true, as some have thought, that "he who saves the life of one, 
saves the world," but it is a good beginning. 
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THE ETIOLOGY OF GENOCIDES
Barbara Harff 
One  of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is 
genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, 
nor rooted in any one ethnocentric view of the world. Genocide con-
cerns and potentially affects all people. Some people have found refuge 
in the idea that the Holocaust was particular to the inhuman Nazis. 
Thus, all barbarous activities perpetrated by these subhumans had to be 
judged by different standards. However, evidence suggests that the 
many who participated in the extermination of a people were not sadis-
tically inclined.1 Israel Chamy argues that in many societies "traditions 
of humanitarian concerns for victims" coincide with "the role of killer 
... or of accomplice to other more vicious genociders. "2 Often demo-
cratic institutions are cited as safeguards against mass excesses. In view 
of the treatment of Amerindians by agents of the U.S. government, this 
view is unwarranted. For example, the thousands of Cherokees who 
died during the Trail of Tears (Cherokee Indians were forced to march in 
1838-1839 from Appalachia to Oklahoma) testify that even a democratic 
system may tum against its people. 
It is tempting to exaggerate the role of individuals, to blame leaders 
for leading their citizens to genocide. But is it not the case that citizens 
and leaders are able to make choices? Although powerful elites in a 
democratic society are able to inject their political preferences into the 
democratic process, sometimes not consistent with the preferences en-
dorsed by the majority, that likelihood is far greater in a totalitarian sys-
tem. But the capabilities for implementing ruthless decisions are always 
hampered or aided by the decisions made in countless bureaucracies. 
Thus, all people associated with the decision-making process lend their 
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own motives, rationalization, and legitimation to the genocidal outcome. 
Although most of these people are not directly involved in executing their 
victims, their ability to halt the process makes them equally responsible 
for the executions. Clearly, the decision to destroy a certain people is a 
product of the many involved, and although some decisionmakers are 
more important than others, the role of the "helpers" surely facilitates the 
larger choice which delivers others to death. 
Throughout the course of history genocides or massacres have been 
directed against specific groups in the context of larger political aims. 
Thus, the Nazis' aim of eliminating "foreign" elements from within by 
targeting Jews, Gypsies, Communists, and the mentally handicapped for 
annihilation was advanced by stressing mystical qualities of the dominant 
group. Similarly, the Turkification efforts, aided by the cry for "holy 
war" of the Young Turks, may have led to the destruction of the Arme-
nians. A more recent example is Kampuchea, where under the leader-
ship of Pol Pot all potential political adversaries were eliminated, which 
included the children of those perceived as reactionary elements. 
Though some massacres could be explained as acts of violence in the 
course of widespread mass hysteria, most genocides are devoid of the 
emotional climate which is conducive to a compulsion to murder those 
who are perceived as enemies of the dominant interests. In contrast, 
murderous leaders are voted into office, are allowed to propagate their 
pathological ideas, and often have ample time to plan and meticulously 
execute genocidal policies. What environment allows for organized offi-
cially sanctioned violence? What enables individuals to shed their re-
sponsibilities and become part of the murderous machine? In the 
absence of that passion which sometimes kills, how do "normal" people 
become vicious killers of children, old and infirm people, and the many 
others who have died in the genocides of modern times? 
The following analysis investigates the conditions under which some 
genocides have taken place. The theoretical framework is provided by 
the author's previous efforts to shed light on why states engage in 
genocide.3
ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS
Scholarly persuasion has it that the state is the ultimate obstacle to a 
just world order, while others see ideological identity or class solidarity 
as the one true path to that envisioned order. Some attempts to overcome 
these predominant modes of analysis in international relations, such as 
the Club of Rome's "doom project," have met with criticism and some-
times ridicule. It is not my purpose to assess in detail the ecologists', 
realists', or Marxists' contribution to the analysis of international rela-
tions. Instead, this modest effort attempts to incorporate various ele-
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ments of different modes of analysis into a framework which allows for 
an assessment of why past genocides have occurred and why future ones 
will occur. Ecological challenges and the international security dilemma 
have greatly contributed to the erosion of the state as the central actor in 
the world. In contrast, the durability of the state is demonstrated through 
its expanding role in providing social services to its citizens. The often 
conflicting roles of the state as provider and entrepreneur have some-
times led to increased elite domination internally or increased military/ 
economic adventurism abroad.4 Here elite domination refers to people 
who hold the controlling positions in the state structure; in other words, 
they are the political elite. Under exceptional circumstances this elite 
domination may lead to genocide. The following identifies the condi-
tions conducive to the occurrence of genocide in national societies. 
National societies are those coincidental with the emergence of the mod-
ern state system during the early seventeenth century. This does not 
mean that genocides are confined to modern times. But "historical" 
genocides are of lesser importance to my argument, which claims that the 
"legitimate" authority structure, i.e., the state, is the predominant culprit 
in genocides (for an extended discussion on the subject, see Chapter 2). 
One of the emphases of my theoretical argument is on structural 
change as exemplified in the concept of national upheaval. National up-
heaval is an abrupt change in the political community, caused, for ex-
ample, by the formation of a state through violent conflict, when national 
boundaries are reformed, or after a war is lost. Thus, lost wars and the 
resultant battered national pride sometimes lead to genocide against 
groups perceived as enemies. Post-colonial and post-revolutionary re-
gimes are prone to internal violence during times of national consolida-
tion, when competing groups/tribes fight for leadership positions. 
Structural change is a necessary but not sufficient condition to pro-
mote the likelihood of genocide. A second factor leading to the develop-
ment of genocide is the existence of sharp internal cleavages combined 
with a history of struggle between groups prior to the upheaval. The 
stronger the identification within competing groups the more likely that 
extreme measures will be taken to suppress the weaker groups. Polari-
zation is usually intensified by such factors as the extent of differences in 
religion, values, and traditions between contending groups, and their 
ideological separation. There are numerous examples from past geno-
cides in which group polarization provided the background to genocides. 
Gentiles versus Jews, Muslims versus Hindus, Fascists versus Com-
munists, Germans versus Gypsies, whites against blacks and Indians-
such are the genocides of Nazi Germany, Bangladesh, Uganda, German 
Southwest Africa, and countless others. 
A third factor triggering genocide against national groups is the lack 
of external constraints on, or foreign support for, murderous regimes. 
At present, lack of international sanctions and/or interventions against 
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massive human rights violators is the norm rather than the exception. 
Unless national interest combined with the ability to interfere dictates 
intervention, few efforts are made to ameliorate the suffering of local 
populations. 
Who are the genociders? Here genocide is defined as public violence 
-by some political actor-aimed at eliminating groups of private citi-
zens. Sometimes genociders are state officials, e.g., soldiers, police, or 
special Einsatzgruppen; sometimes genociders are less openly linked 
with state power, e.g., death squads. Usually genocide is the conscious 
choice of policymakers, one among other options for repressing (elimi-
nating) opposition. However, the likelihood of genocide occurring is 
rare compared to the likelihood that officials will use sporadic violence 
and/or torture to repress opposition. Thus, we have to differentiate be-
tween sporadic violence used against opposition groups, i.e., state ter-
rorism, and systematic, Draconian attempts to eliminate or annihilate 
them. Additional incentives to settle scores through lesser means are the 
avoidance of regime instability and/or sometimes the threat of regionaV 
international sanctions or other forms of interference. Genocide is not 
just another policy instrument of repression; genocide is the most ex-
treme policy option available to policymakers. 
International wars are not genocides, because victims have no specific 
group identity and are often unintended, i.e., civilians. The crime of 
fighting an aggressive war, though outlawed as an instrument of inter-
national policy, is sometimes used as a coercive means to bring about 
structural changes in the target state, not to eliminate the total population. 
More difficult is the distinction between civil strife (wars) and geno-
cides -- civil wars are contributing factors to the possible occurrence of 
genocides but are not genocides themselves. In civil wars the legitimate 
authority structure is weak and is opposed by strong opposition forces. 
Again, as in wars, though atrocities may become a pattern on both sides, 
the intent to destroy the opposition in part or as a whole is the crucial 
variable in determining the onset of genocide. Burundi is a good exam-
ple, one in which civil war eventually turned into a genocide, given an 
array of other contributing factors, such as previous tribal rivalries, and 
lack of regional and international intervention. 
In addition, my definition of genocide differs from the official defi-
nition (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide/Declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
Resolution 96, dated December 11, 1946, article 2) insofar as it broad-
ens the scope of the victims and perpetrators. Thus, political opponents 
are included in my definition, though they lack the formal legal protec-
tion of the Convention on Genocide. The official definition includes 
those acts leading to the physical destruction of the group when "such 
acts are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group," but says nothing about political 
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groups. The Kampuchean mass slaughter under Pol Pot (1975) testifies 
to the need to include political opponents in the definition, thereby 
allowing the Kampuchean tragedy to be properly called genocide and 
thus to enjoy the unfortunately limited protection of the Convention. 
Political victims are not political as in contrast to religious or ethnic 
victims; rather, it is their political affiliation which singles them out as 
victims, not their ethnic identity. Thus, a Jew in Stalin's Russia who 
opposed Stalin would have been a likely victim during the murderous 
campaigns of the 1930s because he opposed Stalin, not because he was a 
Jew. Furthermore, in my conception the Holocaust is the ultimate 
instance of genocide, rather than a unique event defying comparison. 
Only through comparison with other similar or dissimilar cases of geno-
cide can we begin to understand what triggered that monstrous episode. 
This is not to deny Holocaust survivors and victims their place in the 
conscience of humanity; rather, it is to remind us of our special responsi-
bility to its millions of dead children, women, and men in finding ways 
to anticipate and eliminate future holocausts. 
What follows is an analysis of information about twentieth-century 
governments which have engaged in genocidal activities. It describes the 
systemic properties, external environment, and internal conditions of 
states at the time of genocide. It is based on the cases listed in Table 3.1, 
a list which is by no means complete. What is attempted here is only the 
beginning of a systematic ordering of specific cases into categories. The 
cases are selected because they are relatively recent and well known, and 
because information is readily available about them; thus, their analysis 
should foster the kind of international reaction envisioned in the United 
Nations Charter. The cases may also make it possible to test the plausi-
bility of my argument that national upheaval and prior internal struggle, 
combined with lack of constraints in the international environment, are 
conducive to genocide. It should be noted that the estimated numbers of 
victims vary greatly, often because "statistics" were not kept (with the 
exception of the Holocaust) or because population data were inadequate 
or dated. However, I do not believe that the number of victims makes a 
great difference: the important factor is that they were the victims of 
genocidal policies. 
TYPES OF NATIONAL UPHEAVAL 
Genocide happens in different types of political society-what types 
of society? The classification scheme follows from the theoretical frame-
work and distinguishes between types of societies formed after major 
national upheavals. The task of differentiating among societies with on-
going fundamental political change is difficult. Obviously a successful 
revolution with clearly defined ideological goals is much more likely to 
Table 3.1 
Some Twentieth-Century Genocides 
Victims' Estimated 
Country Dates Perpetrators Identity Numbers 
German SW 
Africa 1904 German troops Herero 65,0001
Ottoman 1915 Young Turks/ Armenians 800,000-
Empire Kurds 1.8 million2 
Germany 1941-45 Germans Jews 5-6 million3 
Gypsies 48,000
Sudan 1955-72 Sudanese Southern 
army Sudanese 500,0004
Indonesia 1965-67 Vigilantes Supposed 200,000-
Communists 500,0005
Nigeria 1967-70 Other Nigerians lbos 2-3 million6 
Bangladesh 1971 East Pakistan Bengalis 1,247,000-
army 3 million7 
Burundi 1972 Tutsis Hutus 100,000-
200,0008
Paraguay 1968-72 Paraguayans Guayaki 1,0009
Aché (Indians) 
EastTimor 1975 Indonesian Timorese 60,000-
army 100,00010
Kampuchea 1975-79 Khmer Rouge Kampucheans 740,800-
3 millionll 
Uganda 1976-78 Sections of Ugandans 500,00012
Ugandan army 
1. For an extended discussion see Jon M. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Horst Drechsler, "Let Us Die 
Fighting": The Struggle of the Herero andNama against German Imperialism (1884-
1915) (London: Zed Press, 1980); Arnold Valentin Wallenkampf, "The Herero Rebel-
lion in South West Africa, 1904-1906: A Study in German Colonialism" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, 1969). 
2. For an extended discussion see Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Com-
parison of the Turkish Genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945)," 
Comparative Studies in Sociology, 1 (1978); A. D. Sarkissian, Martyrdom and 
Rebirth (Published by the Armenian Church of America; New York: Lydian Press, 
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1965); Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-
1916 (prepared by Arnold Toynbee; London: H.M.S.O., 1916). 
3. For an extended discussion see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: 
National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust (New York: The 
Free Press, 1979); Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
4. For an extended discussion see Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern 
Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1975); Robert O. 
Collins, The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah 
Center, 1975); Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972 (London: David 
and Charles, 1974); Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977). 
5. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978). 
6. For an extended discussion see John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian 
Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 
1980); Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo and Samuel Udochukwu lfejika, The Making of a 
Nation Biafra (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1969); Peter Schwab,  ed., Biafra 
(New York: Facts on File, 1971). 
7. Kalyan Chaudhuri, Genocide in Bangladesh (Bombay: Orient Longman, 
1972). 
8. For an extended discussion see René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New 
York: Praeger, 1970); Norman Wingert, No Place to Stop Killing (Chicago: Moody 
Press, 1974). 
9. For an extended discussion see Richard Arens, Genocide in Paraguay (Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press, 1976). 
10. For an extended discussion see Jill Joliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and 
Colonialism (Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1978); Justus M. van der 
Kroef, Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia (London: The Eastern Press, 1977). 
11. For an extended discussion see François Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978); Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982 
(Boston: South End Press, 1984). 
12. Dan Wooding and Ray Barnett, Uganda Holocaust (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1980). 
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lead to a restructuring of society than anticolonial rebellions with "re-
formist" goals. In other words, the greater the changes affecting society 
through new governments, the likelier it is that genocidal policies are 
implemented to insure total obedience. Thus, the extent of structural 
change is a major factor underlying my typology.5 
Revolutions are a type of national upheaval. Revolutions always in-
volve the overthrow of the ruling political elite and aim at bringing about 
fundamental social change. 
Anticolonial rebellions, which are similar to separatist conflicts, are a 
type of national upheaval. Anticolonial rebellions are internal struggles 
with mass participation, directed against the ruling foreign power, seek-
ing autonomy. In the case of separatist conflicts, the major struggle 
takes place between two movements, one trying to break away, the other 
to prevent it. 
Coups may constitute a type of national upheaval. Coups involve the 
total or partial replacement of the ruling elite and lack mass participation. 
Thus, coups which involve the total replacement of the ruling elite are 
more likely to induce fundamental social change. 
A special case is a takeover by duly elected or appointed political elites 
who endorse extreme ideologies (right-wing or left-wing). There is no 
abrupt structural change, but rather a move to exert total control. Such 
changes may lead to the creation of a climate in which people are ab-
solved from making personal judgments and are rewarded for their total 
obedience to authority. 
Another crucial factor in the development of genocide is the existence 
of sharp internal cleavages. In some societies internal violence is a way 
of life,6 and some societies are preconditioned to accept political violence 
(coups, for example) because they frequently do occur (for example, in 
Bolivia). However, genocide needs more than reinforcement through 
societal acquiescence. Genocide is a product of state policy, with an in-
volvement and commitment of massive resources, and is only marginally 
beneficial to people involved in the process. 
National upheaval always intensifies internal cleavages. Depending 
on the preferences of policymakers, some groups may become targets of 
genocidal policies. Groups which are most "different" from the domi-
nant group are more likely to become targets than those which more 
closely resemble the dominant group. Thus, groups different in religion, 
culture, wealth, education, and/or ideology have a greater chance to be 
singled out for genocide. Economic preponderance by some groups may 
be enough to induce genocidal policies against them. These cleavages 
usually pre-exist, but in some cases they are introduced by the new elite. 
Thus, for example, the targeted group may involve all those opposed to 
the new regime (Kampuchea), or rich peasants (Communist Russia).7 
The structural precondition of national upheaval combined with so-
cietal receptiveness for internal violence targeted against "most different" 
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groups may pave the path to genocide, but a third condition may ulti-
mately provide the final incentive for the occurrence of genocide. Here 
we are talking about external support for either the genocider or the target 
group. Sometimes the genociders are foreign powers, for example, 
colonizers; sometimes genocidal elites enjoy support/protection from 
powerful neighbors. In modern times the overt or covert support of one 
of the superpowers is a warrant for the survival of regimes involved in 
repression or genocide. In other cases, states may neither condemn nor 
praise other states engaged in internal repression. The state in question 
may be too unimportant to warrant international attention, thus enjoying 
the kind of freedom which comes from lack of automatic sanctions in 
cases of extreme human rights violations. 
Support of a different kind may come for the genocidal target. Thus, 
fellow religionists or ethnic groups may induce their governments to 
intervene on behalf of the potential victims. A more limited kind of sup-
port may come from international organizations in the form of protests or 
boycotts. In some cases irredentist movements elsewhere may lend 
military support. 
COMMON ELEMENTS IN DIFFERENT GENOCIDES
The merits of this theoretical argument can be demonstrated by analy-
sis of the characteristics of cases of genocide categorized according to 
their political circumstances. 
Post-War, Post-Imperial Genocides 
The Holocaust is undisputably the most abominable instance of mod-
em genocide; however, it has many structural, societal, and external 
similarities with lesser genocides. Hitler's rise to power, though by 
constitutional means, came in the wake of a worldwide depression. The 
post-war economic crises and the inability of the new democratic 
government to cope with massive unemployment and extreme currency 
inflation greatly strengthened the radical left and the extreme right. Fear 
of a Communist takeover led to the bare victory of the National Socialist 
Party, and the "Enabling Act" left Hitler with dictatorial powers, which 
he used to bar any opposition. (See Chapter 10.)
The emergence of the nationalist movements of the "Young Turks" 
came in the wake of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire. A prior rebellion 
in 1908, which briefly restored a constitutional monarchy, led to a coup 
in 1913 and the total takeover by the Young Turks under their leader, 
Enver Pasha. During the Balkan wars (1912-1913) the Ottoman Empire 
lost almost all its territory in Europe, which left the new nationalist 
movement with little sympathy for the national aspirations of the 
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remaining ethnic minorities in Turkey. (See Chapter 11.) 
Both countries-Turkey and Germany-did experience a major re-
structuring of their respective governments following loss of territory in 
war and a rapid succession of different versions of government. The 
German Empire was replaced by a democratic government, which lacked 
the strength to unite the warring factions of Communists and Monarch-
ists. In Turkey the Sultan was briefly replaced by a constitutional Sul-
tan, who, however, was in no position to halt the nationalist movement 
of the Young Turks, who tried to propel Turkey into the twentieth cen-
tury with sweeping reforms. The national upheavals following the 
takeover by both nationalist movements had disastrous consequences for 
some ethnic/religious minorities in both countries-Armenians in Turkey 
and Jews and Gypsies in Germany. 
The annihilation of Jews and Gypsies in Germany and the genocide 
against Armenians in Turkey followed a similar pattern. In both coun-
tries domination of the state apparatus by a tightly controlled political 
elite was complete. Both the Young Turks and the Nazi movement 
introduced a kind of myth, exalting the likeness of the dominant group, 
i.e., "Aryan"-Germans and Turks. Germanization and Turkification 
both emphasized pureness of race and common culturaVethnic and 
religious values. Thus, all "real" Germans were to be Christian, Aryan, 
and non-Communist, as all Turks were to be Muslim, Turkoman, and 
pro Young Turk. Both Jews and Armenians were easy targets, for they 
were different in religion, "racial" heritage, and culture. The age-old 
division between Christians and Muslims and Christians and Jews accel-
erated receptiveness for a renewal of a crusade against infidels and the 
people of the book. The readiness to massacre Jews and Armenians was 
not new to either society. Sporadic violence or planned massacres had 
taken place prior to both genocides. But the Holocaust and the Genocide 
of 1915 against the Armenians were exceptional, because they were pre-
meditated acts by policymakers to eliminate a people. Why? 
I have argued that once preconditions such as structural changes, lack 
of external constraint, and internal cleavages combine, the stage is set for 
genocide. In both cases external constraints were either nonexistent or 
too late and too little to halt the slaughters of thousands of innocent 
victims. Neither meager German protest in 1915 (Turkey's major ally) 
nor an international boycott by World Jewry did much to stop impending 
disaster. Russian threat of intervention against Turkey was superseded 
by World War I, similar to Allied lack of intervention due to World War 
II. International sympathy for Jews was virtually nonexistent, evidenced 
by the refusal of other countries to grant entry permits to fleeing Jews. 
Armenians fared little better in the wake of competing nationalist move-
ments elsewhere in Europe and the impending Russian Revolution, and 
the making of new alliances culminating in World War I. 
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But neither structural change nor external conditions fully explain 
why policymakers decide to eliminate or annihilate a people rather than 
engage in sporadic violence, i.e., why they resort to genocide rather than 
state terrorism to suppress opposition. Internal conditions may provide 
the final clues to why states engage in genocide. Often the strength of a 
new government greatly depends on its ability to mobilize mass support. 
Often divisions within culturally heterogeneous societies are overcome 
by declaring one group responsible for the other's misfortunes. Some-
times that is the case in socialist revolutions, where capitalists serve as 
scapegoats for the misery of the workers. Turkification and Germanifi-
cation both served to unite people in their pride of belonging to a people, 
both inheritors of a long history, i.e., heirs of the Holy Roman Empire 
and the Ottoman Empire. Armenians may have been a legitimate threat to 
the Young Turks because they were collectively organized and demanded 
limited autonomy within the new state. Jews, however, were no threat 
to the Nazis; they were neither politically organized nor particularly 
visible as a group-Germany boasted a more assimilated "enlightened" 
(non-religious) Jewish population than most other European countries. 
Yet Nazi propaganda had singled out the Jew from its beginning. If 
Jews in Germany were at all special as a group they were so because of 
achievements in the professions. A disproportionate number of them 
were doctors, scientists, literary greats, and artists. Leading lights of 
Marxism/Socialism included many Jews, e.g., Karl Marx, Rosa 
Luxembourg, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Eduard Bernstein. Why did the 
Nazis single out the Jews? Anti-Semitism has long been part of Euro-
pean history. It was probably the single most appealing prejudicial doc-
trine available to the Nazis, who were trying to consolidate their power. 
Different groups in Germany may have had different animosities, but the 
Jews offered more value as scapegoats than other groups such as 
Gypsies or Communists. Communists were after all "genuine Ger-
mans," whereas Gypsies were too small in number and not a settled 
people. The successful merchant image of the Jews spelled competition 
for the average shopkeeper in Germany; the dominance of Jewish scien-
tists may have caused envy among their colleagues; legendary Jewish 
international finance connections added to the image resented by others. 
The liberal image of artists residing in the capital did nothing to persuade 
the provincial German that the Jew was part of their world. Hitler's 
claim that Marxism/Communism was after all a Jewish invention thus 
was easily absorbed into an ideology offering an escape for many. The 
Jews had something for everyone, and those enlightened enough to 
realize the demagoguery thought that Hitler could be controlled. Once 
the Nazis realized the appeal of anti-Semitism, propaganda made full use 
of it. Nazis, once in power, fulfilled their promises to put people to 
work and "clean" the towns of Jews. Once the Nazis realized that the 
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world was not eager to take "their" Jews, the "final solution" was to take 
care of the Jewish "problem." Who was to stop the murderous engine? 
In 1944 the Germans, their cities bombed, were losing the war, yet the 
death camps were working to full capacity. 
Killing the Jewish population of Europe may have been the rational 
choice of the Nazis, yet the utility of doing so was utterly irrational. The 
costs of keeping the camps going despite the war effort were immense. 
Thousands of people were involved in killing Jews; trains transporting 
Jews had priority over those aiding the war effort. 8 The fanatic pursuit 
of "finishing the job" was part of the robot-like performance of those 
selected to serve the "higher cause" of Nazi ideology. 
Post-Colonial Genocides 
The genocides of Southern Sudan Biafra, Bangladesh, Burundi, and 
East Timor all took place following massive internal rebellions. Bangla-
desh, Biafra, East Timor, and the Southern Sudan sought to secede 
-from Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Northern Sudan, respec-
tively. Bangladesh was successful; Biafra, East Timor, and the South- 
ern Sudan were not. In Burundi the Hutus tried unsuccessfully to throw 
off the minority rule of the Tutsis. All five genocides happened in the 
wake of colonial liberation. In each case euphoria over liberation soon 
gave way to a reemphasis of existing cleavages. 
The Northern Sudanese, Muslims who claim Arab descent, saw their 
future tightly bound to the Arab world. For the Southern Sudanese, 
mostly Negroid, animist (though including many Christians), and multi-
ethnic, the traditional societies of East Africa seemed a more likely ally. 
The racial division is somehow arbitrary, since many Northerners who 
claim to be Arabs are Negroid in appearance and many Southerners 
called Negroid have non-Negroid features.9 More important, Southern 
economic development was grossly inferior to the North. It was no 
surprise that the politically and economically powerful (and more 
populous) North should dominate the South after independence in 1956. 
Thus, domination by the British was replaced with domination by the 
North. Even before independence came to the country the South re-
volted against the North, which resulted in the slaughter of many thou-
sands of innocent people. 
Nigeria after independence in 1960 was united under a federal sys-
tem. But unity was fragile among the three dominant ethnic groups, the 
Hausa-Fulani (about 15 million), the Yoruba (about 10 million), and the 
Ibos (about 10 million). The three were different in language, religion, 
and social organization. 10 The Ibos who became the targets of genocide, 
were mostly Christians and animists, in contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, 
who were Muslim and organized in the traditional Arab way under a 
strong central authority. Adding to the problem was the Ibos' domi-
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nance in education and industrialization. The North, with a high illiter-
acy rate and a largely agrarian economy, nevertheless controlled the 
federation by sheer weight of numbers (the total Northern region 
numbered about 35 million people).11 The lbos who attempted to secede 
in 1967 capitulated to the federal government of Nigeria in 1970. During 
the years of warfare hundreds of thousands died either in battle, during 
massacres, or by starvation. 
The process of decolonization in India brought the division of India 
and Pakistan, strongly fostered by religious cleavages. Pakistanis were 
largely Muslims, and most Indians were Hindus; intermingling between 
the two groups was prohibited because of the caste system of the Hin-
dus. Caught between the two groups were the Sikhs, who were divided 
between the emerging states of India and Pakistan. Before partition the 
Sikhs were embroiled in a "holy war" against the Muslims. Communal 
strife during this time took on mass proportions as an estimated 1 million 
people lost their lives. Upon partition Pakistan was divided into West 
and East Pakistan, separated by 1,000 miles of India. As in the Sudan, 
one region, West Pakistan, was considerably more industrialized, 
whereas the East was predominantly agricultural. In addition to eco-
nomic domination, political domination was secured by a bureaucracy 
consisting largely of West Pakistanis. Negotiations for greater autono-
my for the East in 1971 ended in massive retaliations by the West 
Pakistani government. During the following months genocidal policies 
were implemented which resulted in the indiscriminate deaths of men, 
women, and children numbering well over 1 million. 
Burundi became independent in 1962 after years of extended rebel-
lions against Belgian authorities. The country has a majority of Hutus-
about 85 percent of the population-ruled by a minority government 
composed of Tutsis, who make up about 15 percent of the population. 
This domination by a minority was over 400 years old, established when 
the warrior Tutsis invaded the country from Ethiopia. Three aborted 
coups in 1965, 1969, and 1972 against the unwanted minority govern-
ment led to severe reprisals by the Tutsis and in 1972 to genocide against 
the Hutus which claimed about 200,000 lives. 
East Timor was a Portuguese colony which was to become indepen-
dent in 1978 but preempted that step in 1975 by unilaterally declaring 
independence. The people are largely of Malay and Papuan stock, with a 
majority of Christians and some Muslim minorities. Past rivalries were 
confined to interparty conflicts. The most popular party, FRETILIN, 
which enjoyed 60 percent of the popular vote, was anticolonial and anti-
Indonesian and was thought to be left-leaning. Two other parties, 
APODETI and UDT, called for union with Indonesia. This division 
erupted into violence during August 1975. Indonesia immediately re-
acted by initiating a blockade against East Timar and subsequently in-
vaded the country in December 1975. With the help of UDT and 
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APODETI forces, independence was exchanged for union with Indo-
nesia; the invasion resulted in looting, torture, and slaughter, with the 
result that nearly 10 percent of the population was killed.12 
In all five cases foreign intervention significantly added to the success 
or failure of the secessionist movement. The intervention by India in 
December 1971 ended the genocidal massacres and also secured the in-
dependence of the new state of Bangladesh. Not so typical was the 
international support given to Nigeria/Biafra. China, France, Portugal, 
Israel, and South Africa supported Biafra, while Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union supported Nigeria. The latter "alliance" was probably due 
to Britain's effort to curtail growing Soviet influence in Nigeria. Biafran 
support came in the midst of conflicting European and big-power politics 
(e.g., France's oil interest in Biafra and China's tensions with Moscow), 
while Israel mostly confined its support to humanitarian relief efforts. 
The United States paid lip service to a united Nigeria. The Organization 
for African Unity (OAU) also supported Nigeria.13 The Southern Su-
danese enjoyed almost no support from outside sources, while Egypt, 
Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, East Germany, and the Soviet Union were said 
to have armed the North. In Burundi, no international action was taken 
to halt the massacres, although protests through diplomatic channels 
were plentiful. So, for example, the OAU supported the Burundi gov-
ernment, as did China, North Korea, and France. The greatest concern 
was shown by the former colonial power, Belgium, which early on 
protested against Burundi's genocidal policies. East Timor received 
verbal support from Australia and Portugal, and Indonesia received mili-
tary support from the United States, while others claimed ignorance 
about accusations of genocide in East Timor. In all cases United Nations 
actions were confined to humanitarian relief eff orts.14 
Post-Coup and .ost-Revolutionary Genocides 
The genocides of Kampuchea, Uganda, and Indonesia took place 
after a revolution in Kampuchea, after a coup in Uganda, and after an 
attempted coup in Indonesia, each conflict causing massive internal 
upheaval. 
With the deposal of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 a relatively 
tranquil period ended in Cambodia. Increased involvement in the Viet-
nam War led to increased turmoil in the Khmer Republic. Forces of the 
Khmer Republic fought the Khmer Rouge in a civil war, which ended in 
the takeover by the Khmer Rouge Communists in 1975 and the estab-
lishment of Democratic Kampuchea. From 1975 to 1979 the Khmer 
Rouge expelled all foreigners and instituted one of the bloodiest regimes 
known in the twentieth century. Under the leadership of Pol Pot the 
urban population was sent to the countryside to become part of the 
"new" productive forces. He designated as expendable all those unable 
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to perform the task. Pol Pot's "Marxist" revolution was but a peasant 
uprising against the feudal class represented by the townspeople.15 
Though his fury was mainly directed against townspeople, former 
collaborators including loyal peasants were also eliminated; thus, all 
perceived as opposing the regime were targets of genocidal policies. The 
failure of the regime was sealed with the invasion by Vietnamese forces 
in 1979; Vietnam is still occupying the country. 
In January 1971 ldi Amin overthrew Milton Obote of Uganda in a 
coup, setting in motion a regime which ruled with unprecedented bru-
tality. Amin, the dictator of Uganda who is often compared with Hitler, 
during his first three months in office was responsible for the deaths of 
10,000 civilians and 2,000 soldiers. Like Pol Pot, Amin immediately 
chose to expel all foreigners from the country. His genocidal policies 
extended to all perceived as opposing his regime. His henchmen were 
members of his own tribe, the Kakwa, Nubians inside Uganda, and 
mercenaries from the Southern Sudan. In the effort to consolidate his 
power, Amin was responsible for the slaughter of an estimated 500,000 
people. His regime ended with an invasion by Tanzanian forces in 
1979, leaving behind a legacy of tyranny.16 
On October 1, 1965, six Indonesian generals and a lieutenant were 
murdered in an uprising against President Sukarno. Although the truth 
may remain forever a secret, the events were thought to be Communist 
inspired and/or initiated.17 In a predominantly Muslim society, the 
Communist party was something of an enigma (membership estimated at 
10 million or one-quarter of the adult population). The short-lived 
uprising was crushed a few days later and led to the systematic slaughter 
of hundreds of thousands of Communists over a period of two years. 
Participating in the slaughter were soldiers and civilians trained for the 
purpose. Some officials of the Suharto regime later explained the 
slaughter as the "people's revenge," suggesting a spontaneous mass 
reaction to avenge the death of some of their leaders-hardly convincing 
in light of the fact that the slaughter continued over two years. 
International support for the revolutionaries in Kampuchea came from 
Vietnam and China, while the regime was supported by American arms 
and aid. The faltering United States effort in Vietnam led to an aban-
donment of the pro-American Lon Nol regime, which enabled Pol Pot to 
take over. The subsequent fall of the Pol Pot regime was in part due to 
the growing antagonism between China and Vietnam, eventually leading 
to the invasion by the latter, whereupon Pol Pot fled to China. Uganda's 
Amin received full support from Libya but was criticized by the leaders 
of Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia. By and large, however, the OAU 
remained silent about the indiscriminate killings of Ugandans. Only after 
Uganda invaded Tanzania did Tanzania respond with a counterinvasion. 
Supported by renegade Ugandan soldiers, the invasion successfully 
removed the murderous regime, and Amin fled to Libya. In Indonesia 
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the coup was thought to be inspired by Peking, though no direct link 
with China could be detected. American sympathies went to the Suharto 
regime. In all cases the United Nations did little other than express its 
dismay and verbally condemn these flagrant violations of human rights. 
Genocides of Conquest 
During the imposition of German colonialism in what is today Na-
mibia, the Hereros became the target of genocidal policies. In the early 
1970s "the International League for the Rights of Man, joined by the 
Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, charged the 
government of Paraguay with complicity in genocide against the Guayaki 
Indians."18 
In the short-lived colonial history of the German Empire (ending in 
1918), early efforts of peaceful colonization in Southern Africa were 
soon replaced by measures which reduced the indigenous people to 
serfdom. The Hereros, a pastoral people noted for their large cattle 
herds, saw themselves slowly stripped of their land by German settlers. 
From 1903 to 1907 they revolted against the German colonizers-with 
devastating results. Successful at first, the Hereros were eventually de-
feated by superior technology and firepower. Thousands lost their lives 
in the actions following the uprising. The Germans "hunted them down 
like wild beasts all during 1905."19 An estimated 65,000 Hereros lost 
their lives. 
The Guayaki (Aché) Indians, a hunting and gathering people, were 
targets of genocide when "modern" Paraguayans encroached upon their 
traditional lands. During 197 4 the Paraguayan government was blamed 
for allowing the slaughter, torture, and enslavement of the Indians by 
hunters and slavetraders. 
International action was negligible in the first case. Wars against na-
tive Africans warranted no attention from other colonizers. There was 
some international attention given to the Aché Indian case, and verbal 
condemnation of Paraguayan policy eventually resulted in some response 
by the government. 
CONCLUSIONS
In all the cases considered here genocides were preceded by some 
attempt to change the existing power structure. It should be obvious that 
any attempt to change existing power relations carries a certain amount of 
risk for the challenger. Though most potential revolutionaries accept the 
calculus of losing some lives, genocide would be an unacceptable risk to 
anyone. 
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Successful rebellions (Kampuchea, for example) more often resulted 
in massive internal upheavals than did failed attempts (Indonesia, for 
example). Moreover, unsuccessful coups often resulted in the slaughter 
of those affiliated with the rebelling faction, for example, in Indonesia 
and East Timor. Evidently governments utilize genocidal policies to 
eliminate the opposition in an attempt to maintain the existing power 
structure. In some cases these processes may extend to include attempts 
to annihilate a people, i.e., a holocaust. This does not mean that holo-
causts result in more deaths; it simply means that the pursuers seek the 
total destruction of a people rather than their partial destruction. The dif-
ference is especially apparent in cases where the victims belong to the 
political opposition-often the slaughter stops short off amily members. 
The child of a Communist may not necessarily become one himself, but 
the child of a Jew cannot escape his/her Jewishness, as a result often 
becoming the victim of a holocaust. Utilizing genocide to eliminate 
political opposition thus appears to be a more rational choice than the 
attempt to annihilate a people. As such, policymakers sometimes make 
the argument that political victims are legitimate targets of governmental 
violence which aims to prevent further violence, e.g., future civil war. 
In contrast, one may argue that ethnic/religious victims are illegitimate 
targets of governmental violence because they have neither the means to 
fight back, nor do they compete with government, and thus are truly 
innocent of any wrongdoing. But what is at stake is not the charac-
teristics of the victim group, but the motives of the perpetrators. The 
killing of a people for attempting to change the existing government 
structure cannot be based on the collective character of a group, simply 
because not everybody is involved in the struggle. The only public 
offense which warrants the execution of an individual is the murder of 
another (in some societies even murder does not result in death). Ex-
cluded from this principle are killings done in the process of war, al-
though many people view war and the resulting human carnage as an 
unacceptable means of international interaction. In cases of no war and 
where no individual crime has taken place, any killing either done by or 
conspired in by public authorities against a group of people is a crime. 
The theoretical argument advances the proposition that structural 
challenges result in upheavals, polarize existing internal cleavages, and 
-with external help or the lack of it to either the dominant group or the 
rebelling faction-sometimes lead to genocide. In all cases cited above 
the genocides were preceded by challenges to the dominant power strata. 
In all cases genocidal processes were accelerated through the polarization 
of internal cleavages. The most distinct cases are those of the Holocaust, 
the Armenian genocide, and Burundi, where the groups were targets of 
prior discrimination and/or random violence, and also were easily iden-
tified by differences in culture, religion, and ethnicity. The Southern 
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Sudan, Biafra, and Bangladesh similarly saw incidences of random vio-
lence and/or repression against target groups who were culturally, eth-
nically, and/or religiously different. In East Timor, Kampuchea, and 
Indonesia the victim groups shared similar ethnic characteristics with the 
dominant group, but, though prior internal rivalries existed in all cases, 
the victims were considered enemies mainly because of their political 
affiliations. Uganda is something of a special case, because victims 
were neither clearly political enemies nor did they belong to one specific 
religious or ethnic group. The killings, although systematic, seemed to 
be instituted to consolidate the despotic power of a tyrant, similar to the 
"Enabling Act" which gave Hitler the license to kill. The genocides 
against the Hereros and the Aché Indians were policies designed to ex-
tend the control of the dominant "civilization." In the case of the former, 
the Germans encountered a new type of warfare in the guerrilla tactics of 
the Hereros, which they responded to in kind. Thus, random incidents 
of "savagery" by the Hereros led to their wholesale, systematic slaughter 
by the Germans. The Achés, although part of the same racial stock as 
their persecutors, were culturally separated from the dominant stratum of 
Paraguay. Malign neglect by the government led to their genocide, 
perpetrated by those acting on behalf of the dominant interest, in a march 
toward their version of civilization. 
In all cases external support for either the dominant group or a 
rebellious faction added significantly to the success or failure of the 
undertaking. The Herero genocide is the exception, probably because 
the slaughter of "savages" in 1904 by the colonizers was more acceptable 
then. Today, the "savages" of the past are replaced by either the 
Untermenschen or enemies of the dominant group. Nowadays, the drive 
toward civilization is replaced by the search for a better world, in which 
those perceived as standing in the way of "progress" are liquidated. 
If we are able to explain past genocides and thus to anticipate future 
genocides, the next logical step is their prevention. International organi-
zations such as the United Nations have failed to halt the use of geno-
cidal policies by sovereign states. Internal bickering and competing in-
terests have prevented the effective use of international diplomacy to 
prevent or stop genocides. Yet, the emergence of numerous private 
organizations, in combination with a few U.N. efforts, gives the 
impression that something may yet be done. 
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GENOCIDE AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
THEORY: OBSERVATIONS ON 
THE EXCLUSIVITY OF 
COLLECTIVE DEATH 
Irving Louis Horowitz 
The subject of genocide in general and the Holocaust in particular 
threatens to become a growth industry in the Western cultural apparatus. 
Books, plays, and television dramatizations on the subject pour forth re-
lentlessly. Sometimes they are presented soberly, other times scanda-
lously; but all are aimed at a mass market unfortunately more amazed 
than disturbed by their implications. There is danger in this massifica-
tion of Holocaust studies. Western culture is inclined to adopt fads; even 
Holocaust studies may become a moment in commercial time-interest in 
them may decline as well as grow, and even peak out, leaving in its 
wake a void. The residual debris will probably be summarized in musi-
cal comedy; we have already seen examples of this in The Lieutenant 
(Lieutenant Calley) and Evita (Eva Peron) on Broadway. Peter Weiss' 
play The Investigation led one commentator to suggest that the major 
character in the play, in order to elicit shock from the audience, read lines 
"as if he were saying: 'Let's hear it for genocide."'1 This may be a sign 
of things to come. 
One of the least attractive features of post-Holocaust studies is the 
effort of a few to monopolize the field. As a consequence, a linguistic 
battle looms among survivors over which exterminations even deserve 
the appellation "holocaust" (the total physical annihilation of a nation or a 
people). Such a bizarre struggle over language remains a grim reminder 
of how easy it is for victims to challenge each other and how difficult it 
is to forge common links against victimizers. 2 I do not wish to deny 
Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust the uniqueness of their experience. 
But there are strong elements of continuity as well as discontinuity in the 
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process of genocide, in the evolution of life-taking as an essential dimen-
sion by which state power can be measured in the twentieth century. 
Writing with compelling insight, Elie Wiesel personifies the mystic 
vision of the Holocaust. Those who lived through it "lack objectivity," 
he claims, while those who write on the subject but did not live through 
it must "withdraw" from the analytic challenge "without daring to enter 
into the heart of the matter."3 More recently, it has been suggested that 
"for Jews, the Holocaust is a tragedy that cannot be shared" and "it may 
be unrealistic or unreasonable or inappropriate to ask Jews to share the 
term holocaust. But it is even more unreasonable and inappropriate not 
to find a new name for what has taken place in Cambodia. "4 Since what 
took place in both situations is a holocaust-from the demographic point 
of view-we need not invent new terms to explain similar barbaric pro-
cesses. Those who share a holocaust share a common experience of 
being victim to the state's ruthless and complete pursuit of human life-
taking without regard to individual guilt or innocence. It is punishment 
for identification with a particular group, not for personal demeanor or 
performance. These are not theological, but empirical criteria. To seek 
exclusivity in death has bizarre implications. The special Jewish triumph 
is life. All too many peoples-Jews, Cambodians, Armenians, Para- 
guayans, Ugandans -- have shared a similar fate for victims to engage in 
divisive squabbles about whose holocaust is real or whose genocide is 
worse. 
Those who take an exclusive position on the Holocaust are engaging 
in moral bookkeeping, in which only those who suffer very large num-
bers of deaths qualify. Some argue that the 6 million deaths among 
European Jews is far greater than the estimated 1 million deaths among 
Armenians. However, the number of Armenian deaths as a percentage 
of their total population (50 percent) is not much lower than the per-
centage of Jewish losses (60 percent). Others contend that the deaths of 
Ugandans or Biafrans are too few to compare to the Holocaust; yet here, 
too, tribal deaths in percentage terms rival the European pattern of 
genocide. In certain instances high death rates (approximately 40 percent 
of all Cambodians, or 3 million out of 7 million) are indisputable; then 
one hears that such deaths were only random and a function of total 
societal disintegration. Yet it has been firmly established that such 
deaths were targeted against intellectuals, educators, the foreign-born, 
and literate people-in short, the pattern was hardly random; anyone 
who could potentially disrupt a system of agrarian slave labor flying 
under Communist banners was singled out and eliminated. Even making 
the definition a matter of percentages risks creating a morality based 
solely on bookkeeping. 
There is need to reaffirm the seriousness of the subject. The problem 
of genocide must be rescued from mass culture. It must not be returned 
to academic preserves, but it must be made part and parcel of a general 
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theory of social systems and social structures. The positions which I 
would like to discuss, examine, and criticize perhaps have been articu-
lated best by theologian Emil L. Fackenheim5 and sociologist Leo 
Kuper. 6 In some curious way they represent the extremes that must be 
overcome if an integrated approach to the study of genocide is to become 
a serious subject for scientific analysis. On  the one hand Fackenheim 
speaks with a thunderous theological certitude that approaches messianic 
or at least prophetic assuredness. On the other hand is Kuper, who is 
extremely modest in his approach, to the point where some fundamental 
distinctions between severe strife and mass destruction are entirely oblit-
erated. This is not to suggest that the truth lies somewhere in the middle 
but rather that the need for a social scientific standpoint in the study of 
genocide may convince all to move to a higher ground in this area-an 
area of research that has truly replaced economics as the dismal science. 
Fackenheim's propositions have come to represent the main trends in 
the theological school of Holocaust studies. They carry tremendous 
weight among mass culture figures for whom theological sanction pro-
vides legitimation to their endeavors and respite from critics.7 Facken-
heim does not remotely intend his views to become part of mass culture. 
Quite the contrary. His eight propositions distinguishing the Holocaust 
in particular from genocide in general represent a tremendous effort to 
transcend journalistic platitudes, to move beyond an articulation of the 
banality of evil and into the evil of banality. This deep respect for 
Fackenheim registered, it must also be said that an alternative perspec-
tive-a social science framework-is warranted. 
Fackenheim presents his eight propositions with direction and force. 
A general theory of genocide and state power, which accounts for the 
specifics of the Holocaust, can have no better baseline. 
One: The Holocaust was not a war. Like all wars, the Roman War against 
the Jews was over conflicting interests-territorial, imperial, and religious-
waged between parties endowed, however unequally, with power. The vic-
tims of the Holocaust had no power. And they were a threat to the Third 
Reich only in the Nazi mind. 
The Holocaust was a war; but a modern rather than a medieval 
variety. Earlier wars redistributed power by military means. Genocide 
redistributes power by technological as well as military means. Robert 
Lifton recently stated the issue succinctly. 
The word holocaust, from Greek origin, means total consumption by fire. 
That definition applies, with literal grotesqueness, to Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald, and also to Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Old Testament usage 
there is the added meaning of the sacrifice of a burnt offering. That meaning 
tends to be specifically retained for the deliberate, selective Nazi genocide of 
six million Jews-retained with both bitterness and irony (sacrifice to whom 
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for what?). I will thus speak of the Holocaust and of holocausts-the first to 
convey the uniqueness of the Nazi project of genocide, the second to suggest 
certain general principles around the totality of destruction as it affects sur-
vivors. From this perspective, the holocaust means total disaster: the physi-
cal, social, and spiritual obliteration of a human community.s 
The precedent for this war against the Jews was the Turkish decimation 
of the Armenian population. Like the Nazis, the Ottoman Empire did not 
simply need to win a war and redistribute power; it had an overwhelming 
amount of power to begin with.9 A war of annihilation is a war. To 
deny the warlike character of genocide is to deny its essence: the de-
struction of human beings for predetermined nationalist or statist goals. 
The Holocaust is also modem in that it is an internal war, waged with 
subterfuge and deception by a majority with power against an internal 
minority with little power. Here too the Armenian and Jewish cases are 
roughly comparable. Although one can talk of genocide in relation to the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, genocidal conflict involves inter-
nal rather than external populations. But this is an unambiguous point 
on the nature of war rather than a denial of the warlike nature of the 
Holocaust per se. 
The victims of the Holocaust did have a certain power: they repre-
sented a threat to the Nazi Reich. The Jew as bourgeois and the Jew as 
proletarian represented the forces of legitimacy and revolution in Weimar 
Germany. They had modest positions in universities, in labor, and in 
industry. Regarding state power itself, where there were scarcely any 
Jews, they were powerless. Jews were locked out from the German 
bureaucratic apparatus much as the Turkish Beys locked out Armenians 
from the Ottoman administrative apparatus, except to use them in a Quis-
ling-like manner. The Jews posed a threatening challenge to the legiti-
macy of the Nazi regime. 
Two: The Holocaust was not part of a war, a war crime. War crimes belong 
intrinsically to wars, whether they are calculated to further war goals, or are 
the result of passions that wars unleash. The Holocaust hindered rather than 
furthered German war aims in World War II. And it was directed, not by 
passions, but rather by a plan devoid of passion, indeed, unable to afford this 
luxury. 
This argument rests on a peculiar and misanthropic rendition of the 
Hilberg thesis. The Holocaust did hinder the Nazi war effort in the 
limited sense that troop transportation took second priority to trans-
porting Jews. But in the longer and larger perspective, there were 
advantages. Slave labor was itself an advantage; unpaid labor time was 
useful. The expropriation of goods and materials was an economic gain 
for the Nazi Reich. People were liquidated at marginal cost to the 
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system. The gold taken from extracted teeth became a proprietary trans-
fer.10 Fackenheim questions whether war goals were furthered by the 
Holocaust; this is not answered simply. As a mobilizing device linking 
military and civil sectors of the population, war ends were enhanced by 
the conduct of the Holocaust. The Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews 
was motivated by passion, as evidenced by the fact that troop move-
ments to the Russian front took second priority. 
Raul Hilberg makes clear the direct collusion of the German Wehr-
macht and the German Reichsbahn with respect to the systematic depor-
tation of Jews and the front-line servicing of the armed forces. The 
management of the German railroad illustrates how irrationality can 
become rationalized, how a "true system in the modern sense of the 
term" was employed for the unrelenting destruction of human lives. As 
Hilberg notes, to the extent that the technification of mass society was 
exemplified by the transportation network, such human engineering 
considerations cannot be viewed as ancillary. 
It illuminates and defines the very concept of "totalitarianism." The Jews 
could not be destroyed by one Fhreron one order. The unprecedented event 
was a product of multiple initiatives, as well as lengthy negotiations and 
repeated adjustments among separate power structures, which differed from 
one another in their traditions and customs but which were united in their 
unfathomable will to push the Nazi regime to the limits of its destructive 
potentiaI.11 
The question of passion is a moot point at best; undoubtedly there was a 
collective passion undergirding the conduct of the Holocaust. It was not 
simply a methodical event 
Fackenheim and many other theologians overlooked parallels in the 
pursuit of a genocidal state following defeat. After the Turkish defeat at 
the hands of Bulgaria in 1912, the most massive genocide against 
Armenians occurred. After the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, the 
most massive destruction of Jews ensued. Whatever the vocabulary of 
motives-fear of discovery, of reprisal, or of judgment-the use of 
state-sanctioned murder to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat is 
evident. 
The largest part of European Jewry was destroyed after Germany had 
in effect lost the war. When the major object of the war, defeat of the 
Allied powers, was no longer feasible, the more proximate aim, de-
struction of the Jewish people, became the paramount goal. War aims 
have manifest and latent elements. The manifest aim was victory in the 
war, but the latent aim was defeat of the internal "enemy," the Jews. 
The near-total destruction of the Jewish population might be considered 
the victory of the Third Reich in the face of the greater defeat they 
confronted by the end of Stalingrad. 
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Three: The Holocaust was not a case of racism, although, of course, the 
Nazis were racists. But they were racists because they were anti-Semites, not 
anti-Semites because they were racists. (The case of the Japanese as honorary 
Aryans would suffice to bear this out.) Racism asserts that some human 
groups are inferior to others, destined to slavery. The Holocaust enacted the 
principle that the Jews are not of the human race at all but "vermin" to be 
"extenninated." 
Here Fackenheim represents a considerable body of thought But the 
Holocaust was a case of racism. It is not a question of which comes 
first, anti-Semitism or racism; that philosophical dilemma is secondary. 
Assignment of special conditions of life and work to Jews implies what 
racism is all about: the assumption of inferiority and superiority leading 
to different forms of egalitarian outcomes. Ultimately racism is not 
about institutionalizing inferiority or superiority, but about denial of the 
humanity of those involved. Jewish vis-a-vis Aryan physical charac-
teristics were studied by German anthropologists to prove that there was 
such a thing as race involved. These stereotypes were the essence of 
European racism, as George Mosse has fully documented in a recent 
work. 
Racism had taken the ideas about man and his world which we have attempted 
to analyze and directed them toward the final solution. Such concepts as 
middle-class virtue, heroic morality, honesty, truthfulness, and love of nation 
had become involved as ever against the Jew: the organs of the efficient state 
helped to bring about the final solution; and science itself continued its 
corruption through racism. Above all, anthropology, which had been so 
deeply involved in the rise of racism, now used racism for its own end 
through the final solution. Anthropological studies were undertaken on the 
helpless inmates of the camps. Just as previously non-racist scientists became 
converted by the temptation to aid Nazi eugenic policies, so others could not 
resist the temptation to use their power over life and death in order to further 
their anthropological or ethnographic ambitions.12 
The fact that American racism has a clear-cut criterion based on skin 
color does not mean that the physical and emotional characteristics 
attributed to Jews were less a matter of racism than the characteristics 
attributed to American blacks. To deny the racial character of the 
Holocaust is to reject the special bond that oppressed peoples share, the 
special unity that can bind blacks and Armenians and Jews. To empha-
size distinctions between peoples by arguing for the uniqueness of anti-
Semitism is a profound mistake; it reduces any possibility of a unified 
political and human posture on the meaning of genocide or the Holo-
caust. The triumphalism in death implicit in this kind of sectarianism 
comes close to defeating its own purpose. 
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Four: The Holocaust was not a case of genocide although it was in response 
to this crime that the world invented the term. Genocide is a modem phe-
nomenon. For the most part in ancient times human beings were considered 
valuable, and were carried off into slavery. The genocides of modem history 
spring from motives, human, if evil, such as greed, hatred, or simply blind 
xenophobic passion. This is true even when they masquerade under high-
flown ideologies. The Nazi genocide of the Jewish people did not mas-
querade under an ideology. The ideology was genuinely believed. This was 
an "idealistic" genocide to which war aims were, therefore, sacrificed. The 
ideal was to rid the world of Jews as one rids oneself of lice. It was also, 
however, to "punish" the Jews for their "crimes," and the crime in question 
was existence itself. Hitherto, such a charge had been directed only at devils; 
Jews had now become devils as well as vermin. And there is but one thing 
that devils and vermin have in common: neither is human. 
Here Fackenheim has a problem of logical contradiction. First we are 
told that the Holocaust is not a case of genocide, and then we are 
reminded of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. But more signifi-
cant is the contradiction within this framework, an inability to accept the 
common fate of the victims. Whether they are Japanese, Ugandans, 
Gypsies, Cambodians, Armenians, or Jews, their common humanity 
makes possible a common intellectual understanding. Insistence upon 
separatism, that the crime was Jewish existence and that this makes the 
Jewish situation different from any other slaughter, whatever its roots, 
contains a dangerous element of mystification. It represents a variation 
of the belief in chosenness, converting it from living God's command-
ments into chosenness for destruction. This approach is dangerously 
misanthropic. It misses the point that being chosen for life may be a 
unique Jewish mission, but being selected for death is common to many 
peoples and societies. 
The description of Jews as devils was not the essence of Nazi anti-
Semitism; it was only the rhetoric of Nazism. The Ayatollah Khomeini 
and other Iranian clerics constantly refer to Americans as devils. The 
essence of the Jewish problem for Nazism was the Jew as a political 
actor, and beyond that, the Jew as a cosmopolitan, universalistic figure 
in contrast to Fascist concepts based on nationalism, statism, and 
particularism. The Jewish tradition of social marginality, of reticence to 
participate in nationalistic celebrations, makes anti-Semitism a universal 
phenomenon, as characteristic of France as of the Soviet Union. The 
special character of Jewish living cannot be easily converted into the 
special nature of Jewish dying. Dying is a universal property of many 
peoples, cultures, and nations. 
Five: The Holocaust was not an episode within the Third Reich, a footnote 
for historians. In all other societies, however brutal, people are punished for 
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doing. In the Third Reich, "non-Aryans" were punished for being. In all 
other societies-in pretended or actual principle, if assuredly not always in 
practice-people are presumed innocent until proved guilty; the Nazi principle 
presumed everyone guilty until he had proved his "Aryan" innocence. Hence, 
anyone proving or even prepared to prove such innocence was implicated, 
however slightly or unwittingly, in the process which led to Auschwitz. The 
Holocaust is not an accidental by-product of the Reich but rather its inmost 
essence. 
Response to this proposition must acknowledge the basic truths of the 
first part of the statement. The Holocaust was not merely a passing 
moment within the Third Reich. It did not occur in other Fascist 
countries, like Italy, for example, where death itself was alien to the 
Italian culture, where not only the survival of Jews but the survival of 
Communists was tolerated and even encouraged. Antonio Gramsci's 
major works were written in a prison that had been converted into a 
library by his jailers. The nature of national culture is a specific entity. 
The Italian people, the Turkish people, the German people all had a 
distinctive character. Social analysts do not discuss this kind of theme in 
public. It is not fashionable; we have become even a bit frightened of the 
concept of national character. Any notion of national character as that 
advanced by Fackenheim carries within itself the danger of stereotypical 
thought. But how else can we understand these phenomena? How can 
we understand the character of reaction, rebellion, and revolution in 
Turkey without understanding Turkish character, especially the conti-
nuity of that kind of character in the moral bookkeeping of development? 
Ascribing guilt through proving innocence fits the framework of the 
Nazi ideology. But to construct a general theory of historical guilt may 
have pernicious consequences, in which the sins of the fathers are 
bequeathed to the children and further offspring. That the Holocaust 
was an "inmost essence" makes it difficult to get beyond phylogenic 
memories, beyond a situation in which a society might be viewed as 
having overcome its racism. When guilt is generalized, when it no 
longer is historically specific to social systems and political regimes, then 
a kind of irreducible psychologism takes intellectual command and it 
becomes impossible to stipulate conditions for moving beyond a geno-
cidal state. The Holocaust becomes part of a rooted psychic uncon-
sciousness hovering above the permanently contaminated society. To be 
sure, the Holocaust is the essence of the Third Reich. However, such an 
observation is not necessarily the core question. Does the destruction of 
the Jews follow automatically upon a nation that is swallowed up by the 
totalitarian temptation? In which forms of totalitarianism does a 
holocaust or genocide take place? Is anti-Semitism the essence of the 
Soviet Union as is now claimed? Does the existence of anti-Semitism 
prove a theory of totalitarian essence? 
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The uncomfortable fact is that genocide is the consequence of certain 
forms of unbridled state power. But whether anti-Semitism or other 
forms of racism are employed depends on the specific history of 
oppressor groups no less than oppressed peoples. States which demon-
strate their power by exercising their capacity to take lives may be termed 
totalitarian. Totalitarianism is the essence of the genocidal process. This 
in itself provides an ample definition. If the Holocaust is unique to the 
Third Reich, the question of genocide loses any potential for being a 
general issue common to oppressive regimes. It is parochial to think that 
the Third Reich somehow uniquely embodied the character of the Holo-
caust, when since then we have seen many other societies adopt similar 
positions and policies toward other minorities and peoples. 
Six: The Holocaust is not part of Gennan history alone. It includes such 
figures as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Jajj Amin al-Husseini, who 
successfully urged the Nazi leaders to kill more Jews. It also includes all 
countries whose niggardly immigration policies prior to World War II cannot 
be explained in nonnal tenns alone, such as the pressure of the Great De-
pression or a xenophobic tradition. Hitler did not wish to export national 
socialism but only anti-Semitism. He was widely successful. He succeeded 
when the world thought that "the Jews" must have done something to arouse 
the treatment given them by a Gennan government. He also succeeded when 
the world categorized Jews needing a refuge as "useless people." (In this 
category would have been Sigmund Freud, had he still been in Germany 
rather than in America; Martin Buber, had he not already made his way to the 
Yishuv [Palestine].) This was prior to the war. When the war had trapped 
the Jews of Nazi Europe, the railways to Auschwitz were not bombed. The 
Holocaust is not a parochial event. It is world-historical. 
Curiously there is no mention of any other kind of history. Is, for 
example, the genocide of the Armenian people part of world history or is 
it simply part of Turkish history? This is a very complicated point; at the 
risk of sounding impervious to moral claims, one has to be history-
specific if anything serious is to emerge. If one blames the whole world 
for what took place at Van, one can construct such a theory. But it is 
more pertinent, more appropriate, more pointed, to blame the Turks and 
not the universe, and to blame the Germans and not the whole world, 
including the Grand Mufti. The issue is implementation, not rhetoric. 
The issue is neither the Grand Mufti nor the insecurities of Ambassador 
Morgenthau. 
Fackenheim's idea that Hitler neither exported national socialism nor 
wished to do so represents a special reading of events. As Gideon 
Hausner reminds us,13 as late as April 1945, when the Soviets were 
penetrating Berlin for the final assault and Hitler was imprisoned in his 
bunker, his last will and testament concluded by enjoining "the 
government and the people to uphold the racial laws to the limit and to 
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resist mercilessly the poisoner of all nations, international Jewry." 
Hausner makes it plain that national socialism was an international move-
ment whose linchpin was anti-Semitism. Fackenheim presumes that 
World War II was all about anti-Semitism, but at a more prosaic level it 
was about conquest. There was a Nazi government in Rumania; there 
was a Nazi government in Yugoslavia-all these regimes were exported 
The idea that Hitler was not interested in exporting national socialism is 
curious. It would be more appropriate to note that wherever national 
socialism was exported, so too did anti-Semitism follow. However, in 
conditions where the Jewish population was not a factor, Nazism still 
sought to establish a political foothold, either with or without direct 
military aggression. The relation between national socialism as an 
ideology and anti-Semitism as a passion is one that the Nazis themselves 
were hard put to resolve. The linkage between the ideology and the 
passion, which seems so close in retrospect, was far less articulated 
policy than felt need in the earlier states of the Nazi regime. 
Fackenheim slips in a subtle point that Jews were "trapped" in 
Europe. But Jews were not trapped in Europe. They were of Europe 
and had been of Europe for a thousand years. One of their dilemmas is 
one rendered in almost every history where those who are to be exploited 
or annihilated overidentify with their ruling masters. The Jews of 
Europe were entirely Europeanized. Only a small fragment remained 
outside the framework of Europeanization. The great divide of German 
and Russian Jews was participation in European nationalism, identifi-
cation with enlightenment. Fackenheim's idea that the Jews were 
trapped in Europe is a clever misreading of the facts. The added horror 
of the Holocaust is that it happened to a people who were endemic to that 
part of the world. 
Seven: The Jews were no mere scapegoat in the Holocaust. It is true that 
they were used as such in the early stages of the movement. Thus Hitler was 
able to unite the "left" and "right" wings of his party by distinguishing, on the 
left between "Marxist" (i.e., Jewish) and "national socialism" (i.e., "Aryan") 
and, on the right, between raffendes Kapital ("rapacious," i.e., "Jewish" 
capital) and schaffendes Kapital ("creative," i.e., "Aryan" capital). It is also 
true that, had the supply of Jewish victims given out, Hitler would have been 
forced (as he once remarked to Hermann Rauschning) to "invent" new 
"Jews." But it is not true that "The Jew [was] ... only a pretext for 
something else." So long as there were actual Jews, it was these actual Jews 
who were the systematic object of ferreting-out, torture, and murder. Once, 
at Sinai, Jews had been singled out for life and a task. Now at Auschwitz, 
they were singled out for torment and death. 
The difficulty with this exclusivist formula is that while Jews were 
singled out, so too were Gypsies, Poles, and Slavs. Hitler's appeal was 
to state power, not to unite left and right; not to unite bourgeoisie and 
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proletariat, but to make sure that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of 
Germany were purified of Jewish elements. If one considers the na-
tional aspects of the Third Reich rather than the mystical aspects of 
Jewish destruction it becomes a lot easier to fathom. German Jewish 
concentration points were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in leftist 
socialist politics and in high bourgeois economics. Liquidation of the 
Jews enabled the German bureaucratic state to manage the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat of Germany without opposition.14 The destruction of 
socialism was attendant to the destruction of the Jews. Without socialist 
opposition, the German proletariat was an easy mark for Third Reich 
massification. The first two legislative acts of the Third Reich were bills 
of labor, work, and management. The liquidation of the Jewish popula-
tion, within both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, permitted the Nazis 
to consolidate state power. The Holocaust, from a Nazi standpoint, was 
an entirely rational process, scarcely a singular act of mystical divination. 
It was the essential feature of Nazi "domestic" policy in the final stages 
of the Third Reich. 
Eight: The Holocaust is not over and done with. Late in the war Goebbels 
(who needless to say, knew all) said publicly and with every sign of con-
viction that, among the peoples of Europe, the Jews alone had neither 
sacrificed nor suffered in the war but only profited from it. As this was 
written, an American professor has written a book asserting that the Holo-
caust never happened, while other Nazis are preparing to march on Skokie in 
an assault on Jewish survivors. Like the old Nazis, the new Nazis say two 
things at once. The Holocaust never happened; and it is necessary to finish 
the job. 
On this point, Fackenheim is on sound ground. Still, the point that he 
does not make and that requires emphasis is that the Holocaust did 
happen and could happen again, but is now more likely to happen to 
people other than Jews and Armenians. It was more likely to happen to 
Ugandans, and it did; to Cambodians, and it did; to Paraguayans, and it 
did; to Biafrans, and it did. It is correct to say that the Holocaust is not 
over and done with. But it is not over and done with because there are 
other peoples victimized by the very model created by the Turkish and 
Nazi genocides. 
It is important not to fit peoplehood into theories; theories must fit the 
realities of people. If the restoration of human dignity is to become a 
theme for social research, it becomes imperative to understand the uni-
fied character of genocide, the common characteristics of its victims, and 
ultimately the need for alliances of victims and potential victims to resist 
all kinds of genocide. To insist on universalism, triumphalism, or sepa-
ratist orientations is self-defeating. If there is to be any political conse-
quence of research into genocide, and if victim groups are to do more 
than pay for annual memorials and remembrances, understanding of the 
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unity needed to confront state oppression must be made paramount; 
otherwise little will have been accomplished and nothing will have 
changed. 
Although my analysis has sharply demarcated theological from 
sociological viewpoints, it should be appreciated that Jewish religious 
thought is itself far from unanimous on the special nature of the Holo-
caust Orthodox segments in particular have cautioned against an overly 
dramaturgical viewpoint, urging instead a position in which the Nazi 
Holocaust is but the latest monumental assault on the Jewish people-
one that is neither to be ignored nor celebrated, but simply understood as 
part of the martyrdom of a people. In a recent essay, William Helmreich 
has finely caught the spirit of this "strictly orthodox" view-which may 
be shared by larger numbers than either the mystifiers or the celebra-
tionists may recognize. 
He notes that this orthodox wing rejects paying special homage by 
singling out the victims of the Holocaust on both philosophical and 
practical grounds. 
In their view, the Holocaust is not, in any fundamental way, a unique event in 
Jewish history, but simply the latest in a long chain of anti-Jewish perse-
cutions that began with the destruction of the Temple and which also included 
the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, attacks on Jews led by Chmielnicki, 
and the hundreds of pogroms to which the Jewish community has been 
subjected to over the centuries. They do admit that the Holocaust was unique 
in scale and proportion but this is not considered a distinction justifying its 
elevation into a separate category.15 
Helmreich goes on to note that the ethical problem, in view of orthodox 
believers, is the same if one Jew is murdered or if 6 million meet such a 
fate. Since Judaism is a Gemeinschaft ("a community of fate"), the 
sheer volume killed, while awesome, does not in itself transform a 
quantitative event into a unique qualitative phenomenon. 
The significance of this minority theological report is to call attention 
to the fact that in the problem of the Holocaust, while there are some 
strong clerical-secular bifurcations, there are also cross-cutting patterns 
across disciplinary boundaries. For example, certain sociological les-
sons can be drawn from the Holocaust: the breakdown in egalitarian 
revolutions of the nineteenth century, the subtle abandonment of the 
Palestinian mandate after the Balfour Declaration, the lofty assertion 
followed by a total revocation of Jewish minority rights in the Soviet 
Union. For orthodoxy the Holocaust is more a function of the break-
down of Jewish solidarity than of any special evils of the German nation 
or the Nazi regime. 
The sociological view attempts to transcend sectarian or parochial 
concerns and develop a cross-cultural paradigm that would permit plac-
ing the Holocaust in a larger perspective of genocide in the twentieth 
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century rather than seeing the former as entirely distinctive and the latter 
as some weaker form of mass murder. For example, with the liquidation 
of roughly 40 percent of the Cambodian population, even the quantitative 
indicators of the Nazi Holocaust have been approached in at least one 
other situation. In the past, it has been argued that genocide of other 
peoples-Armenians, Ugandans, Paraguayans, Indians-has been too 
random and sporadic to be termed a holocaust It has also been claimed 
that the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were highly selective 
and refined military targets and not efforts at the total destruction of a 
people. Whatever the outcome of such contentions, the Cambodian case 
would indicate the risks in vesting too much intellectual capital in the 
sheer numbers involved-although it is clearly a factor to be contended 
with. 
Having argued thusly, let me note that qualitative differences do exist 
which distinguish the Jewish Holocaust from any other forms of geno-
cide. First, there is the systematic rather than random or sporadic nature 
of the Holocaust: the technological and organizational refinement of the 
tools of mass slaughter which ultimately reduced all morality to problems 
of human engineering-development of the most effective methods for 
destroying and disposing of large numbers of people by the fewest 
cadres possible in the shortest amount of time. Second, there was an 
ideological fervor unmatched by any other previous variety of genocide. 
So intent were the Nazis in their policy of extermination of the Jews that 
they dared contact other nations, especially Axis powers and neutral 
countries, to repatriate Jews back to Germany to suffer the ultimate 
degradation. Third, genocide against the Jewish people represented and 
rested upon a national model of state power: the purification of the 
apparatus of repression by a total concentration of the means of destruc-
tion in a narrow military police stratum unencumbered by considerations 
of class, ethnicity, gender, or any other social factors affecting Nazi 
response to non-Jewish groups. The liquidation of plural sources of 
power and authority made easier, indeed presupposed, the total liquida-
tion of the Jewish population. 
With all these inner disputations and disagreements accounted for, 
there are still those who--too guilt-ridden to face the monstrous conse-
quences of the Holocaust against Jews in particular and victims of 
genocide as a whole-have chosen the path of evading reality. An 
isolated voice like that of Arthur R. Butzl6 is now joined in a quasi-
intellectual movement, with all the paraphernalia of historical scholar-
ship, 17 denying this massive crime. Denials of gas chambers, rejection 
of photographic evidence, equation of indemnification of the victims 
with Zionist beneficiaries are all linked to the rejection of the Holocaust's 
occurrence. The Nazi "revisionists" dare not speak of Nazism, but of 
national socialism; not of Germany under Hitlerism, but of a Third 
Reich. The Nazi epoch is even spoken of in remorseful terms: "Over-
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whelming British, American, and Soviet forces finally succeeded in 
crushing the military resistance of a Germany which they accorded not 
even the minimum of mercy."18 Pity the poor victim! 
Even the New Nazi "intelligentsia" does not deny mass murder, but 
only the numbers murdered.19 If it is not 6 million, then what number is 
it? No matter, those massacred were Zionists, Communists, or a 
hyphenated variety of the two-Jewish-Bolsheviks-any euphemism for 
Jews other than the admission of a special assassination of Jews as a 
people. The need for exacting scholarship-the sort that has begun to 
emerge-with respect to all peoples victimized for their existence is not 
simply a matter of litanies and recitations, but of the very retention of the 
historical memory itself. The scientific study of genocide is not a matter 
of morbid fascination or mystic divination, but of the need to assert the 
historical reality of collective crime. Only by such a confrontation can 
we at least locate moral responsibility for state crimes even if we cannot 
always prevent future genocides from taking place. 
With all due weight given to the different traditions involved in the 
theological and sociological arguments concerning genocide, they do 
have a strong shared value commitment to the normative framework in 
which greater emphasis is placed on the protection of life than on 
economic systems or political regimes.20 Both traditions are committed, 
insofar as their dogmas and doctrines permit, to the supreme place of life 
in the hierarchy of values. This is no small matter. Nazism witnessed 
the breakdown of religious and scientific institutions alike; and those that 
could not be broken down were oftentimes simply corrupted, as in 
decadent and exotic notions of a Teutonic Church and the equally 
ludicrous belief in an Aryan Science. In the larger context of world 
history and in the wider picture of centuries-old barbarisms, we bear 
witness not to a warfare of science versus theology but rather to a shared 
collapse of any sort of normative structure in which either could function 
to enhance the quality or sanctity of life. 
Leo Kuper, born and banned in South Africa, is professor emeritus at 
the University of Southern California and the author of several excellent 
monographs in social stratification and race relations in African contexts. 
He is a good man writing about an awful subject who has produced, 
unfortunately, a mediocre book. The author of Genocide: Its Political 
Use in the Twentieth Century manages to skirt just about every major 
issue which has arisen in the field of investigation: the relationship be-
tween the Holocaust and genocides in general; the relationship between 
civil conflict and state destruction; and the reasons for the ineffectiveness 
of international peace-keeping agencies in reducing genocide. The last 
omission is particularly glaring since Kuper describes this as an essential 
task. 
On a different level, however, it is an excellent basic text, especially 
for individuals who are not familiar with the subject of genocide. 
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Definitions are invariably fairminded and essentially sound; the 
appendices, especially on United Nations resolutions and areas of back-
sliding (such as its attitude toward the Turkish genocide against Arme-
nians), are particularly revealing. The role of the United Nations, or its 
lack thereof, has been discussed often but understood rarely. At such 
descriptive levels the book provides a welcome contribution. The se-
lected cases are for the most part helpful and demonstrate a keen sense of 
the magnitude of the problems of genocide. When we talk in terms of 
roughly 800,000 Armenians, 6 million Jews, and 3 million Cambodians, 
we have clear-cut examples of an enormous portion of a national 
population decimated by the authorities, giving a sober reminder that our 
century hovers dangerously between creativity and destruction. 
The book's problems are less those of sentiment than of method. 
Equating such phenomena as civil strife between Catholics and Protes-
tants in Northern Ireland with the destruction of German Jewry or the 
destruction of urban Cambodia just does not work. Even the author 
acknowledges that in Northern Ireland, victims have been numbered in 
the hundreds over a long stretch of time, whereas in most clear-cut cases 
of genocide the numbers destroyed are in the millions. Then there is the 
too simplistic equation of civil war and genocide. Equating the Nigerian 
Civil War or even the struggle against apartheid in South Africa with 
cases of undisputed genocide blurs and confuses rather than clarifies 
what genocide is about-namely, the vast, near-total destruction of large 
numbers of noncombatants innocent of any specific crime. Furthermore, 
burdening the United Nations as the source of the failure to control geno-
cide is unconvincing since, as Kuper explains at length, this organization 
is primarily a composite of nations and not in itself a sovereign power. 
Underneath the demand to strengthen the United Nations is an implicit 
assumption that nationalism should be weakened-something that clearly 
has not taken place, nor is likely to take place, certainly not under the 
aegis of the United Nations. 
In the balance of this critique, let me take up some of the thornier 
issues. The problem of genocide is not a new one, and the need for a 
scholarship to move beyond horrors and into analysis becomes increas-
ingly critical. It is risky to equate genocide with arbitrary death. Two 
examples which Leo Kuper has given illustrate a problem rather than 
indicate a solution. He raises, for example, the case of India during the 
partition. Hindus and Moslems constituted majorities in different parts 
of the country, each with the capacity to engage freely in what he calls 
reciprocal genocidal massacre. However terrible and tragic that mutual 
destruction was, to speak of it as genocidal in the context of religious 
competition and conflict risks diluting the notion of genocide and equat-
ing it with any conflict between national, religious, or racial groups. 
This error also appears in his analysis of Northern Ireland, where 
Protestants and Catholics engage in the meanest and most dangerous 
76 Irving Louis Horowitz 
kinds of assaults on one another. If one were to tally the numbers of 
deaths since 1920, they would total about 10,000, surely a terrible hu-
man loss and an indicator, according to Kuper, of the risks involved in 
the removal of the British presence in Ulster before a political solution is 
achieved. One might indicate, as have many leaders from both the 
Catholic and Protestant camps, that the British presence is itself a source 
of violence and that the removal of the occupying power would 
overcome a major obstacle to resolution of the civil conflict. Whether 
this belief is correct or not, we are dealing within the realm of political 
tactics and international relations, but surely not with genocide-unless 
we reduce the term to a fatuous notion of the cultural elimination of 
certain groups and ideologies. 
Kuper also confounds legal identification between apartheid and 
genocide in South Africa with the empirical problem: the place and con-
dition of the blacks within South Africa. As the author himself well 
appreciates, there is a demographic restraint to annihilation. The black 
African population in South Africa grew from roughly 8 million in 1945 
to 19 million in 1980. The Asian population grew from 285,000 to 
765,000; and the white population from 2.4 million to roughly 4.4 mil-
lion. The demographics alone indicate that genocide simply has not oc-
curred. What may have happened is the fragmentation of the African 
population and the consequent denial of blacks' citizenship rights. South 
Africa is also a classic case of exploitation of the majority by a racial 
minority, in a very specialized context. But it does not benefit the 
victims or anyone else to present South Africa as a case of genocide 
-which implies the absolute destruction of a people, if not completely, 
then in such large numbers as to affect their future survival potential. 
Relativizing the issue of genocide particularly damages efforts to 
understand the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews. The major problem in 
such relativizing is that it completely fails to distinguish between the 
systematic, total, scientific engineering of death, and the more random 
occurrences that are characteristic of other events. If others were to 
operate under a veil of anonymity such as the Nazis did, they might also 
attempt a kind of "final solution." But whether that is so or not, the 
notion of the final solution, the sources and consequences of the Nazi 
destruction of the Jews, is absent in the work of Professor Kuper. 
While I myself have argued against celebrating the exclusivity of death, 
one must consider seriously differences between the almost total 
destruction of a population, reducing it to a remnant, and the selective, 
random elimination of political or religious opposition. The very concept 
of the Holocaust as something unique fails to appear in Kuper's work 
and is mentioned only in relation to a book title. It is as if the author 
were consciously and deliberately attempting to relativize the Jewish case 
as one of many, and consequently disregarding the specificity and pecu-
liar characteristics involved in the Nazi Holocaust This undermines not 
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only the moral basis of Kuper's work but also weakens his appreciation 
of the full meaning of the Turkish assault on Armenians. The latter was 
not merely an event that took place in the Ottoman Empire but is char-
acteristic of the Kemalist democracy that followed. The genocide against 
Armenians, like the Holocaust against Jews, was special in its totality as 
well as in its movement beyond the boundaries of nationalism and ration-
alism. Both cases are not characteristic of any others-until we get to 
Cambodian communism. 
Underlying his failure to distinguish between genocide and civil strife 
on the one hand, and genocide and total destruction such as the Holo-
caust on the other, is a peculiar inability to distinguish between theory 
and action and, more specifically, an unwillingness to deal with German 
and Turkish cultures. Kuper, along with others, has dedicated a great 
deal of futile time to problems of ideology. There is sufficient confusion 
within Marxism and Fascism to make one wary of this line of approach. 
Perhaps Marxism, in its acceptance of a theory of class polarization, 
yields to a Manichean vision of a world torn apart; but even a Marxism 
predicated on guilt by social origin may or may not translate into 
genocidal behavior. It certainly does in terms of the Gulag Archipelago 
and the years of Stalinism; it certainly does not in such places as 
Yugoslavia. Likewise, even with Fascism there seems to be no doubt 
that the Nazis analogized European Jewry to a cancer which had to be 
excised and identified Jews with world conspiracy. Fascism in Italy did 
not have the same genocidal potential. When Jewish enclaves in Asia 
came under Japanese dominion during World War II the genocidal 
pattern did not follow. Any comprehensive analysis of genocide must 
deal seriously with cultural canons which permit or forbid genocidal 
behavior. This total absence of cultural analysis--of both those who 
were and were not given to genocide-seriously weakens Kuper's book. 
Ideology rather than culture is held responsible and accountable for 
genocidal behavior. This is a difficult thesis to prove. The republican 
developmentalism of Ataturk in Turkey is absolutely at odds with im-
perial notions derived from the Ottoman Empire, yet both republican and 
anti-republican forces within Turkey carried on genocide against the 
Armenians. The peasant egalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge did not 
spare us a major genocide. Wherever one seeks an answer based on 
ideology the same kind of confusion presents itself, issues which Kuper 
unfortunately does not address. 
Kuper charges the United Nations with having done much less than it 
should have. He argues that its capacities to curtail genocide, much less 
prevent or punish atrocities, have been blunted. He gives several rea-
sons for this laxity: first, the punitive procedures of the United Nations 
are weak; second, the United Nations is committed to the sanctity of state 
sovereignty; and third, the United Nations has established commissions 
to deal with complaints about human rights violations which are them-
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selves highly politicized and controlled by a clique of powerful nations 
whose vested interests are in stilling the voices of opposition. One could 
hardly argue with Kuper's analysis of the weaknesses of the United 
Nations, but from an analytical point of view, it is an extremely thin reed 
on which to hang an analysis of the problem of genocide. The sources 
of genocide are certainly not in the United Nations. The limits of the 
organization are well understood by most. Kuper might then have ana-
lyzed different kinds of national cultures as well as how punishment and 
law emerge in various countries. 
There is now a burgeoning literature on just these subjects. It might 
be possible to develop an early warning signal, a concern about prob-
lems of law and democratic order, that might limit the possibility of 
future genocides taking place. But if the genesis of the problem is not in 
a world organization, then it is hard to believe that the solution will be 
found there. As Kuper knows quite well, the United Nations is itself the 
source of so much amoral self-righteousness that its very existence 
strengthens nationalism and the national ideal. 
The treatment of the Holocaust as a dialogue between God and 
Golem, as ineffable and unspeakable, serves to return the matter of death 
into the antinomic and Manichean tradition of original sin versus original 
goodness, or, as it is more fashionably called, historical pessimism 
versus historical optimism. On the other hand, the treatment of genocide 
as a problem for the United Nations makes it a rather tepid organizational 
affair, denying to this "dismal science" its full meaning and significance. 
If social science is to make its own serious contribution to Holocaust 
studies, it must get beyond the mystery of silence or the silence of 
mysteries. However limited the clinical analysis of collective death may 
be, we may at least be spared the repetition of some forms of genocide. 
To incorporate in the Jewish psyche the phrase "never again" requires an 
antecedent commitment to explain why genocide happened in the first 
place. Theologians must not presume an exclusive monopoly on mean-
ing by insisting upon the mystery and irrationality of taking lives. The 
task of social science remains, in this area as in all others, a ration-
alization of irrationality. Only in this way can the victory be denied to 
Golem and the struggle against evil be understood as a task God assigns 
to humanity. This is far greater than standing in silent awe at the 
tragedies that have befallen our tragic century. 
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GENOCIDE, THE HOLOCAUST, 
AND TRIAGE 
JohnK. Roth 
Since its historical entry into world history the German people has 
always found itself in need of space .... Our people has never been 
able to settle this need for space, except through conquest by the sword 
or through a reduction of its own population. 
AdolfHitler, 1928 
In May 1984, the Associated Press wired to American newspapers the 
recent findings of the Population Reference Bureau, a Washington-based 
research group that studies population trends. I Beyond announcing that 
nearly 4.8 billion human beings now inhabit the earth, the bureau indi-
cated that our planet's population has doubled since World War Il. Not 
only did the world's population increase by almost 85 million in the past 
year, the report went on to say, but there will be 5 billion persons here 
by 1987. That number will rise to 6 billion by the end of the twentieth 
century. Within forty years, the world's population will double. 
Strangely, however, the AP's story took no notice of forces that could 
disrupt these trends. Such interruptions, hastened by exploding popula-
tion growth, ought not to be taken lightly. Nuclear threats make that fact 
obvious. So does the history of genocide. More people exist than any-
one needs. That condition-more or less-has always held. It makes 
history, as Hegel deftly said, a slaughter-bench. 
Where more people exist than are wanted, man-made death is never 
far behind. One of the most persuasive teachers of that lesson was Adolf 
Hitler. Although not sufficient, his leadership was a necessary condition 
for the Holocaust, the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews. As sug-
gested by the quotation with which this essay begins, Hitler believed that 
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the world's population was too large, and that therefore space, entailing 
opportunity as well as geography, was lacking for the German people. 
His self-proclaimed mission was to lead them to their rightful increase 
and dominion. 
Significantly, Hitler's statement comes from his so-called Zweites 
Buch.2 Drafted in 1928, this sequel to Mein Kampf was suppressed by 
Hitler himself. It is not necessary to assess the various explanations that 
have been offered to account for that fact-the work was identified in 
1958 and published in German three years later-but the issue that pro-
voked Hitler to write is noteworthy. As Telford Taylor tells the story, 
"the question of the South Tyrol was an especially sharp thorn in the 
Nazi flesh" (p. xvi). For more than a century preceding the end of 
World War I, this Alpine region south of the Brenner Pass, much of it 
German-speaking, lived under Austrian rule. Thanks to the Treaty of St. 
Germain, Italy gained control of the area. Its policy toward the German 
population was benign until Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime intro-
duced a program of Italianization. By March 1928, for example, Italian 
had become the language of religious instruction in South Tyrol, prompt-
ing strong criticism from the Austrian Chancellor, Ignaz Seipel. When 
Mussolini returned the favor by recalling his ambassador from Vienna, 
the anti-Italian reaction in Germany as well as in Austria was con-
siderable. 
Hitler, however, did not profit from this feeling. On the contrary, 
having praised Mussolini in Mein Kampf, where he also asserted that 
unrest in the South Tyrol was a Jewish-inspired scheme to discredit 11 
Duce and to threaten German-Italian cooperation, Hitler found himself 
"attacked from the 'folkish' and nationalist quarter as 'soft' on an issue 
of German irredentism" (p. xvii). Ironic though the facts just mentioned 
may be, Hitler's Zweites Buch concentrated on the status of South 
Tyrol. If the passing of the crisis influenced him to withhold the book 
when it became apparent that nothing could be gained by publishing a 
work that would "belabor an issue on which he and his Party were on 
the defensive," Hitler's Zweites Buch still shows that the problem of not 
enough space and too many people, or at least not enough space for the 
right kinds of people, was never far from his mind at the time (p. xx). 
Nor would those issues dwindle in importance as Hitler came to power 
and unleashed genocide in his quest for Lebensraum. After the An-
schluss, Hitler may have been content to leave South Tyrol under Mus-
solini's jurisdiction, even though he was unsuccessful in urging its Ger-
man population to emigrate to the Reich, but both outcomes drove home 
the governing principles Hitler had written down in 1928: 
Politics is history in the making. History itself is the presentation of a 
people's struggle for existence. I deliberately use the phrase "struggle for 
existence" here because in truth that struggle for daily bread, equally in peace 
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and war, is an eternal battle against thousands upon thousands of resistances 
just as life itself is an eternal struggle against death. (P. 5) 
No people have ever been wanted less than the Jews were by Hitler. 
His anti-Jewish campaign was so virulent that it reduced Jews to sub- or 
non-human status, thus making their elimination easier. Under Hitler, 
then, the Nazis unleashed their genocide on the Jews. The success of 
this attack is corroborated by the fact that even now debate rages about 
whether genocide is a category that is adequate to encompass the Holo-
caust. At issue in those debates is the Holocaust's uniqueness. Con-
sider, therefore, the useful distinctions that Yehuda Bauer makes by 
designating the Holocaust as "the extreme case" of genocide.3 
To Bauer, genocide suggests a continuum, each instance aimed at de-
stroying a people in one way or another. The Holocaust belongs at its 
"farthest point" because, as Hitler's targets, "every Jew-man, woman, 
and child-was to be killed" (pp. 331-32). Genocide includes a multi-
tude of sins, but heretofore its instances have not aimed at the total an-
nihilation Hitler eventually directed against the Jews.4 Hence, the Holo-
caust is unique. Yet, owing to the possibility that total annihilation might 
in some time or place become the aim again, Bauer contends that the term 
"Holocaust" can be "not only the name by which the planned murder of 
the Jewish people is known," but also "a generic name for an ideologi-
cally motivated planned total murder of a whole people."5 Just as his-
tory contains a variety of Holocaust-related events, such as the Armenian 
massacres, there may also be Holocausts in the offing, a possibility 
made all the more real since the Holocaust occurred. 
If genocide is a continuum with Holocaust at its farthest point, how 
are genocide's victims to be understood? If there is not some universal 
characteristic that they all share, do they at least have what the philoso-
pher Ludwig Wittgenstein would have called a family resemblance? The 
import of such questions is more than historical; it also directs us toward 
the future. For if people become potential targets of genocidal cam-
paigns for reasons that at least resemble one another, that knowledge can 
alert the endangered and those who care about them. 
Such concerns are among those that orient the scholarship of Richard 
L. Rubenstein, whose writings are as far-ranging as they are contro-
versial, as perceptive as they are discomforting. An authorship taking 
him from After Auschwitz (1966) to The Cunning of History (1975) has 
recently been enhanced by The Age of Triage (1983), his most disturb-
ing and hence most important work to date. There will be more to say 
about that book, but first The Cunning of History. It not only focused 
on the Holocaust but did so by accenting motifs already noted in this 
essay. 
For example, while impressed by the unprecedented features of the 
Holocaust, Rubenstein affirmed that more understanding is to be gained 
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by regarding Auschwitz as part of a continuum of human action than by 
putting it in a category entirely its own. Next, although The Cunning of 
History makes no mention of Hitler's Zweites Buch, Rubenstein knew 
the importance of Hitler's conviction that Germany "was always an 
overpopulated area. "6 Rubenstein further understood that Hitler's 
appraisal along those lines was not limited to quantitative considerations. 
Overpopulation was a qualitative matter for Hitler as well. In fact, a 
witches' brew of quantitative and qualitative concerns about population 
was not only what drove Hitler to establish the death camp as one of the 
twentieth century's fundamental realities. That melange could also reveal 
the Holocaust's significance in light of the recognition that the world's 
population is nearly 4.8 billion and escalating at a startling pace. With 
the Holocaust as the precedent, mass murder-if not genocide or 
Holocaust-might well be the remedy of choice to achieve a "final solu-
tion" to the problems created by hordes of people who are unwanted by 
the powers that be. 
Stressing that the power of a political state is essential for Holocaust, 
if not for every form of genocide, The Cunning of History packs an 
incisive array of views into little more than a hundred pages. But none 
drew more vigorous response than Rubenstein's simplest and most 
fundamental thesis: "The Nazi elite clearly understood that the Jews 
were truly a surplus people whom nobody wanted and whom they could 
dispose of as they pleased .... In terms of German ideology, the 
Jews were a surplus population because of the kind of society the Ger-
mans wanted to create. "7 He would expand those claims in The Age of 
Triage, but already Rubenstein's point was that established interests had 
for centuries engaged in the riddance of redundant populations. The 
Nazis' handling of the Jews implemented an extremely calculated pro-
cedure for dealing with an old problem. It also involved a host of par-
ticular features-typically involving the blending of ancient strands of 
religious anti-Semitism with modern ideologies of nationalism and rac-
ism. But Rubenstein's major insight was that the category of "surplus 
people" was a crucial one to employ in relation to the Holocaust because 
it could help us understand not only how that event is unique but also 
how it is symptomatic of features that may be endemically destructive in 
our current ways of life. 
Lest he be misunderstood, Rubenstein carefully stated that "the con-
cept of a surplus population is not absolute. An underpopulated nation 
can have a redundant population if it is so organized that a segment of its 
able-bodied human resources cannot be utilized in any meaningful eco-
nomic or social role" (p. 10). That qualification, however, did not 
prevent criticism for introducing population redundancy into an interpre-
tation of the Holocaust. Even going on to clarify that "a surplus or 
redundant population is one that for any reason can find no viable role in 
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the society in which it is domiciled," Rubenstein is still attacked for 
holding that the Holocaust-though exceptional-is still one of many 
instances of state-sponsored population elimination. 8 
A theory is only as good as its ability to cope with the objections 
brought against it. By indicating some typical challenges directed against 
Rubenstein's view about the Holocaust and surplus populations, re-
sponding to each, and then elaborating other dimensions of his vision, 
Rubenstein's contributions to an understanding of the age of genocide 
can be appraised. As to the criticisms-some explicit, others implied-
the first of seven examples comes from Jacob Katz. Responding to 
statements made by Rubenstein at a conference on "The Holocaust-A 
Generation After," he asserted that Rubenstein was mistakenly trying to 
analyze the Holocaust "in Darwinian terms."9 Specifically, contended 
Katz, the hypothesis that the Jews were a surplus people was not 
credible because the Nazis, even during the intensity of the Holocaust 
itself, "used Jews very profitably in SS factories" (ibid.). Variants of 
this argument have frequently been raised against Rubenstein from time 
to time, but they are not telling. Katz, for instance, undermines his own 
analysis by acknowledging that decisions to use Jews for slave labor 
were often overturned and instead those workers were dispatched to the 
gas chambers. Or, it could be added, many others were simply worked 
to death, as The Cunning of History testifies. Coupling these notes  with 
Rubenstein's basic qualification that population redundancy is not simply 
a matter of numbers, Katz' objection remains beside the point. 
In the same forum, Alice A. Eckardt took a different approach. She 
concurred with Rubenstein that the Nazi treatment of the Jews was not 
adequately handled by calling it an irrational aberration. Instead there 
was a kind of rationality in the Nazis' anti-Jewish campaign. But, she 
insisted, that rationality was not to be located in any Nazi perception that 
the Jews were superfluous. Rather, the Nazis looked on the Jews "as an 
absolute hindrance, a virus, a cancer" (p. 260). They were, in short, 
"the incarnation of evil" (ibid.). From the Nazi perspective, then, it 
could have made good sense to be rid of the Jews. To suggest, how-
ever, that the Jews were targets simply because they were superfluous 
will not do. 
Not much more than Katz' remarks do Eckardt's undermine The 
Cunning of History. Indeed, they reflect it, for her argument, ironically, 
has the unintended consequence of supporting Rubenstein's analysis. 
The concept of a surplus population is not absolute; instead it encom-
passes the factors that Eckardt rightly stresses. People-and the Nazi 
outlook did not simply deny that Jews were people-do not become 
classified as viruses and cancers unless those beings are already regarded 
as unwanted in the extreme. Propaganda and ideology utilizing such 
classifications do so to underscore the more effectively how radically 
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these people are unneeded, how they have no viable role in the scheme 
of things controlled by the powers that be in the region where they 
happen to dwell. 
A third criticism has been advanced by Shlomo A vineri. He takes 
Rubenstein to task for being "a functional structuralist" (p. 262). 
Rubenstein, claims Avineri, tries too hard to subsume particular events 
under universal categories. Such attempts may be part of a noble tradi-
tion, but in the case of the Holocaust, avers A vineri, they will not enable 
Rubenstein to do what he wants. For there simply is not evidence to 
substantiate the claim that the Nazis regarded the Jews as surplus and 
therefore decided to exterminate them. On the other hand, there is 
abundant evidence that the Nazis were fundamentally anti-Semites. The 
Jews became targets not because they were superfluous but because the 
Nazis hated Jews so thoroughly. The full measure of that hatred was 
taken at Auschwitz. 
One ought not trifle with a scholar of Avineri's deserved stature. 
Thus, it is welcome that Rubenstein can accept his points and find that 
the surplus people hypothesis is not jeopardized but strengthened. 
Rubenstein would be the first to agree with Avineri's observation that 
"Nazi antisemitism was not instrumental to Nazi aims but basic and 
immanent to them" (ibid.). Genocide, on the other hand, is instru-
mental. "Seldom elected by a government as an end in itself," Ruben-
stein has since pointed out, "genocide is always a means of eliminating a 
target population that challenges an economic, political, cultural, 
religious, or ideological value of the politically dominant group."10 
Hence, Avineri's stress on Nazi anti-Semitism indicates why the Jews 
were targeted, but in being targeted, the Jews also revealed themselves to 
be a surplus people as far as the Nazis were concerned. Rubenstein's 
point is rightly a functional one. Practically speaking, Nazi anti-Semi-
tism meant Jewish superfluity. Already we have noted that Hitler had 
much to say about overpopulation, but even if Nazi rhetoric did not 
speak directly and consistently about the Jews as surplus people, actions 
spoke louder than words. Moreover, since there is no genocide without 
human redundancy of one kind or another, Nazi actions do support the 
contention that the Holocaust belongs on Bauer's continuum of geno-
cide, albeit at its extremity. In spite of Avineri's contention to the con-
trary, the perspective of a functional structuralist, if the term is apt, can 
illumine the Holocaust's place in the larger scheme. 
The previous objections find fault with Rubenstein's account because 
its emphasis on surplus people seems to overlook certain economic con-
siderations and features of Nazi ideology. If those objections are much 
weaker than purported, the plot thickens when Berel Lang questions the 
explanatory power of Rubenstein's appeal to "the superfluity of a certain 
proportion of the population." 11 Lang does not elaborate his objection, 
but it seems to entail the belief that the surplus people category is itself 
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rather superfluous when it comes to telling us how or why mass murder 
takes place in particular circumstances. If Lang's briefly stated position 
were expanded, it might claim that Rubenstein's concept says both too 
much and too little. We do not know what "surplus" means until we 
look at particular cases where allegedly surplus people are to be found. 
When we do such looking, moreover, we find that "surplus" is indeed 
not an absolute idea but so extremely relative that its meaning incor-
porates any number of specific reasons why a particular people might be 
targeted and killed. In the process, the concept covers so much as to 
become nearly meaningless. 
Lang's criticism, implicit as well as explicit, has not gone unnoticed 
by Rubenstein. The best evidence for that claim is that the author of The 
Cunning of History planned early on to produce the sequel, The Age of 
Triage, that would buttress the propositions about surplus populations 
that were offered only in germinal form in the earlier study. As will be 
pointed out in more detail below, the latter book analyzes numerous 
historical examples to show that man-made mass death is linked with 
perceptions of population redundancy. That redundancy is not merely a 
matter of semantics, either. Historically, people tend to be killed en 
masse when dominant powers deem them unnecessary and unwanted. 
The factors that can put people into that risk are myriad, and hence the 
utility of Rubenstein's theory about surplus populations emerges. If one 
focused only on the many and varied particulars that lead to man-made 
mass death, the continuities among those events would be overlooked. 
Genocide and even Holocaust are concepts that help us to see the links. 
Rubenstein's contribution, vastly meaningful, is to show that the specific 
reasons for genocide also involve a pattern, one to which his inten-
tionally elastic concept of surplus population directs us. The explanatory 
power of the concept may not be its primary hallmark-for explanation 
one must go more to the details in particular cases. The concept's 
strength is instead in its synthesizing capacity, which in turn enables us 
to see before it is too late the diverse ways and places in which people 
might find themselves functionally redundant and destined to be targets 
for riddance. 
Other interpreters have taken The Age of Triage into account and still 
find Rubenstein vulnerable where his theories about surplus people are 
concerned. John Patrick Diggins, for example, echoes Berel Lang by 
wondering whether Rubenstein's appeal to the problem of surplus popu-
lations really tells us why genocide happens. "For all his admirable re-
search," Diggins says of Rubenstein, he "cannot establish the precise 
cause, or even causes, of genocide, and this is profoundly disturbing. "12 
This critic reasons that a historian "must demonstrate that causes origi-
nated in man's conscious intentions and purposes" before claiming to 
know why human consequences turned out as they did. On Diggins' 
reading, then, population superfluity could only be a cause of genocide if 
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awareness of such a superfluity existed and the superfluity yielded a 
conscious motive that led people to kill accordingly. Such evidence, he 
implies with A vineri, is hard to come by not only in the Holocaust but in 
other genocidal scenarios as well. 
Rubenstein, I believe, would be agreeable to Diggins' insistence on 
documentation. One issue between them, however, is where such 
documentation can or must be found Again, Rubenstein's methodology 
places less emphasis on what people say than on what they do. People 
do not have to be overtly labeled "surplus" in order to be redundant; nor 
do the powers that be have to pronounce that there is a problem of 
surplus population in order for them to document through their actions 
that they do, in fact, think one exists. The ultimate documentation is 
extermination. Diggins may wish to wait for more explicit documen-
tation, but if he does so, it is not clear that his historical positivism will 
show itself superior to Rubenstein's willingness to let practice document 
belief. 
Incidentally, Diggins' skepticism notwithstanding, Rubenstein has 
boldly asserted that the Holocaust "can be fully comprehended in terms 
of the normal categories of history, social science, demography, political 
theory and economics." 13 The credibility of that claim, of course, will 
depend on what is meant by ''fully comprehended," but at this juncture 
Rubenstein's Hegelian reach may well exceed an existential grasp. For 
if human experience cannot ultimately account for itself-and it cannot 
-then it is hard to see how "the normal categories of historical and 
socio-political analysis" can fully comprehend the Holocaust or anything 
else, for that matter. Yet, even if Rubenstein's assertion on this par-
ticular issue is not well-founded, a major point in his favor remains. He 
defends the Holocaust's comprehensibility to contest perspectives that 
mystify the Holocaust by stressing that the event eludes rational compre-
hension. Probably the truth is closer to Rubenstein's side than not. 
Admitting that we lack the requisite metaphysical certainty to compre-
hend fully any historical occurrence, the disciplines of history, social 
science, demography, political theory, and economics nevertheless do 
tell much about how and why Auschwitz appeared. The Holocaust's 
"incomprehensibility" is more in the beholder's eye than in the facts 
themselves. 
Where the Holocaust is concerned, however, the nature of the facts 
remains in question, and to some extent that will probably be true 
forever. An example is found in the research of Steven T. Katz, who by 
implication disagrees with some of Rubenstein's economic emphases in 
interpreting how and why the Jews became a redundant population 
destined for mass death.14 Particularly in The Age of Triage, Ruben-
stein has held that the West's modernization process tended to render 
Jews surplus as it turned them away from being an economically com-
plementary class, rendered them instead a source of instability and 
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conflict, and thus set them up for the kill. Not so, says Katz. The deci-
sive turning point on the road to Auschwitz was instead a specific kind 
of anti-Semitic racism. Close to Alice Eckardt's perspective, Katz' sug-
gests that this racism was "microbial" and "parasitological." Such 
racism reflects and inculcates the belief that inferior races will destroy 
superior ones in ways analogous to those that exist when deadly disease-
causing agents invade human life. Racism of this kind brooks no com-
promise. Be killed or kill-completely-is its imperative. 
Once more, nothing in Rubenstein's theory would require him to 
deny that Katz' analysis has much in its favor. But Rubenstein can also 
reply that Katz' account itself would be more credible if it took 
economics with greater seriousness. Katz stresses that the content of the 
Nazis' anti-Semitic racism had very little relationship to any empirical 
realities. Its irrationality was a major characteristic, one that gave this 
ideology peculiar power because it was beyond disconfirmation. 
Rubenstein, however, urges a second look. Perhaps this anti-Semitism 
is not quite so irrational, not quite so much a thing unto itself, if we see it 
more than Katz does as an effect of economic relationships gone sour. 
Understanding that "no single cause can explain a historical phenome-
non," Rubenstein invites us to consider that realities of all kinds are more 
interrelated and continuous than they are discrete and disparate.15 
Rubenstein's approach has the advantage of fitting that pattern better than 
Katz'. It does so by illuminating the economic factors in Nazi anti-
Semitic racism, thus making the latter no less hideous but more intel-
ligible than Katz' stress on its irrationality can do. 
Although Richard Rubenstein's critics contest much that he says, 
even they are likely to agree that he is on target in asserting that ours is 
the age of triage. How we arrived there and what we might do about that 
outcome are two of his main concerns as his book by that title assesses 
the extent of fear and hope in an overcrowded world. Having explored 
several major objections with which Rubenstein's Holocaust theories 
have had to contend, plus some of the rejoinders that can appropriately 
be made to them, it will be well to conclude with an overview of The 
Age of Triage, drawing out of Rubenstein's total vision of our past and 
future his accent on the importance of religious as well as social scientific 
reflection. 
A socioeconomic sorting that saves some ways of life by dispatching 
others, triage testifies to the ascendancy of a powerfully practical form of 
human rationality. Casting his point in economic terms, Rubenstein 
stresses how decisive it has been that people discovered how to produce 
a surplus. For thereby, he asserts, they also took "the first step in 
making themselves superfluous."16 
Already we have observed that current concerns about global popu-
lation find the world containing many more people than anyone needs. 
Rubenstein recognizes, in tum, that this perceived population redun-
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dancy exists partly because of sheer numbers but even more because the 
dominant intentions that energize modem society tend to be governed by 
the belief that money is the measure of all that is real. More than any 
other, he claims, that belief drives the modernization process, which has 
been under way and intensifying for centuries. One effect of this pro-
cess is that the intrinsic worth of people diminishes. Their worth is eval-
uated functionally instead. Hence, if persons are targeted as non-
useful-they can be so regarded in any number of ways, depending on 
how those in power define their terms-a community may find it 
sensible to eliminate the surplus from its midst. In modem times, that 
action has been facilitated, indeed instigated and promoted, by govern-
mental power. Triage, then, entails state-sponsored programs of popula-
tion elimination: through eviction, compulsory resettlement, expulsion, 
mass warfare, and outright extermination-roughly in that order. This 
winnowing process, more or less extreme in its violence, enables a 
society to drive out what it does not want and to keep what it desires for 
itself. 
Persistently intrigued by history's continuity as well as by its cun-
ning, Rubenstein links modernization and mass death in a study that 
encompasses such apparently diverse events as the enclosure movement 
in England during the Enlightenment, the nineteenth-century famine 
years in Ireland, and a variety of twentieth-century events-a non-
exhaustive list would include the Armenian genocide, the slaughter of 
Soviet citizens under Stalin, the destruction of the European Jews under 
Hitler, and the devastation of Cambodia. Taken alone, Rubenstein's 
political interpretation is stunning enough, but The Age of Triage does 
more because its author has not abandoned his grounding in religion and 
theology to tum exclusively to socioeconomic analysis. On the contrary, 
an age of triage makes the vitality of religion and theology more critical 
than ever. It is within this perspective that Rubenstein should be 
understood when he states that "no theological enterprise, that is, no 
consideration of the ultimate values that move men and women, can be 
adequate to its task if it ignores critical political and social theory, es-
pecially insofar as these modes of inquiry seek to comprehend the condi-
tions under which men attempt to conduct their lives both individually 
and collectively" (p. v). 
Explicitly and implicitly, God is both absent and present in The Age 
of Triage. Historically, for example, Rubenstein argues that Western 
monotheism desacralized the world, leaving human power free to exploit 
nature and to kill far too much with impunity. Ironically, the same God 
found in the theologies that were instrumental in unleashing the modern-
izing process has also been its victim, eclipsed by an advancing civili-
zation that has produced in tandem benefit and destruction, both in 
unprecedented abundance. Yet, looking toward the future, Rubenstein 
hints at-indeed he yearns for-a religious revival that might transmute 
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humanity's propensity to move, as Benjamin Nelson put it, "from tribal 
brotherhood to universal otherhood" (p. 7). Such a revival, hopes 
Rubenstein, would convert us so that we are "born again as men and 
women blessed with the capacity to care for each other here and now" 
(p. 240). God's place in an age of triage ought not to be the least of our 
concerns. Consider, then, four of Rubenstein's fundamental proposi-
tions. Each merits a governing role in late twentieth-century theology 
and religious reflection. 
1. "Modern civilization is largely the unintended consequence of a 
religious revolution" (p. 230). Western monotheism, contends Ruben-
stein, replaced magic and belief in a spiritualized nature by insisting that 
there is one and only one God who is the sovereign creator of heaven 
and earth. The success of Judaism and Christianity inadvertently paved 
the way for the secular outlooks that result in triage. True, these tradi-
tions affirmed that the earth is the Lord's. Men and women, moreover, 
were to be obedient to God's will. That will, in tum, would make itself 
known in history, and there not everything was to be permitted. Bonds 
of moral obligation, underwritten by God's judging power, were 
claimed to be in force. Human life, formed in God's image, appeared to 
be even more sacred than it had been prior to monotheism's eminent 
domain. 
Neither in practice nor in theory, however, does history conform 
entirely to conscious intention. In spite of and even because of mono-
theism's moral components, a course unfolded in which nature and even 
human life itself came to be regarded as subject to the mastery of politics 
and economics. Religions predicated on revelation within history un-
leashed reason in ways that transmuted the moral authority of revelation 
itself. A biblical God inspired a secular consciousness, and at times God 
disappeared in the process. Providence became Progress. Progress 
meant the triumph of a calculating, functional rationality whose Golden 
Rule was Efficiency. 
My account, if not Rubenstein's, is overly simple. Still, the power of 
its drift remains. Religions and theologies are loaded dice because they 
always contain more options for development than the limitations of 
immediate consciousness can comprehend. In an age of triage, we have 
learned that lesson to our sorrow. Yet Rubenstein's point is that we can 
be aware of it now. That awareness enjoins a warning, which takes us 
to a second proposition deserving of attention. 
2. "In a crisis, a secularized equivalent of the division of mankind 
into the elect and the reprobate could easily become a controlling image" 
(p. 216). Western monotheism's emphasis on a God of History has 
typically included the idea that some groups or persons are specially 
called. They are linked together and with God in relations of covenant. 
At their best, these convictions have singled people out for service, but 
nearly all of these doctrines of election and covenant have also been 
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extremely volatile. Separating people, they have induced a host of 
rivalries. Those rivalries and their off spring, Rubenstein avers, have 
more than a little to do with triage. 
Unintended consequences are no less real than those that are con-
sciously desired. The former, in fact, may be the more devastating pre-
cisely because their full power remains hidden until the effects are felt. 
In our religious context, the crucial link between theology, religious 
reflection, and triage lurks in the fact that Western monotheism has much 
to do with economic versions of divine election and covenant. Within 
such perspectives, poverty and wealth are much more than economic 
conditions. They entail divine judgment and just desert. Thus, their 
driving force can be not one of ministering to the poor but rather of 
eliminating them so that the position of the elect remains unthreatened. 
The theology of election and covenant sketched here sounds perverse. 
It is. But Rubenstein's point is that it is too simple, too convenient, only 
to protest that a tradition has been distorted. No doubt distortion exists, 
but perhaps the more important point is that what we say about God is 
usually a two-edged sword. That fact holds with respect even to the best 
examples of theology and religious reflection that we can cite. For the 
seeds that sprouted into destructive versions of election and covenant 
were not sowed first by the spiritually bankrupt or by the intellectually 
corrupt. They are gifts from the giants of Western religion. The issue 
that remains, then, is whether theology and religious reflection can speak 
in ways to avert the crises that fuel forces bent on triage because they see 
the world in terms of the elect and reprobate. 
3. "We are by no means helpless in meeting the challenge con-
fronting us" (p. 224). Economically, argues Rubenstein, the basic reme-
dy for triage would be to create a social order that provides a decent job 
for any person who is willing to work. His optimism is muted, how-
ever, because he knows that the implementation of his economic remedy 
is anything but an economic matter alone. In fact, the forms of practical 
rationality that govern modern economic thinking tend to mitigate against 
policies of full employment. The challenge that confronts us, then, is 
largely a spiritual one. Unless men and women are resensitized 
religiously, the resources to avert triage are likely to be hopelessly 
inadequate. 
Rubenstein thinks that we need nothing less than "an inclusive vision 
appropriate to a global civilization in which Moses and Mohammed, 
Christ, Buddha, and Confucius all play a role" (p. 240). To call Ruben-
stein's vision demanding understates the case. For, their universalizing 
tendencies notwithstanding, the major religious traditions have them-
selves been instrumental in "triaging" people "into the working and the 
workless, the saved and the damned, the Occident and the Orient" (p. 
240). Rubenstein, of course, hopes that a new religious consciousness 
will build on the inclusive aspects of the major religious traditions, 
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excluding the exclusive features in the process. Yet a further difficulty is 
that, while the thinker and the theorist can point out the needed direction, 
they cannot manage the achievement of such a vision. 
If the so-called death of God theologies have had their moment in the 
limelight and have now largely faded from view, the radical seculariza-
tion of our time remains. Functionally, human reason in history tends 
toward Godlessness, a pattern that theology and philosophy may check 
but seem unlikely to reverse. It is Rubenstein's conviction that the 
needed reversal, one that would substantially reduce the prospects of 
triage, depends on "authentic religious inspiration" (p. 239). Such inspi-
ration is not absent, but it cannot be called into being at will, least of all 
by intellectuals. Nor are religion's presently dominant forms charac-
terized chiefly by the inclusiveness that Rubenstein advocates. If the age 
of triage is one in which God's best defense may be that God does not 
exist, our religious situation is truly a season of advent, of expectant 
waiting and seeking for the religious transformation we need. 
4. "Theology seeks to foster dissonance-reduction where significant 
items of information are perceived to be inconsistent with established 
beliefs, values, and collectively sanctioned modes of behavior" (p. 132). 
Every religious tradition has to cope with evidence that disconfirms it. 
Triage itself is a case in point, for the experience of the death of God in 
our time has everything to do with the mass wasting of human life. 
Typically, theologians have apologized for God when the problem of 
evil has taken center stage. Specifically, they attempt to reduce the dis-
sonance that arises when traditional claims about God's power and 
goodness collide with history. 
The pertinent point here, however, is that Rubenstein's description of 
theology's function, whatever its validity, is not propounded by him as 
normative. On the contrary, his use of this description helps to identify 
meaningful work that remains for thinkers and theorists to do, even if 
they do not have the charisma to control the floodgates of religious 
inspiration. Rubenstein's Age of Triage is a theological statement, but 
his reflection does little to reduce dissonance. Its mood is instead quite 
the opposite. By calling attention to the Holocaust, to triage, to the 
reality that men and women too often kill with impunity, and by doing so 
in a way that questions the functional status of God in the world, 
Rubenstein's book is an exercise in dissonance production. 
At least indirectly, Rubenstein suggests that an age of triage calls for 
more, not less, theology and religious reflection in that vein. Yet a note 
of caution should intrude. For the dissonance production that is needed 
today, Rubenstein implies, is not the kind that will intensify individ-
ualism and isolation. Rather, it ought to shatter such barriers and extend 
the boundaries of mutual social obligation. To move in that direction, 
however, is a task that will tax the best brain power we can muster, for 
powerful indeed are the drives and interests that find triage tempting 
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because such sorting offers a solution as rational as it is final. Political 
and economic sophistication will need to join hands with theological 
acumen if religious thinkers are to do their dissonance-producing 
responsibly. 
God's fate, as well as that of humankind, hangs suspended in an age 
of triage. Should God be real in any sense at all, God joins humankind 
in responsibility for history's destruction. Yet realistic hope against fear 
in an overcrowded world ought not to pronounce God dead. For history 
itself may induce shame and sorrow in some quarters, but if the age of 
triage is literally a Godless time altogether, the net effect of the defense-
less victims will be to testify that the powers of death are irredeemably 
victorious. Hence the pages of The Age of Triage, particularly those that 
deal with the Holocaust, set an agenda for Western theology and 
religious reflection. In sum, it consists of at least these four imperatives: 
(1) Deconstruct the ties between Providence and Progress. (2) De-
stabilize distinctions between the elect and the damned. (3) Discern, as 
far as thought permits, ways beyond the self-regarding individualism 
that so often drives propensities toward triage. (4) Deploy the right 
kinds of dissonance. 
In his Zweites Buch, Adolf Hitler had a different vision. Proclaiming 
himself a German nationalist, he announced a National Socialist foreign 
policy predicated on "folkish, racial insights" and "determined by the 
necessity to secure the space necessary to the life of our people."17 
Knowing that vestiges and variants of that outlook are still very much a 
part of our world long after Hitler's demise, Richard Rubenstein assays 
genocide, the Holocaust, and triage to find ways beyond them. Admit-
tedly there is little that is totally novel in that agenda, any more than 
Richard Rubenstein's account originated with him alone. The pieces 
have been lying there for some time. Yet, to Rubenstein's credit and for 
our benefit, he has worked the puzzle in a way that shows with particular 
urgency the vital tasks that must be attempted if catastrophe is to be fore-
stalled in our overcrowded world. 
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GENOCIDE AND TOTAL WAR: A 
PRELIMINARY COMPARISON 
Eric Markusen 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all the problems confronting humankind during the last quarter of 
the twentieth century, none is more significant or urgent than the mass 
killing of defenseless citizens by human beings acting as agents of, or 
with the tolerance of, their governments. 
This chapter seeks to contribute to greater understanding of this prob-
lem by comparatively analyzing two major types of state-sanctioned 
mass killing-genocide and total war. Since several of the other chap-
ters in this volume address definitions, causes, and examples of geno-
cide, the focus here is on the phenomenon of total war. Then a prelimi-
nary analysis of differences and similarities between the two types of 
mass killing is offered. The central thesis of this chapter is that there are 
important similarities between the two types. Specifically, it is sug-
gested that ideology, bureaucracy, and technology play comparable 
facilitating roles in both genocide and total war. Finally, tentative les-
sons from this analysis of mass killing in the past and present are drawn 
in order to shed light on the seemingly inexorable momentum toward 
nuclear war. 
Humankind has been afflicted by the problem of mass killing since 
early prehistory. Archeologists have discovered indications that lethal 
conflict among groups of human beings may have originated as early as 
a million to a half-million years ago. 1 As an organized social institution, 
however, warfare is a relatively recent development. According to 
Arnold Toynbee, the institution of war did not emerge until approxi-
mately 5,000 years ago, in the lands of what are now Iraq and Egypt. 2 
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Since that time, the human and material costs of war have tended to in-
crease steadily, despite some temporary respites. In his survey of war-
fare from the end of the fifteenth century through the early 1960s, 
Quincy Wright notes: "War has during the last four centuries tended to 
involve a larger proportion of the belligerent states' population and 
resources and, while less frequent, to be more intense, more extended, 
and more costly. It has tended to be less functional, less intentional, less 
directable, and less legal. "3 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that an unflinching review of 
past centuries-with their mounting death tolls from wars, revolutions, 
massacres, as well as famine and disease resulting from human 
malevolence and negligence-led William James in his celebrated 1910 
essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," to conclude that "history is a bath 
of blood."4 
However, a number of analysts have concluded that the number of 
human beings deliberately killed by other human beings during the twen-
tieth century is far greater than for any other equivalent period of time in 
history. The "bath of blood" that James discovered in his study of many 
past centuries has become a veritable ocean of blood in just a few 
decades. 
For example, Pitirim Sorokin, in his study of wars from the twelfth to 
the twentieth centuries (which was published in 1937, two years before 
World War II began), calculated war casualties in relation to the popu-
lations of the combatant nations and concluded: 
If we take the relative indicators of the casualties, probably the most important 
criterion of war, they tell definitely and unequivocally that the curse or 
privilege to be the most devastating or most bloody war century belongs to the 
twentieth; in one quarter century, it imposed upon the population a "blood 
tribute" far greater than that imposed by any of the whole centuries 
compared.5 
The most detailed and comprehensive attempt to identify those killed 
by their fellow human beings during the twentieth century is British 
sociologist Gil Elliot's Twentieth Century Book of the Dead, published 
in 1972. On the basis of his carefully documented review of historical 
sources, Elliot estimates that there have been approximately 100 million 
"man-made" deaths during the first three-quarters of this century. Elliot 
asserts: "It is possible-in my view certain-that in a future perspective 
this explosion of human lives will be seen as the significant 'history' of 
this period. "6 
But even more ominously, the most powerful nations on the planet 
are currently devoting prodigious resources to the preparations for the 
ultimate mass killing project-nuclear holocaust. The United States and 
the Soviet Union are each annually spending billions of dollars to 
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maintain and expand their nuclear arsenals. At present, these arsenals 
combined contain approximately fifty thousand nuclear warheads with a 
collective explosive force equivalent to more than 3.5 tons of high 
explosive for each of the 4.5 billion people on earth. 7 Current plans for 
both nations call for adding thousands of new warheads to their arsenals 
during the next decade. While the United States and the Soviet Union 
are increasing their stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the other 
nuclear-armed nations, like Great Britain, France, and China, are also 
making additions and refinements in their nuclear arsenals, while several 
nations without nuclear weapons are struggling to acquire them. 8 
If even a small portion of current arsenals is actually used in a nuclear 
war, the ensuing holocaust will dwarf the worst atrocities of history. A 
recent World Health Organization study, for example, concluded that a 
nuclear war fought with about one-half of present arsenals could result in 
1 billion prompt deaths and an additional 1 billion serious injuries, most 
of which would eventually result in death due to lack of medical care, the 
effects of radiation exposure, shortages of food, and other lethal after 
effects of the initial carnage and destruction. 
To these findings must be added those from recent studies of the 
possible climatic and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war. 
Among the most shocking is the possibility that the detonation of even a 
very small portion of existing arsenals (as few as 1,000 of the 50,000 
warheads) could produce a so-called nuclear winter, which would entail 
plunging temperatures and a pall of darkness resulting from smoke and 
other atmospheric pollution generated by fires. This nuclear winter 
could spread across the entire Northern Hemisphere and last for 
months.9 So grave could these and other consequences of nuclear war 
be that the researchers concluded: 
Combined with the direct casualties of over 1 billion people, the combined 
intennediate and long-tenn effects of nuclear war suggest that eventually there 
might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere .... In any 
large-scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers, global environmental 
changes sufficient to cause the extinction of a major fraction of plant and 
animal species on Earth are likely .... In that event, the possibility of the 
extinction of Homo Sapiens cannot be excluded. 10 
In view of the terrible toll of human lives due to governmental mass 
killing in the past, the present, and, very possibly, the future, one might 
expect that a life-affirming species would have mounted a massive effort 
to confront and reduce this problem. Unfortunately, such a massive 
effort has not yet been made. Despite the vital contributions of a number 
of individuals and organizations, the attention and energy devoted to 
understanding and preventing state-sanctioned mass killing have been 
negligible when compared with the scale and urgency of the problem.11 
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A voiding this disturbing topic may well assure peace of mind and 
contentment with the status quo over the short term. On the other hand, 
such avoidance may also serve to encourage the social forces favoring 
continued reliance on mass killing as an acceptable tool of national 
security and thus increase the risk that government leaders may resort to 
mass killing in the future. If that mass killing takes the form of nuclear 
war, then the final price of short-term peace of mind will be oblivion. 
GENOCIDE 
Although the wholesale destruction of groups of human beings has 
been practiced for millennia, the concept of genocide, which depicts 
certain forms of such destruction, has been in existence for less than fifty 
years. The term was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish emigre to 
London who lost seventy members of his family to the Holocaust. In 
1943, he wrote Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, one of the earliest and 
most comprehensive accounts of Nazi persecutions of the Jews and other 
citizens of occupied nations. It was in this book that he introduced the 
term "genocide," which he derived from the Greek word genos, meaning 
race or tribe, and the Latin word cide, meaning killing. According to 
Lemkin, "By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an 
ethnic group. "12 
Thanks in large part to Lemkin's indefatigable lobbying efforts, on 
December 9, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations unani-
mously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. The Convention listed specific actions which con-
stitute the crime of genocide. Article 2 states: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.1 
More recent analysts of genocide have incorporated features of the 
U.N. Convention in their own definition while at the same time criti-
cizing its limitations. Leo Kuper, for example, states that "genocide 
... is a crime against a collectivity, taking the form of massive 
slaughter, and carried out with explicit intent. "14 He notes also that 
"genocide is pre-eminently a government crime."15 However, Kuper 
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also questions the Convention for its exclusion of political groups from 
among those protected. Such an omission leaves out such cases as the 
murder of tens of millions of Soviet citizens under the Stalinist regime 
and the extermination of millions of their own citizens by the Khmer 
Rouge forces in Cambodia during the 1970s.16 
Likewise, Irving Louis Horowitz defines genocide as "a special form 
of murder: state-sanctioned liquidation against a collective group, with-
out regard to whether an individual has committed any specific and 
punishable transgression."17 Horowitz goes beyond the "standard" type 
of deliberate, intentional mass killing to include "one shadowy area of 
genocide that permits the state to take lives by indirection, for example 
by virtue of benign neglect, or death due to demographic causes. "18 
A final contemporary definition is provided by V ahakn Dadrian, who 
defines genocide as "the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested 
with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall 
resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number 
of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and 
useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing 
to the decision of genocide. "19 As will be discussed below, Dadrian 
includes a wide range of actions within his definition, including military 
activities that cause high casualty levels among civilians, even if the 
targeting of the civilians is not deliberate. 20 
Despite inconsistencies evident among these and other definitions of 
genocide, and despite disagreements among analysts regarding whether 
or not particular cases of mass killing constitute genocide, there does 
appear to be a strong consensus on several crucial features of genocidal 
acts. 
First, genocide is undertaken by and for governments. The official 
ruling elite of a sovereign state either undertakes a deliberate campaign of 
intentional extermination; permits subnational groups to slaughter other 
subnational groups; or implements (or tolerates) practices that result in 
mass deaths among members of certain groups, even if such deaths are 
not the explicit policy objective.21 
Second, the individual identity of the victims is in general irrelevant, 
as are distinctions among sex and age. What concerns the state is that 
the individual belongs to the group targeted for destruction. A wide 
range of groups has been targeted throughout history, including racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups; the mentally handicapped; homosexuals; 
citizens of enemy nations; and members of political groups. The vast 
majority of victims of genocide have been civilians. 
Third, while the methods employed vary considerably, direct mass 
killing is the most characteristic form of genocidal destruction, although 
many additional deaths have resulted from hunger, disease, and other 
sequelae of direct killing and the destruction of resources necessary for 
survival. 
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TOTAL WAR 
Like the concept of genocide, the concept of total war encompasses a 
wide range of cases and subsumes a number of components.22 Two 
features of total war-a high degree of societal mobilization for war and 
an extremely high level of death and destruction-have been emphasized 
in most definitions and analyses of this type of mass killing. In con-
sidering the destructiveness of total war, most commentators note the 
tendency to deliberately attack noncombatant citizens of the enemy nation 
or group. Moreover, the direct or indirect participation of the entire 
nation in the war, combined with the targeting of civilians, tends to result 
in wars in which the very survival of one or more of the belligerents is at 
stake. Thus, strategist Edward Luttwak defines total war as "a war in 
which at least one party perceives a threat to its survival and in which all 
available weapons are used and the distinction between 'military' and 
'civilian' targets is almost completely ignored."23 
No recent war, even World Wars I and II, has been completely "total" 
in the sense that literally all of the available resources of the combatant 
nations have been devoted to the conflict or that the destruction of the 
enemy has been complete. (However, as noted above, a nuclear war 
could conceivably result in the latter condition, not only for the 
belligerents, but for uninvolved nations as well.) In practice, the concept 
of total war applies to conflicts in which either or both of these condi-
tions-societal mobilization and destructiveness-exist to extreme de-
grees. As Frederick Sallagar notes, "What characterizes an all-out, or 
total, war is that it is fought for such high stakes that the belligerents are 
willing, or compelled, to employ, not all weapons they possess, but any 
weapons they consider appropriate and advantageous to them. "24 
Throughout human history, many wars have been characterized by 
one or both of the features now associated with the concept of total war. 
As J. F. C. Fuller notes in The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, "Primitive 
tribes are armed hordes, in which every man is a warrior, and because 
the entire tribe engages in war, warfare is total. "25 The price of defeat in 
such conflicts was not simply the concession of territory to the victor, 
but the mass slaughter of the vanquished, with the possible exception of 
those dragged off into slavery. Religious wars have often been total 
wars. Edwin Corwin, noting that most people think of total war in terms 
of extreme degrees of ruthlessness, observes: "While the phrase itself is 
of recent coinage, total war in this primary sense is at least as old as 
recorded history and enjoys, at times, the most exalted sanction."26 To 
illustrate his point, Corwin cites a passage from the Bible, in Deuter-
onomy 20: "Of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth 
give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save nothing alive that breatheth: 
But thou shalt utterly destroy them."27 
Subsequent wars of religion, including the Crusades, involved the 
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mass slaughter of noncombatants as a routine practice. Such total wars 
culminated in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in which as many as 8 
million civilians (as compared with "only" 350,000 combatants) were 
killed, and the destruction of property and crops was so pervasive that 
many survivors were reduced to cannibalism.28 
In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, a trend toward more civi-
lized, limited warfare developed, although there were many relapses and 
exceptions. For nearly 150 years, most European wars were fought 
between relatively small mercenary armies sponsored by absolute 
monarchs. Killing of noncombatants was significantly curtailed, and the 
casualty levels among soldiers were reduced, in part to keep the financial 
burden on the sponsoring monarchs as low as possible. Rather than 
ending in the annihilation of the loser, wars tended to end in settlements 
that left the structure of all societies largely intact29 
This respite from total war began to end at the close of the eighteenth 
century with the French Revolution, the rise of Napoleon, and the begin-
ning of the era of wars waged between entire nations. Napoleon's chief 
contribution to the revival of total war was his utilization of huge armies 
of conscripted soldiers. However, while the scale and intensity of mili-
tary conflicts increased precipitously with the advent of mass armies, the 
other practice of total war, deliberate mass killing of noncombatants, 
remained relatively constrained. 
Following the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, a war-
weary Europe entered another period of relative peacefulness. Indeed, in 
his survey of warfare over the centuries, Sorokin found the overall inten-
sity of war during the nineteenth century to have been exceptionally 
low.30 Nations strove to prevent and limit wars through such efforts as 
the Vienna Congresses which, beginning in 1815, attempted to facilitate 
peaceful resolution of disputes, and the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, 
in which the United States and England agreed to limit warships on the 
Great Lakes. Also, as Richard Preston and Sydney Wise note in their 
history of warfare, the nineteenth century witnessed "the restoration of 
the conservative military system of the eighteenth century in place of the 
mass nationalistic armies of the Revolutionary era. "31 
Unfortunately, however, such restraints on war began to weaken dur-
ing the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century was 
to witness the resurgence of both aspects of total war to a degree that 
would compress the carnage of the Thirty Years' War into little more 
than a decade and multiply it severalfold. 
In modern total wars, mobilization of the combatant nations is accom-
plished in several ways, including the conscription of citizens to serve in 
mass armies, the widespread use of propaganda to maintain morale and 
support for the war, and the calculated exploitation of the national 
economy in the service of the war. 
Conscription results in large numbers of citizens being obliged to 
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leave their peacetime positions, often for the duration of the war. This 
can have a disruptive effect on individuals and families, and on the 
economy as well. In the case of the levee en masse imposed by the 
French revolutionary government in 1793, it has been noted that "the 
forced withdrawal of such great numbers from the normal pursuits of 
daily life disturbed the social economy profoundly, while the task that 
was put upon the depleted society of supplying and equipping such 
numbers aggravated the disturbance. "32 Conscription by one belligerent 
generally compels the others to adopt a similar system for building up 
comparable forces. In the American Civil War, for example, both sides 
initially relied on volunteers, but the high rates of attrition required first 
the Confederacy and then the Union to resort to conscription. 
Mass conscription has affected not only the degree to which the nation 
is involved in war but also the nature of warfare itself. In the case of the 
Napoleonic wars, casualties among combatants increased considerably in 
comparison with the preceding 100 years. As Fuller observes, "Con-
scription changed the basis of warfare. Hitherto soldiers had been cost-
ly, now they were cheap; battles had been avoided; now they were 
sought, and however heavy the losses, they could rapidly be made good 
by the muster-roll. "33 The vastly increased size of the revolutionary 
French army, which grew with conscription to include 750,000 soldiers, 
rquired changes in administration and logistics. The army was broken 
up into smaller, more mobile units, and long supply lines gave way to 
"compulsory requisition" of shelter and food, which often entailed offi-
cially sanctioned plunder of the contested territory.34 Similar measures 
were employed by the German military forces during World War II in 
their campaigns against Poland and the Soviet Union. 
To maintain the morale of the conscripted soldiers and the support of 
the citizens, government propaganda tends to be widely utilized in total 
wars. Such propaganda, which frequently takes the form of vilifying the 
enemy nation, can raise passions to the point where it becomes difficult 
to end wars on a basis that would promote a lasting peace. In his 
analysis of the Napoleonic wars of the late 1700s, Fuller emphasizes 
how difficult it was "for a conscripted nation-that is, a nation in arms 
-a nation fed on violent propaganda, to make an enduring peace. The 
peace treaties wrung from the vanquished were generally so unreason-
able that they were no more than precarious armistices; the losers only 
signed them through duress, and with the full intention of repudiating 
them at the first opportunity. "35 
During the same period that conscription was radically altering both 
the impact of warfare on society and the nature of war itself, the In-
dustrial Revolution was moving both European society and warfare in 
the direction of ever greater mechanization. As Hans Speier notes, this 
trend necessitated "a particularly close interdependency between the 
armed forces and the productive forces of the nation."36 As the size of 
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armies increased, and as armies became increasingly mechanized, the 
number of noncombatants needed to keep the army provided with equip-
ment and supplies increased as well. Under such conditions, much of 
the adult population tends to be directly or indirectly involved in sup-
porting the war effort. The coordination of the many sectors of the 
economy requires greater centralization of governmental authority. 
"Such a gearing-in," observes Wright, "of the agricultural, industrial, 
and professional population to the armed forces requires a military orga-
nization of the entire society."37 Or, as stated by Raymond Aron in The 
Century of Total War, "the army industrializes itself, industry militarizes 
itself; the army absorbs the nation: the nation models itself on the 
army."38 
Such processes tend to blur the distinctions between democratic and 
totalitarian forms of government. Noting the centralization of authority 
among all the involved nations in World War II, Marjorie Farrar 
suggests that "as a result institutional and ideological distinctions among 
the belligerents were reduced and the democratic regimes increasingly 
resembled their totalitarian counterparts. 1139 
Just as industrialization decisively affected the mobilization of the 
society for total war, it has also had a profound impact on the second 
basic component of total war-the extreme levels of destruction and 
death affecting civilian and soldier alike. Such destructiveness reflects 
two trends in the era of modern total war. First, the close interde-
pendence of the military and the economic-industrial sectors of society 
has created a steady expansion in the types of targets considered legiti-
mate by military forces. Second, the long-range and highly destructive 
nature of modern weapons has made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
discriminate between noncombatants and combatants, thereby resulting 
in high levels of civilian casualties even when traditional "military" 
targets are attacked. When civilians are deliberately attacked, the death 
tolls are of course far higher. 
The dependency of the mechanized military forces on civilian industry 
has meant that whole nations have become targets. As Gordon Wright 
observes in his analysis of World War II, "the battlefield, no longer 
limited or defined, was everywhere; it was occupied by civilians and 
soldiers alike. "40 
Some military policymakers, recognizing that total wars are fought 
between entire societies, rather than between armies, have urged and en-
gaged in deliberate attacks against enemy civilians. During the American 
Civil War, for example, Union General W. T. Sherman conducted a 
campaign of killing and destruction against the civilians of Georgia. In 
World War I, although most of the fighting was confined to the battle-
field, toward the end of the war the Germans began using submarines to 
sink civilian ships. Bombing of cities, which had begun early in the 
war, had steadily escalated during its course, although the armistice was 
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signed before its full potentialities were realized. Still, the noncombatant 
death tolls were relatively low. According to Gordon Wright, civilians 
accounted for only one in twenty deaths during World War J.41 By 
World War II, however, such practices as the scorched earth campaign 
of the Nazis and the Nazi and Allied practice of firebombing population 
centers contributed to far greater overall casualty rates, especially among 
civilians, who, according to Elliot, accounted for two-thirds of the 
approximately 60 million deaths.42 
It should be noted that many commentators have deplored the practice 
of deliberate attacks on civilians as a profound moral retrogression. In 
his essay "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," John Ford argues that 
many, if not most, civilians killed in bombing raids were "innocent non-
combatants," especially children and the elderly, who made no contri-
bution to the war effort and therefore could not be regarded as legitimate 
targets.43 The practice of targeting civilians for mass destruction, like 
the total mobilization of the society for war, tends to narrow the gap 
between democratic and totalitarian forms of government. Quincy 
Wright observes that "the development of the airplane by the totalitarian 
states in the twentieth century first extended their empires and then com-
pelled the democracies to adopt their techniques. "44 Lewis Mumford, in 
his essay "The Morals of Extermination," asserts: 
By taking over this method [obliteration bombing] as a cheap substitute for 
conventional warfare--cheap in soldiers' lives, costly in its expenditures of 
other human lives and in the irreplaceable historic accumulations of countless 
lifetimes-these democratic governments sanctioned the dehumanized tech-
niques of fascism. This was Nazidom's firmest victory and democracy's 
most servile surrender.45 
GENOCIDE AND TOT AL WAR: A PRELIMINARY 
COMPARISON 
Genocide and total war have consumed many tens of millions of 
human lives during the twentieth century and many hundreds of millions 
of lives throughout history. The preparations are now being made for a 
nuclear war that could destroy billions of lives and possibly extinguish 
our species. 
The following comparative analysis is offered in the hope of generat-
ing insights into mass killing in the past and in the hope of increasing 
understanding of the momentum toward mass killing in the present and 
future. It should be emphasized that this comparison is preliminary, 
tentative, and necessarily brief; it attempts to discern important differ-
ences and similarities between two ostensibly distinct types of state-sanc-
tioned mass killing. It is hoped that it will stimulate others-including 
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those who disagree with its findings as well as those who find them 
plausible--to undertake further study along these lines. 
Perhaps many others share with Horowitz the assumption that "it is 
operationally imperative to distinguish warfare from genocide. "46 One 
of his reasons for advocating this distinction is his belief that genocide 
involves mass killing in an intrastate, or domestic arena, whereas war-
fare involves lethal conflict between two nation-states. His decision to 
emphasize the distinction, he states, is "warranted by the weight of 
current empirical research that indicates that domestic destruction and in-
ternational warring are separate dimensions of struggle." In further sup-
port, he cites political scientist R. J. Rummel: "There are no common 
conditions or causes of domestic and foreign conflict behavior."47 
Others differentiate between genocide and warfare on moral grounds. 
Genocide is unequivocally evil, an entirely unjustifiable atrocity perpe-
trated against helpless and innocent victims by cowards who face little 
personal risk. On the other hand, warfare can be seen as evil or heroic, 
depending upon one's perspective. It has been noted above that some 
commentators regard the practice of bombing cities as moral retrogres-
sion. Indeed, prior to their involvement in World War II, both Great 
Britain and the United States issued statements condemning the practice 
as immoral. They expressed righteous outrage when Germany bombed 
such cities as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and, later, London. Both nations de-
cried the bombing of cities as a reversion to barbarism and beneath the 
dignity of a democratic nation. Yet, in the course of the war, both coun-
tries-first Great Britain in Europe and then the United States in Japan-
engaged in firebombing of crowded population centers on a scale far 
greater than the Nazis. It is perhaps noteworthy that after the war, Great 
Britain appeared to have second thoughts about its obliteration bombing 
policy; the airmen who managed to survive their extremely hazardous 
missions were never awarded a campaign medal, and the individual most 
responsible for the policy, Sir Arthur Harris, slipped into an obscurity 
that amounted to virtual exile.48 In contrast, Curtis LeMay, the individ-
ual most responsible for the decision to shift American bombing policy 
in Japan from precision attacks on military targets to the deliberate crea-
tion of vast firestorms in the highly flammable, densely populated 
Japanese cities, was widely touted as a hero after the war and was 
rewarded with the command of the elite Strategic Air Command, the 
nation's atomic-armed military unit.49 
Another basis for distinguishing between genocide and total war is the 
relation between goals and means. While both phenomena utilize similar 
means-the production of very large numbers of dead bodies-the goals 
are quite different. For example, Mumford suggests that, "in principle, 
the extermination camps where the Nazis incinerated over six million 
helpless Jews were no different from the urban crematoriums our air 
force improvised in its attacks by napalm bombs on Tokyo .... Our 
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aims were different, but our methods were those of mankind's worst 
enemy. "50 The difference in aims is crucial. The Nazis, as Michael 
Sherry points out in "The Slide to Total Air War," would not have 
stopped mass killing Jews if they had won the war; in fact, they had 
hopes and plans of intensifying their "Final Solution" to additional areas 
they might have conquered. 51 Some scholars suggest that the ability to 
exterminate the Jews was among the chief motives for Nazi aggression 
that led to World War II.52 So vital was genocide as a primary goal 
during the war that the Nazis carried on their extermination program even 
at the expense of their military efforts against the Soviets and Allies. In 
contrast, the Allies continued their mass bombing operations only until 
the surrender of their enemies: as soon as their primary goal was 
attained, they had no reason to continue employing the means. 
While these and other differences between genocide and total war 
support the assumption that they represent two distinct phenomena, 
much of the literature on mass killing is more equivocal. Even Horowitz, 
who was cited above as an advocate of maintaining the distinction, is 
inconsistent. At a later point in his pioneering study, he appears to con-
tradict himself by suggesting that "the end of an era when formal decla-
rations of warfare were made signifies the beginning of a new era in 
which the line between war and genocide becomes profoundly 
blurred."53 As an example, he cites the U.S. war in Vietnam, an unde-
clared war which has been alleged by some critics to have had genocidal 
dimensions, and by others as being a case of actual genocide. 54 After 
citing arguments on both sides of the issue of whether or not the war 
was genocidal, Horowitz states, "the distinction between internal and 
foreign people who are being killed helps little, since it must be con-
fessed that all genocidal practices involve a definition by the perpetrators 
of mass violence of those destroyed as outsiders. "55 Thus, he appears 
to be acknowledging the existence of an important process, deperson-
alization of victims, that occurs in state-sanctioned mass killing in both 
domestic and foreign conflicts. 
Likewise, Kuper, while emphasizing that the sovereign state is the 
main arena for genocide, refers to both conventional and atomic bomb-
ings as genocidal when he notes that: 
the changing nature of warfare, with a movement to total warfare, and the 
technological means for instantaneous annihilation of large populations, 
creates a situation conducive to genocidal conflict. This potential was realized 
in the Second World War, when Germany employed genocide in its war for 
domination; but I think the term must also be applied to the atomic bombing of 
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S.A. and to the pat-
tern bombing by the Allies of such cities as Hamburg and Dresden.56 
Finally, it has been noted that Dadrian, in developing his conceptual 
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schema of types of genocide, explicitly identifies strategic bombing as an 
example of what he terms "latent genocide. "57 
Just as careful analysts of genocide have implicitly or explicitly in-
cluded certain operations of total warfare within their definitions of geno-
cide, some definitions of war have included situations that have been 
regarded as genocidal. For example, in "The Social Types of War," 
Hans Speier develops the concept of "absolute war," which has many of 
the same characteristics as genocide. Absolute war, according to Speier, 
"is not waged in order to conclude peace with the vanquished foe. Peace 
terminating an absolute war is established without the enemy. The oppo-
nent is an existential enemy. Absolute war is waged in order to annihi-
late him."58 Such wars feature a lack of moral restraint; one or both of 
the belligerents regard the other as subhuman or even as an animal. As 
examples of absolute wars, Speier mentions the wars of the ancient 
Greeks against the barbarians and the wars between Christians and Mus-
lims during the Middle Ages. In the latter case, weapons and techniques 
that were prohibited in conflicts with other Christians were freely em-
ployed against the Mohammedans. Speier also includes clashes between 
heavily armed colonizers and poorly armed indigenous peoples in this 
category, which would appear to move it within the realm of genocide. 
Thus, there does appear to be some overlap between the definitions of 
genocide and total war. In terms of actual practice, several common fea-
tures are evident, three of which are particularly salient for this analysis. 
First, both genocide and total war involve mass killing of human be-
ings, the majority of whom are civilians. The mass nature of the killing 
reflects the fact that large numbers of people are killed more or less si-
multaneously and as anonymous members of a targeted group or inhabit-
ants of designated areas. Second, in both cases mass killing tends to be 
done in a deliberate, planned, premeditated fashion. The goal of the per-
petrators or implementors is clearly to kill large numbers of people, 
either as an end in itself, or else as a means to a different end. Finally, in 
both genocide and total war, mass killing is undertaken by the state as a 
national security measure. Both are organized and administered, or at 
least facilitated, by officials of the government for the ostensible purpose 
of assuring the well-being and security of the majority of citizens. 
Another approach to comparison involves examining the role of three 
factors-ideology, bureaucracy, and technology-that have been cited 
by several analysts as significant elements in both genocide and total 
war.59 
If ideology is defined as a system of psychological and political 
rationalizations for adopting a particular policy or engaging in a particular 
practice, then it is evident that the twentieth century has featured abun-
dant ideological incentives to participate in mass killing projects. 60 In 
this respect the twentieth is no different from past centuries: there have 
always been ideological justifications for mass killing. One of the most 
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potent of these has been religion, which has inspired some of the most 
savage cases of organized mass slaughter. 
In the modem world, however, religious ideologies have often been 
replaced by political ideologies, particularly the "religion of nationalism," 
to use Toynbee's phrase. This powerful ideology has been used to 
justify some of the most atrocious mass killing projects of the century. 
"Intense nationalism," notes Horowitz, "is itself an essential charac-
teristic of the genocidal society. It instills not only a sense of difference 
between those who belong and those who do not, but also the inhu-
manity of those who do not belong, and thereby the rights of the social 
order to purge itself of alien influence." 61 Nationalistic ideologies have 
also inspired wars of increasing scale and intensity. Toynbee states that 
"the increasing fanaticism of nationalism has exacted an increasing 
oblation of military human sacrifice. "62 
When the advocates of mass killing are able to justify their policies on 
the basis of national security, they increase the likelihood of cooperation 
by citizens, both in the role of direct perpetrator/implementor and in that 
of compliant bystander. In some cases, the official claim of a threat to 
national security is clearly specious, as has been the case with recent 
genocides. For example, the Jews in Nazi Germany certainly did not 
pose a real threat to the German state. But to the extent that Nazi propa-
gandists were able to convince German citizens that the Jews were to 
blame for Germany's many grave problems, they were able to secure ac-
tive complicity and passive compliance with respect to the "Final Solu-
tion." In other cases, especially total wars like World War II, the threat 
to national survival posed by the enemy is real. But in both cases, spe-
cious and real, the ideology of nationalism and the authority of govern-
ment is used by leaders to promote citizen cooperation in state-sanctioned 
mass killing projects. 
When the authority of national government is invoked, many individ-
uals are willing to subdue any moral reservations they might have about 
a particular policy or practice in order to continue service to their nation. 
This was the defense of many of the war criminals on trial at Nuremberg; 
however, the Tribunal consistently refused to respect their claims of hav-
ing had to obey "superior orders." As the infamous "Obedience to 
Authority" experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram disclosed, normal 
individuals are willing to inflict severe pain on other people when in-
duced by a convincing authority figure. 63 
If the government begins to fear waning support for its policies, it can 
employ propaganda or outright deception. During World War II, there is 
evidence to suggest that bomber crews were given briefings that inten-
tionally exaggerated the military significance of such targets as Dres-
den. 64 The British government attempted to restrict information about 
the Dresden raids from the general public to avoid "jeopardizing public 
support for the war. "65 
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In addition to capitalizing on the tendency of both civilians and 
soldiers to defer personal scruples in favor of conforming to authority, 
the invocation of national security can create a "kill or be killed" men-
tality. The targets of the government killing project, whether members 
of a despised minority group or citizens of an enemy nation, must be 
eliminated in order for the vitality of one's own group or nation to be 
preserved. In his study of Nazi doctors, "Medicalized Killing in Ausch-
witz," Lifton notes that "killing was done in the name of healing. It is 
not too much to say that every action an SS doctor took was connected to 
some kind of perversion or reversal of healing and killing. For the SS 
doctor, involvement in the killing process became equated with heal-
ing. "66 Likewise, Charny states, "Incredible as it may seem, virtually 
every genocide is defined by its doers as being on behalf of the larger 
purpose of bettering human life. "67 In his article, "American Military 
Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians," Ronald 
Schaffer cites excerpts from a wartime memo by U.S. Army Air Forces 
commander Henry H. Arnold in which Arnold stated that the bomber, 
"when used with the proper degree of understanding ... becomes, in 
effect, the most humane of all weapons. "68 Schaffer comments: 
These sentiments appear to conflict with Arnold's willingness to burn down 
cities, his desire to see robot bombers fall indiscriminately among the German 
people .... Yet they are more than lip service or words for the historical 
record. They represent a moral attitude inherent in air power theory, a posi-
tion that goes back to World War I-the idea that the bomber is a way of 
preserving lives by ending wars quickly and by providing a substitute for the 
kind of ground warfare that had killed so many soldiers a quarter century 
earlier. 69 
Among the most important forms of ideological justification for mass 
killing is the dehumanization of the victims. "Dehumanization," accord-
ing to Kuper, "might be conceived as the relegation of the victims to the 
level of animals or objects or to a purely instrumental role. "70 Herbert 
Kelman suggests that dehumanization entails the removal of two funda-
mental qualities from the victims, identity and community; the individual 
identity of each victim is submerged in the group to which he or she 
belongs, and the group as a whole is considered as subhuman or non-
human. 71 In Helen Fein's terms, the victims are placed "outside the 
sanctified universe of obligation-that circle of people with reciprocal 
obligations to protect each other whose bonds arose from their relation to 
a deity or sacred source of authority."72 If the invocation of national 
security and official authority provide initial inducement for both partici-
pants and bystanders to accept the necessity of harsh measures against a 
targeted group, dehumanization of that group further erodes any moral or 
empathic restraints on the willingness to perpetrate massive and indis-
criminate violence. As Kelman notes: "Thus when a group of people is 
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defined entirely in terms of a category to which they belong, and when 
this category is excluded from the human family, then the moral re-
straints against killing them are more readily overcome. "73 
Both total war and genocide are characterized by the dehumanization 
of victims. When the victims are members of a different religion or race, 
dehumanization is greatly facilitated. For example, when the United 
States shifted its bombing policy in Japan from "precision" attacks 
against military targets to deliberate efforts to create huge firestorms in 
urban areas, accounts of the raids in the popular media were replete with 
images suggesting that the Japanese were more similar to insects than 
people and that the bombing campaign was closer to pest extermination 
than a traditional military operation. The image of pest extermination 
was also frequently used by Nazis who were involved in the attempt to 
exterminate the Jews. 
A final element in the ideological justification of mass killing to be 
considered in this preliminary analysis is the role of the academic and 
scientific communities. In the case of the Holocaust, the entire campaign 
against the Jews-from the earliest official persecutions in 1933 through 
the implementation of the "Final Solution"-was intellectually ration-
alized by members of the German academic and scientific community. 
The medical profession, for example, as has been documented by Lifton, 
played very important roles, both by contributing to such legal measures 
against the Jews as the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which made it illegal 
for Jews and non-Jews to be married or have sexual relations (on the 
assumption that interbreeding with Jews would pollute and weaken the 
German-Aryan "blood"), and by direct participation in the mass killing 
operations. 74 Scientific authority was also invoked to justify the shift 
from precision to area bombing by the British during World War II. The 
military and political leaders who favored such a shift in targeting policy 
eagerly seized on the fact that certain prestigious scientists had purport-
edly found evidence indicating that such a policy would significantly 
help the war effort. Other scientists, who reached a contradictory con-
clusion-that "de-housing" the German workers was less efficient than 
continuing to attack specific industrial targets-found far less receptivity 
among the policymakers.75 
A second contributing factor emphasized by analysts of contemporary 
mass killing is the pervasiveness of bureaucratic political and social orga-
nization. According to Richard Rubenstein in his study The Cunning of 
History: The Holocaust and the American Future: 
Usually the progress in death-dealing capacity in the twentieth century has 
been described in tenns of technological advances in weaponry. Too little at-
tention has been given to the advances in social organization that allowed for 
the effective use of the new weapons. In order to understand how the moral 
barrier was crossed that made massacre in the millions possible, it is neces-
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sary to consider the importance of bureaucracy in modem political organi-
zation. 76 
Sociologist Randall Collins sees bureaucracy as a reason for the "fero-
cious" face to face cruelty of the past to have been replaced by a new 
kind of cruelty: callousness, or "cruelty without passion." While he 
notes that callous cruelty has existed throughout history, he suggests that 
it is "especially characteristic of large-scale, bureaucratic organization," 
and that "the structural organization of bureaucracy seems uniquely 
suited for the perpetration of callous violence. "77 
Ongoing mass killing projects-like the operation of killing centers or 
the undertaking of a sustained incendiary bombing campaign against 
densely populated cities-require a complex and efficient organization. 
For every individual who is directly involved with the mass killing (e.g., 
operating the gas chamber or serving as crew on the bomber), there are 
many others who must decide and promulgate the policy; design, build, 
and service the necessary machinery; coordinate the logistics of transport 
and supply; generate, distribute, and file paperwork; monitor and eval-
uate. 
Several features of bureaucratic organizations serve to promote the 
overall efficiency of mass killing projects as well as to enable individual 
participants to carry out their tasks with a minimum of questioning or 
doubt. Insofar as the positions within a bureaucracy are arranged in a 
formally hierarchical structure, individuals at the lower levels tend to 
have a reduced sense of personal responsibility for either the policy they 
are helping to implement or its final outcome. They are, after all, only 
"following orders" that have descended through all the levels of the 
organization above their own. This is particularly true of the military 
with its strongly indoctrinated tradition of unquestioning loyalty to 
authority. Another feature of bureaucracy, division of labor, breaks 
down complex tasks into compartmentalized sub-tasks. "Microdivision 
of labor," according to sociologist Don Martindale, "has made the goal 
of activity invisible, depriving it of meaning for the individual. "78 For 
example, the distinguished physicist and U.S. defense consultant Free-
man Dyson, reflecting on his involvement as a scientific analyst in 
Bomber Command, the organization responsible for British strategic 
bombing during World War II, notes: 
Bomber Command was an early example of the new evil that science and 
technology have added to the old evils of soldiering. Technology has made 
evil anonymous. Through science and technology, evil is organized bureau-
cratically so that no individual is responsible for what happens.79 
A further diminishment of personal responsibility results from the formal 
separation of the individual from the position which he or she occupies 
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within the organization. According to Collins, this separation is "the 
fundamental principle of bureaucracy."80 The assigned task is per-
formed during working hours, after which the individual is free to pur-
sue other activities and interests. 
Bureaucracy facilitates the crossing of the "moral barrier" to which 
Rubenstein referred by its deliberate effort to render humane considera-
tions irrelevant with respect to the performance of the task at hand. As 
Max Weber noted, a bureaucratic organization, "develops the more per-
fectly the more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanizep,' the more completely it 
succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. 
This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special 
virtue."81 
Such amoral rationality augments the effects of the other features to 
help create technically proficient functionaries who perform their spe-
cialized assignments with a minimized tendency to concern themselves 
with the fundamental nature of the overall project or its ultimate goals 
and results. As Fein observes, "Bureaucracy is not itself a cause of the 
choice of destructive ends, but it facilitates their accomplishment by 
routinizing the obedience of many agents, each trained to perform his 
role without questioning the ends of action. "82 
Technology is the third factor that has contributed decisively to the 
unprecedented death tolls of the twentieth century. It has made this con-
tribution by providing killers with weapons of ever-increasing lethality 
and by creating a physical and emotional distance between killers and 
victims. 
Throughout history, technology has always had a powerful impact on 
warfare. In his analysis of the historical development of weaponry from 
preliterate peoples through the 1950s, Francis Allen concludes that tech-
nology is "the clearcut, outstanding variable of importance" in deter-
mining the nature of war. 83 This conclusion is shared by Quincy 
Wright, who states that "the outstanding characteristic in which modern 
war has differed from all earlier forms of war has been in the degree of 
mechanization. "84 
The lethality of weapons has increased tremendously during the 
modern era. In his classic study of the increasing rate of social change, 
sociologist Hornell Hart has documented several dimensions of the 
"accelerating power to kill and destroy." These include the range over 
which weapons can be projected and, as a function of this range, their 
"killing area." Hart notes that from 1 million B.C. until approximately 
A.D. 1450, the maximum range of available weapons remained under 
one-third of a mile and the killing area under one square mile. The only 
weapons developed during this entire period capable of attaining these 
results were the catapult and the ballista (a giant crossbow). Between 
1453, with the invention of cannons, and 1912, with the development of 
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coastal artillery, the range increased from 1 mile to 11.4 miles and the 
killing area from 3 square miles to 408 square miles. However, between 
1915, with the first Zeppelin raid on London during World War I, and 
1954, with strategic bombers and in-flight refueling, the range grew 
from 200 miles to 12,500 miles and the killing area from 126,000 square 
miles to 200 million square miles. This killing area exceeded the total 
surface area of the earth, approximately 10 million square miles.85 
Hart also traced the increase in the killing power of the explosives that 
can be delivered over the above ranges. One measure that he uses is 
deaths per ton of explosive. During the German bombing raids on 
London during World War I, for example, about 3 people were killed for 
each ton of TNT bombs dropped. By World War II, the rate had risen 
precipitously; in the American incendiary bombing raid on Tokyo on 
March 9, 1945, deaths per ton was 50. By the end of the war, the 
invention of the atomic bomb had raised the death toll per ton of explo-
sive even higher, up to "about 10,000 persons killed per ton of normal 
bomb load for the B-29 that made the raid. "86 Hart concludes his 
analysis of increased killing power by noting that "the five centuries 
from 1346 to 1875 saw several times as much increase in explosive 
power as had been achieved in the previous million years. The 70 years 
from 1875 to March, 1945, saw several times as much increase in ex-
plosive power as the previous five centuries. "87 With the development 
during the war of atomic weapons, and after the war of thermonuclear 
weapons, destructive capabilities have climbed even higher. 
The combination of long-range delivery capability and high levels of 
destructiveness has made modern weapons indiscriminate. During 
World War II, even efforts to precisely target key industries frequently 
created large death tolls among civilians living in the vicinity, as the re-
sult of either errant bombs or conflagrations that started in the designated 
target areas and then spread to surrounding residential areas. 
Warfare is not the only type of mass killing that has been vitally 
affected by technological developments. As Horowitz notes, "What 
makes genocide a particularly malevolent practice in this century, with 
wide-ranging consequences, is the role of modern technology in the 
systematic destruction of large numbers of innocents." 88 In the case of 
the Holocaust, technology played a crucial role in at least two ways. 
First, existing technology was utilized by the killers to facilitate their 
tasks. For example, communications technology enabled them to coor-
dinate a killing project that involved millions of intended victims scat-
tered throughout Europe, and transportation technology was exploited to 
ship the Jews and other victims from their far-flung homes to the killing 
centers. Second, new technologies of killing and corpse disposal were 
developed in order to increase the "output." This included gas chambers 
with a capacity of 2,000 people at one time, huge ventilation systems 
designed to evacuate the poisoned air from the gas chambers, and 
116 Eric Markusen 
crematoria capable of disposing of thousands of corpses per day. While 
none of this technology was particularly sophisticated or esoteric, its 
efficient exploitation definitely helped the perpetrators to attain higher 
"body counts" than would have been the case had they continued to re-
sort to more "primitive" methods like shooting, drowning, and burying 
victims alive. 
In addition to affecting contemporary mass killing by increasing the 
destructiveness of the tools used by the killers, technology has also 
decisively affected the mass killing process by imposing physical and 
emotional distance between killers and their victims. Not only can killers 
annihilate great numbers of people in short periods of time, but they can 
do this often without even seeing their victims. As Allen notes, "The in-
creasing tendency is to wage war at a distance .... Modem scientific 
war thus becomes depersonalized."89 For example, during World War 
I, the crews of heavy artillery pieces fired across no man's land into the 
area of enemy trenches rather than at individually sighted enemy sol-
diers. During World War II, many of the bombing raids were obscured 
by cloud cover or by smoke rising from fires started by earlier strikes. 
In the Holocaust, the heavy psychological toll on the Einsatzgruppen 
killers engaging in the face-to-face mass shooting of men, women, and 
children was greatly reduced when the killing methodology shifted to the 
large gas chambers into which technicians would pour gas crystals 
through openings on the roof, without having to watch the victims die.90 
An important effect of technologically imposed distance between kil-
lers and victims is an increased tendency to dehumanize the victim.91 
"In general," notes sociologist Lewis Coser, "the perception of the 
humanness of the 'other' decreases with the increase in distance between 
perceiver and perceived. "92 Such dehumanization further erodes any 
moral restraints that might intrude upon the effective performance of 
function by the killer. A case in point is provided by the strategic 
bombing campaigns of World War Il. Kennett observes: 
The escalation of the air war was made easier by the fact that those who 
directed the bombing offensives and those who carried them out remained 
curiously insulated and detached from the consequences of their work. Pho-
tographs taken at thirty thousand feet gave no clue to the human effects of a 
raid, nor did other sources. In this vacuum, imagination and extrapolation 
could picture the population of an enemy town deprived of its homes but not 
of life and limb .... Anodyne, antiseptic phrases such as "dual target" and 
"area attack" further served to mask the fact that human lives were being 
destroyed.93 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite apparent differences between genocide and total war as forms 
of state-sanctioned mass killing, this preliminary comparison has dis-
closed several significant similarities and parallels. 
Both genocide and total war are undertaken by the nation-state as 
national security measures. Democracies as well as totalitarian govern-
ments have perpetrated genocides and engaged in total wars. Indeed, 
participation in a total war tends to narrow the gap between the two 
forms of government by centralizing authority and encouraging govern-
mental propaganda and secrecy. 
Ideological elements such as dehumanization of the targets of violence 
are common to both genocide and total war, as is the conviction that the 
vitality of one's own group or nation can be preserved only by willing-
ness to destroy masses of people in a different group or nation. The in-
vocation of a threat to national security, and governmental authorization 
for measures that would ordinarily be considered atrocious, facilitate the 
suppression of moral and empathic restraints among citizens who partici-
pate directly in the mass killing, as well as those who tacitly support it as 
"good citizens." 
In the modem era, both genocide and total war tend to be bureau-
cratically organized. This form of social organization results in a dimin-
ished sense of personal responsibility for those who are directly or 
indirectly involved in the mass killing project. It also routinizes the per-
formance of specialized tasks that are removed from the reality of the end 
results, but which collectively and cumulatively contribute to those 
results. 
Technology plays an extremely important role in both forms of mass 
killing in at least two ways. First, it makes the task of killing large num-
bers of people easier and more efficient, and second, it eases any poten-
tial mental burden on the killers by interposing physical distance between 
them and their victims. This distancing reinforces the effects of dehu-
manizing ideology noted above. 
The result of all three facilitating factors is to create a momentum that 
tends to increase levels of destructiveness until the goal has been reached 
or an outside force prevents continuation of the policy. 
This comparative analysis has been admittedly preliminary and brief. 
The roles of such facilitating factors as ideology, bureaucracy, and tech-
nology need to be explored in greater detail, and other differences and 
similarities need to be identified and analyzed. 
On the basis of this initial effort, however, it does appear that the line 
between genocide and total war has become very blurred in many cases. 
Warfare in the twentieth century has become increasingly genocidal, and 
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several genocides-with the German genocide against the Jews as the 
exemplary case--resemble military campaigns and utilize military forces 
in the killing process. 94 
The lessons of this study for the problem of the nuclear threat are very 
ominous. The same facilitating factors that expedite genocide and total 
war also characterize the preparations for nuclear war. The build-up of 
nuclear arsenals and the willingness to use them are justified on the 
grounds of national security. Elaborate ideological rationalizations are 
used to convince citizens of the need for more and better nuclear wea-
pons. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, government 
propaganda and secrecy surround the making of nuclear policy and the 
plans for nuclear combat. Those who are closest to the policies and the 
weapons see them as being absolutely essential for the preservation of 
their nations, even to the point of being willing to risk destruction of 
those nations. The leaders and citizens of each "side" are vilified and 
dehumanized by official rhetoric and propaganda on the other side. The 
Soviets are demonized as "Godless monsters" dwelling in an "evil em-
pire," while citizens of the United States are caricatured as "evil imperial-
ists" and "heartless capitalists." 
The preparations for nuclear war take place in vast bureaucracies in 
which many thousands of patriotic individuals make their livings by 
performing compartmentalized tasks that contribute to the readiness to 
engage in nuclear holocaust. The destructive capacity of nuclear wea- 
pons technology is beyond the comprehension of most, if not all, 
potential victims of nuclear war, which decreases their ability to recog-
nize and confront the risk that such technology poses. The weapons 
themselves will be launched by young men and women buried in under-
ground missile silos, submerged beneath the ocean in submarines, or 
flying high above the ground in airplanes. Most of those who will be 
responsible for actually using the weapons do not even know their 
precise destination. 
These and many other features of the nuclear threat make it very diffi-
cult for human beings to comprehend and confront it. Yet, if they fail to 
even try, then factors that contribute to the growing likelihood will be 
allowed to grow stronger, and the efforts of the minority of the people 
who have dedicated themselves to trying to prevent the holocaust will be 
in vain. The problem of state-sanctioned mass killing-in the past, 
present, and future-must be elevated to the highest level of our priori-
ties as citizens, scholars, and parents. We must confront the ugly issue 
of mass killing in order to avoid becoming victims ourselves. 
Although the following words of Bruno Bettelheim were originally 
addressed to the question of why the Jews became ensnared in the 
unimaginable madness of the Holocaust, they have much to say to us in 
an era of genocide, total war, and the preparations for nuclear holocaust: 
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When a world goes to pieces and inhumanity reigns supreme, man cannot go 
on living his private life as he was wont to do, and would like to do; he 
cannot-as the loving head of a family, keep the family living together peace-
fully, undisturbed by the surrounding world; nor can he continue to take pride 
in his profession or possessions, when either will deprive him of his humani-
ty, if not also of his life. In such times, one must radically reevaluate all that 
one has done, believed in, and stood for in order to know how to act. In 
short, one has to take a stand on the new reality-a firm stand, not one of 
retirement into an even more private world.95 
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7 
SOCIAL MADNESS 
Ronald Aronson 
I 
In The Dialectics of Disaster: A Preface to Hope I have analyzed the 
"Final Solution to the Jewish Problem" as an act of societal madness.1 
We ordinarily use this term "madness" quite freely in conversation, but 
then abandon it upon moving into serious discourse and study-perhaps 
in trying to be more precise, objective, or scientific, perhaps to avoid a 
contentious descriptive term. I would argue, however, that sophisticated 
thought has ignored an important spontaneous insight. Used carefully 
and self-consciously, the term "madness" illuminates much of the cen-
tury's genocidal history, including above all the Nazi project to exter-
minate Europe's Jews. 
Mad: untutored and casual reflection contains an insight to be pre-
served and deepened, not suppressed, by systematic and scientific study. 
Nazi policies toward the Jews were mad, as were Stalin's attacks upon 
Russian society, as was the American near-destruction of Vietnam. And 
in the dynamic structures of these and other quite different madnesses we 
can find guides for understanding and perhaps combatting the nuclear 
madness menacing all of us. 
Yet to describe social policies as mad immediately exposes one to a 
raft of doubts: about indulging in rhetorical excess, about being impre-
cise, about confusing the social with the individual, injecting normative 
conceptions that have no place in social analysis. For example, even if 
we grant that individuals may be described as mad-and this language is 
contestable as being value-charged, unscientific, and obsolescent-how 
can psychological terms appropriate to individual mental functioning be 
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applied to collective behavior? After all, don't societies function accord-
ing to different processes than do individuals? 
This and similar objections are reinforced by the functionalist premise 
that generally guides studies of social life. It is no great leap from as-
suming, quite appropriately, that all social policy is intentional, to seeing 
that intentionality as rational-thus gilding rulers' acts with the ration-
ality of those studying them. If it had afu.nction and purpose, the "Final 
Solution" was done "in order to ... ": to unite Germany, say, or to 
divert it. It had a particular function, then, a logic. The executioners 
were guided by or manipulated according to this logic. But such formu-
lations tend to cast genocide as another human project among the 
universe of projects-whose rationality is either assumed or lies beyond 
the specific study in question-rather than as a policy whose logic is 
fundamentally rooted in illogic. Yes, it was just another human act, but 
it was also an insane one. Yes, understanding it demands that we use 
customary explanatory categories, but it also stretches them to their limit 
The Nazi policy and practice of extermination was-in spite of its 
overwhelming technical rationality, in spite of the palpable reality of the 
extermination-camp universe-as supremely irrational as can be 
imagined. Yet its madness, if felt and intuited, is difficult to locate, more 
difficult to argue. Was it in the decision to exterminate, in the machinery 
itself, in the mental functioning of those who ordered it or those who 
carried out their orders, in the society that made it possible? Although 
the debate continues, it is at least plausible for us to see an organizer of 
the "Final Solution," Adolf Eichmann, as did Hannah Arendt, as banal 
and mediocre rather than as pathologically mad. 2 And it is at least pos-
sible to argue, as did Richard Rubenstein, that the key to the Holocaust 
is not a crazed intentionality but a rather indifferent and impersonal 
process of twentieth-century technological rationality.3 
Certainly I agree that "madness" is a methodologically troubling term 
-a culturally bound concept whose use for socio-historical processes is 
so problematic and controversial that it would be preferable to avoid it 
altogether. But discarding the term will not dispel what it would convey. 
How else can we preserve what is essential to it-the systematically and 
radically deranged character of the "Final Solution"? How do justice to 
the intuition that at its core it was insane, beginning to end? 
Yet aren't these subjective responses? Rubenstein has argued that we 
should bracket our emotional responses as interfering with our objective 
understanding of this event.4 Is not our sense of its madness similarly 
subjective and distortive? Won't dwelling on it slant our discussion in a 
hopelessly colored personal direction? Shouldn't we limit ourselves to 
presenting and understanding the facts without adding any such personal 
evaluation to them? 
On the contrary, if the Holocaust commands our attention it is because 
we cannot separate data-the numbers of dead, for example-from our 
Social Madness 127 
definition of their meaning. The event's impact and significance is in-
deed subjectively based: the sheer scale of the catastrophe cannot be 
disentangled from our sense of its grotesque character. The "Final Solu-
tion" was an end in itself. There is no value-free way of characterizing 
the Holocaust-its very definition as the worst catastrophe imaginable 
short of nuclear war is rooted in our respect for life, our sense of what 
humans should be and how they should and should not treat each other. 
Objectivity, insofar as history and society are concerned, is an intersub-
jective product constituted by those who share this same space, the earth. 
It is assumed, perhaps elaborated, as our sense of the collective condi-
tions for survival, let alone well-being. In its utter gratuitousness, the 
Nazi extermination program so violates even the most minimal of these 
norms-proper behavior in wartime-that we cannot help but perceive it 
by using such terms as "unspeakable," "evil," "barbaric," "horrifying," 
or "demonic." 
We perceive it this way: our lenses are inescapably emotional-
subjective and objective, and give us the event already laden with 
meaning. We perceive it this way: it is this way. In the human world 
"subjective" reactions are indeed objective: they claim to illuminate not 
our feelings about the Holocaust but its very structure and character. 
Conversely, as a human project it has a structure and character only 
within the human world whose norms it so systematically outraged. Our 
objective-subjective reactions claim to mark it off from other historical 
events and tell us how and why it is unique. In this sense such terms do 
not call for being bracketed out at the start, but rather for being 
retained-clarified and understood, in order to better guide us to the 
event itself. 
II 
But what does it mean to call social policy and collective behavior 
"mad"? How can the intuition be preserved and rendered usable for 
research and analysis? 
Let us be clear what we do when we call an act "mad." First, our 
assertion may be of various strengths, and our emphasis may vary 
accordingly. We may simply mean that it is severely and systematically 
abnormal-that it departs considerably from our sense of the normal. 
"Normal," of course, is a subjective-objective notion which, strictly 
speaking, conveys our judgment of the range of proper human behavior 
-the norm we apply. But even if we try to restrict this judgment to 
behavior, it is hard to escape an accompanying reference to the psycho-
logical state underlying the behavior. In other words, in addition to 
considering a "mad" act as extremely abnormal, we imply that its source 
is in a mind that is somehow deranged. A mad action, we may suggest, 
128 Ronald Aronson 
proceeds from a disordered psyche. Indeed, if we call an act "insane" 
we complete this shift and our emphasis falls more heavily on the mental 
state of the actor. Between the milder emphasis on an action's abnor-
mality and the stronger focus on its subjective source, I propose to ex-
plore "madness" in the middle sense, as suggested by "deranged"-as 
judgment of an act which opens toward, but does not immediately insist 
on focusing on, its subjective source. 
Second, we must insist on the normative claim implied at each stage 
so far. When we speak of individuals as mad/deranged, we may have in 
mind three possible areas: systematic derangement of perception, sys-
tematic derangement of intention, or systematic derangement of affect. 
The individual may claim to see things that are not there or not see things 
that are there, may seek to do things that are inconceivable, or may show 
feelings or responses that are seriously and systematically inappropriate. 
In each type of madness, a standard is implied against which the act is 
measured: what is really there to be perceived, what is really possible to 
do, what is normal for human beings to feel. Obviously we cannot re-
strict ourselves to common-sense judgments of reality for our standard-
revolutionaries, inventors, and poets constantly break beyond and re-
define what are assumed to be the limits of reality and are frequently 
falsely thought to be mad. This does not deny that there are standards, 
however; just that a given society's definition of what is real-as in the 
case of Nazi Germany-must in turn be judged against more solid 
standards. 
What is their source? Daily life is underpinned by a shared sense of 
the real world, its structures and limits. Science uses but sees beyond 
this, remains guided by its own, and corresponding, shared sense of 
reality, which is continuously and collectively refined and redefined just 
as is that of common sense. Even a revolutionary social philosophy, 
Marxism, which projects social transformation-a radically different 
reality which, if glimpsed, has not yet been achieved-bases its claim to 
truth on its scientific character. In other words, it is no more than 
utopian speculation if its projections are not based on actual, observable 
tendencies and possibilities of this society. 
Even if it is now regarded as intersubjectively based rather than inde-
pendent and external to us, a structured real world is central to all our 
experience. The rebellious-or revolutionary--rejection of the common-
sense version of these structures is not mad, nor are the transcending 
visions of great poets, artists, and scientists. Their visions have seen 
through to deeper layers of the reality and have allowed future genera-
tions access to them. To be sure, sometimes we cannot tell for sure 
whether we are witnessing a transcendence of common sense or a mad 
break with reality-a vision of a madman. But then no normative con-
cept is without its gray areas. Despite these, judgments of abnormality/ 
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derangement still rest on a shared and demonstrable sense of objective 
reality, its spheres including intention and feeling as well as perception. 
III 
The three categories of individual madness demand closer examina-
tion to see which are useful for societal analysis. First, what does it 
mean to see what is not really there? The Nazis saw the Jews as the 
source of Germany's problems: they perceived them as sub- and super-
humans, as a danger, a pollutant, a parasite, an evil.5 I do not mean 
"see" and "perceive" literally in terms of the physiological/optical fact of 
perception, but inferentially, as in the case of a belief. When someone 
sees the devil we assume not a perceptual but a mental malfunctioning: 
madness is not color-blindness but a mental disorder in which we believe 
our world of experience to form a causal pattern which is radically false. 
Patently absurd connections or processes of causation are invented, 
beings are created for which there is no basis in reality. These specific 
people, the Jews, were endowed by large numbers of Germans with 
certain menacing qualities and were linked mentally to their actually ex-
perienced problems. 
To see this as madness is to concede that at its core were not the 
manipulators and the manipulated, but rather, more disturbingly, people 
who believed the inanities they spoke. Like the madman who sees the 
devil, those who thought the Jews were racially defiling them were sin-
cere. They believed in their fantasies. 
To see what is not there is also to not see what is there. If one looks 
at nuclear weapons and does not see danger but instead security we may 
speak of a similar double, and similarly radical, misperception. Again, 
the term "perception" is used loosely: the derangement lies in the mental, 
not the optical, process. 
Why not simply speak of an error? Why is it not enough simply to 
label as mistaken the man who sees the devil or the Nazi who sees the 
Jew as the devil? After all, we are first of all talking about a mistake. 
The problem is that to call misperception a mistake locates it within the 
realm of reason and evidence we presume in all discourse and indeed 
perception. Within that realm a mistake may be corrected, for example, 
by demonstrating it to be false. But to call it madness underscores on the 
one hand its depth and seriousness, on the other its psychological roots 
and quality of being beyond reason and demonstration. If we regard a 
belief as mad we see it as being both willful and beyond reach. 
This is a remarkable combination of opposites: a mad belief is 
beyond control, unreachable by any customary process of evidence or 
reasoning, yet it is willful. It proceeds with determination and from a 
definite intention. 
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Madness of the first sort, then, suggests a willful turning away from 
both normal perception and inference and its standards of evidence and 
truth, and a turning away which proclaims-and acts on-the inexis-
tence of what is real and the existence of what is not. Of course, no 
individual or social movement turns completely from reality. Hitler not 
only showed normal perceptual capacities when he ate and drank, but in 
rising to power he demonstrated a brilliant grasp of the political situation 
down to the smallest detail of timing. If he was deranged it was only in 
certain specific areas. The same is true for those judged and treated as 
clinically insane: however far from normal reality they may be in spe-
cific areas, they know where and how to eat, how to walk, what it 
means to sleep. Total derangement, if possible, would deprive the 
would-be pathological killer of the very capacity to kill: every reality 
would be scrambled. Derangement is always selective and limited, 
leaving intact most of the vast web of one's other ties to reality as well as 
abilities to function within it. 
Which is why we must see madness as lying along a continuum 
which stretches from the impossible extreme of seeing and acknowledg-
ing reality completely to the other impossible extreme of breaking with it 
totally. If the second is inconceivable for the reasons just given, 
Sigmund Freud has made clear why the first is also conceivable: civi-
lized life demands repression and neurosis. If sane people stand some-
where along the continuum, the insane stand further along, having 
broken with more ofreality. It is, however, a quantitative change which 
becomes qualitative. To speak of "madness" implies that reality is being 
denied more fully and in an area that is decisive for functioning. One 
could scarcely imagine functioning without denying some aspects of 
reality-this is the meaning of repression and neurosis as Freud articu-
lated them. Repression is necessary to civilized life as such-for exam-
ple, generating the sublimations that yield culture as well as protecting 
humanity from the impulses that would threaten it. Neurosis, differen-
tiated from madness only by degree, afflicts every member of Western 
society in some way(s) which at some time(s) may become disruptive. 
Madness is more pronounced, more disruptive, more systematic. 
If the phenomenon of denial characterizes all neurosis and suggests 
the (relatively) easy reversability that treatment or time can bring, a 
stronger term is needed to describe the willful, radical, systematic de-
parture from reality we mean by "madness": a rupture with reality. This 
formulation captures all of the meanings I have been exploring: the fact 
that madness involves a relationship with reality; the normative character 
of the description; the seriousness of the derangement; its willful char-
acter; and the difficulty of return. 
A second meaning of "madness" emphasizes the derangement not of 
perception but of intention. Of course, the two are linked: belief is an 
act whose derangement proceeds from an intention to rupture with reality 
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and so believe. Moreover, madness has consequences-and is thus 
talked about and studied--only when it becomes yet more active and 
produces practical results. Nevertheless, "madness" has still a further 
implication, within the practical sphere, of an act that is undertaken 
contrary to evident possibility and in spite of that evidence. To attempt 
unaided flight from a tall building is so patently pursuing the impossible 
and courting death as to be mad. Of course, as with the earlier quali-
fications of misperception, acts that seek to "do the impossible" are re-
garded as mad when they are sustained, serious, and far-reaching. If 
this madness indeed contains strong elements of misperception, the em-
phasis falls on the misperception of causal relations between act A and 
intended result B. "If I leap I will fly." The absence of any conducting 
path between A and B is rejected, replaced instead with magical belief. 
B can be accomplished by doing A, in the face of all contrary evidence 
and experience. Reality is defied. 
The intention is mad not insofar as it is felt or desired, but insofar as it 
is willed against reality. I focus on this as a distinct kind of madness 
because the intention dominates so wholly as to be pursued in spite of its 
patent impossibility. My desire to fly goes against reality, but instead of 
submitting to that reality I attack and disregard it by jumping from the 
window. If I disregard it with reference to the laws of physics, I attack 
it with regard to my own body. In this sense the realities in and through 
which the action takes place are violated in decisive ways-my body in 
particular-in hope of achieving B. Madness: an extreme and syste-
matic violation of reality in the intention of achieving an impossible 
result. 
And yet common sense tells us that many things are impossible which 
are later accomplished. Was flight impossible in 1900? Black-white 
equality in the American South in 1950? I select a technical and a socio-
political example, both of which were susceptible to change over time. 
Yesterday's impossibility becomes tomorrow's common sense: space 
travel, for example, or women's equality with men. This implies that 
special caution is necessary when talking about madness. Moreover, 
systematic analysis of social structures and tendencies may reveal certain 
possibilities which are roundly denied by established ideologies: social 
movements sometimes suddenly and momentously extend the field of 
possibilities, as when Russian workers created the Soviets in 1905.6 
Thus the intention for social change-even for revolutionary change 
-cannot be a priori characterized as mad any more than can the impulse 
to invent what has not yet been invented. Defenders of the status quo 
may see a given project as mad because of interests which under-
standably limit their sense of what is possible. Here it is important to 
note not that "madness" is and can be falsely applied-true of any nor-
mative term-but that it is used, and with a precise but incorrectly ap-
plied meaning: to attempt what is plainly contrary to possibility. 
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A third meaning of "madness" needs to be considered: systematic and 
radical estrangement from oneself. Psychopathic mass murderers are 
often regarded as mad not only because they kill but also because they do 
so without normal affect. "Cold-blooded murder": the assumption is of 
an appropriate complex of motivations and feelings which this killer 
utterly lacks. We see him as having thus ruptured with his own moral 
sensibilities and human fellow-feeling. He does not feel or react as one 
is supposed to, meaning in turn that he is not only abnormal but quite 
probably radically separated from himself. Acts of extreme cruelty 
which spread beyond specific acts of self-defense or revenge can be 
easily seen to express this divorce between the person's actions and 
underlying feelings. 
Rather than exploring the various problematic aspects of this meaning 
of "madness," it will be useful to note that, like the others, it rests on 
demonstrable standards of reality and normality and makes no sense 
without them. .Like the others, it may be arguable, but those who em-
ploy it as a normative concept would willingly shoulder this burden of 
argument. 
IV 
I have so far been discussing "madness" as we usually use it-to 
describe individuals. In what ways, and with what qualifications, can it 
be applied to the social world? Certainly if we focus on a given ruler we 
can assess his mental state and describe his acts using the definitions just 
developed: Hitler's "Final Solution" was mad. To the extent that an in-
dividual decides policy, we might conclude that any and all analysis of 
individual behavior can be used. Was Hitler's perception deranged? His 
intention, or his affect? How are these reflected in Nazi policy? 
But if we make no distinction between individual and social we would 
ignore the specifically societal character and determinants of the acts of 
even the most powerful dictator. Hitler matters not because he was an 
individual but as the one who managed to become absolute ruler of that 
specific society. He became absolute dictator in the most intimate rela-
tion with those specific social and historical conditions-his character 
expressing and focusing that situation, right down to and including his 
insanity. Moreover, his individual qualities themselves were produced 
in and through a specific history of a specific social class in a specific 
society. Above all, they became reflected in policy only as Hitler took 
power: insofar as he led the movement that became the dominant politi-
cal force in Germany. 
The point is that every step and layer of the madness that became the 
"Final Solution," even the most individual, was social. This suggests 
that the above meanings of "madness" cannot simply be grafted from 
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individual to social process without prior reflection on their suitability. 
Hitler may have been mad in all the senses described above: our ques-
tion turns on the madness of the social policy and collective behavior he 
directed. 
This difference between the individual and the societal becomes clear 
as soon as we ask how political behavior can be mad in the third sense 
used above, as systematic and radical estrangement from self: derange-
ment of affect. What is the "self' of a society from which it would 
become estranged in acting madly? Certainly it might be possible to 
describe a "sane society" or a "sick society" in terms of specific internal 
relations and standards of health. But such an exercise would require a 
totally new definition of categories rather than a translation of the indi-
vidual into the social. Such a redefinition would mark the considerable 
difference, pace Plato, between character structure and social structure. 7 
Political behavior is not individual behavior writ large-the body 
politic is a rather different animal than the individual human being. The 
affective character that is inextricable from relations between individuals, 
for example, has a wholly different place, if any, in collective relations 
these individuals direct or participate in. 
John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev confronted each other in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 not as individuals but as leaders of na-
tions. That the difference was decisive can be gathered from a reading of 
Robert Kennedy's memoir on the near-catastrophe.8 It was apolitical 
conflict which, however it may have used or been reinforced by individ-
ual feelings, was conducted in political terms, according to a political 
logic, for political ends. Kennedy and Khrushchev acted not as private 
individuals might-concerned above all, for example, about their chil-
dren-but as rulers of nations-concerned about power. For example, 
the political consequences of being seen to be backing down were central 
in Kennedy's calculations because of his self-conscious role as president 
of the country that saw itself as the most powerful in the world. As 
such, an abstraction as remarkably distant from the fate of the world's 
people-or of his own children-as "national interest" largely controlled 
Kennedy's behavior in the conflict. However we interpret this psycho-
logically, we must clearly put its peculiar political character at the center 
of our interpretation. 
Thus the example suggests that the third area of our definition of in-
dividual madness, estrangement from self, offers serious resistance to 
being applied to political behavior. But the other two meanings can be 
more readily applied. When its rulers organize a society against false 
enemies, when they believe and propagate the view that the society is 
being mortally threatened although it is not, when they organize to com-
bat the threat-then we may speak of madness as surely as when an 
individual does the same. For systematic misperception is involved. 
But how can we say that the society perceives or misperceives? Es-
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pecially when a society is fragmented into warring classes or groups? 
Here the shift from individual to societal "madness" may complicate our 
efforts but not cancel them. In speaking of a ruler we may say, simply, 
that he sees what is not there and does not see what is there. Rulers' 
perceptions of themselves and their situation may be so deranged as to 
merit the term "madness." 
In certain situations, however, this deranged perception is not theirs 
alone, but rather becomes collective madness. I would cite as an exam-
ple, insofar as it has been believed, the Communist "threat" to the United 
States, or Soviet society's organization against Leon Trotsky's "threat" 
to the Bolshevik Revolution, or (taking a less controversial example) the 
Jewish "threat" to Germany. In each case-however different from each 
other-the character and extent of a societal derangement was so extreme 
as to at least arguably warrant the description of "madness." What 
makes it a matter of a specifically societal derangement is not only the 
obvious fact that it was shared by vast numbers of people, but that this 
sharing, beyond being an imposition by a powerful ruler or dominant 
class, had deep social roots. The "Final Solution" became policy as a 
response to what vast numbers crazily regarded as a real threat to their 
society. To be sure, along the road to Auschwitz there had to be 
manipulators and manipulated-those who, for reasons of power, con-
sciously used paranoid anti-Semitism without sharing it, as well as those 
who acted according to it because they saw no alternative. But the 
manipulations of and obedience to authority were not the secret of the 
Nazi madness but only its inevitable corollary. Bullying and manipu-
lation, submission and obedience may have a place in any social move-
ment, but they never explain it.9 
But isn't everything we have been saying served adequately by the 
term "ideology"? Nazism was an ideology-a class-centered vision of 
social reality which was offered, and accepted, beyond the German 
lower middle class because it made sense of the experience of vast num-
bers of people and gave them a program of action. As such it had to 
distort aspects of reality, just as it had to render aspects of it adequately. 
Nazism, anti-Communism, Stalinism-in speaking of madness am I not 
really describing ideologies which in these key respects are similar to all 
other ideologies? 
Where I quarrel with such analysis is in emphasizing that some 
ideologies must be seen as mad. A central question, in spite of all rela-
tivism, is how far ideology corresponds to reality. At what point do we 
call it deranged? Granted, all ideologies distort in service of specific 
social classes; granted, also, that Marxism set itself up as the scientific 
critique of ideology but in power has become just another ideology. The 
original Marxist distinction between a more or less distorted and a more 
or less accurate vision of social reality is decisive. The psychological 
spectrum, stretching from (impossible) complete sanity to (impossible) 
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complete madness, requires only slight alteration to become as relevant 
to the discussion of societies as of individuals. The rulers of any society 
may impose a more or less distorted vision of reality on all other social 
groups and classes, but at a certain point along the continuum ideological 
distortion can become so severe as to fundamentally lose touch with 
reality. The image of the Jew in Nazi ideology is an example. Quantity 
becomes quality: the degree of willful yet believed obfuscation is so 
great as to merit description as "madness." Even in class societies, then, 
ones governed by grotesque lies and absurdities, a point may be reached 
when the ruling vision crosses a line, the line of madness. 
To explain Auschwitz means looking at those who believed that the 
Jews were menacing German society, and humanity, and were a threat 
that could only be eliminated by extermination. A "misperception" on 
this scale, as I have said, stems from an intention: the various stresses 
and traumas of their experience were shaped by the Nazis and their 
supporters into a deranged vision which placed the evil Jew at its center 
and called for action. The Nazis who so believed ruptured with the 
reality before them to create instead a fantasy-universe which "explained" 
their problems and directed them toward a "solution." That it was evil, 
that it was barbaric and ultimately self-destructive, did not deter (and per-
haps attracted) those who chose it. It motivated and united them, gave 
them moments of victory and indeed mastery, successfully propelling 
them far from their original pain and stress. Since they were able to re-
shape the world around them according to their mad vision, we might 
say that their madness "worked"-the mental rupture led to an actual 
physical rupture in which the menacing subhuman parasites were pro-
gressively deprived of human rights and human treatment, and then were 
exterminated. 
v 
I have differentiated derangement of perception from that of intention, 
but the "Final Solution" certainly crosses the line. In perceiving, then 
treating, people as people-who-are-not-human, the Nazis clearly acted 
contrary to reality. Yet they succeeded whenever they exterminated a 
Jew, insofar as they did remake reality according to their mad fantasy. 
Nevertheless, testimony of survivors indicates that they failed, utterly. 
Not only did many of these people retain their sense of humanity while 
in the camps, as was demonstrated in acts of solidarity, compassion, 
cunning, and outright resistance, most dramatically in the successful de-
struction of Treblinka. But afterwards, even those who felt themselves 
nearly reduced to subhumans by the Nazis but survived returned: to 
reconstitute their sense of humanity, to testify, to remember, to remind 
us. Those who later demonstrated-or whose children demonstrated-
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against wars they saw as inhumane testified to a resilience of human 
fellow-feeling and moral sense which will forever mock the Nazis' effort 
to redefine their reality as human beings. Indeed, the only way the Nazis 
were successful in remaking reality according to fantasy was by com-
mitting genocide. 
I originally spoke of the madness of intention in relation to an individ-
ual trying to do the impossible. We are dealing with action, the category 
where analyses of individuals have the easiest societal application. As 
with the individual, so with social policy: trying to do what cannot be 
done is mad. I have emphasized that it must be clearly differentiated 
from trying to do what common sense says is impossible, for common 
sense always sets its boundaries in keeping with the prevailing social 
structures and their accompanying universe of discourse. But the crite-
rion remains valid nevertheless: it is not madness to seek to transform 
society in keeping with its possibilities and tendencies, according to its 
demonstrable capacities. It was not madness to attempt to enslave 
another people when the differences of power and of culture were so 
great as to render this possible. It is madness to seek to realize a vision 
which has no basis in fact, actual tendencies, human relations, or human 
capacity. 
And so we may judge the Nazi vision: the Reich sought to subjugate 
other "Aryans," to destroy the national identity of "non-Aryans" like 
Slavs or others judged "inferior," and to exterminate the "subhumans." 
Even if extermination could be carried out-and it was the most success-
ful of all the Nazi policies-the rest of the vision could not. Indeed, 
even without the Normandy invasion, the Soviet Union alone eventually 
would have destroyed Nazi Germany. 
It is not mad to attempt a brutal or benevolent social policy whose 
success is unlikely, nor to attempt an action in order to test its possi-
bility. The madness, rather, lies in going against reality, willfully and 
obdurately, when it is quite clear that success is impossible. Great 
destruction is a likely corollary in such cases, because those bent on 
changing what is unchangeable easily seek to coerce it if they have the 
means. In The Dialectics of Disaster I have explored the dynamic 
whereby impotence, in power, can lead to genocide. Societal mass mur-
der, in our century, has been rooted in ruptures with reality in which the 
project of transformation can only be achieved through violence. Human 
reality may be recalcitrant, even to those with political and military 
power, but human beings can be forced: threatened, beaten into submis-
sion, destroyed if they refuse. Violence is indeed the only way of re-
shaping what resists. Thus was "socialism" created by Stalin; thus was 
an "independent non-Communist South Vietnam" pursued by the United 
States after its unattainability became clear in late 1964. In each case 
reality was madly assaulted by those with power to do so, violently 
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made over to resemble the guiding vision. In each case a grotesque 
mutant was created, and at frightful human cost. 
VI 
I have tried to develop a working notion of "madness" as a rupture 
with reality and to indicate how it might be useful for understanding 
catastrophic events like the Holocaust. A number of unresolved ques-
tions remain, above all regarding the kinds of societal processes that can 
produce mad societal behavior. If a society is not an individual writ 
large, how does it become deranged to the point of producing the kinds 
of acts we have indicated? And how is this derangement different from 
the "normal" social conflicts and class struggles that make up so much of 
history? 
In The Dialectics of Disaster I have explored the dynamics of uneven 
historical development within and between societies in search of an 
answer. For now, however, a more immediate question involves stay-
ing on the terrain of the concept and its application: how to employ the 
meanings of "madness" described above to clarify current political be-
havior? It may be possible to reflect fruitfully on the past, but can the 
understanding help us to clarify the far more volatile and difficult world 
in which we ourselves are immersed? Above all, I have in mind the 
impending nuclear holocaust. How are we to regard the casual intuition 
that the current process of nuclear escalation is mad? 
Certainly the notion of radical misperception can be our starting point. 
Do the nuclear planners, we may ask, not see what is there and see what 
is not there? The question may be posed from two directions--one 
regarding their perception of the Soviet Union, its behavior and its inten-
tions; the other concerning how they perceive danger and security vis-a-
vis the spread of nuclear weapons. The point is not to fall into labeling a 
given policy "mad" just because it is unpalatable, but to use the notion 
rigorously as a significant evaluation. It is possible that social policies 
are mad; it is possible that this policy is mad. The task is to evaluate the 
policy of nuclear escalation to determine whether it is indeed a rupture 
with reality of the sort we have been describing. 
Second, we may ask whether it displays a madness of intention: 
trying obdurately to achieve what is demonstrably impossible, assaulting 
reality in doing so. Here our terrain would be the supposed quest for 
security involved in increasing and diversifying nuclear arsenals: "peace 
through strength." Does this in fact only increase the general insecurity? 
Is this not self-evident to all but those who insist on building more 
weapons? Again, the point is not whether the policy is mistaken, but 
rather whether it systematically flouts what is possible and falsely rede-
fines reality in doing so. To destroy a village "in order to save it," as 
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was done during the Tet offensive in 1968 (and indeed describes much 
of American conduct during the war in Vietnam), is more than a violation 
of sense. It is a madness of intention, trying to do the impossible and 
then resorting to destruction. 
We cannot yet talk about the nuclear planners actually destroying the 
world in order to achieve its security, because they have not done so yet. 
Still, we must not be mystified by the peculiar character of nuclear 
destruction: it is all prepared, waiting to happen, the missiles ready to be 
launched. If a mistake sets off the holocaust it will not only, or even 
primarily, be the fault of the mistaken machinery or persons, but of the 
entire process which lies waiting at this very moment. If the world's 
destruction depends on a computer error, we are justified in exploring 
whether the human process leading to this state of affairs was mad. In 
other words, then (and only then, alas, after the fact) will the intuition 
about the systematic rupture with reality be proven incontrovertibly true. 
The question now is, how do we regard the system that endangers us? 
How do we analyze this derangement of intention now, before the 
catastrophe? In short, the intention to achieve security by expanding 
nuclear arsenals can and must be evaluated today, before the holocaust. 
Finally, I have left aside the question of estrangement of self as 
offering too many difficulties for societal analysis. Trying to assess the 
possible madness of nuclear war would force us to reconsider this. It 
may well be that the structure and governing logic of states are drastically 
different than the structure and governing logic of individuals, and that 
this makes it extremely difficult to diagnose a political rupture with 
normal human fellow-feeling. After all, states have quite "normally" 
engaged in wars, and virtually all have habituated their young men to 
fight and die and their people to support their killing. But adequately 
describing nuclear policy brings a new perspective to such questions. 
Ultimately, the purpose of a society is to further the well-being of its 
people. I say "ultimately" understanding that most societies have been 
marked by class and other social struggies-because they have also been 
characterized by class and other social consensus. When the consensus 
has totally broken down-and the rulers decide to survive by perma-
nently suppressing a major part of the population-the society is ripe for 
revolution. Most often a state apparatus has contradictory functions-it 
serves all of its people in some fashion even while guaranteeing the 
exploitation of some by others. The point is that even slaves must be fed 
and kept alive at a human level adequate to their functioning. The slave-
owners who declare all-out war on their slaves are destroying their own 
conditions of survival. Mad? Our earlier reservations about the psycho-
logical origins of the concept no longer apply because we are dealing 
with a self-rupture which is far more basic. They would be made in a 
structural sense similar to the estrangement from self discussed earlier. 
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Similar, yet more profoundly so: actions which attack one's own sur-
vival itself are the most radical rupture with one's own reality. 
Of course, to return to the individual level, suicide is not necessarily 
mad, even if it is the most extreme possible rupture with self. Great pain 
or suffering or a loss of all purpose can lead one to choose death over 
life, just as death in struggle may rationally be preferable to a life of 
subjection. The Warsaw Ghetto uprising, although suicidal, asserted for 
all time the dignity of the fighters and their refusal to die passively. It 
was a sane act. Their suicidal struggle was self-consciously seen as a 
testimony: it implied a world that would continue beyond this battle and 
even the Nazis, and it spoke to that world. 
Are those who declare "better dead than Red" threatening the same 
courageous battle to the death? Not at all. First, nuclear policymakers 
are choosing not only their own death, but that of tens of millions of 
others. Certainly the Warsaw Ghetto fighters brought German retribu-
tion down upon the entire ghetto, but this happened in the process of the 
Nazi attack on the resistance. The primary targets of nuclear war are 
civilian population centers themselves, because they are population cen-
ters. Thus he who would save Americans from an alleged Communist 
victory would "save them" by having them killed. Moreover, the threat 
itself is an absurdity. The belief in the Communist or Soviet threat is one 
of those madnesses of perception which has operated, and continues to 
be revived, against all evidence, by those whose perception is systemati-
cally deranged. But above all, the nuclear planners are mad because 
nuclear war would destroy the world as we know it. Even assuming for 
a moment that their cause were real, the war they plan on its behalf 
would leave no one alive to struggle for a better social system than the 
one they would combat. 
Are there no conditions under which it would make sense to risk 
destroying all human life for an end superior to life itself? Or is it mad to 
risk destroying all of life? We can find our direction in answering this 
by asking how we would respond if the Soviet Union were indeed Nazi 
Germany and threatened the rest of the world with nuclear weapons 
unless it surrendered. This is the deranged perception of some anti-
communists, notably the Committee on the Present Danger; let us sup-
pose it were true. Even then, it would be mad to deprive tens of millions 
of people who had made no such decision, as well as virtually all of 
humankind, present and future, of the chance of struggling against and 
overthrowing such a monster. Yes, surrender under such conditions 
would not only be the best course, it would be the only sane course. 
Even the mass suicide at menaced Masada left Jewish communities intact 
elsewhere: otherwise no one would recall it today. It would then have 
had no meaning at all. Destroying the outside world as well as those 
locked in a struggle, however righteous, against an evil system would 
render their own struggle absurd. A continuing existence is a presuppo-
140 Ronald Aronson 
sition of every struggle, just as the continuing existence of an outside 
world is a presupposition of every individual suicide. 
In short, omnicide-the destruction of everything-is mad in a way 
that individual or group suicide is not. It is mad without regard to its 
reason, mad because it attacks the basis of all life, all value, all meaning. 
To risk this-virtually unimaginable-total death is totally different than 
risking death amidst an abiding world. Today, "better dead than Red" 
points us toward the ultimate rupture with reality, the nuclear planners' 
flirtation with destroying the human adventure as such. Or rather, we 
must say that they have already decided to do so-under such and such 
determinate conditions. 
I have willy-nilly begun characterizing nuclearism while still in the 
process of asking whether our categories could be useful in describing it. 
The reason lies in the nature of omnicide itself-it is unlike any evil 
humans have yet encountered in that it promises destruction without 
appeal, the world at an end. It alone threatens the premise of continuing 
human existence implied by other, more partial disasters, indeed, by 
suicide itself. Madness, in all forms, suggests a partial but significant 
and systematic rupture with reality. How, then, to characterize the 
preparation for total and ultimate rupture, the destruction of reality per 
se? We can understand the relevance of the category as we have done 
only by briefly exploring the situation itself. 
The rigorous use of "madness" is deeply disturbing, of course, which 
is perhaps one reason why it has been so conspicuously avoided in a 
century so rife with madness. The functionalist bias of most systematic 
thought assumes that there is a reason for every societal act, a more or 
less rational intention behind political action. It offends the intellect to 
suggest that there is no reason behind a major policy--or that indeed its 
reason is profoundly and systematically irrational. "Madness" is even 
more unsettling in suggesting that we may be living admist a profound 
and destructive irrationality, one which lies beyond the traditionally 
understood irrationalities of history-those of mad individual leaders, 
for example, or of irrational class societies in a state of crisis. Moreover, 
our conventional political sense is deeply troubled by ascriptions of such 
madness: what political countermeasures will move the crazy leaders of 
mad societies? To describe a major social policy as "mad" and to sug-
gest that it is rooted in fundamental societal dynamics is to rule out the 
hope of simple reforms improving the situation, of leaders seeing the 
light. 
Above all, as if these implications were not disturbing enough, much 
of this essay, and the study where these reflections began, points to our 
society, today, in the United States and the West. If it can be seriously 
discussed whether the Vietnam War was mad, whether nuclear escalation 
is mad, then all of the above problems may apply to us, our social 
Social Madness 141 
structures, our daily life. Not that they do not or have not applied else-
where-in the Soviet Union, for example, or in the genocidal transfor-
mation of Kampuchea-but we who study and think and act here have 
responsibility for understanding the situation we would influence. Did 
most Germans between 1933 and 1945 see the sickness of their society, 
or were some of them too deeply immersed to even question it, others 
deluded by false hopes? What assumptions did they share with those 
who ruled them, and with the genocidal policies they themselves carried 
out? Can the same question be asked, today, by ourselves, of our-
selves? Can we afford to wait until the blinding flash to acknowledge 
that the nuclear planners are mad? 
Such are some of the challenges of pursuing, rather than abandoning, 
a term like "mad" to describe events such as the "Final Solution." 
Daunting to the intellect, certainly, and to the will as well. But too much 
is at stake to ignore the challenge. 
NOTES 
1. Ronald Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster (London: Verso, 1983). 
2. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking Press, 
1965). 
3. Richard Rubenstein, The Cunning of History (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1978). 
4. Ibid., p. 2. 
5. See Eberhard Jackel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1972). 
6. See Jean-Paul Sartre's interview with Daniel Cohn-Bendit on the 
events of May 1968 in The French Student Revolt, trans. B. Brewster (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1968). 
7. See Plato, The Republic, trans. F. M. Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1941). 
8. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 
9. This is Stanley Milgram's error in the famous experiments described 
in Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). 

PART II 
Understanding Occurrences 
of Genocide: Some Case 
Studies and Investigations 
of Related Social Processes 

8 
WAS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: 
A PECULIAR QUESTION? 
Alan Rosenberg 
The question of the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust has itself become a 
unique question. However, when we approach the Holocaust we are at 
once confronted with the following dilemma: if the Holocaust is the 
truly unique and unprecedented historical event that it is often held to be, 
then it must exceed the possibility of human comprehension, for it lies 
beyond the reach of our customary historical and sociological means of 
inquiry and understanding. But if it is not a historically unique event, if 
it is simply one more incident in the long history of man's inhumanity to 
man, there is no special point in trying to understand it, no unique lesson 
to be leamed.1 Of all the enigmas, paradoxes, and dilemmas facing 
Holocaust scholarship,2 the "uniqueness question" is surely the most 
vexing and divisive, the one question most likely to evoke partisan 
debate and to generate emotional heat in discussion.3 
In my own efforts at analysis of the issues underlying the "unique-
ness question" I have been struck by the very oddity of the question 
itself, for it is strange that there should be argument about it at all. What 
strikes me as peculiar about it is the fact that the legitimacy of the 
question as such is so taken for granted, that it is so readily assumed that 
the uniqueness of the Holocaust is not merely a fit subject for analysis 
but is a problem of the very first rank in importance. The anomaly here 
is just that the "uniqueness question" itself is taken to be crucially rele-
vant to an understanding of the Holocaust although it is relevant to 
few-if any-other landmark events of history. One finds little discus-
sion, for example, of the "uniqueness" of the Protestant Reformation or 
the Industrial Revolution. The atomic destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki-surely qualified as "unique" and "unprecedented" in terms of 
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their implications for the future of mankind-is simply not the subject of 
debate concerning its "uniqueness" involving controversy and serious 
divisions of opinion. While scholars often draw comparisons and mark 
the contrasts of the American and French revolutions, little time is spent 
in analysis or discussion of the "uniqueness question" with respect to 
either. If the "uniqueness" of such events as these, events that have 
radically altered our world, is not in question, why is it that the "unique-
ness question" has assumed such prominence in the context of Holocaust 
studies? Why is the question itself so hotly contested? Why do some 
authorities on the history of the Holocaust go so far as to claim that the 
stance that one takes with respect to the "uniqueness question" deter-
mines the way in which one relates the Holocaust to the rest of human 
history, influencing every dimension of one's interpretation and evalua-
tion of the event itself? 
According to Saul Friedlander, for example, before we can begin 
analyzing any number of the central issues surrounding the Holocaust 
we must first deal with "a preliminary issue of crucial importance for 
every aspect of the Holocaust: are we dealing with a phenomenon com-
parable with some other historical event or are we facing something 
unique not only within any traditional and historical context, but even 
within Nazism itself?"4 George Kren and Leon Rappoport call the 
"uniqueness question" very important, for, "depending upon how it is 
answered, the general orientation of interpretive analysis will obviously 
vary a great deal. "5 And again, insistence upon its historical uniqueness 
may, according to Yehuda Bauer, render the Holocaust irrelevant except 
as a specifically Jewish tragedy. Here is the thrust of Bauer's argument: 
If what happens to the Jews is unique, then by definition it doesn't concern 
us, beyond our pity and commiseration for the victims. If the Holocaust is 
not a universal problem, then why should a public school system in 
Philadelphia, New York or Timbuktu teach it? Well, the answer is that there 
is no uniqueness, not even of a unique event. Anything that happens once, 
can happen again: not quite in the same way, perhaps, but in an equivalent 
form.6 
In what follows I shall be addressing the problems and issues that are 
raised by texts like these, texts cited here simply as evidence that-for 
Holocaust studies-the "uniqueness question" is at once paramount and 
problematic. 
It is clear, moreover, that the "uniqueness question" has become a 
matter of concern to the Jewish and Christian lay community as well as 
to the professional scholars in the field. One need only think of the pub-
lic debate over the issues of the inclusion of the Holocaust in the social 
studies curriculum of the New York City school system or the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Council to see how sensitive the issue has become, 
especially within the Jewish community itself.7 We may ask if this spe-
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cial sensitivity is not itself an impediment to more widespread dialogue, 
thus hampering the very cause of understanding which Jews support. 
For, as Professor Ismar Schorsch states, the Jews' "obsession" concern-
ing the uniqueness claim "impedes genuine dialogue, because it intro-
duces an extraneous, contentious issue that alienates potential allies from 
among other victims of organized human depravity. Similarly, our fixa-
tion on uniqueness has prevented us from reaching out by universalizing 
the lessons of the Holocaust. "8 
Considerations such as these clearly imply that, if we are to widen 
and deepen our understanding of the Holocaust, we must deal with the 
claim of "uniqueness" by developing a strategy that will free us from the 
conceptual muddles that presently cloud the issue. We must be clear as 
to the meaning of the claim itself if we are to escape the mystification that 
frequently has surrounded it.9 We appear to have three principal op-
tions: (1) We can dismiss the whole question of "uniqueness," as 
Schorsch suggests that we should, simply on the grounds that it adds 
nothing of value to our understanding of the Holocaust. (2) We can 
attempt to account for why it is that the "uniqueness" claim has become 
integral to the discussion of the meaning of the Holocaust while it has 
been treated as merely peripheral to the analysis of other historical events 
of major consequence. (3) We can concentrate our analysis upon how 
the "uniqueness question" helps as well as hinders us in our quest to 
elucidate the meaning and significance of the Holocaust 
Though I am sympathetic with those who confine their strategy to the 
first option, I shall reject it as unrealistic. For, while it is true-as 
Schorsch points out-that the claim to uniqueness sometimes does pose 
a difficulty for those who would gain a better understanding of the 
Holocaust by comparing it with other cases of mass human destruction, 
it does not seem to me that we can duck the "uniqueness question" by 
simply disregarding it. The "uniqueness question" is much too central to 
the Holocaust to be ignored. Since, as I shall go on to show, an ade-
quate strategy for dealing with the "uniqueness question" will include 
-rather than preclude-grounds for developing comparative historical 
analysis and evaluation, the second option is of decisive import, for it is 
always helpful to understand what lies behind any particular perspective 
on an event, and especially so when the range of perspectives on the 
event is so much a part of the event itself and gives rise to so much 
controversy. Although I shall be exercising the third option, since it 
builds upon the second-depending as it does upon clarification of the 
meaning of the claim of "uniqueness" with respect to the Holocaust-so 
it will be necessary for me to say something about this issue, though a 
full account of the matter lies beyond the scope of this chapter. In the 
end I shall try to show why "unpacking" the "uniqueness question" is 
the strategy that is most fruitful in understanding the Holocaust itself. 
However, although I shall be adopting this third option, let me first 
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sketch some of the factors that have tended to make the "uniqueness 
question" itself a part of the problem in understanding the Holocaust. 
Before we can see how it can be treated as part of the "solution," so to 
speak, we must see why it has become "part of the problem." 
It seems to be beyond question that the peculiar role that the "unique-
ness question" has come to play in relation to the historical accounts and 
understanding of the Holocaust is largely due to the insistence of the 
Jewish community that the Holocaust must be viewed as unique.10 It 
was a segment of the Jewish community, in fact, that devised and 
accepted the very label "Holocaust" in order to express the uniqueness of 
the event, 11 literally defining it as such by the name that they gave it.12 
The process by means of which a series of historical incidents becomes 
known as an "event" is well known, for it is only by gathering into 
meaningful clusters the apparently separate and unrelated facts of histori-
cal happenings that we are able to form coherent concepts of what has 
happened in the past. The naming of such a cluster is but one step in the 
process of self-understanding, and so it is easy to see why a segment of 
the Jewish community has come to view the naming of the Holocaust as 
an attempt to capture and preserve the uniqueness of meaning which is 
implicit in the facts so named. As those facts became known in the after-
math of World War II they immediately gave rise to a numbing horror in 
which the human mind seemed to be incapable of dealing with them, of 
grasping them in the normal fashion that we deal with the factual 
materials of history. The awful depth and scope of these "incidents," of 
these particular historical facts, were of such horrible dimensions as to 
seem completely incomprehensible. It is from this response that the 
claim to the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is generated.13 And it is in 
the context of this response that the search for those characteristics and 
traits that mark the Holocaust as unique must be understood. For it is 
precisely this search, and the various proposals which have issued from 
it, that is responsible for making the "uniqueness question" a part of the 
event which the "Holocaust" names: it has become part of the problem 
of the understanding and comprehension of what happened. The pecu-
liar question of "uniqueness" may not have been an inevitable component 
of the problem, but it is clearly, at this point, an inescapable one. 
Quite aside from the origins of the "uniqueness question" and its inte-
gration into the total problematic of the Holocaust, there are at least three 
other substantive problems concerning the characterization of the Holo-
caust as "unique." They can be readily stated, though not so readily 
solved. We must, first of all, be clear about what we mean when we 
claim an event to be unique. Secondly, we must be clear as to what 
element or elements of the event make it unique. And, lastly, we must at 
least try to be clear about the implications of the decision to classify the 
Holocaust as unique and try to understand how that decision may affect 
our interpretation of the event itself. 
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Existing Holocaust scholarship, surprisingly, is of little help in deter-
mining criteria for what constitutes "uniqueness" with respect to a his-
torical event, whether it be the Holocaust or any other. And, should we 
consult ordinary language, we are helped even less. The American 
College Dictionary gives three possible definitions of "unique": (1) "of 
which there is but one"; (2) "having no like or equal"; and (3) "rare and 
unusual." In such terms, every event can be called unique, for no event 
of history is ever literally duplicated or "happens" twice, or is exactly 
"like" any other event, or its "equal." Moreover, it would seem to 
trivialize the importance of an event such as the Holocaust to call it 
simply "rare" or "unusual." In order to avoid such trivialization we must 
look at the actual use of the claim itself, we must analyze the intentions 
of those who have insisted upon the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust, and 
we must try to grasp the point of the claim. In this way, it seems to me, 
we can make sense of the question. For it is clear that what the claim of 
"uniqueness" is intended to do is to set apart from other historical events 
just that singular event that has the potential of transforming a culture, or 
altering the course of history, in some profound and decisive way. If the 
Industrial Revolution, for example, is said to be a "unique event" in the 
history of the West, it is because it is viewed in this transformational 
light; it changed our Western culture, altered its values, and so can be 
viewed as a cause of a major "turning point in history."14 Such a way of 
defining the "uniqueness" claim corresponds closely to the definition 
offered by Emil Fackenheim, for his "epoch making event"15 is just 
what is meant by terming an event as actually-or potentially-
"transformational" of the status quo ante, as radically altering the course 
of history .16 Given such a definition we can see how it is possible to 
claim that the Holocaust, as well as other events, such as the atomic 
bombing of Japan, can be classified as "unique." 
And yet we must be cautious about such claims. I have used the 
words "see how it is possible to claim" since it must be emphasized that 
no historical event comes with its meaning already attached. As Walter 
Wurzburger has said: 
Historic events possess only the kind of meaning which historians assign to 
them. Since there is no objective meaning inherent in any historic event that 
awaits discovery, meaning is not given but is created. The meaning of any 
particular event is not a function of its objective properties but hinges upon the 
choices of categories selected by a given subject for its interpretation. Hence, 
history teaches only the lessons that people choose to learn. 7 
For my own part, even Wurzburger's statement puts the matter too 
weakly and accounts for only a small portion of the process whereby 
meaning accrues to a historical event. For it is not merely the ascription 
of meaning by "historians" that counts, but the construction of meaning 
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by the culture that matters. It is by means of those processes that we 
have come to understand, after Peter Berger and Thomas Luclcmann, as 
the "social construction of reality," that the past can become meaning-
fuI.18 It is not the ascriptions of historians that make certain events 
rather than others "transformational" events or "turning points" in his-
tory. It is only through the actions of the individual members of a cul-
ture and the consequences of those actions-both intentional and unin-
tentional-that any event becomes transformational of meanings and 
values. Only through those practices which Anthony Giddens has called 
acts of "structuration" can events of transformational potential become 
actual transformations of culture.19 And yet, while these are undoubted 
features of the historical process of change and the acquisition of mean-
ing, we find interpreters of the Holocaust seriously divided over the pre-
liminary question of uniqueness-a question that must surely be 
resolved if the event itself is to be transformational. 
In the first instance, there are those who view the whole issue of 
uniqueness as unimportant, for there is, as we have seen, a trivial sense 
in which all historical events are unique.20 They see the Holocaust as 
unique only to the extent that every historical event is necessarily dif-
ferent from every other historical event; since "history never repeats 
itself'--contrary to what has sometimes been popularly believed-it 
follows that the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is affirmed. But such an 
affirmation is clearly a "trivialization" of the "uniqueness question." 
There is yet a second group that falls within the camp of the "trivial-
ists." They are quite willing to see the Holocaust as an event of major 
importance, but they nevertheless agree that the claim of uniqueness 
cannot be sustained in any non-trivial form. They argue that too much 
has been made of what have been called the "exceptional" features of the 
Holocaust. Without denying the existence of these features, this group 
concentrates on showing that these features are just what might have 
been expected to follow from the events leading up to the Holocaust as 
such. In their view the Holocaust may simply be regarded as just one 
more incident-albeit a flagrant one-of man's inhumanity to man, one 
more horrible atrocity in a century filled with them. They cite such 
precedents as the destruction of the Armenians by the Turks21 and 
pogroms in Poland and Russia, even reaching back to the genocidal 
near-extermination of the American Indians for parallel cases. Some of 
these critics grant that whatever uniqueness the Holocaust may possess 
can only be seen within the context of Jewish history.22 But some 
Jewish intellectuals, Jacob Neusner23 and Arnold Eisen24 for example, 
go so far as to hold that even within the context of Jewish history the 
Holocaust cannot be viewed as unique. They contend that the Holocaust 
should be understood as one event in a succession of events, one link in 
a long chain of events aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people 
commencing with the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. 
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In sharp contrast, those that I have called "absolutists" are certain that 
no other event in history even remotely resembles the Holocaust or 
furnishes a precedent for understanding it. Its singularity is such that it 
exceeds the power of language to express; its meaning is such that it 
belongs to "another planet." It is incomprehensible, completely outside 
the normal dimensions of our terrestrial history, beyond all historical 
explanation and appraisal. It is, they say, not merely unique; it is, to use 
the Eckhardts' phrase, "uniquely unique. "25 
Menachem Rosensaft sums up this view succinctly: "Holocaust 
stands alone in time as an aberration within history."26 And Elie Wiesel 
writes that "the universe of concentration camps, by its design, lies 
outside if not beyond history. Its vocabulary belongs to it alone."27 In 
Bauer's striking characterization, the Holocaust is viewed by these 
writers as an "upside down miracle."28 These absolutists see the Holo-
caust as unique simply because it happened, and concerning their view 
nothing needs to be added. 
Those reluctant to accept either the trivialist or the absolutist position 
may be termed "relativists." Other turning points in history, other great 
crises, they suggest, contain elements comparable to and related to the 
Holocaust. Accordingly, they view it as "relatively unique," for there 
will always be distinct features of the Holocaust that set it apart and 
which remain of more importance than its similarities and resemblances 
to other events. Approached from this angle the Holocaust is neither 
"extra-historical," in the sense claimed by the absolutists, nor yet just 
another atrocity, as the trivialists maintain. It is central to the relativist 
thesis that the Holocaust must be viewed contextually. This means that it 
is possible to view the Holocaust as unprecedented in many respects, 
that it is an event of critical and transformational importance in the 
history of our world, and yet it is still an event that must be addressed as 
a part of that history. It can and should be compared to other genocidal 
incidents, described and analyzed in language free from the "mystifi-
cation" which only blocks our understanding, and made as accessible to 
explanation as possible. It should not be assumed, on a priori grounds 
of its absolute "uniqueness," that what caused the Holocaust is forever 
beyond the reach of the tools of historical analysis, or that the conse-
quences cannot be explored by means of social theory. For, if we fail in 
our efforts at historical comprehension, and if our social theories are 
inadequate to the task of explaining such events, we are almost sure to 
experience similar catastrophes in the future. Indeed, if our conceptual 
tools and analytical methods are baffled by the Holocaust, we must de-
vise new concepts and new methods. 
It would be misleading to claim that all those scholars that I have 
categorized as relativists-possibly the term "contextualists" would be 
more appropriate-speak with a single voice concerning the "uniqueness 
question." Steven Katz29 and Saul Friedlander,30 for instance, take an 
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"intentionalist" approach. They hold the view that it is the "intention" of 
the Nazis with respect to the total elimination of Jewry that marks the 
Holocaust as unique among comparable pogroms and genocides. 
Others, such as Richard Rubenstein31 and Henry Friedlander,32 take a 
more "methodological" point of view. They see the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust more in terms of the distinctive bureaucratic and technological 
methods of destruction employed. These very sharply defined differ-
ences of focus on what accounts for the uniqueness of the Holocaust are 
responsible for serious divergences of interpretation of the event itself. 
For it is clear that both the intentionalists and the methodologists employ 
their respective views of the "uniqueness question" as interpretive frame-
works for understanding the Holocaust itself. The preliminary question 
of uniqueness helps to determine, by the way in which it is solved, the 
conceptual apparatus for exploring the other problems of the Holocaust 
Some idea of how decisively this preliminary step figures in the even-
tual perspective upon the character of the event itself can be gained from 
comparing the following texts. In "Whose Holocaust?" Yehuda Bauer 
takes the intentionalist approach: 
The uniqueness of the Holocaust does not ... lie in numbers. It does not 
lie in the method of mass murder .... What makes it unique is the exis-
tence of two elements: planned total annihilation of a national or ethnic group, 
and the quasi-religious, apocalyptic ideology that motivated the murder. 3 
By contrast, here is Robert E. Willis representing the approach from the 
methodology standpoint: 
For whatever similarities are present between Auschwitz and other 
cases--and there are many-the former is distinguished by being the first 
instance of a situation in which the full bureaucratic and technical apparatus of 
the state was mobilized for the primary purpose of extermination.3 
With these very different approaches to the Holocaust locked into the 
different interpretive grids through which the event itself is to be viewed 
and interpreted, from the preliminary stage on, it is small wonder that the 
eventual interpretations that are reached should themselves be widely 
variant. 
What concerns me here is not that we should accept any one approach 
to the "uniqueness question" as true-and the others as false-but that 
we should try to discover which of these approaches yields the most co-
herent and intelligible results, which framework elucidates the problems 
of understanding the Holocaust most clearly and is the most promising 
for understanding its historical and moral significance. It is not a simple 
matter to decide, and the fact that there are subtle differences within each 
of the two basic types of approach does not make the task any easier. 
Some methodologists, for example, make it clear that they fully recog-
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nize the important role which the intentionalists ascribe to the "unique-
ness" of the Nazis' emphasis on "total extermination," while insisting 
that the special bureaucratic and technological means employed in that 
destruction are the more decisively unique feature of the event.35 Both 
forms of relativist interpretation have great appeal owing to their com-
mon stress upon understanding the Holocaust in contextual terms, and 
the great illumination that results from such analysis of the "uniqueness 
question" leads to a preference for both over either the trivialist or abso-
lutist stands. And yet between them, I lean most to the methodologist 
explanation as providing the framework that most clearly helps in com-
prehending both the uniqueness of the event and the event itself. For it 
is the emphasis upon method in the apparent "madness" of the event that 
helps us most to grasp the significance of the event for our own lives and 
for the world we live in. After all, we do live in a depersonalized bu-
reaucratic world, a world in which almost every facet of public and 
private life is subject to the mindless influence of bureaucratic methods. 
But it is not merely that the methodologists appear to shed more light 
upon the relevance of the Holocaust to our own situation that leads to my 
rejection of the intentionalist approach. For there are internal problems 
with the intentionalist position itself, problems of internal coherence, as 
well as problems with the facts and assumptions upon which it is predi-
cated. In order to show the dimensions of some of these difficulties, I 
have chosen to analyze them in the context of Yehuda Bauer's position, 
for he is clearly the strongest exponent of the intentionalist view and the 
most popular of its recent defenders. It is not my purpose to refute 
Bauer-for both "proof' and "refutation" are hardly apposite when we 
are dealing with frames of reference such as these-but I do intend to 
show how Bauer's insistence that it is the intention of the Nazi state--the 
policy of total annihilation of the Jews-that determines the uniqueness 
of the Holocaust can be more of a hindrance than a help in dealing with 
the meaning of the Holocaust 
Bauer's argument is most forcefully presented in his important book, 
The Holocaust in Historical Perspective, in which he devotes his second 
chapter to an analysis of the various implications of the "uniqueness 
question." Titled "Against Mystification: The Holocaust Phenomenon," 
this chapter puts the central dilemma of uniqueness this way: 
If what happened to the Jews was unique, then it took place outside of his-
tory, it becomes a mysterious event, an upside down miracle, so to speak, an 
event of religious significance in the sense that it is not man-made as that term 
is normally understood. On the other hand, if it is not unique at all, then what 
are the parallels and precedents?36 
Bauer wants to escape the dilemma by developing a conception of the 
Holocaust that will account for its uniqueness by placing it within the 
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context of history. He argues that the historical uniqueness of the 
Holocaust does not consist in the fact that it involves the practice of 
genocide, for he acknowledges that there are precedents and parallels 
where genocidal practices have been politically instituted. He does, 
however, find that there is something unique and unprecedented in cer-
tain special features of the genocidal policies and practices of the Holo-
caust. These features, he claims, show that what happened to the Jews 
is different from what befell other victims of mass murder, both within 
the Nazi "universe of death" and outside it. For it is clear that Bauer 
wants to give full weight to the fact that mass murder as practiced by the 
Nazis-as well as by others-has not been confined to attempts spe-
cifically aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people. But he also 
wants to claim that there is something quite different about the Nazi 
policy with respect to the Jews. Bauer argues that only the Jews were 
the victims of a deliberate policy of total extinction. 
He acknowledges that some two and a half million Soviet prisoners of 
war were killed by Nazi practices and policy, by ill-treatment in the 
prison camps, malnutrition, and starvation. He points out that "tens of 
thousands of Poles were brutally murdered as resistants, real or 
imagined."37 But he goes on to argue that the policies which sponsored 
these atrocities, while "genocidal" in character, were not aimed at the 
total extinction of either the Poles or the Soviets. Bauer cites Raphael 
Lemkin, coiner of the term "genocide," in order to support his contention 
that "clearly, what was happening to quite a number of people in Nazi 
Europe was genocide. "38 But he goes on to distinguish such general 
Nazi practices from the intentions embodied in the Holocaust: 
The difference between that and the Holocaust lies in the difference between 
forcible, even murderous, denationalization, and wholesale total murder of 
every one of the members of a community. Contrary to legend there never 
was a Nazi policy to apply measures used against the Jews to other national 
communities.39 
In short, Bauer's contention is that the only group that the Nazis in-
tended to totally annihilate was the Jews. Accordingly, he concludes, 
the term "Holocaust" should only be used with reference to the exter-
mination of the Jews so that its uniqueness does not become blurred and 
the Holocaust confused with other mass murders committed by the 
Nazis, murders to which the term "genocide" also applies. 
It is this last contention that weakens Bauer's argument by intro-
ducing into it an element of conceptual confusion and incoherence. 
When Raphael Lemkin first introduced the term "genocide" he intended 
that it should be used to denote only those instances of mass murder 
directed at the total extermination of a people, and not merely intended to 
bring about their "denationalization." Lemkin states: 
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Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of 
a national pattern. The author believes, however, that this word is inadequate 
because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the biological structure; (2) 
in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor; and (3) denationalization is 
used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship.40 
Bauer does not appear to recognize that Lemkin himself was fully 
satisfied that the Nazi policy of genocidal destruction was aimed at total 
annihilation, whether directed at the Jews or at the Czechs or the Poles. 
Lemkin specifically stated that "genocide is directed against the national 
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against indi-
viduals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national 
group."41 Genocide is instituted, Lemkin argued, as "a coordinated plan 
of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of 
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups them-
selves. "42 
The incoherence of Bauer's use of the term "genocide" as applicable 
to the policies aimed at less than total annihilation is made even more 
perplexing when it is recalled that, in an earlier work, he employed the 
term-as Lemkin did-to denote the intended total destruction of a 
people. There he stated: "The Holocaust was a crime of genocide-that 
is, an attempt to exterminate all members of a particular national or racial 
group simply because they were members of that group. "43 It is clear 
that in this statement the "Holocaust" and "genocide" are not seen as 
denoting two different types of event. One can, of course, argue, as 
Bauer does, that the Holocaust was a unique event, distinguishable from 
other events of Nazi mass murder. One might even be able to argue that 
the Nazi intention was different in kind, with respect to the Jews, from 
what it was with respect to other national groups. But one cannot, as 
Bauer has done, cite Lemkin as sponsoring authority for such argu-
ments. For it is undeniable that Lemkin views what happened to the 
Gentile populations that fell victim to Nazi genocide as more, rather than 
less, like what happened to the Jews. Lemkin sees the Nazi intent in all 
such cases as the same, i.e., total destruction. 
On the factual side, Bauer's argument is similarly weak. He argues, 
for example, that the Nazis' intention with respect to the Gypsies and 
other groups was very different from that toward the Jews. Although 
debate over this matter cannot be entered into here, there is substantial 
evidence to indicate that the Nazis did indeed intend the total elimination 
of the Gypsy population. As Bauer himself had earlier acknowledged: 
"History records other actions which qualify as genocide by the strictest 
definition. Hitler himself sought to annihilate the Gypsies as well as the 
Jews."44 
Assuming that my criticism has cast doubt upon the adequacy of 
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Bauer's thesis as to the "uniqueness question" and shows that there are 
serious difficulties to be overcome in the intentionalist position, we now 
have to ask about the alternative methodological view. Is it, perhaps, a 
more adequate perspective in terms of which to approach the "unique-
ness question," and from which to proceed to the substantive interpre-
tation and understanding of the Holocaust itself? Can it be said, for 
example, that the Holocaust is a unique form of genocide-using that 
term, indeed, as Lemkin originally defined and used it? As we have 
seen, Lemkin treated genocide as the intentional attempt to destroy a 
group in its ethnic and biological totality. With that definition in mind 
are there discernable features of the Holocaust that distinguish it from 
other such genocidal events? 
I believe that these questions can be answered affirmatively. 
Although I cannot deal with the evidence here in detail,45 I can suggest at 
least/our kinds of evidence that can be offered as showing how and why 
the Holocaust should be understood as a unique genocidal event, gen-
uinely unprecedented in the annals of our world and its history. First, 
there is evidence of uniqueness in the simple fact of the size and scope of 
the destruction, in the enormity of the numbers alone, which are of an 
entirely new order of magnitude when compared with other genocides. 
Second, there is the far more complex fact of the means employed in the 
Holocaust, for no other genocidal event has so deeply involved the entire 
structure of the legal and administrative machinery of a government in its 
implementation. There are simply no similar instances of a legally con-
stituted government adopting anything like the extensive bureaucratic and 
technological apparatus that was created to carry out the genocidal inten-
tion of the Holocaust. Third, the Holocaust is unique in the varied 
physical and psychological qualities used to reduce the intended victims 
to their barest physical qualities as "objects" in order that they might be 
more efficiently processed in the mechanical production line of the death 
camps. And, finally, the Holocaust is unique in the vast and determined 
attempt by the Nazis to transform the victims into the image that the 
Nazis had of them. The scope of this massive effort at creating an 
"image" of the intended victims of genocide is such that it vastly exceeds 
similar efforts; its scale is literally unprecedented. 
It will be evident, then, that I am among those who believe that it is 
the various processes, techniques, and methods of destruction charac-
teristic of the Holocaust that justify the ascription of "uniqueness" to it. 
And it is because of these same features of the Holocaust, features that 
help us to understand not merely why the Holocaust is unique but also 
features that help us to understand how it was possible that such an event 
could occur in our history and in the context of our age, that I reject the 
absolutist view. That view, I believe, tends to render the Holocaust 
incomprehensible by putting the event outside of our history, by treating 
it as outside the context of our age, our language, and our capacity for 
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analysis and understanding.46 This rejection of the Holocaust as some-
thing that could occur in our time, and which could clearly occur again 
for much the same political and sociological reasons, seems to me simply 
unacceptable. It virtually amounts to the denial that it did occur, a denial 
that seems to me almost an invitation for it to happen again. For if we 
are to avoid such an event in the future we must surely attempt to grasp 
its meaning in political and sociological terms. If the Holocaust seems 
somehow to be beyond the grasp of our usual categories of political and 
sociological analysis, to be beyond the reach of our normal concepts of 
historical interpretation and explanation, the lesson is not that we should 
give up the attempt at analysis and explanation. The lesson is that we 
must develop more adequate categories and concepts. 
Finally, it is for this last reason that I reject all forms of trivialism with 
respect to the "uniqueness question." By drawing attention away from 
just those novel features of the Holocaust process that are unprece-
dented, by trivializing them, the trivialists divert our attention from the 
very features of the Holocaust that we ought to be trying to understand 
and explain, features that we must be able to cope with if we are to avoid 
such events in the future. By taking the view that the Holocaust is just 
one more atrocity, we are unlikely to see its deep and unique significance 
as an event with potential transformational consequences for our culture 
and our age. We are unlikely to see the possible implications of the Nazi 
abuse of science and technology, the application of bureaucratic tech-
niques, principles of managerial efficiency and "cost-benefit" analysis, 
and all such unique features of the Holocaust process for our own situa-
tion, our own lives. For there are analogies to be drawn between our 
own situation and that of the victims of the Holocaust, analogies that 
depend upon understanding as clearly as possible how such things as 
science and technology, bureaucracy and managerial "efficiency" were 
employed in the destruction of the Jews and how they might well be 
employed for our own destruction somewhere down the road. More-
over, as I have emphasized, we cannot accept the simple situation of the 
Jews and the special "intention" of the Nazis with respect to their total 
extinction. Not only does this emphasis on the particularity of the Jew-
ish situation tend to obscure relevant analogies with the predicaments of 
other groups-possibly even with our own situation as hostages to the 
threat of nuclear war-but it also obscures the more universal implica-
tions for the future of all mankind that the Holocaust raises. For, as 
even Bauer himself once asked, if the Holocaust has no universal lesson 
for all men, why should anyone study it?47 In the end it is those who 
emphasize the uniqueness of the methods, processes, and techniques of 
the Holocaust that best enable us to draw the analogies and explicate the 
event itself. In the end it is possible that by understanding those 
methods, techniques, and processes by means of which an oppressed 
population can be destroyed we can avoid such destruction in the future. 
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If we can succeed in this purpose, the Holocaust will truly have been a 
transformational event. 
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THE HOLOCAUST AND 
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
Robert G.L. Waite 
Those who reflect on the nature of the Holocaust will confront the 
question of its uniqueness. Was the Holocaust the culmination of over 
2,000 years of active anti-Semitism and persecution, or was it unique, 
forming a radical break from the past? 
Both sides of this ancient historical debate, continuity versus change, 
are important. Certainly there is much continuity with the past. Indeed, 
the Holocaust was made possible, in large part, because German history 
had shown a continuum of virulent anti-Semitism. It is of course true 
that anti-Semitism existed in every country of the Western and Slavic 
worlds. But in no country in the world did so many influential leaders 
over so long a time champion so vicious a hatred of the Jewish people. 
Martin Luther, for example, preached hatred and persecution of the 
Jews 400 years before Hitler. As early as 1543 Luther demanded that 
Jewish synagogues and schools be set afire, that their silver and gold be 
taken from them, their houses and prayer books seized and destroyed, 
that brimstone and pitch should be thrown upon them, and that they be 
driven away "like mad dogs"l-a program which Adolf Hitler would put 
into practice on a national scale beginning with the infamous Reichskris-
tallnac ht of November 9-10, 1938, a date which, by a quirk of 
chronology, fell on Luther's birthday. 
For centuries Catholic bishops and priests joined Lutheran pastors in 
thundering against an imaginary "Jewish menace." Indeed, the anti-
Semitic record of both Christian confessions is one of the most appalling 
chapters in the entire history of religion. Published statements made by 
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saints of the Catholic Church were later used as texts for scurrilous anti-
Semitic broadsides. Saint Gregory of Nyssa (d. 396) described Jews as 
"slayers of the Lord, murderers of the prophets, haters of God, advo-
cates of the devil, a brood of vipers." St. Ambrose, Augustine's 
teacher, said that Jewish synagogues should be burned to the ground and 
boasted that he personally had set fire to one. St. John Chrysostom (d. 
406) called Jews "lustful, rapacious, greedy, perfidious bandits." He 
preached that "it is the duty of Christians to hate the Jews" and con-
cluded that the Jews are "fit for slaughter."2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, the 
most influential theologian in the history of the Catholic Church, argued 
that it was morally justifiable for Jews to serve Christians as slaves be-
cause, as the slayers of God, they were bound to "perpetual servitude. "3 
The Church practiced what its Fathers preached. Official Church 
councils set forth decrees which clearly foreshadowed Hitler's infamous 
Racial Laws. The Synod of Elvira of 306, for example, forbad inter-
marriage and sexual relations between Christians and Jews. The Synod 
of Claremont (535) decreed that Jews could not hold public office. The 
Third Synod of Orleans of 538 made it illegal for Jews to walk in public 
streets during Passion Week. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 
decreed that Jews must mark their clothing with a special badge. The 
Council of Oxford (1222) forbad the construction of new synagogues. 
The Council of Basel of 1434 prohibited Jews from obtaining academic 
degrees.4 
One day in April 1933 when Catholic bishops protested to Hitler that 
his government was mistreating Jews, Hitler replied that he was "only 
putting into effect what Christianity had preached and practiced for 2000 
years. "5 He had a point. 
The historian Uriel Tal is therefore probably justified in concluding 
that the Christian church bears heavy responsibility for the virulent anti-
Semitism of the Third Reich. 6 German Christians agree. In January 
1980, the Synod of the German Evangelical Church of the Rhineland, 
the most populous of the twenty-seven regional units of the EKD, 
passed overwhelmingly the official declaration, Zur Erneurung des 
Verhaltnisses von Christen und Juden (For the Renewal of Relations 
between Christians and Jews). The first sentence of this historic declara-
tion reads: "Stricken, we confess the co-responsibility and guilt of Ger-
man Christendom for the Holocaust. "7 
Religious anti-Semitism, it bears repeating, had shown great conti-
nuity in Germany. But it was only in the Second Reich-Imperial Ger-
many after 1871-that religious persecution gave way to a racial anti-
Semitism which explicitly anticipated the Third Reich. 
When Adolf Hitler was still a babe in his doting mother's arms, 
Germany's most influential thinkers were inciting racial anti-Semitism 
with slogans which Hitler would later take over as his own. In the 
1890s, for example, the prodigious scholar Paul de Lagarde (whom 
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Thomas Mann hailed as "one of the giants of our people")8 coined 
portentous metaphors: "Jews are decayed parasites ... usurious ver-
min" and warned that "with bacilli one does not negotiate: one extermi-
nates them as quickly as possible."9 The long list of racial anti-Semites 
includes Germany's most popular historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, a 
best-selling novelist, Gustav Freytag, and probably the most influential 
Jew-baiter of them all, Richard Wagner.IO 
Hitler exploited this legacy of hatred. But while showing continuity 
with the past, Nazi anti-Semitism was different from its predecessors. 
Here was not merely prejudice, persecution, and invective. Here, for the 
first time, was a calculated program of mass murder set forth by the legal 
government of Germany-a government unique in all history. 
This was no mere "authoritarian state" of which we have so many and 
varied examples in world history. This was a government conceived in 
oppression and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created un-
equal. This was social and moral cannibalism. This was the very "nega-
tion of God erected into a system of government." 
This government promised that Jews would be traduced, persecuted, 
vilified, destroyed. Such was the promise and such was the practice. 
The horror of Hitler was this: he was no hypocrite; he meant what he 
said; he practiced what he preached; he kept his promises. Indeed, as 
Elie Wiesel has noted with bitter irony, "Hitler is the only one who kept 
his promises to the Jewish people."11 
Hitler's policy of genocide was not designed to remove subversives 
who were a threat to the German state. Quite to the contrary, German 
Jews through the centuries had proven their devotion to the Fatherland 
by supporting its government and fighting gallantly in its wars. Their 
loyalty was shown even after Hitler came to power in 1933. One 
example: the Reichsbundjadischer Frontsoldaten (National Association 
of Jewish War Veterans) hailed the advent of Hitler in 1933 and publicly 
promised support of his government.12 (They soon changed their 
minds.) 
Nor were the Nazi executions designed to punish criminals and male-
factors. The Jews were killed not because they had done anything but 
merely because they existed-because they had been born. Jews were 
criminals by definition. In occupied Russia, for example, the Nazi con-
querors decreed death for the following crimes: ( 1) sabotage, theft, es-
pionage, and (2) also for "Judenverdacht"-those suspected of being 
Jewish. 13 
The Nazi Holocaust was also different in the extent of the cooperation 
it received from the German social infrastructure. The Holocaust en-
joyed the support or the benevolent neutrality of Christian churches, the 
civil service, the judiciary, educators, and thousands of the railroad offi-
cials who handled the complex logistics of transporting millions of 
people to their death. Army generals-the evidence is now incontro-
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vertible-also knew of the mass murders and gave their approval.14 
Thus this genocide succeeded because its perpetrators could count on the 
cooperation or acquiescence of German state officials, of religious, civic, 
and military leaders, and of the German public at large. Recent studies 
have shown that the German people really did know about the genocide 
and reacted with "a mixture of private sympathy and public passivity." 15 
A German historian of public attitudes toward Jews during the Third 
Reich has concluded that there was "scarcely another country whose 
population accepted the carrying away of its Jewish fellow citizens with 
so little opposition. "16 
There is another reason why the Holocaust could take place: the vic-
tims cooperated with their executioners; they collaborated in their own 
destruction. I find this to be one of the most disturbing and least under-
stood problems of the Holocaust. But here we must sound a clear note 
of warning about the use of the words "cooperative" and "collaboration." 
If they suggest a voluntary desire to be helpful, the words are badly 
misused. As Lucy Dawidowicz has emphasized in her valuable studies, 
there was no voluntary Jewish cooperation; there were no Jewish col-
laborators in the sense of the word made infamous by Quisling and 
Laval. Not one Jew wanted to cooperate with the Nazis. No Jew 
wanted Hitler's "New Order" in Europe.17 The Judenriite (the Jewish 
Councils approved by the Nazis and elected by the Jews themselves) 
cooperated with the SS by selecting Jews for transport to their deaths, 
but they did so only under the most extreme duress. When the Nazis 
threatened more drastic enlargement of the death quotas they were 
obliged to fill, the councils had little choice but to obey. Constantly they 
confronted soul-destroying decisions: choose for extinction either the 
young or the old. The Judenriite -it must be repeated-had virtually no 
choice. They tried desperately to do the very best they could under im-
possible circumstances. They were coerced into compliance. That much 
needs to be said and remembered. And yet the hard conclusion reached 
by eminent Jewish authorities on the Holocaust must be squarely faced 
and carefully pondered: however compelling the reasons, however ex-
treme the duress, the fact is that Jews actually did become tragic 
accomplices in their own extinction. Raul Hilberg, Hannah Arendt, and 
Isaiah Trunk have demonstrated beyond dispute that leaders of the 
Jewish communities in Berlin, as in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Warsaw, 
cooperated with the Nazis and smoothed the way to deportation and 
death. It is true that there were notable exceptions among the Jewish 
Councils, but the predominant pattern is clear. Most of the Judenriite 
implemented SS directives, published benign Nazi cover stories, denied 
warnings given by the Jewish underground, selected those who were to 
die, arranged their transportation, and collected money to pay their trans-
portation to the death camps-thereby helping the Nazis achieve their 
goal of making the Final Solution "self-financing." The Councils gen-
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erally opposed sabotage and active resistance and ordered compliance 
with Nazi directives.18 Most Jews followed the orders of their leaders, 
and many displayed what Hilberg has called "anticipatory compliance": 
in pathetically futile efforts to pacify the Nazis, they sedulously collected 
and turned in their jewels and gold and arrived well ahead of time at the 
designated staging areas, having paid their railway fare in advance. 
"They attempted to tame the Germans," Hilberg writes, "as one would 
attempt to tame a wild beast. They avoided 'provocation' and complied 
instantly with decrees and orders."19 
The Nazis were surprised and pleased by the passivity and coopera-
tion they received from their victims. It made their job much easier. 
Adolf Eichmann, the SS official chiefly in charge of the mass murders, 
testified during his trial in Jerusalem that the Jewish Councils were so 
effective in implementing SS orders that German personnel could be 
released for other service.20 Hannah Arendt concludes bitterly that with-
out Jewish help, the murder of millions of Jews would not have been 
possible: "To a Jew, this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of 
their own people is ... the darkest chapter of the whole dark 
story."21 
An even darker role was played by the Jewish Police of the ghettos, 
an agency which the Nazis created with Satanic cunning to implement 
their orders and to shatter and demoralize the Jewish community by 
setting it against itself. After the war, Jewish "Courts of Honor" 
established that the Jewish Police actively participated in the destruction 
of their fellow Jews. They ferreted them out of their hiding places, 
arrested them in the middle of the night, beat them up in the streets, and 
filled their own pockets with bribes from their victims. A Jew who was 
to pay with his life for their vicious treachery angrily recorded in his 
diary: "Every Warsaw Jew, every woman and child, can cite thousands 
of cases of the inhuman cruelty and violence of the Jewish Police. 
Those cases will never be forgotten by the survivors, and they must and 
shall be paid for. "22 
Later we must consider some of the explanations which Jewish 
writers have given for the extent of Jewish cooperation with their 
executioners. But first something else must be said. For it is true, as 
Reuben Ainsztein has shown in his massive book on Jewish resistance 
to the Nazis, that many, many heroic Jews fought back at hopeless odds. 
Their gallant resistance was most tragically demonstrated in the uprisings 
against their oppressors in the Warsaw ghetto during the spring of 1943 
-was it not the only urban uprising against the Nazis in Europe?-and 
in the death camp of Sobibor in October 1943.23 
And yet it must be recorded that the overwhelming majority of the 
Jews of Europe, by the hundreds and hundreds of thousands, did indeed 
go, as furious Jewish activists charged at the time, "like sheep to the 
slaughter." Shortly before he and his family were killed, one of the 
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heroes of the Warsaw ghetto noted "the passivity of the Jewish masses" 
and asked some anguished questions: "Why are they all so quiet? Why 
does the father die, and the mother, and each of the children without a 
single protest? ... Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? 
... This will be an eternal mystery-this passivity of the Jewish 
populace even toward their own police. "24 
These questions of Emmanuel Ringelblum and the mystery he could 
not solve will continue to haunt historians of the Holocaust. 
The Holocaust differed from other genocides in other ways as well. 
For the first time in history, a cultivated and articulate people, confronted 
by unimaginable suffering and death, left records of immense value to 
survivors who seek to understand what happened. Philip Friedman has 
called the details of these harrowing experiences "test tubes ... in a 
vast psycho-sociological laboratory such as had never been set up 
before. "25 These records do indeed provide insight into the ways in 
which the human psyche reacts to stress. They also cast new light into 
the human soul, probing not only the depth of wickedness and evil, but 
also--in the memoirs of Anna Frank, Emmanuel Ringelblum, Viktor 
Frankl, Chaim Kaplan,26 and thousands of others-the light that human 
courage, faith, and goodness can shed in the darkest pits of hell. 
In short, these precious records display the human capacity both for 
evil and for good. There is a political as well as a moral and a psycho-
logical lesson here, for the duality of human wickedness and human 
goodness proclaims the dangers of dictatorship and the saving promise 
of democracy. The political lesson of this human duality was best stated 
in Reinhold Niebuhr's memorable aphorism: 
Man's capacity for good makes democracy possible; 
Man's inclination to evil makes democracy essential. 
The Nazi genocide was also unique in its senselessness. Yehuda 
Bauer has well asked, where else in history has a government of a 
civilized nation set out to kill everyone whose grandfather was of a 
particular religion or ethnic group? "For the first time in history a 
sentence of death had been pronounced on anyone guilty of having been 
born. "27 And where have mass murders been so injurious to the 
perpetrator's own self-interest? In 1943, 1944, 1945, beleaguered Ger-
many desperately needed railway transport and skilled labor supply. Yet 
Hitler allocated billions of work hours and massive amounts of trans-
portation to one purpose: the killing of a nonexistent "menace." For the 
Jews were not then and had never been a threat to the German Reich. 
The whole thing was quite literally senseless. 
But was this genocide really unique? Was there no historical prece-
dent or parallel? Historians will recall other mass murders, other 
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slaughters of the innocent. One thinks of Herod and Genghis Khan, or 
of Stalin's murder of some 15 million kulaks, minority groups, and 
Russian prisoners of war.28 We recall the massacres perpetrated by Idi 
Amin Dada of Uganda29 and the calculated starvation in Cambodia, 
where over 50 percent of the entire population was killed between 1975 
and 1980.30 
Two parallels to the Holocaust of the Jews seem particularly close. In 
1915 Turkish authorities ordered the annihilation of the entire Armenian 
people. The proportion of Armenians killed was about the same as that 
destroyed in Hitler's Holocaust of the Jews: two out of every three 
people died.31 The Nazi genocide of the Gypsies also shows close 
parallels to the murder of the Jews. Gypsies too were killed for no other 
reason than the alleged threat of "racial pollution" of German blood. As 
with the Jews (and unlike the Poles) all Gypsies were to be executed. 
They too (unlike other Nazi victims) were gassed at Auschwitz.32 
So what can be concluded on this issue of continuity versus change? 
Many eminent Jewish authorities insist that this Holocaust was unique-
it alone deserves a capital letter. Alvin Rosenfeld has called it an event 
without analogy, "something new in the world, without likeness or 
kind. "33 Y ehuda Bauer has said that any comparison with other geno-
cides is misleading and inaccurate. 34 
An American sociologist, John Murray Cuddihy, has noticed some-
thing revealing about the very intensity of Jewish insistence that it is only 
their genocide which is worthy of the name "Holocaust." He finds that 
this affirmation of uniqueness and denial of universality is a modem re-
working of the ancient "Chosen People" concept: "Chosenness is 
found ... even in such horrible context as the Holocaust in the at-
tempt to define victimization in such a way as to exclude all other groups 
besides Jews. "35 
Elie Wiesel illustrates Cuddihy's point. When historians refer to 
other holocausts, such as the massacre of the Armenians or the Gypsies, 
Wiesel is disturbed because such parallels question the special status of 
the Jewish victims. He is sorely afraid, he says, that "they are stealing 
the Holocaust from us ... [which] we need to regain our sense of 
sacredness. "36 
There are obviously differences of opinion on this question, but I 
would say that despite close parallels, the uniqueness of the Jewish 
Holocaust is striking. It was unique in Hitler's avowed purpose of 
killing all members of a religious, cultural, ethnic community-a calcu-
lated effort to annihilate one of the most creative people on earth. 37 This 
genocide was unique in the endorsement of leading social institutions 
and agencies; unique in the senselessness of the whole program; unique 
in the help the victims gave to their murderers; unique in the consequence 
it has had on both Jewish and Christian thought. 
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Let us turn to a second group of questions that highlight the problem. 
How adequate are the explanations and theories that attempt to account 
for the Holocaust? What approaches seem most fruitful? What new 
approaches are needed? 
First, how adequate are the explanations? The answer to this is 
simple: there is no adequate explanation of the Holocaust. This event 
will continue to stagger the mind and trouble the soul of anyone who 
investigates it 
Yet several approaches are particularly helpful in leading us to a 
deeper understanding-though we shall never know the full and final 
truth about it, just as we shall never know the final truth about any 
historical problem that is worth its intellectual salt. 
In our search for understanding, insights can be gained from socio-
logical and psychological studies. Helen Fein,38 for example, following 
closely the monumental work of Raul Hilberg, has examined the social 
setting for the Holocaust and found answers to such questions as: What 
made the social environment congenial to genocide? She provides care-
ful comparative statistics from different countries to show that the extent 
of cooperation with the SS depended upon a number of factors, but the 
most important of these was the amount of anti-Semitism that existed 
historically in each country (thus the importance of the first question 
about continuity). Fein shows, for example, that there is a direct rela-
tionship, a positive correlation, between the amount of anti-Semitism 
-and the support it received from church, army, and the civil service-
and the number of Jews killed. Where anti-Semitism was extensive, as 
in Germany, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland, genocide was extensive. 
Where anti-Semitism was not strong historically, and where popular 
sentiment and civic and religious leadership did not support it, as in 
Denmark and Bulgaria, killing was minimal. Bulgarians and Danes re-
fused to carry out SS orders and helped thousands of Jews to escape 
death. 
Thus the congeniality of the social environment helped determine the 
extent of the Holocaust. So too did the degree of effective political 
power. Where political power is overwhelming-as in Stalin's Russia, 
Amin's Uganda, or Hitler's Germany-where opposition is silenced and 
bureaucracy is obedient, mass murder can become routine. 
Fein's comparative approach, which encompasses sociological and 
quantitative analysis, is a valuable aid to a fuller understanding. So too 
are the contributions made by psychologists and psychoanalysts. 39 We 
particularly need their help because the very irrationality of the Holocaust 
makes traditional political and historical explanations distressingly 
inadequate. 
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Psychologists can tell us a great deal about the personalities of the 
perpetrators. What kinds of people, yes, what kinds of human beings, 
were the Nazis? For it is important, though admittedly distasteful, to 
remember that the Nazis were human. To dismiss them as "monsters" or 
"freaks" or "demons" is too easy and far too dangerous. We shall learn 
little about this historic event until we recognize that the Holocaust was a 
deeply human phenomenon. 
In all people there is a propensity for murderous aggression. Even 
the unspeakable events of the Holocaust are not "bestial" in the literal 
sense of the word. To call the Nazis beasts is to defame beasts. Ani-
mals in the jungle do not kill except for food or self-defense. Such 
events as the Holocaust, Heinz Kohut has written, are "decidedly 
human, an intricate part of the human condition. "40 That is a disturbing 
and unpalatable thought, but it is a basic fact of psychological life. 
Hannah Arendt reached the same conclusion. In her brilliant study of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem she observed that Eichmann was no monster-if 
he had been, the entire case against him would have collapsed imme-
diately. "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were 
like him and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they 
were and still are terribly and terrifyingly normal. ... This normality 
was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together."41 Elie 
Wiesel found the same things to be true about Franz Stangl, commandant 
of the Sobibor and Treblinka death camps: "It is not the murderer in 
Stangl that terrifies us-it is the human being."42 We need to know 
more about the mechanisms which permit normal people to commit such 
awful crimes, and psychologists can help provide some answers. 
Psychologists have also helped by demonstrating what the "anti-
Semitic personality" is like.43 Germany has no monopoly on such 
twisted human beings. Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Eichmann, and the 
rest were very much like American anti-Semites: they too reveal infantile 
personalities incapable of development; they too swing radically between 
swaggering confidence and abject despair. Like American anti-Semites, 
the Nazis exalted the strong and despised the weak. They too projected 
their personal problems onto others, namely, the Jews. They too tended 
to be sado-masochists with inclinations to perversion. 
Psychologists can help us understand the anti-Semitic person. So too 
can philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre, quite without realizing it, has paint-
ed a discerning picture of Adolf Hitler and his vicious but frighteningly 
human colleagues: 
We are now in a position to understand the anti-Semite. He is a man who is 
afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself .... He is a coward 
who does not want to admit his cowardice to himself; a murderer who 
represses and censures his tendency to murder without being able to hold it 
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back .... The existence of the Jew merely permits the anti-Semite to stifle 
his anxieties .... The anti-Semite is a man who wishes to be pitiless stone, 
a furious torrent, a devastating thunderbolt-anything except a man.44 
Biographers, aided by psychology, can reach a deeper understanding 
of the individual perpetrators of the Holocaust. One recalls Peter 
Loewenberg's penetrating study of Himmler,45 Richard Hunt's pioneer-
ing work on Joseph Goebbels, 46 Gidda Sereny's sensitive insights into 
Franz Stangl,47 as well as Hannah Arendt's study of Eichmann. 
Certainly we need to know a great deal more about the personality of 
the one person who was finally responsible for the Holocaust: Adolf 
Hitler.48 We need to understand the psychodynamics of the process by 
which his personal hatred of the Jews was rationalized and projected into 
public policy. We need to see how the personal prejudice of one 
demented person was transmuted into a horrendous historic force. 
Psychologists have also widened our horizons and deepened our 
knowledge of how it is possible for average people to follow orders 
which debase and destroy their fellow human beings. Here, two studies 
by two American social psychologists offer insights-only partial 
insights, it is true, but nevertheless revealing glimpses of an answer-to 
that simple but terribly complex question: How could decent people 
commit such evil crimes? How could they possibly do it? Stanley 
Milgram at Yale and his colleagues in several other American universities 
have reached deeply disturbing conclusions about the propensity of ordi-
nary people-in this case hundreds of American citizens-to follow bru-
tal orders commanding them to turn on electric currents which appeared 
to inflict suffering on fellow citizens. Professor Milgram concludes: 
Subjects will obey the experimenter no matter how vehement the pleading of 
the person being shocked, no matter how painful the shocks seem to be and 
no matter how much the victim pleads to be let out. This was seen time and 
again in studies and has been observed in several universities where the ex-
periment was repeated. It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost 
any lengths on the command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding 
of the study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation. 
This is perhaps the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary people 
simply doing their jobs and without any particular hostility on their part can 
become agents in a terrible destructive process.49 
If this is true of average American citizens, how much more it is true 
of German Nazis whose attitude and inclinations were powerfully rein-
forced by an environment which not only permitted the destruction of 
their fellow men, but demanded it. 
Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University has demonstrated that college 
students carefully selected for their normality can become perverted by 
the pathology of power. These students illustrate Stendhal's assertion 
The Holocaust and Historical Explanation 173 
that "power is the greatest of all pleasures." In his experiment, Zim-
bardo simulated a prison situation and had students act out the roles of 
prison guard and prisoner. The experiment showed how much Ameri-
can students delighted in that greatest of all pleasures and used it to hu-
miliate and hurt their fellow students. It also showed that the victims of 
this power-also normal college students-became depressed and dis-
oriented, and meekly followed the commands of their persecutors. 
Zimbardo's experiment, which was planned to last two weeks, was 
aborted after six days because in those few days Professor Zimbardo 
was alarmed by a frightening metamorphosis he witnessed in the stu-
dents. Those who were serving as guards grew increasingly abusive 
and sadistically cruel to the "prisoners"; the students who were prisoners 
became so depressed that they were on the verge of psychological 
disintegration and suicide. Zimbardo concluded that 
in the contest between forces of good men and evil situation, the situation 
triumphed. Individuals carefully selected for their nonnality, sanity, and 
homogeneous personality traits were, in a matter of days, acting in ways that 
out of this context would be judged abnonnal, insane, neurotic, psychopathic 
and sadistic.SO 
If that can happen to average American college students in six days, it is 
small wonder that Germans who had been carefully conditioned to Nazi 
ideology could become brutal instruments of Hitler's "wicked will," or 
that humiliated, frightened, starving, and disoriented Jews who felt the 
utter futility of resistance should yield to brute force and passively obey 
commands. 
Psychoanalysts such as Bruno Bettelheim have further increased our 
understanding of the difficult question-and to Jews a very sensitive 
question-of why the Jewish people cooperated in their own destruc-
tion. Bettelheim believes that the aggressive-destructive drive so ob-
vious in the SS was also present in their Jewish victims. Feeling help-
less and abandoned, they were unable to direct aggressive impulses 
outward against their hated oppressors. They therefore made both an 
excuse and a virtue out of futility and used it as a psychological defense 
against self-accusations of cowardice. Thus they continually exagger-
ated their own utter helplessness and the total omnipotence of the enemy, 
and then turned aggressive-destructive drives inward against themselves, 
thereby cooperating in their own destruction. Bettelheim concludes that 
Jews were already suicidal before they walked toward the death 
chambers. 51 
Such analysis, not surprisingly, has brought a storm of protest and 
denial from Jewish writers. But it is ironic that these writers who 
denounce the conclusions reached by Bettelheim, Arendt, and Hilberg, 
and who vehemently deny that the Jews died with meek resignation, 
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nevertheless in their own books offer explanations of why the Jewish 
people were compelled to do just that. They give a number of reasons, 
all of which have considerable merit. 
First, they argue that Jewish tradition did not encourage active resis-
tance to persecution. They point out that for centuries Jews had been 
conditioned to obey, to suffer, and to survive. As Lucy Dawidowicz has 
written, "[their] religious tradition elevated powerlessness into a positive 
Jewish value. It fostered submissiveness."52 Jews believed that their 
vaunted capacity to submit and yet to endure would carry them through 
even this persecution, as it had so often in their past. They made a 
catastrophic mistake. As Richard Rubenstein has noted, "The Jewish 
reaction to the Nazis was one of the most disastrous misreadings of the 
character of an opponent by any community in all of human history." 53 
Jews did not understand that Hitler did not plan merely to humiliate 
them; he planned to kill them. This sensible, legally minded, and culti-
vated people simply could not believe that the German government really 
meant to murder them all. That just did not make sense. In this the Jews 
were quite correct. It did not make sense. But it happened. 
Second, Jewish writers argue that to this tradition of "suffer and 
survive" was added the psychological defense of denying. Jews denied 
that they were to be transported to death camps. Such horror stories 
could not be true. Gladly they accepted the Nazi fiction that they were 
merely being "resettled" in the East. Their psychological need to believe 
that fantasy led them to cooperate and obey SS orders because to do so 
was a way of denying what they dreaded might be true. Notice how 
psychological denial is reflected in their euphemisms. Jews did not talk 
of killing centers, of gas ovens or death camps; they referred to them as 
"bakeries"; a person who had given up all hope was a "Moslem"; a depot 
holding the belongings of recently gassed victims was called 
"Canada."54 
Third, as Helen Fein has noted, there was a general belief-
particularly among Western Jews-that the Nazis were "punishing" only 
Eastern Jews, not the rest. Many German Jews, for example, said that 
Polish Jews must have done something terribly wrong to merit their 
fate.55 
Fourth, Yisrael Gutman believes that thousands of devout Jews went 
quietly to their death with prayer shawls gathered about them in the faith 
that they were participating in a Kiddush Hashem-a sanctification rite in 
which they bore witness to their devotion to God. They agreed with a 
revered rabbi who said, "The quintessence of martyrdom is dying for 
one's Jewishness. "56 And psychologically it was easier to believe that 
they were dying as martyrs to their faith in God than it was to entertain 
the awful thought that their God had forsaken them. 
Fifth, to many Jews, death in Hitler's gas chambers was atonement 
for individual or collective sin. Devout Jews found it more bearable to 
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believe that it must be they themselves-and not the God of Abraham 
and Sarah, Isaac and Jacob--who had broken the sacred covenant which 
Jehovah had made with his Chosen People. 
Sixth, historically, Jews tended to trust their spiritual leaders. As we 
have noted, official Judenrate urged Jews to obey orders for shipment to 
the East and not to resist. As Dawidowicz has written, they feared-
with ample justification-that any act of resistance would only increase 
the wrath of the SS.57 
Finally, and this is the point that needs most emphasis, we must 
recognize that European Jews, like the kulaks of Russia or Idi Amin's 
victims in Uganda, yielded to a force majeure. The Jews, isolated, 
intimidated, and confronted by the institutionalized terror of a modem 
police state, had no other effective choice. They were overwhelmed by 
sheer power. 
It seems to me that all these explanations-including Bettelheim's-
deserve an examination that is as careful, as courageous, and as dispas-
sionate as this emotion-laden issue will allow. 
The Holocaust clearly required perpetrators; and we need to under-
stand the psychodynamics which drove them. Here, by and large, were 
frighteningly normal people who were given great power and trained to 
exploit universal human frailties for horrendous purposes. The Holo-
caust also required victims, and they too can teach us much about the 
human condition-how even under the most brutal tyranny, people can 
retain their humanity and refuse to be broken. But the Holocaust also 
shows how the cowed and frightened and disoriented can succumb to 
brutal power and cooperate in their own psychic and physical destruc-
tion. The Holocaust is indeed a terrifying but profoundly revealing 
laboratory of human behavior. 
Which is to say that the Holocaust was a human event-an event of 
shattering and unspeakable inhumanity, but one perpetrated by humans 
upon humans. It was an event unique in history and yet within the 
human experience. 
III 
Historians, as well as psychologists and sociologists, can also con-
tribute to our understanding of the Holocaust because of their long 
experience with a third issue: the role of the commanding personality. 
We see in the Holocaust yet another example of the ancient historical 
interplay of man and circumstance. But it is doubtful if ever in the past 
there has been so close a relationship, so fateful an interconnection, as 
there was between this peculiarly compelling man and these peculiarly 
receptive circumstances. 
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First consider the man, Adolf Hitler, the originator and mover of the 
Holocaust, the one person without whom this event could not have been 
possible.58 He was both a consummately cunning political opportunist 
and a pathological fanatic. And both aspects determined his program for 
the Jews. As an astute political operator he recognized the appeal of anti-
Semitism to Germans of the 1920s and 1930s. This "Terrible Simpli-
fier" offered a simple explanation for all difficulties: Jews were respon-
sible for the defeat and humiliation of 1918, for the economic disasters 
of 1923 and 1930-1933, for all the political and moral problems of the 
time. It was not "our" fault: the Jew was to blame. There have been 
other racists, other political anti-Semites before Hitler. Three things 
made Hitler special: the depth and intensity of his hatred for the Jews; 
the extent of his effective political power; the opportunity given to him 
by a compliant and cooperative society. 
Hatred of the Jews and the desire to murder them was a lifelong 
obsession of Hitler, the organizing principle of his life. One can feel the 
venom of his hatred in an early conversation, now recorded in the 
archives of the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich. 
As soon as I have power [he said in 1922] I shall have gallows erected, for 
example in Munich in the Marienplatz. Jews will be hanged one after another 
and they will stay hanging until they stink ... then the next group will 
follow ... until the last Jew in Munich is extenninated. Exactly the same 
procedure will be followed in other cities until Gennany is cleansed of the last 
Jew.59 
This personal obsession became his political program. His promise was 
kept. Both his last and his first political statements confirmed his obses-
sion with a nonexistent "Jewish Menace." His last political statement, 
delivered on April 30, 1945, was dictated just before taking a lethal dose 
of cyanide: "Above all I enjoin the leaders of the Reich to scrupulous 
observance of the Racial Laws defending against the universal poisoner 
of mankind, international Jewry." In his first public speech, of which 
we have one faded shorthand report dated August 7 or 8, 1920, 
Salzburg, Hitler had sounded the same ominous note: 
Don't be misled into thinking that you can fight diseases without killing the 
carrier! ... Don't think you can fight racial tuberculosis without ridding 
the nation of the carrier of racial tuberculosis! This Jewish contamination will 
not subside, this poisoning of the nation will not end until the carrier himself, 
the Jew, has been banished from our midst.60 
That promise was also kept. 
The extent of Hitler's anti-Jewish phobia is manifest. The psycho-
logical reasons for it are complex and cannot concern us here. 61 Let us 
simply reiterate that the Holocaust was not possible without Hitler. It 
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was also not possible without a supportive society. For, once again in 
history, man and circumstances worked together to produce the event. 
German society exhibited attitudes and values recognizable in any 
country. What made German circumstances peculiar was the intensifica-
tion and distortion of those attitudes and values through the force of 
unusual historic pressures and the manipulative skills of the man, Adolf 
Hitler. We should consider some of these attitudes and notice the way 
Hitler used them to his advantage. His program required anti-Semitic 
racism, and German history, as noted, obliged him with a particularly 
virulent variety. He manipulated it with diabolical cunning. Anti-Semi-
tism not only provided a simple explanation for all Germany's recent 
disasters, it allowed Hitler to fulfill his contradictory claims that he was, 
at the same time, a conservative and a revolutionary; that he would 
preserve traditional society and transform it through a New Order; that he 
was the champion of both capitalism and socialism. "The Jew" enabled 
him to have it both ways and to win both capitalist and proletariat to his 
banner. He convinced capitalists that he was the enemy only of "Jewish 
finance capitalism"; he persuaded socialists that his program of National 
Socialism fought only "Jewish Marxist Socialism." He also applied anti-
Semitism in another way. His success as mass leader was due in part to 
his psychological insight that man is both evil and good, beset by two 
conflicting tendencies: an impulse for aggression, destruction, hatred; 
and a capacity for creation, cooperation, sacrifice, and service. Hitler 
appealed to both impulses. His regime institutionalized brutality and 
aggression, channeling them against the Jews. But we do not under-
stand his appeal, particularly to the youth of Germany, unless we under-
stand that he also inspired them with faith and hope-a shining hope for 
the future, faith in him as their Messiah. Through the magic of his 
charisma and the cunning of his propaganda he convinced millions that 
barbarism was heroic, brutality was strength, and nihilism was an 
exalted ideology. And the lofty goals of Germany strong and triumphant 
could be achieved only when the country was cleansed and purified by 
removing the Jews who defiled the Fatherland. 
Hitler manipulated German anti-Semitism to his own advantage. He 
also gained mightily from another national tradition: obedience to the 
state. Surely the German people have no monopoly on obedience and 
capacity to obey inhuman orders, as Milgram's chilling experiments have 
shown. Yet in Germany, since Luther and the Prussian kings and the 
Imperial Army, obedience to Obrigkeit (authority) was raised to the 
highest virtue of citizenship. At Nuremberg, as at a score of Nazi trials 
since, the phrase Befehl ist Befehl! (an order is an order) was recited as a 
litany. 
Hitler's Holocaust was helped along by yet another circumstance: 
general indifference to the suffering, humiliation, and murder of the 
Jews. Here again a common human phenomenon was intensified in 
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Germany. People in most societies are indifferent to the existence of 
social evil in their midst. Edmund Burke's justifiably famous warning 
about evil prospering because of the indifferent silence of good men and 
women is, unfortunately, true of most good people. Certainly the 
silence of many good and influential people-people like Pope Pius XII, 
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Felix Frankfurter, and Rabbi 
Stephen Wise62-helped Hitler carry out the Holocaust. Silence was 
international. But the indifference of the elite of German society was 
particularly pronounced and peculiarly helpful to Hitler, as Rainer Baum 
and Dieter Hartmann have graphically shown. 63 
Hitler was also aided by the psychological phenomenon of defensive 
denial. People have a remarkable capacity to deny what they prefer not 
to believe. Turks deny that an Armenian massacre took place in 1915; 
Englishmen denied the existence of concentration camps in the Trans-
vaal; Americans denied the Christmas bombing of Hanoi; Israelis denied 
all responsibility for massacres of Palestinians. But denial was pan-
demic during the Holocaust. And Jews joined the chorus of those who 
insisted that the genocide was not actually taking place. Since they could 
not believe they were being transported East to their deaths, they denied 
it, and their denial expedited their extinction. To a large degree, as was 
noted, Jews accepted their own victimization. But attitudes of resigna-
tion and cooperation with one's oppressor are emphatically not an 
exclusively Jewish trait. As Barrington Moore has demonstrated, human 
beings in vastly different social, religious, and political settings all 
display a remarkable tendency to accept maltreatment and make a virtue 
out of humiliation. Such is true of Christian ascetics and saints, the 
Untouchables of India, Chinese coolies, and German steel workers in 
the Ruhr in the 1890s. Acceptance is a social norm, Moore has ob-
served; resistance is an acquired taste.64 But here again, during the 
Third Reich there were specific psychological, social, and political 
reasons why the Jews put up so little resistance and helped Hitler to 
direct a human condition to inhuman purposes. 
We seek to understand the Holocaust, to explain it, and to establish 
the truth about what happened. We shall never explain it adequately, 
never find the final truth. But there is no cause for despair. We can find 
comfort in the words of a wise old rabbi: 
Who says the Truth was meant to be revealed? 
It has to be sought, that's all. 
I have suggested that we begin our search by considering the interplay 
of a peculiar man with peculiarly fortuitous circumstances; that we seek 
enlightenment from such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and 
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history; and that we recognize this event both as a part of a historical 
continuum and as a phenomenon with distinctive features of its own. 
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DISCRIMINATION, 
PERSECUTION, THEFT, AND 
MURDER UNDER COLOR OF LAW: 
THE TOTALITARIAN 
CORRUPTION OF THE GERMAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1933-1945 
Gunter W. Remmling 
The German dictatorship did not materialize quite as suddenly as 
Pallas Athena, who sprang fully armed from the forehead of Zeus. The 
Third Reich, something the German resistance fighter Ernst Niekisch 
called the "realm of the lower demons, "1 had numerous links with the 
past. 
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP 
The anti-Semitic rabble-rousers of imperial Vienna kindled Adolf 
Hitler's murderous hatred of the Jews. "Then I came to Vienna," he 
wrote in his political autobiography Mein Kampf, as he set out to explain 
the origin of his anti-Semitism.2 The chief designer of the National 
Socialist death machine was never in the mood for hiding his megalo-
mania: "So I believe today that I am acting in the spirit of the Almighty 
Creator," Hitler raved. "By struggling against the Jew I am fighting for 
the Lord's work. "3 When the Austrian moved across the northern bor-
der he joined the strident chorus of German anti-Semites. 
World War I and its aftermath influenced the political drift toward 
authoritarian regimes in Germany. When Hitler entered the political 
scene in Weimar Germany, he promised to restore the power of the 
military and garnered support among the warlords.4 When the ex-
corporal promised to "tear up" the Treaty of Versailles, he won over 
many nationalistic and conservative voters.5 When Hitler echoed the 
"Dolchstoss" legend he appealed to chauvinists and militarists who 
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peddled the fantasy that radical Social Democrats, pacifists, and Jews in 
Berlin had plunged a dagger into the back of the victorious army. 6 
The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) received 
financial support from German industrialists and bankers who were con-
vinced that Hitler could destroy the trade unions and the Communists. 7 
In the crucial election of July 31, 1932, the inhabitants of upper-class 
and upper-middle-class residential districts of large cities cast a dispro-
portionately high Nazi vote.8 Available statistics show that the social 
"elite" was overrepresented in the party leadership and membership.9 
The Nazi party, however, was not the movement of a single class. 
All strata of German society contributed to the growth of the Nazi vote 
and the buildup of the NSDAP. The National Socialist program offered 
something to some Germans in every segment of society-with the 
exception of the German Jews.10 
FREE CORPS ACTIVITIES AND VEHMIC TRIALS 
Apart from the wider connections between the Nazi phenomenon and 
the German past,11 there are two developments which directly influenced 
the course of events leading to the totalitarian corruption of the legal 
system. 
The first development began in World War I, when German Army 
commanders built up Storm Troops (Sturmbataillone). These highly 
trained "princes of the trenches" had a special mission. They were to 
tear apart the unity of the enemy's defenses and open the way for the 
regular infantry attack.12 According to G. S. Graber, the storm bat-
talions of World War I were the forerunners of the SS or Schutzstaffel 
(Protective Squad). They anticipated the Nazi SS as regards recruitment 
and the relationship between the men and their leader. The storm battal-
ions also left their imprint on the SS in other ways: in the creation of an 
elitist self-image and in the practice of a "blind savagery which was taken 
over from the heightened conditions of war into peacetime bourgeois 
life."13 
Unwilling to lay down their weapons after the war, many members of 
storm battalions enthusiastically supported the formation of the Free 
Corps (Freikorps). These paramilitary volunteer units brutally went to 
war against the German Communists and against the Poles, Latvians, 
and Russians on the country's eastern borders. Freikorps soldiers used 
the German salute (Heil!), the brown shirt, and the swastika.14 When 
the government disbanded the volunteer units in 1921, thousands of 
Freikorps fighters joined the SA and the SS.15 
The second development which is especially important for the cor-
ruption of the law began after World War I with a series of illegal Veh-
mic trials-imitations of secret medieval blood trials or Vehmegerichte.1 6 
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In 1920, ex-Freikorps leader Hermann Ehrhardt founded a secret society 
in Munich: Organisation Consul. This organization of right-wing con-
spirators held Vehmic trials of postwar political leaders and others who 
were condemned to death as traitors. 
On August 26, 1921, two members of Organisation Consul killed 
Matthias Erzberger, Catholic Center politician and chief signer of the 
armistice. Another famous victim of the Vehmic trials was the Jewish 
industrialist and German foreign minister Walther Rathenau; members of 
Organisation Consul murdered him on June 24, 1922.17 In 1922 and 
1923, Major Buchrucker's nationalistic Schwarze Reichswehr or Black 
Army conducted Vehmic trials of so-called traitors which resulted in 
numerous brutal murders.18 
Ehrhardt's and Buchrucker's roles were not limited to the sphere of 
Vehmic murder (Fememord). Both men were involved in attempts to 
overthrow governments which the German people had elected.19 
The German judicial system treated the right-wing extremists who had 
participated in Vehmic murders and political insurrections with great 
leniency. The legal liquidations of political insurrections such as the 
Kapp, Kiistrin, and Hitler putsch created a pattern that became typical for 
the treatment of right-wing offenders: law breakers were allowed to flee 
the country or go into hiding; highly placed offenders were never 
brought before a court; cases against defendants were dropped; convicted 
criminals received light sentences; prisoners only served a fraction of 
their time.20 After the Beer Hall putsch, Hitler was sentenced to serve 
five years at Festung Landsberg; he was paroled after a few months. In 
the preface to Mein Kampf, he described his comfortable stay at Lands-
berg prison as a chance to relax and start work on his autobiography.21 
While the courts treated right-wing extremists very leniently, they 
handed out severe--often unjustified-sentences to left-wing Ger-
mans. 22 The operation of this double standard revealed the fatal flaw of 
the entire judicial system: tacit approval of Fascist and anti-Semitic 
terrorism. Over the years most jurists proved to be disloyal to the 
Weimar Republic. 23 The same lack of loyalty characterized the behavior 
of many civil servants, administrators, and military officers who had 
sworn to uphold the republic.24 
BATTLE LAW AND SECRET POLICE TERROR 
The National Socialists knew that they could count on the cooperation 
of most established jurists and civil servants when they set out to create 
law in their own image. The totalitarian corruption of the German legal 
system began as soon as the NSDAP came to power on Januar; 30, 
1933. The Vehmic courts provided a murky background as Nazi jurists 
began to demolish the existing legal system. The National Socialists 
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called their new law Kampfrecht, or battle law. 
"Heil, Comrade jurists!" wrote Hans Frank, the Fuhrer of the 
German Law Front (Deutsche Rechtsfront), ushering in the year of the 
bloody Rohm Purge, "you are gathering around the flag of Adolf 
Hitler ... you have committed your entire being ... to the battle 
against the enemies of our State and Community. "25 
In 1935, Frank told a meeting (Gautagung) of the National Socialist 
Jurists League: "There is only one source of law ... the sovereign 
National Socialist people, and there is only one center of will for Reich 
and people and the Movement, and that is the Fuhrer. "26 
In this roundabout way German jurists were ordered to accept blindly 
the will of Hitler as the only legitimizing principle. Now one man's 
pathological hatred and thirst for revenge came to determine what was 
considered justice in Germany. The National Socialists transformed the 
German legal profession into an army of soldiers taking its orders from 
Hitler, the supreme commander. On January 30, 1934, Roland Preisler 
wrote: "So we also have our task. We, the soldiers of law .... We 
must create a law, a German, a National Socialist law ... Therefore 
criminal law must be combat law .... like the weapon's tip which in 
battle is pointed at the enemy ... it must view the lawbreaking will of 
the ... antisocial and antinational ... individual as the object of 
... destruction. "27 
Nazi battle law changed all parts of Germany's legal system; the 
transformation was most lethal in the area of criminal law. The National 
Socialists invented a plethora of nebulous new crimes such as "insulting 
the people," "affront to the folk tradition," "economic treason," and 
"assaults upon the racial continuance of the German people."28 The 
National Socialists also escalated the severity of punishment--death 
penalties became as common as fines for littering. 
With unprecedented ruthlessness and brutality, the dictator and his 
henchmen used all the levers of power to transform Germany into the 
monstrous thing Hitler liked to call the "total state." Battle law served 
the purposes of the new rulers well-but they wanted more. Therefore 
the Nazis accepted SS-Gruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich's idea to insti-
tutionalize protective custody (Schutzhaft): a dreadful penal twilight 
zone supervised by the SS Main Security Office (Sicherheits-Hauptamt). 
Now official pseudo-law was linked with the naked terror of secret 
police activity. Graber has described the sequence of events. Under the 
guise of Schutzhaft any local Gestapo official could suddenly arrest 
anybody he viewed as an "enemy of the state." The victims of protective 
custody were never brought to trial: without ever finding out what 
crimes they were charged with they languished in police prisons until 
they were herded into cattle cars and transported to concentration 
camps.29 
Among the first victims of protective custody were the leaders and 
Corruption of the German Legal System 189 
members of Germany's workers' mass movements and so-called paci-
fists. On March 9, 1933, the Nazi Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm 
Frick, proclaimed gleefully that Communists and Social Democrats were 
being sent to concentration camps.30 On March 20, 1933, Reichsfuhrer-
SS Heinrich Himmler announced the opening of Dachau concentration 
camp during a news conference in Munich. 31 
The destruction of the workers' movement entailed the arrest, torture, 
and murder of proletarian leaders and activist workers, the theft of all 
properties and funds belonging to trade unions, workers' organizations, 
the German Communist Party (KPD), and the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), and the prohibition of all working-class activities. On March 31, 
1933, the National Socialist government decreed that "crimes against 
public safety" were punishable with death by hanging. The last blow fell 
on June 22, 1933, when the Nazis used Article 48 of the Weimar Con-
stitution to outlaw the SPD. With the "voluntary" dissolution of the 
Catholic Center Party on July 5, 1933, all political parties-with the 
exception of the NSDAP-ceased to exist.32 
The Nazi leaders used battle law and secret police terror to destroy 
their opponents, to cow the people, and to accelerate the establishment of 
a totalitarian social system. Nazi totalitarianism was a reign of terror 
benefiting only a few: Hitler, the National Socialist leadership, high-
ranking military officers, large landowners, the big capitalists, and the 
top civil servants.33 The rest of humanity paid an exorbitant price for the 
twelve-year rule of the Nazi mass murderers. When World War II 
ended, 50 million people had been killed, 30 million were crippled, and 
half of Europe lay in ruins. 34 
THE ASSAULT ON GERMAN JEWRY 
When the destruction of the workers' movement and the demolition of 
the democratic political structure were in their final phase, the Nazis in-
tensified their official assault on the German Jews. On March 28, 1933, 
the leadership of the NSDAP organized the nationwide Judenboykott, 
centered around the long-standing Nazi slogans "Don't buy from the 
Jews" and "The Jews are our misfortune." The boycott took place on 
April 11, 1933. This anti-Jewish action unleashed members of the SA 
and SS who terrorized Jewish retail merchants, physicians, professors, 
lawyers, and their clients. Uniformed Nazis also prevented Jews from 
entering universities, libraries, and law courts.35 During the boycott 
many Jewish merchants and professionals were taken into "protective 
custody" and sent to concentration camps.36 
The continued oppression and persecution of the German Jews deep-
ened the corruption of the legal system. During the period 1933-1939, 
the National Socialists created a huge body of anti-Jewish law-their 
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Judengesetzgebung, which they published in its entirety in 1939.37 As 
Joseph Walk and his co-workers have shown in their recent collection of 
anti-Jewish laws, decrees, ordinances, secret orders, etc., the legal 
transformations took place during the entire Nazi period, continuing until 
the last year of World War II.38 The fate of the roughly 565,000 
German Jews39--eventually shared by the other victims of the Holo-
caust throughout Nazi-ruled and Nazi-occupied Europe-indicates that 
modern large-scale genocide must be prepared for. And among the 
prerequisites of genocide, the corruption of the law occupies a prominent 
place. 
THE FIRST PHASE OF ANTI-JEWISH LEGISLATION 
The first phase of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation began on January 
30, 1933, with the National Socialist seizure of power, and ended on 
September 15, 1935, with the enactment of the "Nuremberg Laws."40 
The anti-Jewish measures belong to a body of laws made possible by 
actions of the Reichstag which met for one day on March 23, 1933. The 
Nazi-dominated legislative body suspended all constitutional provisions 
protecting the political and civil equality of all German citizens. On the 
same day, the Reichstag transferred its legislative powers to the cabinet, 
thereby giving the Hitler government unquestioned authority to issue any 
kind of dictatorial edict. The enabling law (Ermiichtigungsgesetz), 
which empowered the government to enact laws deviating from the con-
stitution, provided the legal smoke screen for this drift into totalitarian-
ism. By a vote of 441 the Reichstag adopted the law-a creation of the 
NSDAP and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. Only the Social Demo-
crats cast their 94 votes against the enabling law. The KPD had already 
been forced to leave theReichstag on March 8, 1933.41 
The drift into extraconstitutionality which began in the final phase of 
the Weimar Republic had been speeded up by the Reich President's 
Emergency Decree on the Protection of People and State of February 28, 
1933. The provisions of Paul von Hindenburg's decree included the 
revocation of the citizens' basic constitutional rights. 42 With the subse-
quent enabling law of March 24, 1933, the extraconstitutional power 
passed into the hands of Hitler.43 
During the first phase of the anti-Jewish drive, German government 
authorities enacted numerous laws and issued many decrees, regulations, 
ordinances, directions, and explanations. In keeping with the Party 
Program of the NSDAp44 this "legal" onslaught was designed to pub-
licly humiliate Jews, baptized Jews, non-Jews of Jewish descent, non-
Jewish spouses of Jews, and persons of "doubtful Aryan descent."45 
The term "Aryan" formerly designated groups oflanguages. The Nazis 
arbitrarily used the term in their crackpot racial theory claiming that "non-
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Aryans" were inferior to "Aryans." Nazi agitation and legislation was 
programmed to brand all "non-Aryans" as pariahs. 
The National Socialists combined the public humiliation of the Jews 
with their campaign of discrimination and persecution. On April 7, 
1933, shortly after the boycott of Jewish business, Reich Chancellor 
Hitler, Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, and Reich Minister 
of Finances Count Schwerin von Krosigk promulgated the Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. Paragraph three of the 
law, the so-called Aryan paragraph, began with the statement, "Civil ser-
vants who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired; honorary officials 
are to be dismissed from office. "46 Many Germans of Jewish descent 
were deprived of their jobs by a stroke of the dictator's pen. 
On April 11, 1933, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of 
Finances promulgated the First Decree to the Law for the Restoration of 
the Professional Civil Service. The second paragraph of this decree ex-
tended the expulsion to civil servants with only one Jewish grandparent. 
The decree also appointed an "expert on racial research" (Sachver-
standiger fur Rasseforschung) in the Ministry of the Interior to whom 
persons of "doubtful Aryan descent" had to apply for an opinion. Para-
graph one of the decree ordered the dismissal of all civil servants with 
Communist affiliations of any kind-an afterthought in view of the 
earlier mass arrests of German Communists and Socialists.47 
The Second Decree to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional 
Civil Service of May 4, 1933, annulled all service contracts of "non-
Aryan" clerks and workers in civil service organizations such as health 
insurance and social work. 48 
On May 6, 1933, the Third Decree to the Law caused the dismissal of 
"non-Aryan" judges, notaries, public school teachers, and salaried and 
unsalaried university teachers.49 
The National Socialists deployed the "Aryan paragraph" as a major 
"legal" weapon in their offensive against the economic underpinnings of 
the Jewish community: a tidal wave of discriminatory legislation fol-
lowed the attack on Jewish civil servants. 
When the Nazis enacted the Law on Patent Lawyers on September 
28, 1933, they completed a series of laws which excluded Jews from all 
forms of legal practice and all positions in the judiciary.so 
The beneficiaries of this campaign quickly responded with a public 
display of their servile obedience to the Nazi rulers. On October 1, 
1933, the judges of the Reich donned their blood-red robes and assem-
bled in front of the law court in Leipzig. There the judges and other 
jurists swore an oath of loyalty to Nazi battle law.51 
The arbitrary and inhuman expulsions of Jews from the civil service, 
education, and law were coordinated with other ousters to bring about 
the blighting effect upon Jewry which the Nazis had been planning from 
the start. 
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Other laws which the Nazis enacted to surround their illegitimate cam-
paign of Jewish annihilation with the mantle of legality removed and ex-
cluded Jews from tax assessment and tax consultancy. The anti-Semitic 
legislation destroyed the likelihood of Jewish physicians, dentists, and 
dental technicians working with social health plans which covered almost 
the entire population. Other laws removed and excluded Jews from 
journalism, literature, the film industry, the theatre, broadcasting, music, 
the plastic arts, the ownership of hereditary rural homesteads, public 
orders and contracts, the stock exchange, the produce exchange, and 
executive positions in trade unions.S2 
On July 14, 1933, the cabinet passed the Law Regarding the Seizure 
of Anti-folkish and Subversive Assets, which was aimed at Marxist or-
ganizations. However, the Nazis also used this law to steal Jewish 
property; later they promulgated specific anti-Semitic laws designed to 
rob Jews of their possessions.S3 
The Nazis used boycotts, forced sales, and terror to oust Jews from 
commerce and trade. The Law Concerning the Ordering of National 
Labor of January 20, 1934, intensified the process of excluding Jews 
from executive positions in the German economy.54 
During the Party Day rally of September 1935 (Parteitag der Freiheit), 
Hitler ordered officials of the Ministry of the Interior to Nuremberg, 
where they had to draft legislation which became known as the 
"Nuremberg laws." On September 15, 1935, the Nuremberg law on 
citizenship (Reichsburgergesetz) officially transformed Jews into 
second-class citizens. Unlike "Aryans," Jews were not allowed to attain 
the new status of "citizen of the Reich" (Reichsburger) and consequently 
lost all political rights.SS The blood protection law (Blutschutzgesetz) of 
September 15, 1935, prohibited marriages and extramarital relations 
between Jews and "citizens of German or kindred blood." Jews were 
not allowed to employ "Aryan" females below the age of forty-five in 
their households, and they could not display the German flags.56 
THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE 
The second phase of anti-Jewish legislation began on September 15, 
1935, with the Nuremberg laws and ended on November 9, 1938, with 
the start of the officially prompted pogrom which the Nazis dubbed the 
night of crystal (Kristallnacht). 
During this period the Nazis intensified the anti-Jewish drive by using 
the weapon of prohibition of profession (Berufsverbot). The ousters 
devastated additional occupational groups such as construction en-
gineers, cattle dealers, auctioneers, arms dealers, realtors, nurses, etc.S7 
The Nazis continued to expropriate Jewish companies and enacted 
oppressive measures which excluded Jews from doctoral examinations; 
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imprisoned Jewish violators of racial laws and returning emigrants in 
concentration camps; prohibited changes of Jewish names; enforced the 
registration of Jewish businesses, assets, and persons; and ordered Jews 
to carry special identity cards and to use the middle names Sarah or 
Israel. 
After the annexation of Austria, the Nazis disenfranchised the Aus-
trian Jews on March 16, 1938. On October 5, 1938, the German gov-
ernment seized all Jewish passports. The Minister of the Interior also 
limited the issuance of new passports, which had to be marked with the 
letter J. On October 26, 1938, Himmler ordered the deportation of all 
Polish Jews. Two days later the Gestapo arrested these Jews and 
transported them to the border, where SS officials brutally forced them 
into an unhospitable Poland.58 
The third phase of anti-Jewish legislation extends from the pogrom 
night of November 9-10, 1938, to the start of World War II on Sep-
tember l, 1939. During the November pogrom Hitler unleashed hordes 
of sadistic SA and SS hooligans who murdered Jews, burned down their 
synagogues, demolished their stores and apartments, and carried out 
mass arrests. 59 
A wave of legislation followed the pogrom which accelerated the 
isolation and impoverishment of the Jews. On November 11, 1938, 
Jews had to surrender all weapons in their possession to the police. On 
November 12, 1938, Hermann Goring signed three decrees in his 
capacity as plenipotentiary for the (economic) Four-Year Plan. The first 
decree and subsequent legislation levied a punitive payment in the 
amount of 1 billion marks upon all Jews. The second decree excluded 
Jews from cooperatives and forbade them to engage in business, artisan-
ry, or management. The third decree forced Jews to pay for the enor-
mous damages which Nazi hoodlums had inflicted upon Jewish property 
during the November pogrom and to surrender all insurance claims to the 
Third Reich. 60 
The discriminatory legislation of the third phase sharpened the isola-
tion and confinement of the Jews. On November 12, 1938, the presi-
dent of the Reich Chamber of Culture, Joseph Goebbels, issued an order 
barring Jews from theatres, movie houses, concerts, exhibitions, etc. 
Subsequent legislation forbade Jewish children to attend public schools, 
subjected Jews to curfews, limited their freedom of movement, invali-
dated their driver's licenses and automobile registrations, expelled them 
from non-Jewish apartments and houses, and forced them to move into 
buildings occupied solely by Jews.61 On July 4, 1939, the Minister of 
the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, established the SS-controlled Reich Asso-
ciation of Jews in Germany and decreed that all Jews inside Nazi terri-
tory had to belong to the association. 62 
The fourth phase of anti-Jewish legislation and activity extends from 
the start of World War II to the destruction of the Jews in Nazi-domi-
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nated Europe and covers the period September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945. 
The legislation of this phase aimed at the complete impoverishment 
and isolation of the Jews and their physical destruction. On September 
12, 1939, Heydrich issued an edict which limited the access of Jews to 
food stores and subjected their apartments to police searches. 63 Other 
measures forbade Jews to do the following: leave their apartments after 
eight in the evening; own radios; buy clothes; have telephones; use 
public transportation without restrictions; move without permission; 
write checks; own typewriters, bicycles, cameras, binoculars, etc.; use 
public telephones; keep pets; subscribe to newspapers and magazines; 
receive an education; purchase meat, meat products, eggs, milk, and 
books; send letters abroad. 64 These measures and others of similar 
nature dissolved the everyday world of Jews. 
Behind this nightmarish scene smoldered the Polish horizon; there the 
SS was herding Jews into city ghettos. By December 1939, Poles and 
Jews were pouring into Nazi-dominated Poland, where the SS was car-
rying out executions of hundreds of thousands. 65 
On March 4, 1941, the Nazis subjected German Jews to forced labor; 
on September l, 1941, they ordered them to wear a yellow Star of 
David; on October 23, 1941, they forbade them to emigrate; on Novem-
ber 4, 1941, the transportation (Abschiebung) of Jews to Nazi-occupied 
Eastern Europe went into high gear and the Minister of Finances, 
Schwerin von Krosigk, organized the seizure of the deportees' assets.66 
On July 31, 1941, Goring, as head of the Four-Year Plan, charged 
the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD), SS-Grup-
penfuhrer Heydrich, with the preparation of the Final Solution of the so-
called Jewish question.67 On January 20, 1942, Heydrich summoned 
top officials of all ministries and offices involved in anti-Jewish activities 
to a villa in Wannsee, a swank Berlin suburb. Under SS direction the 
assembled civil servants developed a plan for the Final Solution. 
Authorized by Hitler and supported by the Nazi leadership, the Wannsee 
planners developed a detailed schedule for the destruction of Europe's 11 
million Jews. 68 
After the Wannsee Conference Nazi legislation and policy operated in 
support of genocide. The consequences were horrendous and bestial: 
Jews became the slave workers of German corporations, which profited 
enormously from their misery; Jews were systematically worked to death 
by the SS; Jews were murdered in the torture chambers and gas cham-
bers of the concentration camps. 
The Nazi program of large-scale genocide, resulting in the death of 6 
million Jews and millions of Poles, Russians, and other non-Jews, 
conjured up a final wave of legislation. On April 25, 1943, the Minister 
of the Interior cynically decreed that Jews and Gypsies-who were 
continually being destroyed in Nazi death factories-could not become 
German citizens.69 On June 9 and 10, 1943, the Nazis dissolved the 
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Reich Association of Jews in Germany and seized the assets of the 
organization.70 On July 1, 1943, Jews officially lost all legal protection 
and were subjected to the power of the police and Gestapo. In the event 
of death, Jewish assets were seized by the Reich.71 
And so the Nazi death machine rattled on. The horrifying operation 
of the machine of mass extermination was supervised by brutal SS 
hordes and accompanied by the dry pronouncements of miserable 
bureaucrats. These debased representatives of a perverted legal and ad-
ministrative system continued their lethal labor to the last moments of the 
Hitler regime-down to that Runderlass of the Minister for Economics, 
Walther Funk. The minister's circular of February 16, 1945, ordered 
the destruction of all files containing references to anti-Jewish activities 
in order to prevent the capture of these documents. 72 
The Nazi technicians of hell tried to shroud the scenes of mechanized 
mass murder with an impenetrable veil of secrecy. Against concealment, 
ignorance, and indifference a united humanity must set the watchword of 
the Italian anti-Fascists: Non dimenticare! Don't forget! 
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THE ULTIMATE REPRESSION: 
THE GENOCIDE OF THE 
ARMENIANS, 1915-1917 
Gerard J. Libaridian 
INTRODUCTION 
Exterminations of families, tribes, and ethnic or religious groups have 
been known to occur since the dawn of history. The particular heinous-
ness of mass death, however, has brought the gradual recognition of 
such acts as crimes against humanity. Planned and systematic genocides 
have even acquired a wider scope, while technology has increased their 
efficiency. Given the technological advances in military and biological 
hardware, the degrees to which many groups depend on governmental 
policies for their survival, the abrupt changes which traditional societies 
undergo when facing the challenge of modernization, and the increase in 
tensions between nations due to the diminishing resources available for 
distribution, one can expect governments to have recourse to radical 
solutions such as genocide to solve real or imaginary problems. Geno-
cide thus may become merely another manifestation of what differen-
tiates a state from other institutions: its monopoly of the right to kill 
enemies of society and to ask its citizens to kill enemies of the state or to 
be killed doing it. 
A corollary to the above hypothesis is that certain groups that seek 
change in a system, particularly a traditional one, are more likely to be 
victims of genocide. This is especially true when the ideology of the 
state characterizes a potential victim as both an enemy of society (of the 
internal order) and of the state.1 
The genocide of the Armenian people during World War I is the 
earliest case of a documented modern day extermination of a nation. 
Planned and carried out by the Ittihadist (Ittihad ve Terakke Jemiyeti, or 
the Committee of Union and Progress) government of the Ottoman 
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Empire, this first genocide of the twentieth century may also be a para-
digm for a type of "political" genocide likely to become the pattern of 
twentieth-century genocides. 
The purpose here is to suggest the possibility that twentieth-century 
genocides may have become radical means used by governments to 
resolve political problems. This chapter will briefly present the facts and 
impact of the Armenian genocide, discuss the generally accepted 
explanations of the holocaust as the final solution to a thorny national 
problem, introduce some newly discovered evidence on the relations 
between Armenian and Turkish leaders preceding the genocide, and sug-
gest that the Ittihadist government perceived Armenians not only as an 
unwelcome ethnic group but also as a social group which threatened the 
traditional authoritarian order of Ottoman society. 
The events between 1915 and 1917, the worst years of the genocide, 
are quite clear and documented in gruesome detaiI.2 In early 1913, the 
Young Turk government was taken over by its militaristic and chauvin-
istic wing led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas.3 This triumvirate led 
the country into World War I on the side of Germany. Sometime in 
early 1915 that same government developed and put into effect a plan for 
the extermination of its Armenian population, variously placed at be-
tween 2 and 3 million subjects. Most Armenians lived in the rural and 
small-town environment of historic Western Armenia, a part of the Otto-
man Empire since the sixteenth century.4 
The plan was carried out in phases. In April 1915, the religious, po-
litical, educational, and intellectual leadership of the Armenian people, 
close to 1,000 individuals, most educated in the Western tradition, were 
taken into custody throughout the Empire and killed within a few days. 
Then Armenian draftees of the Ottoman army, estimated at 200,000, 
were liquidated through mass burials, burnings, executions, and sheer 
exhaustion in labor battalions. Finally, the remainder of the population, 
now composed largely of elderly people, women, and children, was 
given orders for deportation in all parts of the Empire (except the capital 
and a few cities with European presences).5 While a few cities and dis-
tricts resisted the orders, most followed them, with the faint hope that 
they might be given a chance to come back. 6 
The fate of the deportees was usually death. Caravans of women and 
children, ostensibly being led to southern parts of the Empire, became 
death marches. Within six months of the deportations half of the de-
portees were killed, buried alive, or thrown into the sea or the rivers. 
Few reached relatively safe cities such as Aleppo. Most survivors ended 
up in the deserts of Northern Mesopotamia, where starvation, dehydra-
tion, and outright murder awaited them. Subsequent sweeps of cities en-
sured the elimination of the Armenian people from the western and 
largest portion of their historic homeland. 
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The extermination was accomplished under the supervision of a secre-
tive organization which functioned as part of the government, the 
Teshkilat-i Mahsusa or Special Organization, run by the highest govern-
ment officials, manned by convicts released from jail, and acting under 
the immediate supervision of select members of the Ittihad Party. 7 The 
release of the vilest, unbridled animal passions served well the govern-
ment's purpose of ensuring extermination in the most humiliating, de-
humanizing fashion. The torture of thousands of women and children 
became a source of satisfaction for hundreds who sought and found offi-
cial sanction from government officials as well as Muslim clergymen, 
since the murder of Armenians was characterized, like the war against 
the Entente, as a jihad or holy war. Human imagination labored to de-
vise new ways of mutilating, burning, and killing. The suicide of hun-
dreds of women and children attests to the particular brutality of the 
methods used. 
The carnage took place in full view of the military and diplomatic rep-
resentatives of governments allied with the Ottoman state, such as Ger-
many, and neutral ones, such as the United States (until 1917). In addi-
tion, Western missionaries, journalists, travellers, and even sympathetic 
officers of the Ottoman army described the death marches and atrocities 
in daily letters and accounts. Reports of the extermination and its 
methods forwarded to Washington, Berlin, and other capitals by eye-
witnesses confirm the stories told by thousands of survivors in subse-
quent memoirs and oral history interviews. 8 
The methods used to bring about the extermination of the Armenians 
are very significant, since they attest to the participation of an important 
segment of the general population. The acquiescence of Turkish, Kurd-
ish, and, to a limited extent, Arab civilians was made easier by the 
promise of loot, of appropriation of children and women, and of an 
afterlife in heaven. A governmental decree making it illegal to assist 
refugees or orphans might ultimately have been responsible, however, 
for the absence of wholesale assistance from Turks to their former neigh-
bors and friends. The penalty for such assistance was death by hanging 
in front of one's own house and the burning of that house.9 This did not 
stop some, nonetheless, from resisting orders. A number of Turkish 
governors and sub-governors were removed from office for their unwill-
ingness to follow orders. Many Turks and Kurds, especially in the 
Dersim region, risked their lives to save straggling Armenians, and 
Arabs throughout the Empire's southern provinces accepted and helped 
the survivors. 10 
It is not clear whether it was the absence of technologically viable 
means to exterminate swiftly or the desire to keep the appearance of "de-
portations" that led the government to achieve extermination through 
such methods. The Ottoman government had a record of massacres, 
some against Armenians. Of these, the 1894-1896 and 1909 are the best 
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known.11 But this was the first time such a wholesale operation was 
conducted, ending in the uprooting of a whole nation. 
The impact of the genocide was devastating. Of the 2 to 3 million 
Western Armenians, 1.5 million perished during the holocaust. Up to 
150,000 of those who had accepted Islam or had been kept, stolen, or 
protected by Turks and Kurds survived in Western Armenia without, 
however, any possibility of preserving a sense of religious or national 
identity. Close to 400,000 survived by fleeing to Russian Armenia and 
the Caucasus (where many more died as a consequence of disease and 
starvation) or Iran; perhaps 400,000 survived by reaching the southern 
or Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.12 
In addition to the death of some 50 to 70 percent of Armenians living 
under Ottoman Turkish rule, Armenians lost the right to live as a com-
munity in the lands of their ancestors; they lost their personal property 
and belongings. They left behind the schools, churches, community 
centers, ancient fortresses, and medieval cathedrals, witnesses to a long 
history. Survivors were forced to begin a new life truncated, deprived 
of a link with their past, subject to upheavals in the new lands where 
they suddenly found themselves as foreigners. The remnants of the 
largely peasant and rural population were now a wretched group of 
squatters on the outskirts of cities poorly equipped to handle an increase 
in population. 
The genocide constituted a radical break with the past for Western 
Armenians. The normal transmission of ethical and cultural values was 
cut off. The traditional ways of explaining tragedies could not accom-
modate the final solution. Orphans grew to remember and tell the stories 
of childhood years; they did not know what to think of their Turkish 
neighbors and found it difficult to imagine that they had once lived 
together in relative peace. 
ENEMIES BY DEFINITION 
The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide-the Jews, the 
Gypsies, the Armenians-were murdered in order to fulfill the state's design 
for a new order .... War was used in both cases (an opportunity antici-
pated and planned for by Germany but simply seized by Turkey after World 
War I began) to transform the nation to correspond to the ruling elite's for-
mula by eliminating groups conceived of as alien, enemies by definition.13 
So argues Helen Fein in Accounting for Genocide. This provides a 
basic and adequate explanation for the dynamics of the Armenian geno-
cide. Whatever political, sociological, and other explanations one may 
end up accepting as part of the causal process, only such an encom-
passing, exclusive characteristic of the human mind can account for the 
radical nature of the "solution," for the act of genocide. It is when man 
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plays God and wants to recreate the world in his own image-however 
perverted man or the image--that the other can be reduced to a nuisance, 
to an enemy that by definition must be destroyed regardless of his or her 
actions and policies. 
Explanations of the Armenian genocide have generally agreed with 
Fein's conclusion. The "formula" which historians have ascribed to the 
Ittihadist elite may vary; some stress a Pan-Islamist vision at work, 
others a Pan-Turanian one. Most have focused on the rise of an exclu-
sive Turkish nationalism underlying or in the service of Pan-Turanian 
and/or Pan-Islamic dreams.14 This nationalism was tied to Anatolia, the 
"birthplace" of Turkism, a last bastion after the loss of European Turkey. 
In some cases, as if to moderate the burden of the crime, some have 
argued that the genocide was the violent manifestation of an otherwise 
predictable and historically natural clash of two nationalisms in conflict, 
Armenian against Turkish; this explanation allows for the equation of the 
motivations of the two groups, with a difference only in the means used 
by each to achieve their goal.15 
Evolving Turkish nationalism was, in fact, the major factor which 
determined the course of Ottoman history during the first two decades of 
this century. Whatever subjective satisfaction Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Turanian dreams gave to its adherents, whether under Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II or the Young Turks who replaced him, these ideologies re-
mained vehicles by which energies outside Turkish nationalism could be 
harnessed to its service. The Young Turk-Ittihadist elite cared not under 
what ideology it continued its domination. Religion worked for a while, 
in some places. It was particularly potent in moving the ignorant 
masses, in ensuring the support of the mollahs (priests) and the softas 
(students of religion) for the Holy War. The idea of unification of Turk-
ish groups across Asia had some success as well; but Pan-Turanism too 
remained an abstraction for most of the people it was supposed to 
inspire. 
By the time the Ittihadist triumvirate decided to sign an alliance with 
Germany, its members had determined that whatever ideology emerged, 
and regardless of who won the war, drastic measures were needed if the 
Turkish elite were to continue to rule over the remains of the Empire. 
Long before the war, the Ittihadists were already pursuing a policy of 
Turkification which went beyond Pan-Islamism.16 Arabs and Albanians 
were to speak Turkish; it was not sufficient that they were largely 
Muslim. The problem with the Ittihadists was that they had not as yet 
given up on the idea of an empire, which required an ideology and a 
basis of legitimation wider than Turkish nationalism or dynastic 
allegiance. 
Conditions were ripe for genocide to occur during a period of transi-
tion from the concept of an empire based on dynastic allegiance to that of 
a nation-state. Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideologies were stages that 
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helped the Ottomans accept the break from a tradition of conquest. One 
of the vehicles for the building of Turkish nationalism was the identi-
fication of "enemies" of the yet to be born nation; a second vehicle was 
its resistance to the loss of territory and dignity to Western imperialism. 
The self-definition in relation to the Armenian enemy was convenient, 
since Armenians were neither Turks nor Muslims; and the long history 
of the Armenian Question as an integral part of the Eastern Question 
made identification with outside enemies, in this case France, Great 
Britain, and Russia, easy.17 
The Ottoman government had used wholesale massacres before 
against "enemies" of the state. Wartime conditions provided justification 
for extraordinary measures. Western governments, traditionally the only 
ones interested in and capable of intervention, were already at war, on 
the wrong side, as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned. Germany, 
the Ottoman Empire's major ally, was capable of making a difference but 
opted not to.18 Armenians, based on their history of past victimization, 
could easily be perceived as enemies of society or the state, given the 
paranoia of Ittihadist leaders.19 
It is possible to paraphrase Helen Fein, then, and reconstruct a Turk-
ish "design for a new order." This would be based, on the one hand, on 
the assertion of sovereignty vis-a-vis the West by reversing the series of 
losses of territories; on the other hand, this design would insist on the 
establishment of "order" within the country, an order which was 
threatened by elements for whom the symbols of Turkism, Islamism, or 
Turanism could not mean much and who were seeking an alternate 
framework for identification with the state. In addition, these elements, 
i.e., Armenians, could be charged with collusion with the traditional 
enemy, Russia. 20 
The basic explanation provided by Fein, however, does not preclude 
the further elaboration of the vision of the criminal state in its specific 
and more complex historical context. Many scholars have contributed to 
the understanding of genocide and to the identification of factors leading 
to genocide. Leo Kuper and Irving L. Horowitz have developed new 
perspectives on genocide as a political weapon in the twentieth century 
and argued for its study as a new category in social research. 2I Vahakn 
Dadrian, a sociologist pioneering in studies on the Armenian genocide, 
has concentrated on the victimization theory and has pointed out socio-
logical factors involved in the process of dehumanization leading to 
genocide resulting from the search for power.22 
The Kurdish historian Siyamend Othman, in his doctoral dissertation 
and a subsequent article, attempted to explain the reasons why Kurds 
played such a prominent role in the deportations· and massacres. His 
argument is that for Kurds within a feudal structure the tribe provided 
group identity and therefore allegiance was to the chief, who was ma-
nipulated by the Ottoman government. Othman also points out that the 
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common Kurd may have been harboring some resentment toward Arme-
nians, who tended to be the usurers and capitalists in the marketplace. 23 
In a recent paper Ronald Suny attempted an analysis of the socio-
logical makeup of both Turks and Armenians and suggested that the 
existence of an Armenian upper class in control of many critical sectors 
of the economy might in fact have accentuated antagonisms.24 
Of major importance is the analysis provided by Robert Melson. 
Melson has recently argued that one must go beyond victimization theo-
ries that generally point to victims of genocide as scapegoats or as pro-
vocateurs. He found instead that groups that have social mobility and 
adaptability to modernization, and thus tend to disturb the traditional 
orders, may tend to become victims in times of crisis. Melson has called 
for a somewhat more complex model within which the paranoia of the 
victimizer is as important in understanding-and foreseeing-genocide 
as the "success" of the victim.25 
These recent points of view can be seen as suggestive and important 
efforts that provide specificity to the case of the Armenian genocide and 
help shed light on the "formula" operative in the minds of the Turkish 
leaders that made possible the dehumanization and, eventually, the exter-
mination of Armenians. 
A Populist Agenda and the Alienation of the State 
To the extent that the Ittihad decision to exterminate Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire can be explained by the history of relations between the 
two, the period from 1908 to 1914 is obviously the most important. 
Armenian political parties, the revolutionary Hunchakians and 
Dashnaktsutiune, had opposed the Sultan's government until 1908, as 
had the various Turkish groups known as the Young Turks, of which 
the Ittihad ve Terakke was the most important. When the Young Turks 
took over the government in 1908 and restored the Constitution that had 
been promulgated in 1876 and prorogued in 1878, Armenian 
revolutionaries ended their armed struggle and pledged allegiance to the 
new regime and kept their pledge until the beginning of the genocide. 
Thus, the first point to be made regarding the pre-genocide period is 
that Armenian political parties functioned as legitimate Ottoman 
institutions, whose goals and bylaws were recognized by the Ottoman 
government. While they differed in their assessment of the chances for 
successful reforms under the Ittihad government, there was and there 
could have been nothing in their programs or actions which could have 
been considered illegitimate or detrimental to the Constitution. 
The second important fact with regard to these relations is that, along 
with a change in the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, the 1908 Consti-
tution also produced a change in the representation of the Armenians. To 
negotiate Armenian demands for reform the Ottoman Turkish govern-
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ment had to deal with Armenian leaders of the revolutionary and guerrilla 
movement The new spokesmen for the Armenians had won the right to 
represent Armenians by waging an armed struggle on behalf of economic 
and political rights; their religion had been Enlightenment. These new 
leaders supplanted the largely conservative clergymen of the Patriarchate 
who were bound by the dictates of the millet system which defined 
Armenians as a religious community and denied them an essentially 
political character. 
A third important characteristic of the pre-genocide Armeno-Turkish 
relations is that they evolved between 1908 and 1914. The major factor 
which determined this change was the gradual elimination of the liberal 
program which some Young Turks had advocated prior to and imme-
diately after the 1908 takeover. As a whole, the Young Turks had linked 
the imperative of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire with the 
need to introduce general reforms. This willingness to recognize the im-
portance of domestic social, economic, and political policies affecting the 
larger population had satisfied Armenians in their struggle to improve 
their situation, particularly the lot of the peasant and rural populations. 
Generally speaking, the Ittihad government discarded its liberal demo-
cratic ideals; it moved toward despotism and began relying, as its prede-
cessor had done, on the reactionary classes, repressive measures, and 
symbols to secure its position in power. 
Based on documents being studied for the first time, it is possible to 
argue that the critical period when the fundamental change occurred was 
between 1909 and 1911.26 By 1909, the excitement of the first days 
was over. Elections for the first Parliament were completed. The Ittihad 
Party had run on a platform with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(ARF) or Dashnaktsutiune, and won. Furthermore, following the mas-
sacre of Adana, the government promised to take concrete steps to 
introduce long promised reforms, consolidate the constitutional regime, 
and resolve domestic issues which caused hardship to Armenians. 
An agreement signed between the Ittihad and the Turkish Section of 
the Western Bureau (highest executive body) of the Dashnaktsutiune 
seemed a secure path toward the realization of reforms throughout the 
Empire. In 1911 the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune 
reached the conclusion that the party could no longer hope that the Ittihad 
would realize the reforms and consequently it could no longer remain in 
an alliance with the Ittihad. 27 
According to the agreement, the two parties were to develop a joint 
committee, above and beyond formal contacts and parliamentary negotia-
tions. This committee would be composed of high-level officials whose 
task it was to find ways to strengthen the Constitution, educate the public 
on political issues and against the reaction, educate the Turkish masses 
on anti-Armenian prejudices, and increase political rights for all. In 
addition to the main committee in Constantinople, regional and district 
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joint committees were also to be organized. The agreement was reached 
at a meeting between representatives of the Turkish Section of the ARP 
Bureau and the Central Committee of the Ittihad held in Salonika in 
August 1909, four months after the massacres of Adana. These negotia-
tions may have been the price paid by the Ittihad in return for the 
willingness of the Dashnak:tsutiune to ascribe the massacres to the reac-
tion, when in fact at least local Ittihad members were implicated. 
The institutionalization of contacts at all levels appeared a good way to 
avoid future misunderstandings, to decrease tensions, and to open the 
way to important reforms. However, from the beginning, the Dash-
naktsutiune had difficulties in ensuring the functioning of the committee. 
The first and most important committee, to be established in the capital, 
did not get its Turkish appointees until early 1910. In addition, the 
Ittihad avoided regular meetings from March to June 1910, and none of 
the important issues, foreign or domestic, was placed on the agenda by 
the Ittihad. 
The Dashnak:tsutiune had its own agenda, which constituted basically 
its minimum and practical program. The party demanded: 
1. The end of feudal structures, laws, and practices in Anatolia. 
2. A change in the government's policy of total indifference toward so-
cial and economic development and the concomitant crises affecting 
all segments of society; economic development was necessary to 
provide opportunities for the improvement in the standard of living. 
3. The solution of the most critical issue, the agrarian crisis, which 
resulted both from inherent inequities and the feudal system as well 
as from the conscious policies of officials to expel Annenians from 
their fanns, expropriate their lands, and give them to muhajirs or 
Muslim immigrants. The latter, often coming from the fonnerly 
Ottoman Balkan districts, were systematically directed into Anne-
nian districts for resettlement, which would then take place at the 
expense of Annenian fanners. 
4. The end of regressive, extralegal, and illegal taxes, which par-
ticularly affected Christians, but generally had a negative impact on 
all subjects. 
5. The end of insecurity of life, honor, and property, particularly for 
Annenians whose communal existence was threatened by continuing 
pillaging, lawlessness, and renewed overt aggression and discrimi-
nation.28 
These issues, and especially the agrarian crisis and the tax laws, were 
pointed to as threatening the economic foundation of the Armenian com-
munity. 29 
The Dashnak:tsutiune placed these and other, more specific, items on 
the agenda on many occasions. None of the issues, however, received 
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satisfactory solutions. A second trip was needed to Salonika to deter-
mine why there was no action. In March 1911 two party plenipoten-
tiaries went to meet again with the Ittihad Central Committee. The result 
was renewed promises for reform, once a new study was completed by 
two Ittihad leaders who were sent on a tour of the provinces. The Ittihad 
leaders seem to have agreed with the Dashnaktsutiune representatives 
that the problem was not between Armenians and Turks or Kurds but 
between the poor and the rich, and that Turkish and Kurdish peasants 
often suffered as much as Armenians. Despite the agreement in principle 
and the promise to seriously confront the problem, the tour by the two 
dignitaries produced no changes in government policies. Reporting from 
Van, a member of the Dashnaktsutiune's local Central Committee echoed 
the observation of many Armenians when he wrote: "[The two repre-
sentatives] are here now and, frankly, we cannot understand what they 
are doing. They have shied away from all contacts with the popular 
masses and the rural folk; they are constantly surrounded by the local 
notables and government officials. "30 
Following two years of intense efforts and accommodation to an Itti-
had agenda which seemed to be lacking focus, the Dashnaktsutiune came 
to the conclusion that it no longer could expect basic changes to come 
from the Ittihad. A Memorandum accompanying the Report to the Cong-
ress listed a number of reasons for the inability of the Ittihad to respond: 
1. Feudalism was still not such an abhorrence to the Ittihad; at any rate, 
its leaders did not wish to alienate the Kurdish chieftains and local 
landlords, whose support they ultimately considered more impor-
tant, and safer-since they demanded nothing in return-than that of 
the Annenians. 
2. The Ittihad allowed reactionary elements, such as great landowners 
and mollahs, to become members of the local Ittihad clubs, changing 
the liberal character of the organization; it was gradually taken over 
by those forces which constituted the backbone of the previous 
regime and which had opposed constitutional change and parlia-
mentary government 
3. The fear ascribed by Ittihad leaders to Kurds but in fact shared by 
some Turks that should Annenians have an equal chance in the sys-
tem they would overwhelm others by their numbers and achieve-
ments. 
4. The Ittihad did not wish to see the Dashnaktsutiune or any other 
Annenian party strengthened. 
5. The Dashnaktsutiune's unqualified support of the Ittihad allowed 
them to take that support for granted; the Ittihad did not need to 
return any favors for the support. 
6. The Ittihad did not wish to see an element in Asia Minor 
strengthened which might be favored by the Russians, particularly 
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when the more important friend, Germany, had other plans for Asia 
Minor. 
7. The disagreement between two Dashnaktsutiune members of the 
Ottoman Parliament on the best methods to develop the proposed 
railroad in Eastern Anatolia. 
8. Instability in the cabinet and its inability to make decisions. 
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In addition to the absence of reforms and the Ittihad's disregard for its 
own pledges, the authors of the Memorandum listed the following gov-
ernmental actions to support their conclusions: 
1. The Ittihad government had stopped prosecuting Kurdish chieftains 
accused of crimes against Armenians; one prominent criminal, 
Huseyin Pasha, had in fact been invited back into the country with a 
pardon. 
2. The Ittihad had favored the Bagdad railway line which, in the view 
of the Dashnaktsutiune, would only enrich foreign capitalists; the 
party had recommended instead the Anatolian railway, which would 
help the economic development of this poor region. 
3. No concrete steps were taken to return to Armenian peasants and 
farmers their lands, their principal means of livelihood. Such a dis-
tribution would hardly have affected the Kurdish or Turkish 
peasant, but it would have hurt the large landowners and muhajirs. 
The Dashnaktsutiune's proposal to achieve such a return through ad-
ministrative decisions was frustrated by the Ittihad's recommen-
dation that the regular courts be used for that purpose; pleas that the 
courts had not yet been reformed since the revolution and that 
peasants did not even have money to go to court or to bribe the 
corrupt officials were hardly heeded. 
4. Where joint committees had been formed, the CUP representatives 
had on occasion made unreasonable and suspicious demands, such 
as assimilation of the Dashnaktsutiune into the Ittihad ve Terakke or 
turning over the lists of party members to the Committee of Union 
and Progress.31 
The Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune determined that the 
party could no longer be in alliance with the Ittihad, and that it would 
continue its efforts as a party in friendly opposition in Parliament. 
Thus, during the period of intense relations following the revolution, 
when the two groups were able to know each other and act on this 
knowledge, Armenian leaders discussed security of life, land reform, 
economic development, and political equality, rather than autonomy or 
independence. Their disagreements and ultimate break were over bread 
and butter issues rather than over boundaries. Simon Zavarian, one of 
the founders of the party and a member of the Buro's Turkish Section, 
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argued in 1912 that of all the elements in the Ottoman Empire, 
Armenians had been the most supportive of the Constitution: 
This sympathy was not the consequence of [the Annenians'] high morals, 
[their] pro-Turkish inclination, or [their] political maturity. Rather, it is a 
question of geo-political realities and the current situation. Dispersed all over 
Asia Minor and mixed with Turks and other nationalities over the centuries, 
Annenians could not seek their future in a territorial autonomy, to lead an 
even more isolated political life. Annenians have tried to create [favorable] 
conditions for all Ottomans by supporting refonn for the Ottoman state, [and 
to change] for the better the status of Annenians and Annenia.32 
He observed, however, that Ottoman subjects had very little to show for 
the four years they had lived under a Constitution: "End of the internal 
identification cards, a few students to Europe, and some road projects . 
. . . But what do peasants and craftsmen have to show? ... One 
also cannot hope much from the new Parliament, since most new depu-
ties have titles such as beys, zades, pashas and mu/ties. "33 The aliena-
tion of the Armenians from the state was most dramatically illustrated in 
the final defense statement of the Hunchakian Paramaz in 1915, who 
after having been accused of plotting against the government, was 
hanged along with twenty other Hunchakian leaders. "I am not a sepa-
ratist," said Paramaz. "It is this state which is separating itself from me, 
unable to come to terms with the ideas which inspire me. "34 
It seems, then, that long before the beginning of World War I the 
Ittihad, as well as the Armenian parties, had concluded that the Young 
Turk revolution had failed. Jemal Pasha, one of the triumvirate, argued 
in his memoirs that the Ittihad failed to take root.35 In 1912 Zavarian 
had been more explicit in his explanation of the failure of the Ittihad: 
Instead of waging a struggle, of establishing a popular militia, of creating a 
democratic party, a party with [political] principles, [the Ittihadists] went the 
way of their predecessors: they chose "the easy path." They kissed and allied 
with all the dignitaries and created a "union" of coreligionists.36 
Armenian political parties wavered between clear signs that the liberal era 
had ended and the hope that they were mistaken. Meeting in Constanza 
in September 1913 for its Seventh World Conference, the Hunchakian 
Party had perceived the dangers inherent in Ittihad mentality. A new 
party policy was based, among other arguments, on 
the fact that the fundamental principles [of the lttihad] call for the preservation 
of a Turkish bureaucracy and that they do not allow for the emergence of a 
new state, and that it is the [lttihad's] obvious goal not only to assimilate but 
also to eliminate, and if need be, extenninate, constituent nationalities. 37 
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The Hunchakians concluded that Armenians should at least be ready for 
self-defense. Nonetheless, they, along with others, were determined to 
pursue the search for peaceful solutions. The Dashnaktsutiune continued 
to advocate reform, whatever the source. In 1914 the Dashnaktsutiune 
was still insisting on the need for reforms advocated in a June 1912 edi-
torial published in the party organ, Droshak. That editorial had listed six 
critical issues, in addition to land reform: 
1. Better administration throughout the Empire; 
2. Decrease in taxes on the poor and implementation of progressive 
taxation; 
3. Abolition of all feudal taxes; 
4. Balanced budget by decreasing the number of officials and building 
up an economic infrastructure; 
5. End to acts and policies which create fear of Turkification and 
Islamization of minorities; 
6. Safeguarding of freedoms.38 
After 1912, Armenians welcomed the renewed Western, and es-
pecially Russian, interest in pressuring the Ottoman government for re-
forms in the Armenian provinces of the Empire, reforms which would be 
realized under the supervision of European governors.39 This, how-
ever, did not change the fundamental relationship between the leader-
ships of the Ittihad government and Armenians and the political program 
each represented for the other. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
While the issues raised by Armenians were in the area of social and 
economic development and political equality, general interpretation of the 
genocide which followed this period remains mired in the limited and 
limiting perspective of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms. 
The nationalist perspective creates many obstacles to an understanding 
of the full and real picture of Armeno-Turkish relations and mutual per-
ceptions during the period preceding the genocide. It is true that the na-
ture of the crime and its inhumanity are such that it is difficult to imagine 
that the Armenians and Turks were able to have a relationship other than 
that of victim and victimizer; it seems that it was always in the nature of 
the relations of these two peoples to massacre and to be massacred; that it 
was in the spirit of the times for both peoples to develop traditions of 
modern nationalism; that these two nationalisms were bound to clash as 
they did; and that it was natural for the Turks to be the killers and for the 
Armenians to be the victims. Moreover, the current domination of the 
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theme of genocide in Armenian life, the bitterness and resentment in the 
absence of international recognition, and the increasing intensity of the 
Turkish denial of the genocide strengthen the misleading impression that 
all events preceding the genocide led to the genocide, and all events 
succeeding the genocide have been caused by it. 
Turkish historiography has had particular difficulties with the Young 
Turk period, which remains little studied. While critical of the Ittihad ve 
Terakki on many grounds, Turkish historians have followed the policy 
of recent Turkish governments in either denying the genocide or justi-
fying "deportations" during which "unfortunate" deaths occurred.40 
More so than is the case with Armenian writers, Turkish historians have 
denied Armenians any role in Ottoman politics except to assign them 
dreams of "independence," of which pre-genocide Armenians had to be 
disabused. Charges of separatism have become convenient vehicles to 
avoid discussion of the real problems then facing Ottoman society and 
the failure of the Young Turk government to solve them by means other 
than war and genocide. 
The absence of Armenian life in Western Armenia (now Eastern 
Turkey), the success of the genocide, and the depoliticized existence of a 
contemporary Armenian community denied its memory in Istanbul make 
it easier for some Turkish historians to characterize Armenians and their 
aspirations as they do the Balkan peoples: once happy Ottoman subjects 
who were carried away by romantic nationalism. Turkish historians treat 
Armenians as an important political factor only in the context of a sepa-
ratist threat that had to be dealt with.41 
In other words, students of the period have difficulty imagining that 
Armenians were an integral part of Ottoman society for many centuries. 
This integrality was based on more than the physical occupation of lands 
under Ottoman dominion. It involved parallel developments in folk cul-
tures, integration through a single economy, and mutual adjustments of 
social mores and values between Armenian and Turkish as well as Kurd-
ish societies.42 Thus Armenians constituted an integral part of the politi-
cal life of the Ottoman Empire, whether defined as a millet or as an ethnic 
group with parliamentary representation under the Young Turks.43 
Yet terms such as nationalism and independence have re-created a 
reality which places Armenians outside Ottoman history, just as the 
genocide placed Armenians outside Ottoman society; and analysis re-
volving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and reli-
gion tum history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting, 
abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act 
as prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminolo-
gy then comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that, 
ultimately, one need not account for real Armenians leading real lives 
whose disappearance from their homes and from history must be ac-
counted for; one is comforted by the thought that Armenians can be 
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reduced to a corollary of a concept. The politician dehumanizes a nation 
in order to get rid of it; the historian does so to explain it away. 
Genocide becomes its own explanation; ultimately, it becomes its own 
justification. 
The Young Turks, including the Ittihad ve Terakke, evolved in oppo-
sition to the despotic, reactionary, and corrupt rule of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II as well as in reaction to his ineptness in protecting the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire against separatist tendencies and West-
ern imperialistic encroachments. The latter were often justified in the 
name of persecuted minorities in the Empire. Therefore there evolved a 
linkage between domestic reforms, particularly those that might affect 
non-Muslims and non-Turks, and the defense of the territorial integrity 
of the Empire. 
While all Young Turks agreed that the Sultan must go and that the 
prorogued Constitution of 1876 must be reestablished, it was obvious 
from the start that not everyone agreed on the best possible solution to 
the problem of territorial disintegration. One group, led by Prince Saba-
heddine, promoted the idea of a multinational empire, with not only 
equal rights to the non-dominant groups, such as Armenians, but also a 
decentralized government which recognized a degree of regional autono-
my to these groups.44 Ahmed Riza, on the other hand, whose views 
became the more dominant after the revolution, believed in an Otto-
manism which minimized differences, in a centralized state which, while 
recognizing the equality of all under the law, would promote the evolu-
tion of a homogeneous, corporate body politic. According to one his-
torian: 
[Ahmed Riza] used the word "Ottoman" freely in connection with individual 
inhabitants of the Empire, Muslim and Christian, as did Sabaheddine, but in 
Riza's vocabulary the word did not connote so much an individual with 
supra-national citizenship as a person who, if he was not already a Turk, must 
be hammered into a reasonable likeness to one.45 
In 1908 the Young Turks took over the government and restored the 
1876 Constitution. An era of brotherhood and renovation was thought 
to have begun; there was popular support for the move, and all problems 
were expected to be resolved soon with a new parliament.46 Parlia-
mentary elections were held twice during this period, in 1909 and 1912. 
These parliaments included representatives of various religious and 
ethnic groups, including Armenians, although there seems to have been 
constant haggling over the number of deputies each group was allotted, 
the Turks always retaining a comfortable majority. 
But the Ittihad government, already weak in its commitment to 
democratization, was frustrated in its attempts to implement significant 
reforms. Between 1908 and 1914 the Ottoman Empire had to fight two 
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wars against Balkan states during which it lost the remainder of its 
European holdings; the Ottomans also lost Libya to Italy. Thus, their 
revolution had not guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Empire. The 
Young Turks were particularly irritated by France and England, the two 
bastions of liberalism and the principal external sources pressuring for 
internal reform, who stood by while more and more Ottoman lands were 
taken away. The Ittihad ve Terakke was also naive in its belief that a 
parliament in and by itself constituted reform and could change a society. 
Impatient about criticism and unwilling to undertake reforms which they 
thought would weaken the authority of the state, the Ittihad ve Terakke 
itself moved toward despotism, just as Abdul Hamid II had done over 
three decades earlier. The Ittihad leadership gradually eliminated not 
only opposition parties but also elements within the Ittihad who still 
linked the salvation of Ottoman society to domestic reforms and a 
vigorous constitutional life.47 The coup d'etat in 1913 led by Enver, 
Talaat, and Jemal Pashas came as the logical conclusion of the evolution 
of the Ittihad toward a dictatorship. The three continued to believe that 
they embodied all the wisdom necessary to lead the Empire toward 
salvation; and the salvation of the Empire was couched in terms of 
molding the character and thoughts of the citizens of the Empire in the 
image of some ideal Ottoman. 
From the promise of reform and equality and political rejuvenation 
springing from the dedication to the ideal of a state which provided 
equality under the law, the Ittihadids had moved to the position of a 
corporate state within which not only non-Turks would be designated 
"enemies" by definition, but also all liberals who insisted on a different 
vision than the one articulated by the Ittihad, however vague and shifting 
that may have been. Liberalism, which sought to reject the use of ethnic, 
religious, or national identity as the basis for legitimation of power, was 
seen as a weakness, as the lot of the forces of particularism and dissent, 
as a source of chaos and further disintegration, unworthy of the various 
visions of greatness that were motivating the Ittihad-the "true" 
successor of the once powerful sultans.48 
The Ittihad distaste for liberalism is critical for the understanding of 
their policies before and during the war. In the Ottoman Empire liber-
alism and ethnic issues had been intertwined since the nineteenth cen-
tury. Western pressures for reform always focused on the status of 
Christians. The Turkish and Kurdish masses in the Empire had been 
denied a systematic exposure to the need for reform from their own 
revolutionaries.49 They consequently viewed the Ottoman Constitution 
as a privilege only for Christians.SO Moreover, the Turkish people felt a 
false sense of power through identification with the ruling dynasty and 
ruling elite. Ramsaur, who tends to see all minorities as budding 
nationalists, nonetheless recognizes that 
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the Moslem minorities, such as those Albanians who professed Islam, were 
beginning to feel the sweep of nationalism as well, but they were somewhat 
weakened in their aspirations by the fact that they enjoyed better treatment 
than did the Christian minorities and because they had a religious bond with 
the dynasty that the latter did not possess.51 
Naturally, non-Turks found it easier to understand and appreciate re-
forms. Being more affected by the corrupt and decrepit taxation and 
legal systems than others, Armenians had long developed a tradition of 
political thought of their own in reaction to Ottoman misgovernment, 
Turkish superiority, and despotic rule. 
Nonetheless, these non-Turkish parties constitute as much a part of 
Ottoman history as those founded by Turks. The Armenian focus of 
their parties, for example, is a reflection of the religious/ethnic structure 
created by the Ottoman government, not a natural result of Armenian 
nationalism. 52 
By 1914 the idea of liberal reforms had been eliminated from the 
agenda of the Ittihad. By 1914 as well, Armenians were the only 
significant non-Muslim people left in the Empire, the only non-Turkish 
political element in Anatolia capable of measuring the actions of the 
government beyond the rhetoric of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism-a 
rhetoric which certainly could not inspire Armenians. Armenians were 
also the only segment of the electorate still supporting the parliamentary 
system and the Constitution. While the promise of Russian-sponsored 
reforms may have diminished the need to see political reform for the 
majority in the Armenian vilayets (administrative divisions) of the Em-
pire, Armenians in central Anatolia, Cilicia, and the western provinces 
had no other hope. 
A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
Armenian liberalism was the legacy of the revolutionary movement 
which developed following the failure of the signatories of the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878 to deliver on their promise of reforms for Ottoman 
Armenia. Armenians developed a liberation movement which, while 
having as an inspiration the Balkan movements, grew in reaction to 
Ottoman policies and Armenian realities and needs. Armenian groups 
were motivated much more by the socioeconomic disintegration of their 
society than by dreams of a renewed Armenian dynasty. 53 Even the 
Hunchakian Party, the first revolutionary party and the only one to 
advocate independence when founded in 1887, did so because it argued 
that since there were no positive results to be seen decades after the 
promise of internal reforms and almost a decade after the Congress of 
Berlin, Armenians could no longer hope to see reforms general enough 
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to bring a change in their status.54 The Dashnaktsutiune, founded in 
1890, which in 1892 advocated a degree of autonomy and the oppor-
tunity to create "political and economic freedom," made clear that their 
purpose was not the replacement of a Turkish sultan with an Armenian 
one.55 It was not surprising, therefore, that neither the Church nor the 
wealthy classes in Armenian society supported the revolutionaries; both 
remained very much part of the millet mentality fostered by the Ottoman 
government and, ultimately, were manipulated by it 
The liberation movement among Armenians, which turned into an 
armed struggle in the 1890s, acquired depth and an inter-ethnic scope in 
the 1900s. This included prodding Young and liberal Turkish groups 
into action against despotism and cooperation among the anti-sultan 
forces. One of the issues raised by the Armenian political parties during 
these early years was the need for Turkish liberalism to acquire a popular 
basis by addressing social and economic issues and by being ready to 
engage in an armed struggle to achieve the goal of a democratic and 
parliamentary regime. They also urged Turks to provide for a popular 
defense mechanism against any possible reaction following a revolution. 
In other words, the Young Turks were urged to make a revolution rather 
than a coup d'etat. These positions were articulated clearly over a decade 
of relations between Armenian revolutionaries and Turkish liberals in 
Europe and in the Ottoman Empire.56 The last time the Dashnaktsutiune 
had insisted on the need for an Ottoman revolution was in 1907, during 
the second congress of Ottoman opposition forces, which had been 
convened on its initiative. Armenians did not have much faith in revolu-
tions from above. 
Although in 1908 it was the Ottoman army and not the people that 
toppled the Sultan, the move was radical enough to invite the support of 
many segments of Ottoman society, and particularly Armenians for 
whom liberalism and reform had become political solutions as well as 
ideological tenets. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 produced impor-
tant changes in the Armenian political scene. The oldest of the political 
parties, the quasi-Marxist and revolutionary Hunchakians, met in 1909 
for their Sixth General Convention and decided to discard the party's 
demand for political independence for Armenia and voted to realize their 
ultimate goal, socialism, within the Ottoman context. Nonetheless, the 
Hunchakians registered their distrust of Ittihadist nationalism and ab-
sence of commitment to reforms.57 The Dashnaktsutiune put into place a 
mechanism for realizing the federal structure it had envisioned in its 
Fourth World Congress in 1907, in collaboration with the Young 
Turks.58 Finally, the Armenian bourgeoisie and well-to-do, who had 
never felt comfortable with the armed struggle and socialistic rhetoric of 
the two existing parties, created a third party, the Ramgavar-Sah-
manatragan or Democratic-Constitutional Party, which rejected violence 
and adopted capitalism as the proper form of economic development for 
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the Ottoman Empire and the appropriate way to solve Armenian socio-
economic problems.59 
All three parties worked within the bounds of the Constitution to 
achieve gains and to realize their goals. The coalition of the Dashnak-
tsutiune and the Ittihad produced parliamentary victories for both. The 
Hunchakians formed an alliance with the Ittilaf Party of Prince Saba-
heddine. More important, all three Armenian political parties shared a 
vision of the society which they wanted to see evolve in the Ottoman 
Empire. This vision was based primarily on the need to address the 
problems facing a disintegrating Armenian rural society and a frustrated 
middle class. Equality, reform, and progress were slogans which 
everyone used and no one found to be against the interests of the state in 
1908.60 They were inspired by what educated Armenians considered the 
universal values of the Enlightenment. Armenians believed in progress 
and in change at the expense of the traditional because, to paraphrase 
what has been said of German Jews, these attitudes facilitated emanci-
pation from the political and social disabilities that had oppressed them 
for centuries; the Enlightenment gave them optimism, faith in themselves 
and in humanity. It was this general belief that led the Armenians, but 
especially the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, not only to participate 
vigorously in the first Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 but also 
to play a role in the Persian Constitutional movement before World War 
I. This role was critical enough for one of the leaders of the Dash-
naktsutiune, Yeprem, who had led his guerrilla fighters into many 
battles, to end up with the responsibility for the security of Tehran until 
his death in 1912.61 
Among the Turks, enlightenment and progress were adopted by 
Prince Sabaheddine and the Liberal Party. However, they were small in 
number and lacked a popular base. Even the nascent Turkish bour-
geoisie supported the Ittihad policies of economic nationalism and placed 
their hopes on a strong central government which might find it easier to 
make room for the growth of Turkish capital, as opposed to the tradi-
tional Ottoman capital that had been accumulated in trade by Armenians, 
Greeks, and Jews. The masses were more easily swayed by the rhetoric 
of glory, whether of the imperial or religious variety. When faced with 
the Western challenge, the Turkish reformers, whose liberalism was "ill 
digested," were more likely to be impressed by the technological and 
military advances-advances which, when borrowed, could have re-
solved the Ottoman problem as seen by Turks: military weakness 
against European powers and humiliation at the hands of former sub-
jects. 62 Some also internalized Social Darwinism, which made it pos-
sible for them to rationalize their insistence on the primacy of Turks in 
the Empire, their internal imperialism. 63 
Even in 1908, therefore, there were two visions of society at work, 
both in opposition to the Sultan, both favoring the Constitution, both 
222 Gerard J. Libaridian 
based on the dual principles of internal reforms and territorial integrity of 
the Empire. It was the first time since the articulation of Armenian 
political demands that so much common ground existed and that there 
was an opportunity for the solution of both problems. Yet for those in 
the Ittihad who had believed in some degree of equality and justice, the 
promise of reforms may have been the price to be paid in return for 
territorial integrity, and possibly aggrandizement. With the continued 
loss of territories in the Balkans and the threatened loss of the Arab 
provinces, the Ittihad lost even its weak interest in limited reforms and 
sought its aggrandizement elsewhere. 
Armenian political parties, meanwhile, had been willing to make all 
the necessary adjustments to strengthen the Constitution: it was a wel-
come alternative to an otherwise difficult position. Armenians, particu-
larly the Hunchak:ians and Dashnaktsutiune, made serious compromises 
on the degree of socioeconomic reform needed in order to provide the 
best possible support to the liberal elements in Turkish politics. And 
while among the Young Turks they had always associated with Saba-
heddine, the Dashnaktsutiune agreed to run joint election campaigns with 
the Ittihad, which, as the party in power, the Dashnaktsutiune thought 
needed the largest dose of liberal presence. 
The Armenian parties made it clear, however, that their commitment 
to the Ottoman fatherland, their willingness to defend its territorial 
integrity and the search for Armenian reforms in the context of the 
empire-wide changes, were contingent upon one condition: the Ottoman 
Empire had to be a "democratic and parliamentary state." 64 This feeling 
was shared by the larger Armenian population as well. A letter to the 
editor of the Droshak stated it clearly: 
For citizens states are not goals. They are means to develop, to progress, to 
become strong. If a means to reach a goal is inappropriate, inadequate or 
weak, it becomes necessary to exchange it for a better and more appropriate 
form .... The issue is not separation or inclusion in the Ottoman state, 
since these are fundamentally related to the larger purpose---our welfare. We, 
Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Kurds and other citizens like to remain 
and live and even, yes, sacrifice and be sacrificed, in a state where our 
welfare is [considered]. We shall shed our blood only for the flag which 
knows how to keep our heads up. Flags which are miserable, shameful, 
often defeated, subject to derision and mockery do not deserve our blood.65 
The Hunchakians in 1913 reaffirmed their intention not to seek a separate 
homeland; but they also made it clear that they did not intend to accept a 
regime where any group dominated the others.66 In October 1913 all 
Armenian parties functioning in the Ottoman Empire signed a joint state-
ment which, in addition to promising an end to internal conflicts, also 
reasserted their dedication to the Ottoman Parliament and Constitution. 67 
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In other words, for Armenians allegiance was to basic forms of politi-
cal association or organization rather than to a dynasty, a nationalism, a 
religion, or a race. They were ready to support a political system which 
allowed for the equitable and just solution to ethnic and religious as well 
as social and economic problems. 68 This was a form of social contract 
which was reminiscent of what Sabaheddine had come to learn and re-
spect from contemporary readings. 69 With their concern for social, 
economic, and agrarian reforms and a democratic system of government, 
Armenians were thus part of the Ottoman political spectrum. But they 
occupied the left wing of the spectrum. 
Two other issues were problematic for the Ittihad government. First, 
Armenian parties had strong popular bases due both to their long 
struggle and sacrifices and to their populist platforms. Secondly, given 
the socialistic nature of their programs, they had also made serious 
efforts, beginning in 1900, but especially after 1908, to spread the liberal 
creed among Turks, and even Kurds in Anatolia. 70 While they had had 
very limited success, there always was a danger that Armenian revolu-
tionary parties with socialistic tendencies could create politically viable 
coalitions of peasants and rural craftsmen, supported by a liberal bour-
geoisie. 
WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE 
It was no accident that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and 
did so on the side of Germany. A crisis situation, martial law, and war 
conditions in general would change the rules of politics and the need for 
accountability for failures, while creating the possibility of territorial 
expansion. Siding with Germany was in character with an elite in power 
increasingly hostile toward any element which reminded them of their 
promises and failures. Fighting the war on the side of Germany could 
free the Ittihad from its commitment to reform just as the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877-1878 had freed Abdul Hamid II from the pledge he made in 
1876 to create a constitutional government.71 A war which was to be 
fought against France and England, the liberal states of Europe, allowed 
the linkage between external threats and internal reform to be articulated 
in the measures taken against Armenians, now seen as the main threat, 
the enemy of the Ittihad "vision"; the Turkish elite considered Armenians 
ideological allies of the French and British or as a population sympa-
thizing with the traditional enemy, Russia, which in 1912 had resumed 
its role as the sponsor of Armenian reforms. The war provided an 
opportunity for the Ittihad to create a coherent world: an opportunity to 
prove Turkish military prowess by fighting on the side of a strongly 
militaristic non-liberal empire such as Germany, and against the bastions 
of liberalism, France and England. 
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But the war also made it possible to eliminate the particularities and 
dissent in the political arena by eliminating Armenians, who could never 
be part of the new vision since they were not Turks or Muslims, and 
who, by their political consciousness, were bound to become a perma-
nent source of dissent and discontent, a particularity in a society which 
was expected to find solace in the Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic creeds or 
in Turkish nationalism rather than in the search for equality, justice, and 
a dignified human existence. Jemal Pasha, one of the Ittihad triumvirate 
and Minister of the Navy, conceded a fundamental relationship between 
the decision to enter the war, domestic policy, and the Armenian 
"problem": 
Of course, it was our hope to free ourselves through the World War from all 
conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence .... Just 
as it was our chief aim to annul the capitulations and the Lebanon Statute, so 
in the matter of Armenian reforms we desired to release ourselves from the 
agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us. 72 
Jemal certainly did not imply that reforms were not needed, since in 
these memoirs he confesses having promised Armenians reforms as 
soon as the war was over, if Armenians functioned as a fifth column in 
Russian Armenia against Russia.73 In a strange but intriguingly vague 
style, Jemal stated that "it was an active domestic and foreign policy" that 
drove the Ittihad to war. The most important domestic problem was the 
question of the minorities, Jemal asserted, and, among the minorities, 
the Armenians were the most critical. 74 Subsequent justifications of the 
deportations and massacres clarify the meaning of "active" policy. It 
seems to have been nothing less than the domestic equivalent of war on 
enemy states. 
The desire to proceed with state building unfettered by any external or 
internal accounting was, according to Jemal, one of the reasons for the 
Ittihad's decision to enter the war. Of course, as soon as the war started, 
the two European governors who had just arrived in the country to 
supervise reforms in Armenian provinces were sent back. But the war 
allowed the Ittihad to do more. The purpose of the deportations and 
massacres, wrote the German missionary and eyewitness Johannes 
Lepsius, "seems to be to drive the idea of reforms out of the Armenians' 
minds once and for all."75 Perhaps this will explain why the murder of 
the intellectuals took on such a gruesome character. It is said by 
eyewitnesses that on more than one occasion their skulls were crushed 
with stones and the brains were thrown to the ground with an invitation 
to the victim to dare to "think again." 
When the news of the deportations and massacres reached Europe, 
many Turks dissociated themselves from the policies of the Ittihad. 
Attempting to do so publicly, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, the son of the first 
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Grand Vizier of the constitutional regime in 1908, described the 
Armenians as industrious and peaceful people. Attempting to explain the 
carnage taking place in his homeland, Mehmet Sherif added that "the 
Armenians' agitation against despotisms in Turkey and Persia [is a 
quality] one suspects has not endeared them to the autocratic 'reformers' 
of the Young Turk regime. "76 
GENOCIDE: A RADICAL FORM OF POLITICAL 
REPRESSION? 
The relationship between genocide and domestic change is a theme 
which precedes the Young Turks in Ottoman history. Evaluating the 
meaning of the Constitution first introduced by Midhat Pasha under the 
young Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876, Harry Luke wrote that, "[Midhat 
Pasha] was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that 
only by drastic internal reform, self administered, could the rapidly 
dissolving Empire stave off the coup de grace which Russia was im-
patient to administer. "77 Soon after he felt secure, the Sultan exiled 
Midhat Pasha and replaced the Constitution with an administration 
repressive enough to invite a revolution from his most resilient subjects, 
the Turks. In the introduction to an unsigned study published in 1913, 
"Turkey: The Situation of Armenians in Turkey Introduced with Docu-
ments, 1908-1912," a commentator discussed the repression of the 
massacres of 1894-1896 in the following way: 
The top officials of the old regime were convinced that repression is essential 
to despotism and refonns are deadly weapons. Seeing the determination of 
Armenians to obtain reforms and to make their Turkish compatriots 
companions in their aspirations, they preferred to massacre the Armenians as 
the ones responsible for the situation, instead of undertaking general refonns 
which could have brought the end of despotism and their rule. 8 
Given this strong sense of the relationship between repression and 
wholesale massacre felt by Armenian leaders and nurtured by events, it 
is not surprising that both major parties as well as conservative leaders 
could see by 1913 that the Young Turks might be moving in the same 
direction as the Sultan. "Turkey is promising reforms for European 
consumption," argued a Droshak editorial in June 1913, "but is actually 
aiming at the destruction of the Armenian element in Anatolia." Only the 
method would be different from the Hamidian massacres, argued the 
editorialist. 79 The Hunchakians thought that the scope would be 
different too. so 
They were both correct, although it seems that none wanted to believe 
that the worst actually could happen. The parties did caution the Arme-
nians not to give any reason for provocations. During the initial stages 
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of the roundups of leaders, the drafting of young men into the army, the 
inspections for caches of arms, and other preliminaries to the actual de-
portations and massacres, Armenians tended to accede to demands, 
avoided any actions which might have been construed as opposing the 
state, and hoped that the whole episode would ultimately be forgotten 
and that the community would survive with minimum damage. Local 
measures such as the murder of a few hundred intellectuals or a few 
thousand enlistees were nothing compared to what had been predicted. 
In most communities where any self-defense was possible the realization 
that the small incidents were part of the larger event came too late to be of 
any use. Where communities acted early, such as in Van, Shabin 
Garahisar, Musa Dagh, and Urfa, the self-defense became part of the 
justification for the genocide while the genocide was progressing.81 
To complete the preliminary stages of the genocide, the emasculation 
of the nation without risking much resistance, the planners of the 
genocide had, in fact, counted on the infinite belief of Armenian leaders 
in the possibility of political solutions to their problems. Armenians 
were, after all, students of the Enlightenment and devotees of political 
discourse once discourse had been made possible by the elevation of the 
"revolutionary" Young Turks to power. To believe that their colleagues 
from the days of exile in Europe and from the Ottoman Parliament could 
in fact use the methods of the Sultan and improve on them was to 
undermine the basic motivation for their adoption of the best that the 
West had to offer: belief not only in progress by man but also progress 
in man, in his perfectibility, in his ability to reason and to do what is 
reasonable. 
When the Young Turks determined to exterminate the Armenians, 
they were not just ridding themselves of another ethnic group; they were 
also eliminating the social basis for a substantial change in the regime. 
They were not guaranteeing just a turkified Turkey, but also a Turkey 
which was closer to the model of the Empire in its heyday: virile and run 
by elites who were inspired by ideas beyond the reach of common men 
and women, particularly those of a lower race and religion, by ideas 
beyond the reach of discourse, abstracted from reality and, ultimately, 
from humanity. 
The genocide of the Armenian people may be a paradigm for twen-
tieth-century "political" genocides, where the elite's vision was predi-
cated upon the political and sociological dimensions of the society they 
wanted to rule over. The return to a traditional order where hierarchies 
are in place and unchallenged may be one such vision. Recent geno-
cides, especially the Indonesian, the Cambodian, and the Ibo, have been 
more brazenly political in nature, confirming the worst fears that 
knowledge of evil does not necessarily result in abhorrence of evil; that 
human reasoning can always find ways to characterize evil as being 
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something else and to conclude that some societies must be destroyed or 
must destroy parts of themselves to be saved. 
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RELATIONS OF GENOCIDE: 
LAND AND LIVES IN THE 
COLONIZATION OF AUSTRALIA 
Tony Barta 
I think of land as the history of my nation. It tells of how we came into 
being and what system we must live. My great ancestors who lived in 
the times of history planned everything that we practise now. The law 
of history says that we must not take land, fight over land, steal land, 
give land and so on. My land is mine only because I came in spirit 
from that land, and so did my ancestors of the same land .... 
My land is my foundation. I stand, live and perform as long as I 
have something firm and hard to stand on. Without land ... we will 
be the lowest people in the world, because you have broken down our 
backbone, took away my arts, history and foundation. You have left 
me with nothing. Only a black feller who doesn't care about anything 
in the world. My people don't want to be like you!l 
-Galarrwuy Yunupingu 
The basic fact of Australian history is the conquest of the country by 
one people and the dispossession, with ruthless destructiveness, of 
another. The recorded effects of this encounter are as clear as they are 
terrible. Of the black people who inhabited the continent as "Ab-
origines," "from the beginning," and who had developed complex lan-
guages, cultures, and social organizations in more than 50,000 years of 
tribal life, only small minorities survived the first generations of contact 
with the white invaders. Driven from their lands, deprived of traditional 
food supplies, decimated by introduced diseases, many thousands died 
of causes the Europeans would list as "natural." Thousands more-
perhaps 20,000-were killed in the raids and reprisals of frontier war, in 
massacres, in countless individual acts of violence. 2 Wherever Euro-
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peans were determined to settle, Aborigines were fated to die. Not only 
in Tasmania but in all the rapidly occupied south and east of Australia the 
processes of colonization and economic expansion involved the virtual 
wiping out of the Aboriginal population. Australia-not alone among 
the nations of the colonized world-is a nation founded on genocide. 
This is not a view which many white Australians share. The majority 
have in any case little consciousness of the violence in their past and 
resent the increasingly outspoken Aboriginal references to it. They 
would prefer to celebrate their bicentennial in 1988 free of black counter-
demonstrations and untroubled by the mounting Aboriginal claims for 
restoration of land. Among the historians who have shaped the Aus-
tralian consciousness of the past only very few, very recently, have 
emphasized the destruction of the Aborigines as a central fact. If they 
have not spoken of genocide-the word appears very rarely3-it is for 
reasons of definition which have made the concept inadequate in a case 
crying out for its use. What we need, I shall argue, is a conception of 
genocide which embraces relations of destruction and removes from the 
word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being. 
That genocide must be seen as a policy, for which individuals could 
be held responsible and called to account, was the main argument behind 
Raphael Lemkin's conception. The new word was meant "to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating 
the groups themselves. "4 This emphasis on intention and scope, on pur-
poseful annihilation, has given the word its terrible leading edge. It has 
succeeded in devaluing all other concepts of less planned destruction, 
even if the effects are the same. To be really terrible, an ordeal inflicted 
on a people now has to be "genocidal." These essays, too, are written 
under that shadow. 
"The deliberate destruction of a race or nation"; "acts committed with 
intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group as such": all subsequent definitions of genocide have 
pressed home the emphasis on planning and purpose.5 Yet we know 
that the destruction of many peoples, genocidal outcomes, have been the 
result of complex and only obscurely discerned causes, and in that re-
spect genocide should properly lose its uniqueness-the uniqueness of 
having intentionality as its defining characteristic. It should not be pos-
sible after more than a century of Marxism and other varieties of his-
toriography intent on teasing out dialectics of change behind apparently 
singular events to accept the construing of policy as a substitute for ex-
plorations of its contexts. This is the issue Karl Marx addressed early 
on, when he attempted to establish the sets of relationships structuring 
historical reality as the proper object of historical enquiry, rather than 
only the intentions and actions of individuals. 
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In the investigation of political conditions one is too easily tempted to over-
look the objective nature of the relationships and to explain everything from 
the will of the persons acting. There are relationships, however, which 
detennine the actions of private persons as well as those of individual authori-
ties, and which are as independent as the movements in breathing. Taking 
this objective standpoint from the outset, one will not presuppose an exclu-
sively good or bad will on either side. Rather, one will observe relationships 
in which only persons appear to act at first 6 
Marx did not have genocide-or Australia-in mind; nor was he yet 
thinking primarily in terms of economic relationships. Discussion of 
capitalism, of imperialism, of colonialism has of course embraced the 
kinds of violence associated with the clash of cultures and the imposition 
of an alien economic, social, and political order. It is in this way that 
Leo Kuper (somewhat reluctantly, it seems to me) acknowledges a con-
tribution of Marxism to our understanding of genocide. He quotes Eric 
Wolf on the extermination of hunting and gathering peoples in the name 
of civilization, whose representatives then inherit the land: "The prog-
ress of civilization across the face of the earth is also a process of 
primary accumulation, of robbery in the name of reason." And while 
Jean-Paul Sartre is seen as too readily equating colonization with geno-
cide, Kuper recognizes in Sartre's reference to Americans "living out 
... a relationship of genocide" with the Vietnamese as a way around 
some of the more legalistic approaches to the problem of intent.7 
It is this kind of "living out a relationship of genocide," one structured 
into the very nature of the encounter, which I wish to explore in the case 
of Australia. I will not, I hope, beg the question of how relationships 
might be expressive of intentions; I expect to construe intentions from 
action (and inaction) and from words as well. But I will assume of ac-
tions that they imply relationships, and entail consequences, which 
people do not always envisage clearly. Genocide, strictly, cannot be a 
crime of unintended consequences; we expect it to be acknowledged in 
consciousness. In real historical relationships, however, unintended 
consequences are legion, and it is from the consequences, as well as the 
often muddled consciousness, that we have to deduce the real nature of 
the relationship. 
In Australia very few people are conscious of having any relationship 
at all with Aborigines. My thesis is that all white people in Australia do 
have such a relationship; that in the key relation, the appropriation of the 
land, it is fundamental to the history of the society in which they live; 
and that implicitly rather than explicitly, in ways which were inevitable 
rather than intentional, it is a relationship of genocide. 
Such a relationship is systemic, fundamental to the type of society 
rather than to the type of state, and has historical ramifications extending 
far beyond any political regime. Irving Horowitz (misleadingly, in my 
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view) calls Germany "a genocidal society" because during one terrible 
period of political aberration the "state bureaucratic apparatus" was used 
for "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people."8 My 
conception of a genocidal society-as distinct from a genocidal state-is 
one in which the whole bureaucratic apparatus might officially be 
directed to protect innocent people but in which a whole race is never-
theless subject to remorseless pressures of destruction inherent in the 
very nature of the society. It is in this sense that I would call Australia, 
during the whole 200 years of its existence, a genocidal society. 
Nothing could have been further from the minds of its founders. 
Captain James Cook had taken possession of eastern Australia as "terra 
nullius," land not effectively belonging to anyone, so that there was 
never any negotiation with the Aboriginal inhabitants. 9 In this certainly 
were the seeds of the subsequent genocide: because the Aborigines had 
never mixed their labor with the soil to make it productive they had no 
right to it and would be cleared from it by those who did. However, 
when Captain Arthur Phillip arrived with the first fleet at Botany Bay in 
1788 his instructions were unequivocal: he was "by every possible 
means to open an intercourse with the natives," to "conciliate their affec-
tions," and to enjoin everyone to "live in amity and kindness with them." 
He must punish all who should "wantonly destroy them, or give them 
any unnecessary interruption in the exercise of their several occupa-
tions. "10 The problem, of course, right from the beginning, would be in 
defining "wanton destruction" and "unnecessary interruption." Coloniz-
ing activity in itself-founding a settlement, planting crops, pasturing 
animals-could not be considered under either heading. To "wantonly 
destroy" the Aborigines was something very different from taking land 
they appeared to make no use of, and the distinction became more im-
portant in the maintenance-and modification--0f colonial attitudes as 
the area of settlement expanded and Aboriginal resistance increased. 
The impulse to expansion was economic. In 1812 it was demon-
strated that Australian wool could sell profitably to the Yorkshire mills. 
Having displaced the peasant farmers from the British countryside by 
enclosures and larger-scale farming (a process of social dislocation not 
unrelated to the rise in urban crime and the pressure to transport convicts 
to Australia), the agrarian revolution in Britain now helped finance an 
expanding textile industry which it could not supply with raw materials 
from home production. In 1822 the British government dropped the duty 
on wool from its own colony on the other side of the world to one-sixth 
of that on German wool. A new wave of free settlers, often only with 
sufficient capital for a small starting flock, knew that enterprise and 
determination-with much of the frontier hardship borne by convict or 
ex-convict stock-keepers-might bring rich rewards. Sheep may seem 
unlikely instruments of genocide, but together with the cattle that 
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trampled edible plants and fouled the water holes, they were the innocent 
embodiment of historical pressures which wrought massive and irreme-
diable destruction. The tide of strange animals loosed on the Aborigines' 
carefully tended grazing lands displaced the Aborigines' game and the 
Aborigines themselves. If the kangaroo, so curious to the eyes of white 
men, represented the ecologically delicate economy of the hunter-gather-
ers, the sheep, equally odd in the eyes of the blacks, were suitable rep-
resentatives of the incomprehensible concepts of individual ownership 
and private property. The imported animals and the appropriated land 
were soon shown-like Byron's stocking-frame-to have a higher value 
than human life. The most drastic demonstration was in Tasmania. 
In 1817 the European population of Van Diemen's Land stood at 
2,000, the Aboriginal population at about the same. By 1830 the Euro-
peans' numbers had increased to 23,500, some 6,000 of whom were 
free settlers with capital to invest in the pastoral industry. They had been 
granted almost half a million hectares, which they stocked with 1 million 
sheep-more than in the whole of New South Wales.11 Nobody 
seriously considered the effect of this on the few Aborigines encoun-
tered; the settlers were more worried about escaped convict bushrangers. 
But the Aborigines were shortly to make their attitude plain, and in the 
necessity of fighting a virtual war to protect the settlers Australia was to 
at least brush with that more classical mode of genocide, the direct 
sanctioning of violence by the state. 
The imperial administrator called on to test the viability of humane 
principles on the frontier was Colonel George Arthur. He arrived in 
Hobart as Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen's Land in 1824 with a 
reputation for having stood up to the slave owners of British Honduras 
in defense of an indigenous people, the Mosquito Indians. One of his 
first duties, indicative of the way things were to develop, was to approve 
the trial and execution of the first two black resistance leaders-one of 
them called Mosquito. He also issued a proclamation, in accordance 
with Colonial Office instructions, placing the Aborigines under the pro-
tection of British law and warning the stock-keepers that if they con-
tinued to "wantonly destroy" the Aborigines they would be prosecuted. 
Neither during his tenure of office, which saw the rapid escalation of 
frontier violence, nor in the subsequent history of the colony was any 
European charged, let alone committed for trial, for assaulting or killing 
an Aboriginal. 
Arthur was no doubt sincere in his desire to protect the Aborigines. 
But attacks on settlers continued, and in November 1826, only two and a 
half years after his arrival, he gave the settlers the right to drive off any 
Aborigines they suspected of meaning them harm, and if their own force 
was insufficient they could call on assistance from the nearest detach-
ment of troops. There followed three years of warfare during which 
Arthur could find no alternative to the policy being urged on him by the 
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settlers; the Aborigines would have to go. As the clamor increased for 
their forcible removal to some kind of reserve-or else for a free hand to 
the settlers-he confessed, "I cannot divest myself of the consideration 
that all aggression originated with the white inhabitants," but it is not 
clear that he ever saw this aggression as being synonymous with the 
very act of settlement. Settlement, after all, was Arthur's business; 
whatever Colonial Office principles of fair treatment might be, they did 
not include the re-embarkation of the colonists and the restoration of the 
land to savages who had never known how to make it productive. If the 
blacks would not allow white expansion to proceed uncontested (and 
thirty white deaths in 1827 showed that they would not) their exclusion 
from the settled areas was the only option. Under pressure from the 
local press-the Hobart Town Courier recalled the removal of the 
Indians to the other side of the Mississippi forty years earlier-the final 
solution came to be envisaged as removal of all Aborigines from the 
main island of Tasmania. 
Arthur was only reluctantly pushed into declaring martial law, into 
sponsoring the Black Line, a drive across the entire island which despite 
ridicule hastened success in clearing the settled areas of Aborigines, and 
into the removal of the remainder to special camps on outlying islands. 
He was persuaded that the Aborigines were ready to go for their own 
good, that removal was necessary for their protection, that once removed 
from their traditional lands they would more readily accept the blessings 
of white civilization--Christianity and the work ethic-as the only 
means to survival. He knew that they might "pine away"; he also knew 
that their end would be more violent if they were left among the settlers. 
The despair and disease which finished off the last full-blood Aborigines 
was not ameliorated by Arthur's hope that their passing be attended by 
"every act of kindness." Nor was this decline confined to the southern-
most colony, with the smallest black population. In fundamental re-
spects the pattern was repeated in the rest of Australia: pastoral invasion, 
resistance, violent victory of the white men, mysterious disappearance of 
the blacks. 
When a House of Commons Select Committee in 1837 attempted to 
understand what was happening to the Aborigines it quoted the Bishop 
of Sydney: 
They do not so much retire as decay; wherever Europeans meet with them 
they appear to wear out, and gradually to decay: they diminish in numbers; 
they appear actually to vanish from the face of the earth. I am led to appre-
hend that within a very limited period, a few years, those who are most in 
contact with Europeans will be utterly extinct-I will not say exterminated 
-but they will be extinct.12 
The bishop had observed well. By 1850 whole tribes from the region 
of Sydney had disappeared. The story was the same at Newcastle, 
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further north. In the Port Phillip area, after the settlement of Melbourne 
in 1835, the numbers dropped from more than 10,000 to less than 2,000 
in eighteen years-a decline of over 80 percent. Around Geelong, a 
center of pastoral expansion, the decline was from 279 to 36. In the new 
colony of South Australia, the number of Aborigines in the region of 
Adelaide fell from 650 to 180 in the fifteen years after 1841. Relatively 
few of these deaths-perhaps a fifth of them-were the result of direct 
violence. The countless undocumented atrocities and the known killings 
on the advancing frontier of settlement do not account for the vast 
proportions of the disaster. By far the greatest number-possibly two-
thirds-were killed by the previously unknown illnesses against which 
Aborigines had no resistance (chiefly smallpox) but also by alcohol and 
malnutrition. Aborigines had a low resistance to alcohol and tobacco and 
the respiratory complaints which were exacerbated by the European 
conventions of clothing (often worn when wet) and housing (now fixed, 
but without adequate sanitation). Malnutrition, in the almost instan-
taneous adaptation to a high carbohydrate European diet-flour and 
sugar were irresistible innovations-played a part in the dramatically 
lowered birthrate, as did venereal disease.13 A greater part, too easily 
underestimated, was played by demoralization and despair. If the Euro-
peans only half understood the inability of the Aborigines to withstand 
civilization and too readily saw them as a race doomed to extinction, 
Aborigines themselves had reason to be fatalistic. With many of their 
women bearing mixed-race children to white men, the black birthrate 
dramatically in decline, their social structure destroyed, and their tradi-
tional culture impossible to maintain, many Aborigines could hardly en-
visage a future in such a cataclysmic world. They knew the white men's 
ways, and they knew that the kind of statements now treated as empty 
rhetoric by many historians expressed the white man's view of the real 
relationship between the races, the genuinely historic terms of the 
encounter. 
We cannot shut our eyes to the inevitable destiny of the Aborigines-the 
incontrovertible fact that the propagation of the race has ceased-and the con-
sequence, that the present generation of Aborigines is the last that will have 
existence .... we have already expressed an opinion, which under the ex-
pectation of receiving obloquy of pseudo-philanthropists, we unhesitatingly 
repeat, that the perpetuation of the race of Aborigines is not to be desired. 
That they are an inferior race of human beings it is in vain to deny; (the 
probable extinction of the race from natural causes is a proof of this); and it is 
no more desirable that any inferior race should be perpetuated, than that the 
transmission of an hereditary disease, such as scrofula or insanity, should be 
encouraged. In the case of the Aborigines, the process of their extinction is 
the result, in a great degree, of natural causes; and even if not beyond cure, is 
scarcely to be regretted .... This may be considered a harsh, cruel view of 
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the question, but it is founded upon clear conviction, and is not unkindly 
meant.14 
The immediate context of this statement, an expression of editorial 
opinion by The Geelong Advertiser in 1846, was a discussion-intended 
to be realistically supportive-of missionary efforts to help the Ab-
origines. The larger context was Geelong's new status, within a decade 
of its foundation, as one of the busiest wool ports in the world, the 
center of pastoral expansion into that area of potential wealth called by its 
white discoverer "Australia Felix." In these vast grasslands individuals 
with sufficient capital and pioneering spirit could take up "runs" as 
"squatters" on Crown Land.15 If not every squatter had to kill for the 
land which would now be his, he knew that the necessity to protect his 
flocks and stockmen from Aborigines might arise and that if the 
Aborigines did not threaten him it was because some of them had already 
been killed-"taught a lesson"-by other settlers. The Geelong Adver-
tiser, which since the previous year had added "and Squatters' Ad-
vocate" to its masthead, was vocal in retailing the "depredations" and 
"outrages" of the blacks and in demanding military protection from a too 
philanthropic government. So the reality of land seizure by whites, and 
clearing or at least "pacification" of blacks, was the context of all 
government policy in Victoria, too, as it had been in Tasmania. 
The strategies adopted by a harassed, undermanned administration 
were to be the same elsewhere, until every yard of the continent had been 
appropriated. "Protectors" would be appointed to round up the Ab-
origines and "civilize" them, while saving them from the settlers. Those 
who resisted this path to social and cultural destruction risked more 
immediate annihilation at the hands of a new and deadly force of black 
troopers formed in response to settler demands. Expert at tracking down 
and "dispersing" Aborigines accused of crimes against people or prop-
erty, the Native Mounted Police were an effective instrument for se-
curing the displacement of one people by another in most of Australia. 
Nowhere was the displacement achieved without official and unofficial 
killing. Everywhere the killing-whether officially sanctioned or not-
was understood as necessary to the establishment of the new economic 
and social order. 
The connection between appropriation and violence was lost on no 
one. From the first expansion of the zone of settlement around Sydney 
there had been official encouragement for the settlers to form vigilante 
groups, and in 1824, to protect the flocks and herds spilling out onto the 
plains beyond the mountains, martial law was declared for five months. 
No casualty figures were ever reported, but in that time the Aboriginal 
problem was generally considered solved: there was no more trouble in 
the Bathurst area. Later the missionary L. E. Threlkeld gave an account 
of what had been told to him. It is thick with the language of genocide. 
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One of the largest holders of Sheep in the Colony, maintained at a public 
meeting at Bathurst, that the best thing that could be done, would be to shoot 
all the Blacks and manure the ground with their carcases, which was all the 
good they were fit for! It was recommended likewise that the Women and 
Children should especially be shot as the most certain method of getting rid of 
the race. Shortly after this declaration, martial law was proclaimed, and sad 
was the havoc made upon the tribes at Bathurst A large number were driven 
into a swamp, and mounted police rode round and round and shot them off 
indiscriminately until they were all destroyed! When one of the police en-
quired of the Officer if a return should be made of the killed, wounded there 
were none, all were destroyed, Men, Women and Children! the reply 
was;-that there was no necessity for a return. But forty-five heads were 
collected and boiled down for the sake of the skulls! My informant, a 
Magistrate, saw the skulls packed for exportation in a case at Bathurst ready 
for shipment to accompany the commanding Officer on his voyage shortly 
afterwards taken to England.16 
Such massacres took place on every colonial frontier: in Australia the 
terrible story of shootings, decapitations, and poisonings continued into 
the twentieth century.17 There was open discussion of atrocities in the 
press, many of them involving troopers supposedly upholding the law, 
and many more incidents than were ever reported lived on in Aboriginal 
memory. One of the best documented, because the Attorney General of 
New South Wales was determined to show that the law (unlike the land) 
could not be taken into private hands, was the Myall Creek Massacre of 
1838. Some thirty peaceful and friendly Aborigines on Myall Creek 
station were kidnapped by twelve white stockmen and the entire group, 
men, women, and children, slaughtered. Although the bodies were 
burned beyond recognition, seven of the killers were tried and-at the 
second attempt--convicted. Amidst enormous public outrage at this 
victimization of men who had acted no differently (it was asserted) from 
government agents in the same area some weeks before, and despite a 
defense lobby organized by the squatters, they were hanged. Their jailer 
reported that right to the end all of the men maintained "that as it was 
done solely in defence of their masters' property ... they were not 
aware that in destroying the aboriginals they were violating the law, or 
that it could take cognizance of their having done so, as it had (according 
to their belief) been so frequently done in the colony before. "18 
It is true that the colonial government, prodded by the disquiet ex-
pressed in the House of Commons, now attempted to assert its authority 
over the settlers and to make its protection of the Queen's black subjects 
more effective. But the government knew it was dealing with a larger 
historical encounter whose effects it could at best mitigate. It knew that 
its own position represented a fundamental denial of Aboriginal claims 
"whether as sovereigns or proprietors of the soil," and the settlers knew 
it, too. When they demanded that "energetic and effectual steps" be 
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taken against the Aborigines because they were "convinced that such a 
course will eventually prove to be the most humane and merciful," they 
knew there was after all no dispute about the necessity to protect "the 
laudable and enterprising pursuit of a pastoral life in the interior" or their 
status as "pioneers of civilisation." 19 The government was able to pro-
ceed with the appointment of protectors because it was understood that 
their mission would be a civilizing one-rounding up Aborigines and 
showing them the benefits of Christianity. They would not interfere-
and would in fact stop the Aborigines from interfering-with the 
"laudable and enterprising" incorporation of the continent into the 
capitalist economy. 
The settlers won on the ground, and it is their history, pioneers of 
civilization in a harsh continent, inevitably displacing the stone age 
tribes, which remains the conventional view. Very few Australians are 
aware of the ruthlessness of the process; sympathy for Aboriginal fringe-
dwellers, out of sight and out of mind, is low. Claims for land rights are 
often met with derision. References to the subsequent history of atti-
tudes to the Aborigines-" smoothing the pillow of a dying race," remov-
ing children from parents, forcing assimilation of half-castes, insisting 
that the majority culture of white Australians must be embraced by 
Aborigines if they are to survive (this has remained the basis of policy in 
most areas up to the present)-are assumed to be either excusable 
("that's the way they thought in those days") or, in common-sense way, 
inevitable. Certainly nobody now, despite occasional remarks later 
passed off as jokes, thinks in terms of extermination. So the idea that 
the consistent, indeed mounting pressure toward incorporation in the 
now even more internationalized Australian economy is in some way 
related to genocide is incomprehensible. In fact, all the subsequent 
pressure on the Aborigines as a people is a direct result of their losing the 
unequal war for possession of the land. It is possible that a people less 
weakened by disease might have resisted more successfully; it is not 
possible to imagine a settler class less determined to break that resis-
tance. The killing on the frontier, then, had to be of a kind that would 
destroy the ability of Aborigines to survive as independent peoples, with 
their own social organization, ethnic separateness, and cultural value 
system in conflict with the world view and economic interest of the 
invaders. This was clearly understood at the time, by both sides. The 
Europeans knew that if they could not establish their right to secure 
property-possession of the land-they had no future; the Aborigines 
knew that when they lost the fight for the land, all was lost. The fatalism 
of the black people's "fading away" from those areas where the white 
man's civilization so quickly triumphed was not very mysterious. In the 
ten years to 1849 only twenty births were recorded amongst all the seven 
tribes around Melbourne. But without the land to which their whole 
being belonged, without the sacred sites and ceremonies which ex-
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pressed the meaning and purpose of Aboriginal life, how could a future 
life be envisioned? Derrimut, of the Yarra people, said to a European in 
the 1840s: 
You see ... all this mine, all along here Derrimut's once; no matter now, 
me soon tumble down .... Why me have lubra? Why me have picca-
ninny? You have all this place, no good have children, no good have lubra, 
me tumble down and die very soon now. 
And Billibellary, an elder of the same group, apparently explaining the 
increase in the traditional practice of infanticide: 
The Black lubras say now no good children, Blackfellow say no country now 
for them, very good we kill and no more come up Pickaninny. 20 
To veil the realities of this conflict behind the cloudy rhetoric of "the 
fatal impact" is to deny historical responsibility by refusing historical 
analysis. "We Australians," a Melbourne sociologist recently assured 
newspaper readers, "have inherited the wreckage of one of the many 
cultural tragedies that litter human history. When a strong and a weak 
culture meet, the latter invariably dies." It was not a matter of anyone 
being at fault in the past, so we should not overreact in the present-
notably by "rushing in dripping with guilt to give away huge sections of 
the country" which might (through mining) be of benefit to all Aus-
tralians.21 I am aware that the large-scale "relations of genocide" I pro-
pose can imply a similar "no one is to blame" approach. The difference, 
I hope, is in an insistence that relations imply connections within sys-
tems, and that the whole system needs to be critically explored. 
What Marx said in 1843 referred to the economic and societal pres-
sures on the Moselle wine growers, but it is equally apt to the situation 
of Australian wool growers at the same time. It was not "an exclusively 
good or bad will on either side" which caused the destruction of the 
Aborigines but "the objective nature of the relationships" between 
(white) capitalist wool producers and (black) hunter-gatherers. Local en-
counters were always between individuals, and individual attitudes could 
make an immediate difference between life and death. The quality of 
personal relationships varied according to the whole range of individual 
character and circumstance, but the larger encounter and the inescapable 
relationship was between totally incompatible forms of economy and 
society. 
At the center of this relationship-both in consciousness and in 
actuality-was the land. Both peoples, the Aboriginal inhabitants and 
the invaders, needed the land. Because of the uses for which each 
people needed the land, and because of the cultural gulf in under-
standings about the land, coexistence was impossible. The black people 
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belonged to the land, their being was part of it and it was part of them. 
Collectively and individually, it was their life. To the white people it 
was land to be brought into production; that production was at the center 
of their culture and the basis of their social order. Collectively, taking 
over the land was the driving force of the colonists; individually, they 
saw the land as potential and then actual property. Once appropriated by 
one man it belonged to him alone-even if normally owned by the state 
power which had claimed it all. Very few of the invaders had a sense of 
alienating the land from the Aborigines; how extreme a form of alienation 
it was they understood even less. The men who put their capital into 
land knew they had a relationship, through wage labor, with the men 
who helped them make the land productive, even if they would not have 
recognized any alienation of labor into capital through that relationship. 
With the Aborigines there were generally no relations of production, 
only relations-again by means of capital-through the land. So the key 
relation between white and black was one of total alienation: that was the 
condition of the triumph.of a taken for granted economic, social, and 
political order in an "alien" land 
It will still be objected that taking over a continent and destroying its 
inhabitants are two very different things. And-as I have been at pains 
to agree-the determination to do one did not imply the intention to do 
the other. Only a minority "had to" kill, as they saw it, in defense of 
their property, or in defense of their own lives-lives on the line because 
of commitment to property. But the violence accompanying the appro-
priation of the land was of a scale and ruthlessness-largely uncurbed by 
official intervention-which could leave no doubt in black or white 
minds as to the fate of those who resisted the "inevitable" course of 
events, and it can be no coincidence that it was accompanied, among 
those with no thought of murder in their minds, by much talk of the 
"inevitable" dying out of the black race. I do not think it is too simplistic 
to see in this dominant opinion the most comfortable ideological 
reflection of a relationship which could not be recognized in good 
conscience for what it was-a relationship of genocide. 
In some larger human reckoning, it has been pointed out, the eco-
nomic development of Australia benefited more people than it harmed. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, "three million Australians and 
millions of people in other lands were being fed by a continent which in 
its tribal heyday had supported only a fraction of that number." The new 
sheep industry in Australia provided work in English mills and warmth 
to millions in Europe and North America. 22 And it was the blanket, a 
typical and beneficent product of the new capitalist world economy, 
which provided the symbol both of the production relations and the rela-
tions of dispossession which came together in the appropriation of the 
land. Made productive according to the original justification for its 
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seizure, the land was never acknowledged in principle or practice as hav-
ing been taken from previous owners. Therefore no payment or com-
pensation was ever offered. But for many years the acknowledgment 
that a black fringe-dweller was a full-blood Aborigine, deserving at least 
of government charity, was the issue of a new blanket, completing its 
journey from the wool of the seized grasslands, through the mill of the 
industrial economy, to the survivors of the dispossessed. 
We were hunted from our ground, shot, poisoned, and had our daughters, 
sisters and wives taken from us .... What a number were poisoned at 
Kilcoy .... They stole our ground where we used to get food, and when 
we got hungry and took a bit of flour or killed a bullock to eat, they shot us or 
poisoned us. All they give us now for our land is a blanket once a year. 23 
Times change, commodities at the center of the economy change, 
ways of negotiation change. Aborigines in the far north of Australia, 
where the climate and landscape were less congenial to European settle-
ment, met the white onslaught later and with greater numbers. Some 
who still remember the massacres-the last shooting by a police party 
took place in 1928-finally, in the 1970s, acquired rights to significant 
areas of reserve land. But the pressure at the frontier of the yet more 
transnational economy has not let up. Bauxite, industrial diamonds, 
uranium-a substance whose genocidal potential for the first time 
threatens the white peoples of the world as well-have joined pastoral 
products as necessary commodities which black peoples, in the name of 
the greater good, should not stand in the way of. Some would have the 
Aborigines stand finn against uranium mining. The Aborigines know 
the uranium will be mined when there is a market for it and that their 
choices in the future are not separable from what has happened in the 
past. They know that the relations of power between black and white 
may still be modified, but that their fundamental weighting will not be 
changed.24 In that sense the relations of genocide are alive, and every 
negotiation will continue to be witnessed by the Aboriginal dead. 
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MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES AND 
GENOCIDE 
Walter P. Zenner 
Africans have rioted against Asians in South Africa and Kenya. The 
Asians were expelled from Uganda. Chinese have been persecuted 
throughout Southeast Asia and expelled from Vietnam. Japanese Ameri-
cans in the United States were interned in 1942. Armenians by the 
hundreds of thousands and Jews by the millions were slaughtered in this 
century. All of these events have given rise to the connection between 
middleman minorities and the victims of genocide.I "Middleman" or 
"trading" minorities are ethnic groups which are disproportionately 
represented in occupations related to commerce, especially in the small 
business sector. As minorities, they are not part of the ruling elite, 
although many may become quite affluent. It is this lack of power which 
makes them vulnerable to violence. The connection is certainly present 
in the last two cases, although the other cases, while reporting inter-
ethnic conflict and violence, do not refer to genocide per se. 
Genocide is defined legally in terms of the intentional physical 
annihilation of all or part of a group of people on racial, religious, or 
ethnic lines. This definition approximates what Helen Fein, following 
Vahakn Dadrian, has called "optimal genocide" and the manner in which 
Yehuda Bauer has distinguished the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews 
from most other "genocides."2 Genocide is a species of the more gen-
eral category of "massacre," which involves "the intentional killing by 
political actors of a significant number of relatively defenseless people." 
Genocide, however, differs from ordinary massacres, because of its 
scope and aims. In the case of genocide, the aim is to transform a social 
field by removing a whole group of actors, not merely to terrorize the 
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group's survivors. It also differs from another favored form of popu-
lation elimination, namely, expulsion or enforced emigration.3 
Genocide by this definition has been directed at a wide variety of 
peoples. Probably the largest number of ethnic groups in recent times 
subject to genocide, although usually involving small numbers of indi-
viduals, have been peoples subsisting by hunting, gathering, and shift-
ing horticulture (see Chapter 12). Other groups have also been subjected 
to genocide and various other forms of liquidation, such as the kulaks 
(or so-called wealthy peasants) in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or the 
Communists of Indonesia after the attempted coup of 1965, or the Mus-
lims of Hamah (Syria) in 1982. None of these events points to a con-
nection between middleman minorities and genocide. Still, the fact that 
two large-scale genocides were committed against groups generally 
identified as middleman minorities means that the link cannot be ignored 
Indeed, the international convention against genocide was formulated in 
the wake of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, which can be seen as 
the prototype for the concept of genocide itself. 
In this essay, those theories which have examined the middleman 
minority phenomenon will be examined in terms of what they say about 
the victimization of these ethnic groups in general and with regard to 
genocide in particular. This will be followed by a brief comparison of 
middleman minorities which have or have not been subjected to various 
forms of persecution. 
MIDDLEMANISHNESS AS A PRECONDITION FOR 
VICTIMIZATION4 
Middleman minority theories in modern social science began with 
theories which strove to explain the special position of the Jew in 
medieval and modem Europe. Several of these theories, particularly 
those of Werner Sombart and Max Weber, debated the role of the Jew in 
the creation of modem capitalist economies, not in understanding the 
reasons for hostility toward the Jew. Indirectly, both sociologists sug-
gest that Jewish culture is responsible for hostility against Jews. Som-
bart was generally hostile to the bourgeois-capitalist form of enterprise, 
for which the Jews as well as other ethnic groups were responsible. 
Weber saw traditional Jewish forms of capitalism as being quite different 
from the rational capitalism that arose out of Puritanism. Unlike the 
Puritans, according to Weber, the Jews practiced a double standard of 
economic ethics, treating out-group members differently from members 
of their own group and not viewing work and business as a sacred voca-
tion. While Sombart and Weber differed in their views on the roles of 
Judaism and Puritanism and in their politics, neither dealt with the vic-
timization of the Jews per se. 5 
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Wilhelm Roscher, Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Toennies saw the 
Jewish problem in terms of intergroup relations. Roscher, the earliest of 
these three, analyzed the Jewish role in the medieval economic European 
economy, although he compared Jews with other groups as well. 
Roscher, based on then available historical data, found that the Jews 
controlled commerce in the early Middle Ages, only to be displaced by 
Christian merchants in the latter part of that period. In the early period 
the Jews were dominant, because they, as strangers, introduced mone-
tary commerce into a feudal economy. They occupied a niche in the 
society as traders. As the society grew, Christians aspired to the posi-
tion which Jews occupied, and through use of their power they displaced 
the Jews. 
Simmel and Toennies considered the role of the trader as an inter-
mediary between different groups of people, as one who is simulta-
neously within a society and outside it, as one who is distant even when 
physically nearby. The marginality of the intermediary makes him more 
objective, thus serving his success as a trader (and in other roles), but 
causing ambivalence on the part of others. They suggest a dialectical 
relationship between the intermediary who may or may not be a member 
of an out-group and members of a particular community. 
An important part of the "stranger-intermediary" involves credit. In 
borrowing, the debtor reveals much of himself to the borrower. One 
may prefer to borrow from a stranger, who has little power over other 
aspects of one's life, but the high cost of such credit also breeds re-
sentment. The ambivalence toward credit from a "stranger," even a 
familiar alien, lies at the heart of commercial arrangements involving 
minority middlemen and their majority clients. 6 Even though the role of 
intermediary may be a necessary one, it may produce deep-seated 
hostility. 
The elements of "middlemanishness" stressed by these five authors 
continue to be the ones which form the basis for middleman minority 
theory. The term "middleman minority" comes from Howard P. Becker, 
but the theories, which increasingly have been concerned with Asian 
immigrants and others rather than with Jews, have continued to make 
use of ideas formulated in an earlier time. The minority's ethnic speciali-
zation, in the first instance, is created by a status gap. The societies need 
people to do certain jobs in commerce and crafts; this is especially true of 
feudal and colonial societies, but such gaps may appear in modern 
industrial societies as well. The minority which occupies this niche is 
generally of foreign origin or otherwise distinguished from the rest of the 
population. Its success in occupying this niche is enhanced by its ethnic 
solidarity and by certain attributes such as frugality and a double stand-
ard of economic ethics. Hostility toward the minority is the result of the 
tensions between the minority as successful traders and entrepreneurs 
against majority group members who are their clients, employees, and 
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competitors. As more and more majority group members compete with 
the minority, hostility against the minority increases. The minority is 
also a convenient scapegoat, because of its frequent association with the 
ruling classes, who were their initial patrons. 7 
Edna Bonacich's revision of middleman minority theory by applying 
it to immigrant groups in contemporary capitalist societies has renewed 
interest and debate. She has connected the middleman minorities to other 
ethnic groups by showing the similarities between the split-labor market 
and the situation of immigrant small businessmen. Both pertain to sec-
tors of the economy which are shunned by natives because of the paltry 
rewards for hard labor, but, at the same time, both the immigrant laborer 
and the alien small businessman are seen as unfair competitors. While 
pointing to empty niches in the economy which minority middlemen fill, 
she did not see the necessity of positing a status gap in these societies. 8 
From the debates of Weber and Sombart on, those explaining the 
connection between ethnicity and commerce have often disagreed with 
each other quite sharply. Rather than thinking of a single theory of mid-
dleman minorities, it is more appropriate to see middleman minority 
theory as a subset of hypotheses and propositions which deal with the 
meeting of economics and ethnicity. 
One issue in the discussion of middleman minorities and victimization 
is determining situations in which these minorities escape persecution. 
Among the factors which appear to cause such reactions are competition 
with the out-group (or groups), visibility as strangers, and visibility as a 
separate ethnic group. 
The first of these involves objective features of the economic scene. 
In the ideal model of the Indian caste system, there is a caste division of 
labor into which foreign groups could be incorporated. Each group con-
tributes to the whole, and the society is permeated by an ideology recog-
nizing the role of each without challenge. Indeed, we find that the 
Parsis, a fairly typical middleman minority in western India, and the 
Jews of India, who served in various occupational roles, did not suffer 
from persecution.9 In the ideal status gap setting, such as in early 
medieval Germany or even in eastern Poland during the inter-World War 
period, the situation is similar. Again, various authorities suggest that 
persecution of Jews in pre-Crusades Germany, pre-World War II 
Volhynia, and the Belorussian areas was not as severe as in other times 
and places.to 
Another objective feature is that minority members are more likely to 
be seen as non-threatening in an open society with a growing economy. 
Then they may be seen as individuals, not group members, and their 
contributions are welcome. The openness to innovation may be limited 
to certain sectors or regions of a country or may encompass the whole 
society. Thus, in frontier areas minority members will be welcomed 
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more than in old areas, while they may find opportunities in either aban-
doned sectors of the economy, such as urban slums, or in new lines, 
such as the film industry in the early 1900s. Thus, such niches will be 
filled by disproportionate numbers of minority members.11 Contrari-
wise, a shrinking economic base with growing impoverishment is likely 
to result in anti-minority sentiment. This is especially true if the minority 
is growing and if its share of the societal wealth is growing. Perception 
of such growth, even if only apparent, may be sufficient to cause a rise 
in xenophobia.12 
The perception of the minority by the majority is important when 
theorists speak about such variables as visibility and ethnic solidarity. 
Bonacich, who isolated ethnic solidarity as a factor in both the success of 
the minority and in their persecution, has also pointed to the fact that 
such minority communities are frequently rent by intense factionalism 
and other rivalries.13 If there is much solidarity, it is most frequently 
found at an interpersonal familial level or in friendships formed in the 
community of origin. Yet, to outsiders, the minority is often seen as 
more united than it is: the famous psychological principle that all out-
groupers look alike. 
The effects of discrimination and persecution are twofold. On the one 
hand, they may induce group members to seek assimilation into the 
majority, especially its elite. On the other, they may react defensively 
and thus such action may reinforce group solidarity. These two reac-
tions may come simultaneously, affecting different segments of a single 
minority. Thus we find that European Jewry during the late nineteenth 
century spawned assimilationists, Christian converts, and universalistic 
revolutionaries on the one hand, and Zionists and fervent Orthodox Jews 
on the other. 
While most middleman minority theories see ethnic solidarity as rein-
forcing the xenophobia of the majority, assimilatory trends may have a 
similar effect. Minority members attempting to assimilate compete even 
more directly with majority members for places in universities, the army, 
the civil service, and other niches in the society. Since the majority tends 
to perceive all members of the minority as being part of a unified whole, 
it is easy to see how they may come to see all members of the minority, 
whether assimilationist, radical, conservative, or religious, as playing 
different roles in a single conspiracy against the majority.14 
The proportion of the minority to the majority may play a role in the 
way it is perceived by the majority. Stanislav Andreski has argued that if 
the minority is 10 percent or more of the population, it has reached a 
critical point of conspicuousness.15 The only exception he claims to a 
high proportion leading to such molestation is in New York City, where 
the position of the Jews has made it possible to fend off persecution. He 
sees the importance of numbers in that it leads to points of friction be-
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tween majority and minority members. On the other hand, he does not 
claim that smaller numbers inevitably lead to freedom from discrimi-
nation. 
Numbers and proportions, however, are tricky indeed. Germany in 
1933 gave rise to the movement which caused the Holocaust par 
excellence. The proportion of Jews was less than one percent of the total 
population. Yet the total "war against the Jews" was initiated and orga-
nized by a German, not a Polish, government Again, perception is im-
portant The proportion of Jews in prominent social positions and in the 
major German-speaking cities, including Vienna, was higher than in the 
country as a whole. There also were Jews throughout the country, 
including many in rural areas. This made the Jew in early twentieth-
century Germany loom larger than percentages would suggest 
An important part of a perception is whether one is seen as a "native" 
or as a "stranger." (Alternatively, a minority member may wish to be 
seen as an individual on one's own account, rather than as a repre-
sentative of a collectivity.) Entrepreneurs in early nineteenth-century 
Britain might be primarily Scots or Dissenters, like Quakers-Le., 
members of distinctive groups within the society, but natives. The busi-
nessmen of Casablanca include Berbers from the Sous region and Arabs 
from the city of Fes, both groups of Moroccan Muslims, albeit 
distinctive ones. In addition, there are Jews, who are Moroccans but not 
Muslims, and Frenchmen who are neither.16 Thus there are degrees of 
"nativity" and "strangerhood." 
Urbanization and other forms of internal migration may upset the 
feelings of neighborliness which may have come to mark relations in 
rural areas. In the older cities or in the countryside, an equilibrium based 
on complementarity and toleration may have been established. With 
massive urbanization, however, all out-groupers may be seen as hostile 
strangers, and competitiveness and envy of successful minority members 
may be the new order of the day. Large-scale international migrations 
would amplify such a perception. The mass emigration of Jews from 
Russia and the Polish provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during 
the late nineteenth century upset relations between the small Jewish 
populations of Western Europe and the United States and their Gentile 
neighbors. The large-scale emigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia in 
the late nineteenth century had similar effects for the more acculturated 
Chinese in those countries. 
Visibility of the minority is heightened by its own characteristics, 
such as concentration in certain occupations, a special religion or 
religious practices, racial signs, and speaking a separate language. This 
occurs most obviously when the minority consists of recent immigrants, 
but in multilingual or multi-religious areas, members of several ethnic 
groups may have shared a single region for generations, such as in much 
of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
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For these elements of estrangement to result in conflict, other ele-
ments must be added. Political mobilization which may utilize the mi-
nority as a target is an important one. In such a case, the members of the 
minority are seen as representatives of a group. Usually such a political 
mobilization is connected with an ideology. Two elements combine in 
anti-middleman ideology. One is to view commerce, especially that 
engaged in by stranger-middlemen, as evil and as violating the rights of 
natives. In its extreme form, moneymaking is seen as diabolical. 17 The 
second is to view the minority middlemen as foreign agents who are ene-
mies of the nation, whether this is the Bolsheviks, the Pope, or the 
Japanese Empire. Both serve to dehumanize the minority middlemen; 
when combined they form a potent weapon to use against them, and this 
helps exacerbate the normal frictions between businessmen, their com-
petitors, and their clients. 
While those opposed to particular minorities follow strategies to 
convince the majority and the ruling classes of the minorities' estrange-
ment, the minorities follow various strategies with an opposite intention. 
They may seek to lower their profile and to be less conspicuous. Thus 
they may refrain from open political activity as an ethnic group and may 
give up their language, religion, and the like. They may strive to con-
vince their fellows that while they maintain a separate identity, they are 
full members of the nation. Thus they may stress their participation in 
the struggle for independence by the nation-state. They may try to 
change the ethnic group's occupational structure and otherwise reform 
themselves so as to answer their critics. Finally, they may stress a 
political ideology that gives them full rights of citizenship as individuals. 
In post-World War II North America, several ethnic groups once labeled 
middleman minorities have made considerable progress along these 
lines, including the Jews and the Japanese.18 
Middleman minority status thus seems to cause victimization when the 
friction derived from trade relationships is compounded by ethnocen-
trism and by ideologies which dehumanize all alien-traders. Even if the 
minority, however, is in some ways victimized, the types of victimiza-
tion range from mild discrimination to optimal genocide. Middleman 
minorities have a special vulnerability to attack because their social 
position is one with some wealth but with little authority or power. Even 
if most members of the minority are extremely poor, there are usually 
some who are affluent and excite envy. The minority is usually depen-
dent on the ruling class, which sacrifices the minority as a scapegoat. 
The minority is generally unarmed. Because of its business connections, 
it must be essentially sedentary.19 
Some of these qualities may under some circumstances be a strength. 
The weak, unarmed nature of the minority may make it possible for the 
majority to tolerate the minority. Such was indeed the position of the 
Jews under Islam, where for centuries they were outside the power 
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struggle. Jewish officials might serve as scapegoats, and mobs might 
attack Jews as a whole when they fell, but they were also to be tolerated 
if they showed proper deference for the majority. The occasional attacks 
can be seen as a ritual to restore the proper deference. 20 
Middleman minorities as groups may have some protection through 
their dispersion, in that one place may be a refuge when another is 
perilous, although if the net used against them is wide enough this is of 
little avail. Since such minorities are often recent immigrants, their 
former homeland may offer protection and/or refuge. This, however, 
has often proven hazardous, especially if the homeland is the enemy of 
their present place of residence and makes the sense of threat seen by 
their hosts realistic, as in the cases of the Jews of Syria after 1948 and 
the Japanese Americans during World War IL 
PROBLEMS IN THE COMPARISON OF GENOCIDES 
Certain problems of comparison can be found throughout the social 
sciences. First, no two situations, events, or other units of analysis are 
identical. When taken to the extreme, realization of this fact would make 
any comparison impossible, but it should be kept in mind. Two, study-
ing more than one case often necessitates spending less time and effort 
on each case than if one were devoting all of one's attention to a single 
instance. While several examples will bring out crucial features which 
need to be compared, the presentation of each case becomes more super-
ficial as the number of cases increases. Where a great many cases are 
used, as in cross-cultural or cross-national correlational studies, complex 
patterns must be reduced to relatively simple abstractions. Three, the 
definition of the units of analysis is always a difficult task. Four, studies 
on particular cases are often quite different in quality. 
These problems are acute in the study of genocides. Uniqueness has, 
of course, been argued with regard to the Jewish Holocaust of 1941-
1945, although in the process both Bauer and Dawidowicz have 
compared these events to others. Bauer comes close to admitting that the 
Holocaust does have some resemblance to the Armenian genocide during 
World War 1.21 The second problem is one endemic to comparison and 
not particular to this area. Problems of unit definition are, however, 
important. Social scientists are accustomed to dealing with nation-states 
as units; yet problems spill over national frontiers. This is especially true 
in times of armed conflict. The Jewish Holocaust and attendant geno-
cides of other groups during World War II took place at a time when 
Germany rapidly spread its control over most of the European continent 
and then retreated. Thus the nation-state approach has had to be 
modified considerably.22 The Armenian genocide was contained within 
the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in the East African cases of 
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Asian expulsions possible demonstration effects of the Kenyan partial 
expulsion on Uganda must be taken into account. In addition, the reac-
tion of receiving countries, particularly Great Britain, depended on 
internal factors. This was also relevant with regard to other expulsions, 
as we shall see, such as the role of Malaysia and Indonesia at the time of 
the 1978-1979 refugee crisis involving ethnic Chinese. In defining the 
unit of analysis, attention must be paid to temporal dimensions as well as 
spatial ones. In considering European Jewry, does one begin the Holo-
caust in 1933 with the rise of the Nazis to power or in 1939 with the 
invasion of Poland? Does one consider the 1894 massacres under Abdul 
Hamid II as forerunners of the 1916 genocide or as pa.rt of it? When one 
concentrates on the preconditions, this question is less crucial than in 
dealing with other aspects of the genocidal events, but the question is 
still relevant. Scale also plays a role in our consideration since some 
ethnic groups discussed here are much smaller than others. 
A problem faced by comparativists is that of the differing bodies of 
literature on each group or crisis. There is an immense and growing 
literature on the Holocaust and a smaller but substantial body of material 
on the Armenian massacres and genocide. Those dealing with Asians in 
East Africa and Chinese from Vietnam are much smaller, especially since 
these are events which occurred much closer to the present. The former 
two literatures are dominated by participants and historians, while the 
latter two are dominated by social scientists. The richness of the work 
on European Jewry, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust is overwhelming, 
compared with the much thinner data available on the other communities. 
In this essay, I will compare a number of middleman minorities, 
beginning with those who were not subjected to extreme harassment. 
They will be compared to those persecuted and expelled, as well as to 
those subjected to "optimal genocide." The comparison made here is 
suggestive and not definitive; the units used are not strictly comparable. 
For our cases of non-persecution or only minor harassment, the Parsis 
of western India and the Jews of Morocco will be used. In dealing with 
expulsions, recent cases from Africa and Asia are cited. One such exam-
ple, that of the Chinese in Vietnam, is considered in greater detail. This 
particular instance was quite recent and, at the same time, suggested 
many parallels to one phase of Nazi persecution which preceded geno-
cide proper, namely, the refugee crisis of 1938-1939. It is important that 
we understand what differentiates such forms of population elimination 
from the full-scale Holocaust 
There is some agreement that total or near-total murder of peoples 
occurred in only two cases of persecution of middleman minorities-that 
of the Jews by the Nazis and that of the Armenians by the Young Turk 
regime. The material on these two cases is better formulated than that on 
the others. Dadrian and Robert Melson, in particular, have analyzed the 
events which led up to the deportations and liquidation of Armenians in 
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1915 in social scientific terms, which makes comparison easier.23 The 
work done on the Nazi "war against the Jews" is huge; various authori-
ties, such as Bauer, Dawidowicz, and Fein, have addressed themselves 
to a number of issues of interpretation in which they have summarized 
the literature available. Rather than summarizing the history of the 
Armenian and Jewish holocausts again, I will refer to these events, as-
suming some knowledge on the part of the reader. In all cases, descrip-
tions will be brief, and those interested are referred to the sources listed 
in the notes. 24 
All of the minorities in question are concentrated occupationally in 
commercial and related occupations. While the ramifications of this vary 
from place to place, this is not gone into here. Among the points to be 
compared are the following: 
a. recency of foreign origin; 
b. visibility of the group; 
c. degree to which the minority is separated from the majority on cul-
tural, racial, religious, and linguistic lines (nativity and stranger-
hood); 
d. degree of impoverishment of the society at large at the time of 
conflict; 
e. the minority's proportion of the population at large; 
f. the minority's perceived share of the national wealth (separate occu-
pational role); 
g. extent of complementarity and/or competition with the majority; 
h. the absence of common foes and the relationship of the internal eth-
nic conflict to external relations of the nation. 
These points of comparison suggest that the occupational speciali-
zation of the minority is but one aspect influencing its ultimate fate. 25 
EXAMPLES OF MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES 
Just as middleman minorities are not the only victims of genocide, so 
they are not inevitably the subjects of persecution. One example is that 
of the Parsis of western India, who were neither persecuted in pre-
modem times nor in the twentieth century when India was the scene of 
much inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. Previously, the Indian 
Parsi and Jewish cases were explained in terms of the complementarity 
implicit in the traditional caste system, but this does not explain why no 
persecution (apart from two minor instances of riots) took place when 
other conflicts and massacres engulfed India. Here structural explana-
tions have some cogency. The Parsis are neither Hindu nor Muslim; 
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rather, they belong to the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. 
They have been in western India for a thousand years and they speak 
Gujerati, the local language. While the Parsis were clearly demarcated as 
an ethno-religious group which was concentrated in certain sectors of the 
economy and were more prosperous than the general populace in an 
impoverished nation, they were a small and declining group. In 1971, 
there were approximately 91,000 Parsis in India, approximately 70 
percent living in Bombay. This was fewer than in 1941, in a country 
where the population was over 400 million and growing. Even within 
Bombay their proportion of the population was declining and their once 
great local political power had vanished. Until very recently Bombay 
had prided itself on its inter-religious harmony, and the Parsis benefited 
from that as well. Although the Parsi community as a whole had favored 
a conservative pro-British course, enough Parsis, including Indira 
Gandhi's husband, had been proponents of independence to give them a 
place in the national constellation. Many of the Parsis who feared the 
consequences of independence emigrated quietly, thus contributing to the 
community's decline. Intermarriage was increasing. Despite their cool-
ness to Indian nationalism, the Parsis were not identified with either 
China or Pakistan, the main enemies of the Indian Republic since 
independence. 26 
Another case where no major persecution took place in a potentially 
threatening situation is that of the Jews in Morocco. Again we have the 
instance of a middleman minority which (although containing numerous 
poor people) is more prosperous in the aggregate than the majority in a 
Third World nation. Like the Parsis and the Jews of Europe, the Moroc-
can Jews had lived in the country for many centuries; they were not 
recent immigrants. They spoke the local Arabic dialects. Later, many 
adopted French as a domestic language. As in India, the Moroccan Jews 
occupied specific economic niches in a traditional pre-industrial econo-
my, although there also was some competition in commerce between 
Jews and Muslims. Jewish occupations ranged from craftsmen and rural 
peddlers to international traders. 
The Jews were clearly subordinated to the Muslims in traditional 
Islamic fashion. While this resembles the hierarchy of the Indian caste 
system, there is a difference. The Jewish and Christian religions are 
viewed as past and potential rivals of Islam. The Jews could also con-
vert to Islam. Moroccan history contains instances of pogroms against 
Jews, especially when Jewish officials were deprived of office, and 
scholars dealing with North Africa dispute the degree to which Jewish-
Muslim relations were marked by subordination and persecution or by 
peaceful symbiosis, based on patron-client relations.27 There is little 
dispute, however, that these relations were never marked by such mas-
sive upheavals as the Rhineland massacres during the Crusades, the 
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medieval expulsions from England, France, Portugal, and Spain, or the 
Cossack depredations of the seventeenth century. 
Like the Parsis in British India, the Jews in both Spanish and French 
Morocco welcomed the protection offered by European colonialists. 
They were perceived as being collaborators. At the same time, they were 
subjected to French anti-Semitism, but when this came to a head during 
World War II under the Vichy regime, the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed 
V, protected them as his subjects. The postwar period was marked by 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Moroccan struggle for independence. 
While some Moroccan Jews identified with Moroccan nationalism, 
others stood aside, preferring the continuation of French rule or emi-
gration to Israel, France, or Canada. Although far to the west of the 
Levant, Morocco is a member of the Arab League and contributed troops 
to various countries fighting Israel in 1967 and 1973. The potential for 
large-scale violence and/or government sponsored restriction and harass-
ment has been present, but it has not occurred.28 Indeed, in April 1984, 
Morocco was the scene of a public meeting between Moroccan and non-
Moroccan Jews and the King of Morocco in Rabat. The Jewish leaders 
included members of the Israeli Parliament. This was an unprecedented 
event, especially since Morocco is a member in good standing of the 
Arab League. 
Several structural features may explain why Morocco has not been the 
scene of such persecution. One is that the patron-client relationships 
which were marked by dyadic contracts between an individual Jew and 
his family on the one hand, and a powerful Muslim and his family on the 
other, characterized intergroup relations in many parts of the country. 
The patron would consider an attack on his Jewish client as an attack on 
himself. While such patronage was primarily found in rural areas, it 
could be extended to urban areas, and the present king and his father 
have considered the Jews as their clients.29 This serves as a deterrent to 
persecution, although such patronage has not been unknown elsewhere 
in countries where pogroms have occurred. 
The rapid and unimpeded emigration of Jews since 1950 has made the 
Jews less vulnerable. Anticipating trouble, the Jewish community has 
declined from over 200,000 to less than 20,000 today. This is a much 
more rapid decline in numbers than that of the Parsis. While it has in-
creased the perception of the Jews as a foreign and unassimilable minori-
ty, it also makes them less and less of a threat and a scapegoat.30 Few 
Jews are prominent in politics. 
In post-independence Africa, Southeast Asian and various middleman 
minorities have been affected by legal discrimination and expulsions, 
involving either the whole community or particular segments of it. The 
groups involved have generally been of recent immigrant origin and, for 
the most part, bearers of foreign nationality. Victims of persecution have 
included civil servants and labor migrants as well as those involved in 
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commerce. In West and East Africa, for instance, victims of forced 
repatriation have included both Africans from neighboring countries and 
Asians.31 Many of the migrants entered these countries during the colo-
nial period to serve in the newly expanding economy, crossing what 
were basically provincial boundaries between colonies of the same met-
ropolitan power. There were some exceptions to this, such as the 
Chinese and Lebanese. Many Indians from British India migrated into 
French-controlled areas. While the expulsions of this variety which have 
drawn the greatest world attention have been those of Asians from 
Kenya and Uganda and of Chinese from Vietnam, equally large expul-
sions have occurred involving labor migrants from neighboring coun-
tries. For instance, Idi Amin's actions against the Indians and Pakistanis 
in Uganda in 1971 were preceded by the expulsion of the Kenyan mi-
grant workers, especially members of the Luo ethnic group, by his 
predecessor, Milton Obote.32 This earlier event was less publicized out-
side of Africa because the expellees were repatriated to a neighboring 
country, requiring little action on the part of European countries. The 
Asians, however, attracted greater world attention because many had 
claims as British subjects; but Britain was reluctant to accept non-white 
commonwealth subjects as immigrants. On the other hand, India and 
Pakistan, the lands of origin of these expellees, felt that those who 
claimed British nationality were the responsibility of Britain, which at the 
time of Ugandan independence had promised them protection. 33 While 
there have been massacres, pogroms, and other genocidal actions in 
Africa since independence, they have generally not been directed pri-
marily against middleman minorities. One possible exception is that of 
the massacres directed at the Ibo in northern Nigeria in 1966, which led 
to the attempted secession of Biafra and a hard-fought civil war. These 
massacres, however, had been preceded by a military coup in which Ibo 
officers had overthrown a government dominated by northerners and in 
which northern officials had been assassinated. Subsequently the Ibo-
dominated junta was violently overthrown and pogroms were conducted 
against Ibo outside of their region in Nigeria. Dadrian (1975) sees the 
anti-Ibo pogroms as retributive genocide.34 
The separateness of the groups considered here varies. As recent im-
migrants to the various countries where they live, they are generally 
separated by culture and social structure. In some cases, they are racially 
similar, as in the case of Nigerians in Ghana or Thais in Malaysia. The 
degree of linguistic separation also varies, as does willingness to inter-
marry with the local populace. Most separated from the local populace 
were probably the Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa. In addition to 
their linguistic and racial distinctiveness, most South Asian groups also 
maintained rigid caste and sectarian boundaries and did not even inter-
marry with other Asians. This was more true for Hindus than for 
Muslims. 
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Some of the instances of expulsion from African and Asian nations 
have evoked images which remind many in the West of events related to 
the Holocaust. The massacres in northern Nigeria were very effectively 
used by proponents of Biafran independence. The homelessness of 
Asian refugees from East Africa and the "boat people" from Indochina 
reminded many of the refugee ships of the World War II era which went 
from port to port with unwanted people, sometimes sinking under the 
weight of their overcrowded passengers in a hostile sea. It is clear, 
however, that these middleman minorities have not suffered the "optimal 
genocide" which constituted the holocausts of the Armenians and the 
Jews. One instance of this variety will be examined in some detail 
before considering the similarities and differences between that case (as 
representative of such expulsions) and that of the holocausts. 
THE CHINESE OF VIETNAM AND THE SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN CONTEXT 
The vast majority of Chinese immigrants in the world, especially prior 
to the revolution, came from the southeastern provinces of China. Prior 
to the nineteenth century, junk trade between China and Southeast Asia 
was carried on through these provinces. The vast labor migrations to 
both Southeast Asia and the Americas were primarily from this region 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While most of the mi-
grants were farmers by origin, commerce and moneymaking were fa-
miliar to countryfolk there, and commerce carried greater prestige in the 
southeast than in other parts of China. 
The initial migration as part of a traditional trade diaspora, and later 
migrations of single men unaccompanied by families, produced a situa-
tion in which Chinese men frequently formed liaisons with or married 
local women. In many places, their offspring assimilated into the local 
population, although in some places, such as Java, they formed a dis-
tinctive part of the local Chinese community. Through such intermar-
riages and unions Chinese communities had kinship links with the non-
Chinese population. However, a large immigration of Chinese families 
during the twentieth century changed this and led to greater isolation of 
the Chinese from the local population. Coupled with rising Chinese and 
local nationalisms and fears of the "Yellow Peril," conflict between the 
Chinese and host populations increased. The immigration into Vietnam 
and other parts of French Indochina followed this pattern. In fact, the 
high point of Chinese immigration was reached during the civil unrest 
and the Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s. 
Chinese participation in the economies of the various Southeast Asian 
countries followed two patterns. One was labor migration. During the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Europeans recruited 
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many Chinese to work in mines and on plantations throughout Southeast 
Asia, as well as in other areas of the world. Such laborers were inden-
tured or otherwise indebted to their employers. The vast majority were 
single males, often leaving spouses and children behind in China. The 
second pattern was for Chinese migrants to open enterprises of their 
own, ranging from small mining operations and truck farms to large rice 
mills and rubber-trading corporations. While many laborers returned 
home, others went into business for themselves or worked for Chinese 
employers. 
The situation of the Chinese in Vietnam was fairly typical of such 
populations throughout Southeast Asia, with some special conditions 
stemming from Vietnam's proximity to China itself. The history of 
Sino-Vietnamese relations prior to the French conquest in the nineteenth 
century was marked by trade, tribute, and occasional warfare. Although 
not expansionary in the Western sense, Chinese civilization did 
incorporate areas south of its original heartland, some of which are seen 
by modern Vietnamese as part of their own homeland. In premodern 
times, Vietnam was seen by the Middle Kingdom as a tributary state, 
even when it was independent. Struggles for independence from Chi-
nese domination are part of Vietnamese history; at the same time, Viet-
nam absorbed important cultural complexes from China. This history 
has ramifications for contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
During the early Ching or Manchu period (seventeenth-eighteenth 
centuries), Chinese fleeing from Manchu rule were settled in Cochin 
China (what is now the southern part of Vietnam, including Saigon/Ho 
Chi Minh City). The Vietnamese rulers of the time encouraged such 
immigration. Under French rule (1859-1954), Chinese immigration 
increased. By the end of the French administration, the majority of 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were either immigrants themselves or the 
descendants of recent immigrants, many of the earlier migrants having 
been assimilated. In 1978, there were approximately 1.5 million 
Chinese in Vietnam, only 300,000 of whom lived north of the 17th 
Parallel, which divided the two Vietnamese states from 1954 until 1975. 
The Chinese were approximately 10 percent of South Vietnam's 
population and under 5 percent of Vietnam's population as a whole.35 
The Chinese practiced a wide range of occupations, although they 
were, to a large extent, involved in trade. In northern Vietnam (es-
pecially Tonkin), there were Chinese factory workers, fishermen, and 
miners. Prior to independence, certain avenues to economic mobility 
were reserved by the French for themselves, including mining, forestry, 
and large plantations. Most Chinese business firms were small in terms 
of their capital and simple in their organization. The most important in-
dustry in which the Chinese were predominant was rice-milling, crucial 
in a rice-exporting country. At one time, this industry appears to have 
been monopolized by the Chinese. In 1958, 60 percent of the rice-mills 
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in the Saigon area were still owned by Chinese. The Chinese also in-
vested in spinning and weaving shops, generally small in size. Chinese 
also owned groceries, medicine shops, rice shops, second-hand goods 
stalls, export and import firms, inland and maritime transportation, 
banks, and insurance companies. Some Chinese, especially those origi-
nally from the island of Hainan, specialized in the cultivation of specific 
crops, such as pepper. In general, the Chinese in South Vietnam in 
particular played central roles in the commercial economy.36 
As with other minorities, the political status of the Chinese throughout 
Southeast Asia and in Vietnam was problematical. This status was fur-
ther complicated by the continuing struggle for international recognition 
and for the sympathies and loyalties of overseas Chinese by the rival 
governments of Peking and Taipei during most of the post-1949 period. 
The Peking government in particular varied between policies encour-
aging overseas Chinese to assimilate and measures to recruit these people 
for its cause and for their protection. On the one hand, the Peking gov-
ernment would tell overseas Chinese to be good citizens in their host 
countries. On the other hand, overseas Chinese students would be en-
couraged to study in the homeland. When governments persecuted their 
Chinese residents, Peking sometimes sent a ship to repatriate overseas 
Chinese from that country. 37 
The nationality of the Chinese in Indochina was complicated by 
various arrangements which the French had established for the control of 
Chinese populations in their colonies. During the colonial period, the 
French administration ruled the Chinese indirectly through "chiefs" 
whom they appointed to maintain law and order. The chiefs ruled the 
Chinese "congregations," which thus helped segregate the Chinese from 
other Indochinese. This system was abolished by both the Communists 
in the north and by the Diem regime in the south. The Chinese in Indo-
china remained Chinese nationals but were granted rights combining 
those given to the natives and those granted to French nationals. They 
were technically under the protection of the Chinese government. The 
status of Chinese in Vietnam was thus comparable to that of Europeans 
who had been granted extra-territoriality in various Asian and African 
countries, although as nationals of a weak power the ability of China to 
help them effectively was limited.38 
After the partition of Vietnam the situation became more complicated, 
since there were two Vietnams, each of which had diplomatic ties with a 
different Chinese government. In the north, there was a partial mainte-
nance of the status quo ante but with encouragement for the Chinese in 
Vietnam to become naturalized. In 1961, the People's Republic of China 
recognized North Vietnamese jurisdiction over its Chinese residents and 
ceased issuing Chinese passports to such residents of Vietnam. In South 
Vietnam, the Diem government followed a policy of forced naturalization 
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by which many Chinese residents became citizens in order to remain in 
business there. Their importance for the economy of the region re-
mained intact. After the fall of Saigon, the Vietnamese government 
viewed the Diem measures as valid, but the Chinese government con-
tended that they were invalid as the products of an illegitimate govern-
ment. 39 
The dispute over the citizenship of the South Vietnamese Chinese was 
entangled with other issues. There were some unresolved territorial 
disputes and trouble over Cambodia, in which China sided with the Pol 
Pot regime.40 In addition, Hanoi's decision to nationalize the South 
Vietnamese economy and to integrate South Vietnam with North Vietnam 
impinged on the Chinese large and small businessmen of the Saigon 
area. By May 1978, Hanoi had decided to clamp down on the Chinese 
businessmen of South Vietnam, and China reacted by announcing an 
intention to send two ships to Vietnam to evacuate Chinese residents. As 
relations between Hanoi and Peking worsened, negotiations over this 
and other issues broke down. By the summer of 1978, ethnic Chinese 
residents of both former North and South Vietnam were encouraged to 
leave, and refugees began flowing over the Sino-Vietnamese border and 
into the seas off Vietnam. 
While this precipitated the refugee crisis of 1978-1979, the exodus 
was initially illegal. Extortion and departure taxes were demanded from 
potential refugees. Often Chinese businessmen acquired a boat and fares 
were paid in cash and gold, half of which would go to the government 
and for bribes to officials. In this way, it was similar to the departure of 
ethnic Vietnamese, who were the majority of "boat people" during the 
other refugee waves out of Vietnam since 1975. By July 1979, nearly 
300,000 ethnic Chinese had fled from Vietnam. 
What made this refugee crisis comparable to the pre-World War II 
crises was the attitudes engendered in other nations, especially those of 
Southeast Asia and the West. The People's Republic of China (PRC) 
and Taiwan did accept refugees who arrived by land or sea. In the case 
of the PRC, however, refugees in some cases had to undergo re-edu-
cation, much like that which they were trying to avoid in the New 
Economic Zones of Vietnam. This was less of a problem for proletarian 
refugees from northern Vietnam than for those from Saigon.41 
Vicissitudes of travel by sea in an open boat were many. The ships 
and boats were often barely seaworthy. The passengers faced storms, 
but also pirates. Many of the pirates were Thai fishermen who found 
that robbing refugees was a lucrative occupation. At the height of the 
refugee crisis, many ships avoided sealanes where there were refugees. 
If landfall was achieved, there was no certainty that one would be al-
lowed to land. Even the predominantly Chinese "city-states" of Singa-
pore and Hong Kong were reluctant to accept refugees. Other neighbor-
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ing countries, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
were unwilling to accept ethnic Chinese refugees because each had its 
own "Chinese" problem. 
In Indonesia and in the Philippines, the Chinese constitute a small 
percentage of the population (in both cases less than 5 percent). In these 
countries, conflict between local "native" populations and the Chinese, 
who are seen as controlling certain sectors of the economy, has been 
acute for the past century. In both, dual nationality of the Chinese has 
been an issue, with alternate policies of exclusion or forcible assimilation 
of Chinese having been followed. In both, one also finds high degrees 
of assimilation by certain segments of the Chinese population. "Mes-
tizos" of partial Chinese ancestry have played an important role in Philip-
pine life; Jose Rizal, the father of Philippine nationalism, was such a 
mestizo. In Indonesia, many people of mixed Chinese and Indonesian 
ancestry speak the local language. However unwilling they were to ac-
cept Chinese refugees, these countries played a less prominent role 
during this crisis than did Malaysia. 42 
The government of Malaysia was quite vocal during this period. In 
the summer of 1978 it threatened to tow refugee boats back into the sea if 
they reached land in its territorial waters, and at times it backed up its 
threat The Chinese constitute 35 percent of Malaysia's total population. 
Thus an ethnic Chinese wave of settlers would threaten a delicate ethnic 
balance. Malaysia had quietly resettled Muslim refugees from Indochina 
in 1970. The balance between Chinese and Muslim Malays can, in fact, 
be seen as crucial to the formation of the present Malaysian federation. 
Singapore was expected to be part of this federation, but was excluded, 
in part because it would have made a Chinese majority in the federation 
possible. The Chinese had come to Malaysia as laborers to work in the 
mines and the plantations, and many have continued to do so. The range 
of Chinese occupations is broader in western Malaysia than in other 
Southeast Asian countries. While the Chinese in Malaysia cannot be 
seen exclusively as a middleman minority, they are prominent in com-
merce, and Singapore, with a Chinese majority, is the financial center of 
the region. In general, the politically dominant Malays have felt that they 
were weak economically relative to the Chinese and that the latter would 
take over their country. The present Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mo-
hammed, expressed this fear in a controversial book published in 
1970.43 
The dramatic events of 1978 and 1979 filtered to the West with 
reports that the South China Sea was full of refugees who were being 
cynically allowed to leave Vietnam after paying extortionate taxes and 
bribes; robbed, raped, and killed by pirates; and refused permission to 
land by various governments, especially that of Malaysia. This aroused 
memories of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and a wave of sympathy 
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swept over certain Western countries. An international conference was 
called. Pressure was put on Vietnam to control the flow of refugees and 
on Malaysia to allow them to stay until other arrangements could be 
made. Certain countries, especially France and the United States, ac-
cepted substantial numbers of these refugees. This relieved the transit 
camps in various Southeast Asian countries, though large numbers con-
tinue to live in such camps and continue to leave the Communist nations 
of Indochina through a variety of means. It is my impression that the 
"boat people" of 1978 and 1979 were viewed by most Americans in a 
manner similar to previous and subsequent groups of Southeast Asian 
emigres and not as ethnic Chinese. While all of the Indochinese refugees 
in the United States have encountered anti-alien racist prejudices and 
opposition, no specifically anti-Sinic current differentiated the 1978-
1979 wave from the others. 
The Sino-Vietnamese case shares many features with other such in-
stances, although it resulted in a rather brutal expulsion rather than an 
optimal genocide. In Vietnam proper, especially southern Vietnam, the 
minority was visible and conspicuous. Poverty was general and aggra-
vated by many decades of war, both domestic and foreign. The minority 
was apparently more prosperous than the majority, and the occupation of 
the south by the north increased poverty. While the minority was 
probably not increasing relative to the majority, it did control more 
wealth than did the majority Vietnamese population. The minority's eco-
nomic role was resented, and the Chinese were blamed for economic 
problems in South Vietnam as early as 1957. This was also the case 
under the Hanoi occupation.44 Clients and competitors, as well as the 
officials of a nationalistic and socialistic government, all resented the role 
of the Chinese. After 1975, the Chinese in Vietnam were no longer 
related to a fraternal socialist government on the one side or to an anti-
communist ally (Taiwan) on the other, but to the enemies of Vietnam, 
i.e., the Chinese to the north and the Americans. They did have wealth 
to plunder, through taxation and extortion. 
So far, the preconditions for expulsion and genocide coincide. Why, 
then, did the Vietnamese government carry out the former program rather 
than the latter? There may be several reasons. One, the Vietnamese 
government at this time was justifying its invasion of Cambodia on the 
basis of the brutality of the Pol Pot government. While governments are 
not particularly consistent in this regard, some form of legitimation plays 
a role in political actions. Two, at least some of the Chinese were ac-
cepted by China proper. Three, the Vietnamese were themselves vulner-
able to attack by China and the United States, although neither was in a 
strong military position in 1978-1979. Still, some retaliation was pos-
sible. Four, the creation of a refugee crisis by expelling or encouraging 
emigration is useful in embarrassing one's neighbors and foes. This 
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crisis did do this, although not as effectively as the Mariel refugee flow 
from Cuba in 1980. Five, the Vietnamese were not ideologically pre-
pared for an optimal genocide. 45 
COMPARISONS WITH HOLOCAUSTS 
Looking at a number of examples is instructive. The two holocausts 
of middleman minorities were committed on groups who were long-
standing residents in the regions where they were murdered, not rela-
tively recent immigrants. In this way, the Jews of Germany and Eastern 
Europe and the Armenians of Anatolia, the main bodies of victims, 
resembled the Parsis and the Moroccan Jews more than they did the 
Indians in East Africa or even the Chinese in Vietnam. 
In Europe, however, the Holocaust had been preceded by a period of 
great migrations and urbanization. The Jews, in particular, were part of 
these migrations, especially after the pogroms and May Laws in Russia 
in the early 1880s. While the anti-Semitic movement in Germany began 
well before that period and anti-Semitic ideas were commonly held at an 
earlier time, large numbers of East European Jewish immigrants in 
Germany and throughout Western Europe and North America certainly 
reinforced the view that Jews were essentially an alien people. The 
growing numbers of foreign Jews similarly lent credence to fears of 
Jewish domination. 
The recentness of migration is also relevant to the degree to which the 
minority is visible as a separate group, although both the Jews in Eastern 
Europe and the Armenians in Anatolia remained loyal to a separate 
language for a long period of time. Such language loyalty, however, 
was breaking down in Eastern Europe during the interwar period, and 
many Armenians spoke either Turkish or a mixture of Turkish and Ar-
menian. Genetic markers are also blurred with durable co-territoriality, 
since sexual relations between members of the various groups take place, 
whether in the form of marriage or of illicit seduction, rape, and 
concubinage. While linguistic, genetic, or sumptuary markers may per-
sist as ideals or as stereotypes, their breakdown may give anxiety about 
assimilation and/or infiltration on the part of both groups in contact. 
The fact of being old-timers in the region should also mean that a 
minority is viewed as "native." At the very least, one would expect them 
to reinvest resources in the country of their residence rather than sending 
them abroad. Yet in most of the cases discussed here, such an ex-
pectation was upset for both old and recent residents. The major excep-
tion was probably pre-1914 Germany. One cause of such foreign 
investment was the general impoverishment of the country. In most 
cases, this was strengthened by moves of discrimination coupled with 
fears of escalating persecution. To a lesser extent this was found among 
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the Parsis of India, but it is certainly true of the other cases. 
While it is hard to describe economic trends simply, most of the 
countries under consideration have had economic difficulties during the 
period preceding persecution (or expected harassment). Population 
growth in many developing areas, depression, and inflation all con-
tributed to a sense of impoverishment in the countries under considera-
tion. The other part of the economic picture is the relationship of differ-
ent classes with the minority, which had characteristics of a class in 
itself. In India and Morocco, there were a variety of mercantile groups 
competing with reasonable success. In Vietnam, East Africa, and 
Poland, the minority was perceived as having some kind of monopoly 
on trade and was particularly resented. In the Ottoman Empire, the 
Armenians were one of several non-Muslim minorities who were per-
ceived as controlling commercial enterprise; the degree to which Muslim 
Turks desired to compete is not indicated in the literature. Germany, of 
course, has been studied and dissected, and yet the results are incon-
clusive. It should also be pointed out that those who were most inte-
grated into the society, whether in Poland or Germany, often competed 
most directly with members of the majority ethnic group. It was the 
German-speaking or Polish-speaking Jew who sought to enter the 
university, become a professional or civil servant, or pursue success as 
an artist. When positions of this kind are limited, competition is often 
intense. While anti-Semitism was central to the Nazi ideology, it is still 
unclear whether anti-Semitism itself was part of the core of its appeal to 
those who became Nazis or voted for the Nazi party. Andreski, when 
offering his economic interpretation of anti-Semitism, explicitly argued 
that anti-Semitism in Germany was weaker than in Poland and Hungary, 
roughly corresponding to the relatively small percentage of the popu-
lation which was Jewish. Lately even the thesis that it was the lower 
middle class that was most in competition with Jews and in the forefront 
of German Fascism has been called into question. Istvan Deak agrees 
with Andreski's argument that anti-Semitism was secondary to other 
factors in drawing Germans to the Nazi movement and in leading them to 
comply with the systematic genocide which followed 46 Still, the Nazis 
incorporated the stereotype of the Jew as an alien middleman into their 
propaganda. 
Where does this leave middleman minority theory in its relationship to 
genocide and ethnic conflict in general? As indicated early on, mid-
dleman minority theory is primarily applicable to the preconditions for 
inter-ethnic conflict and genocide as a manifestation of such conflict. 
Like most sets of theory, it provides us with questions to ask. Un-
questionably, economic conflict between competing merchants, workers 
and employers, and buyers and sellers takes on an ethnic dimension 
when those on one side tend to be members of a different ethnic group 
from those on the other side. There is a wide range of options for the 
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end results of majority-middleman minority relations, including sub-
stantial assimilation, occupational integration, or the development of 
complementarity, all with minimal conflict, as well as the conflicts re-
sulting in voluntary emigration, harassment, expulsion, and genocide. 
There is thus no necessary connection between middleman minority 
status and victimization.47 In a period which has seen the mass murder 
of Indians in Brazil, Paraguay, and Guatemala; Communists in Indo-
nesia; large segments of the total population in East Timor and Cam-
bodia; landowners and others in China; the ruling Afro-Shirazis in 
Zanzibar; the dominant Tutsis in Rwanda; Hutu in Burundi; and 
dissident members of ruling groups in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to 
say that any group is not subject to genocide. Still, the vulnerability of 
middleman minorities is related to their economic position and has been 
demonstrated dramatically in this century. In all cases of victimization, 
other factors were present, but the images of minority middlemen as 
economic parasites and collaborators with alien enemies of the nation 
were intertwined and served to justify their liquidation from the body 
social. 
As noted earlier, middleman minority theory's historical roots are 
shared with the ideologies used to justify anti-minority actions. The 
denigration of trade and moneylending and the ideal of a national 
economy controlled by members of the national community, excluding 
strangers, were important in the foundation of the social sciences as well 
as in the formulation of both socialist and nationalist ideology. Jacob 
Katz48 in his study of modem anti-Semitism concluded that many of the 
observations of anti-Semites on the Jewish position in Europe were 
empirically based, but the conclusions which they drew were colored by 
extremely negative attitudes toward the Judaic heritage and the Jews 
themselves. This observation can be extended to attitudes toward 
middleman minorities elsewhere and to social scientists studying these 
groups. As social scientists and scholars, we must pursue the economic 
reasons for inter-ethnic conflict, even though our writings may be used 
to justify oppression and persecution. With this awareness, however, 
we might paraphrase A vtalyon: Beware scholars of your words, for evil 
may follow from your speech.49 
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AFTERWORD: GENOCIDE AND 
CIVILIZATION 
Richard L. Rubenstein 
Although there have been thousands of books written about the de-
struction of the European Jews, few have been devoted to the more 
general problem of genocide per se. Indeed, a number of contributors to 
this volume have commented on the avoidance of the subject by political 
and social researchers. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk observe that 
until recently scholars participated in a process of pervasive, self-
imposed denial concerning the importance of genocide in history. In 
their introductory essay, editors Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkow-
ski note the relative silence of social scientists on the subject. They 
argue that social scientists have, e.g., been far more interested in poverty 
than in the "nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into 
war and destruction." At the 1983 convention of the American Political 
Science Association, a session on genocide, which featured papers by a 
number of leading authorities, drew an audience of no more than ten. It 
is this writer's thesis that the relative silence on the subject of genocide 
stems from the unwillingness of both scholars and their audiences to 
confront the fact that, far from being a relapse into barbarism, genocide 
is an intrinsic expression of civilization as we know it. Put differently, 
the genocidal destructiveness of our era is an expression of some of its 
"most significant political, moral, religious and demographic ten-
dencies."1 If indeed genocide expresses some, though obviously not all, 
of the dominant trends in contemporary civilization, it would hardly be 
surprising that few researchers would want to spend much time on the 
night side of the world we have made for ourselves. 
In the present volume the connection between civilization and geno-
cide is raised most directly by Tony Barta's chapter, "Relations of Geno-
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cide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia." A professor at 
an Australian university, Barta asserts that the basic fact of his nation's 
history has been the conquest of the country by one people and the dis-
possession "with ruthless destructiveness" of another people, the Abor-
igines, those who were there aborigine, "from the beginning." Barta ar-
gues that, although it was by no means the initial intention of the British 
government to destroy the Aborigines, Australia is nevertheless a "nation 
founded on genocide." According to Barta, genocide was the inevitable, 
though unintended, consequence of the European colonization of the 
Australian continent. Barta's thesis puts him somewhat at odds with 
those scholars, such as Walter P. Zenner, who hold that genocide is "the 
intentional physical annihilation of all or part of a group of people on 
racial, religious or ethnic lines." According to Barta, in order to compre-
hend genocide we need a conception of the phenomenon that embraces 
relations of destruction and removes from the term the emphasis on 
policy and intention with which it is normally associated. Barta argues 
that the history of his own country amply demonstrates that genocidal 
outcomes can come into being without deliberate state planning. More-
over, he fully appreciates the degree to which the destruction of Aus-
tralia's Aboriginal population was not the consequence of the actions of 
isolated men acting out their aggressions on a lawless frontier far from 
metropolitan centers of civilization but was in fact the outcome of eco-
nomic, social, political, and religious transformations in the mother 
country, the first European nation fully to enter the economically 
rationalized world of the modern era. 
If we wish to comprehend the roots of genocide in the modem world, 
the beginnings of the modernization process in Great Britain may 
provide an excellent starting point.2 The beginnings of English moderni-
zation are to be found in the acts of enclosure which transformed the 
subsistence economy of premodern English agricultural into the money 
economy of our era. In the process, the customary rights to land usage 
of the economically unproductive English peasant class were abrogated 
and that class was largely transformed into a congeries of individuals 
whose survival was entirely dependent upon their ability to find wage 
labor. Absent gainful employment, the dispossessed peasants could 
only turn to a harsh and punitively administered system of poor relief, 
vagabondage, or outright crime. A crucial social by-product of Eng-
land's economic rationalization was the creation of a large class of people 
who were superfluous to England's new economic system. 
A class of more or less permanently superfluous people is a potential 
source of acute social instability. Having no hope of receiving society's 
normal rewards, it has little incentive, save fear of punitive retaliation, to 
abide by society's customary behavioral restraints. Even if such a group 
is tied to the rest of the population by common ethnicity and religion, it is 
likely to be perceived and to perceive itself as having been cast outside of 
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society's universe of moral obligation. Implied in a universe of moral 
obligation is the expectation that, consistent with their social location, its 
actors will, under normal circumstances, subordinate their individual 
inclinations to the good of the whole. A measure of self-sacrificing al-
truism rather than self-regarding egoism will normally characterize the 
behavior of members of such a universe toward each other. At a mini-
mum, members will not normally regard other members as potential 
sources of injury or even personal destruction. To the extent that trust is 
possible between human beings, the actors within a shared universe of 
moral obligation will normally trust each other, an attitude they will find 
impossible to extend to strangers. Such attitudes have less to do with the 
moral virtuosity of individuals than with the way social relations are 
structured. The enclosure laws had the effect of expelling England's 
displaced peasants from the only universe of obligation they had ever 
known, that of the manor and the parish. This was clearly understood 
by English decisionmakers as early as the enactment of the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws, which were as much police measures aimed at controlling 
England's first redundant population as they were philanthropic efforts 
to supply that population's irreducible needs for survival. 
In the case of the modernization of England, the arable land taken 
from the displaced peasants was devoted to sheep raising, a cash crop, 
and economically rational large-scale farming. Out of the vast social 
dislocation engendered by the process, England was able to finance its 
first large-scale modem industry, textiles. However, the transformation 
of arable land to pasture seriously diminished England's ability to pro-
duce its own food supply. Moreover, by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, that country was no longer able to produce all of the raw 
materials necessary for its burgeoning industry. 
Australia was an ideal land for sheep raising. It was also a convenient 
outlet for the relatively humane elimination of a significant portion of 
England's redundant population. As Barta points out, the convict popu-
lation exported by England to Australia was not unrelated to the dispos-
session of England's peasantry by the acts of enclosure. In addition, 
England contained large numbers of undercapitalized small holders and 
artisans who were faced with the prospect of downward economic 
mobility in an increasingly capital-intensive home economy. Many of the 
more enterprising small holders took their meagre assets to Australia in 
the knowledge that an ever-increasing demand for both sheep's wool and 
sheep's flesh in the mother country presented the undercapitalized free 
colonizers, who were willing to work and capable of prudent manage-
ment, with opportunities for prosperity which could not be duplicated at 
home. Australia was thus an important safety valve for those segments 
of England's population made redundant by the progressive rationaliza-
tion of its economy and society. 
As we know, Australia was not an unsettled country. Its Aboriginal 
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people had developed a viable human ecology which was altogether 
incomprehensible to the settlers, as indeed the ways of the settlers were 
incomprehensible to them. Moreover, sheep raising and the settlers' 
rationalized agrarian economy was incompatible with Aborigine land 
use. Since both sides were absolutely dependent upon the land, albeit in 
radically different ways, loss of the land necessarily entailed the 
complete destruction of the defeated way of life. As Barta writes, co-
existence was impossible. 
The issue was decided by the superior power and technology of the 
settlers. Since their survival was at stake, the Aborigines had no choice 
but to resist. The predictable response of the settlers was to root out the 
menace to their way of life. There were a number of bloody massacres. 
There were also government-sponsored attempts to diminish settler vio-
lence, but even without direct violence the Aborigines were destined to 
perish. Having lost their way of life and having been deprived of a 
meaningful future, most of the Aborigines who were not killed by the 
whites "faded away." Barta writes that between 1839 and 1849 there 
were only twenty births recorded among the seven Aboriginal tribes 
around Melbourne. He concludes that, whatever the official British 
intent, the encounter between the white settlers and the blacks was one of 
living out a relationship of genocide, a relationship that was structured 
into the very nature of the encounter. Barta distinguishes between a 
genocidal society and a genocidal state. National Socialist Germany was 
a genocidal state. Its genocidal project was deliberate and intended. 
Australia was a genocidal society. It had no conscious genocidal project. 
Nevertheless, its very existence had genocidal consequences for the 
original population. According to Barta, the basic pattern of the coloni-
zation of Australia was everywhere the same. It consisted of white pas-
toral invasion, black resistance, violent victory of the whites, and finally 
the mysterious disappearance of the blacks. 
Although Barta confines his description to Australia, it is clear that the 
process he describes was repeated in other European colonial settle-
ments. In his biography of Oliver Cromwell, the English historian 
Christopher Hill comments: 
A great many civilized Englishmen of the propertied class in the seventeenth 
century spoke of Irishmen in tones not far removed from those which the 
Nazis used about the Slavs, or white South Africans use about the original 
inhabitants of their country. In each case the contempt rationalized a desire to 
exploit3 
What Hill could have added was that Cromwell was fully prepared to 
exterminate those Irish Catholics who resisted exploitation and to turn 
their lands over to Protestant colonizers. The towns of Drogheda and 
Wexford refused to surrender to Cromwell. They were sacked and those 
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inhabitants unable to flee were massacred. In the case of Wexford, after 
all the inhabitants had been killed, Cromwell reported that the town was 
available for colonization by English settlers. An English clergyman 
commended the place for settlement: "It is a fine spot for some godly 
congregation where house and land wait for inhabitants and occupiers."4 
Even in the seventeenth century, it was clear to England's leaders that the 
more Ireland was cleared of its original Catholic inhabitants the more 
available it would be for Protestant English settlement. 
The extremes to which England was prepared to go to empty Ireland 
of its original inhabitants became clear during the famine years of 1846-
1848. It is estimated that within that period the population of Ireland 
was reduced by about 2 million out of an estimated 1845 population of 9 
million. Approximately 1 million perished in the famine. About the 
same number were compelled to emigrate in order to survive.5 Else-
where, this writer has attempted to show that the relief given by the 
English government to the Irish, who were, technically speaking, British 
subjects at the time, was deliberately kept at levels guaranteed to produce 
the demographic result which came to pass. Moreover, the demographic 
outcome was welcomed by leading members of England's society and 
government The deaths by famine and the removal by emigration were 
lauded as achieving for Ireland what the enclosures had done for Eng-
land, namely, clearing the land of uneconomic subsistence producers and 
making it available for rationalized agricultural enterprise. 6 The candor 
of an 1853 editorial in The Economist on the benefits of Irish and 
Scottish emigration is instructive: 
It is consequent on the breaking down of the system of society founded on 
small holdings and potato cultivation .... The departure of the redundant 
part of the population of Ireland and Scotland is an indispensable preliminary 
to every kind of improvement.1 
Unfortunately, the "departure" welcomed by The Economist entailed 
mass death by famine and disease for a very significant proportion of 
Ireland's peasant class. In the eyes of the British decision-making class 
of the period, Catholic Ireland was an inferior civilization. 8 A class that 
was indifferent to the fate of its own peasants was hardly likely to be 
concerned with that of the Irish. 
The basic colonizing pattern described by Barta, namely, white settle-
ment, native resistance, violent settler victory, and, finally, the disap-
pearance of most if not all of the natives, was played out in North and 
South America as weU.9 If Australian society was built upon a genocidal 
relationship with that of the indigenous cultures, so too was American 
society. There was a time not so long ago when it was taken for granted 
that "the only good Indian was a dead Indian." 
The connecting link between genocidal settler societies of the eight-
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eenth and nineteenth centuries and twentieth-century genocide can be dis-
cerned in Adolf Hitler's Lebensraum program. As a young man, Hitler 
saw the settlement of the New World and the concomitant elimination of 
North America's Indian population by white European settlers as a 
model to be followed by Germany on the European continent. As John 
Roth points out in his chapter, Hitler was keenly aware of Germany's 
population problems. He was determined that there would be no surplus 
German population even if a significant portion of Germany's Slavic 
neighbors were exterminated to provide "living space" for German 
settlers adjacent to the homeland. Put differently, Hitler proposed to 
repeat in Europe, albeit with infinitely intensified viciousness, the ex-
ploitative colonialism practiced by other Europeans overseas. In Hitler's 
eyes the Slavs were destined to become Europe's Indians. They were to 
be displaced, uprooted, enslaved, and, if necessary, annihilated to make 
way for Germany's surplus population. Unlike the earlier colonizers, 
Hitler had no illusions concerning the genocidal nature of such an under-
taking. He had the historical precedents of earlier European efforts at 
colonization and imperial domination. He regarded the defeat of native 
cultures by white settlers and colonists as evidence for his version of 
Social Darwinism, the belief that history is the theater in which the races 
enact their life and death struggle for survival and the superior races 
destroy their racial inferiors. As is well known, this same Social Dar-
winism became an important component in the legitimating ideology for 
the Holocaust. In Hitler's eyes, the Jews were the most contemptible of 
all of the inferior races destined by fate and German strength for 
destruction. 
As noted above, there was a fundamental difference between the 
behavior of the older European colonizing powers and Hitler's in that his 
policies were intentional and deliberately formulated. If the destruction 
of the Aboriginal cultures of Australia was an unintended consequence of 
state policy, the destruction and eventual extermination of Germany's 
neighbors was fully intended by Hitler and National Socialist Germany. 
Nevertheless, that difference should not obscure the fact that (a) both 
colonizing policies were intended to solve the same fundamental prob-
lem, namely, the relatively humane, non-genocidal elimination by the 
mother country of a redundant or potentially redundant sector of its do-
mestic population, and that (b) both could be successfully implemented 
only by the merciless elimination of the indigenous population of the 
colonized lands. Moreover, the very success of the earlier projects 
invited their repetition by political leaders, such as Hitler, who believed 
their nation to be faced with the problem that had led to the original 
colonization. Such leaders could no longer pretend ignorance of the con-
sequences of their policies. One of the differences between Hitler and 
his predecessors was his lack of hypocrisy and illusion concerning the 
extent to which his project entailed mass murder. Nevertheless, it is 
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clear from the history of the English in Ireland and Australia as well as 
that of Europeans in the New World that the destruction of the indige-
nous population never constituted a reason for calling colonization to a 
halt There is thus a historical continuum between the unintended geno-
cides of the period of Europe's demographic projection beyond its 
original territorial limits and that of the period of Europe's deliberate 
auto-cannibalization. 
If the above argument has merit, it will be possible to define genocide 
as the most radical means of implementing a state or communally 
sponsored program of population elimination. It should be noted that (a) 
the issue of intention is not raised in this definition, and that (b) genocide 
is grasped conceptually within the wider context of programs of popu-
lation elimination. This definition allows for a comprehension of the 
larger historical conditions under which a population is likely to be iden-
tified as redundant and targeted for one or another form of elimination. 
This definition also helps to structure the connections between popula-
tion redundancy, emigration, expulsion, colonization, modernization, 
and genocide. 
According to Walter P. Zenner, the aim of genocide is to transform a 
social field by removing a whole group of political actors. Without nec-
essarily disagreeing with Zenner, Roger Smith argues that the funda-
mental issue in genocide is Who belongs, who is to have a voice in 
society? It is this writer's conviction that, unless the identity of society 
and the political order is assumed, a highly questionable assumption, the 
real issue is Who is to have a voice in the political order? 
The issue of a voice in the political order is in turn related to the uni-
verse of moral obligation. In ancient Greece, members of the polis be-
longed to a common universe of obligation. This was especially evident 
in war. Only those who shared common origins, belonged by inherited 
right to the same community, and saw themselves as partaking of a com-
mon fate could be trusted in a life-and-death struggle. Neither the slave 
nor the stranger could be so trusted. Hence, they were regarded as 
outside of the shared universe of obligation. 
A very grave problem arises when, for any reason, a community 
regards itself as having within its midst a sub-community or a group of 
strangers who cannot be trusted. The problem is especially urgent in 
time of war. The perception of disloyalty may be mistaken, as in the 
case of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and Japanese 
Americans during World War II. The fundamental reason for the mass 
incarceration of the Japanese Americans was the belief of most Ameri-
cans that the majority of Japanese Americans were loyal to the Emperor 
rather than to their adopted country. Similarly, Rabbi Meir Kahane's 
extremist agitation to expel all Arabs from contemporary Israel ultimately 
rests upon the conviction that Israelis can only trust each other and that 
as long as the state contains potentially hostile elements, the safety of the 
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community remains precarious. This author is convinced that, were 
Kahane's policies ever implemented, the consequences would be disas-
trous. Nevertheless, even those Israelis who find Kahane's "solution" 
abhorrent do not advocate opening the ranks of the Israeli armed services 
to its Arab population. The problem Kahane proposes to "solve" is the 
classic problem of the nature of membership in a community. 
Sometimes the question of a voice in the political community takes on 
a class rather than an ethnic dimension. When Kampuchea fell to the Pol 
Pot regime in 1975, the victors had a very clear idea of the kind of 
agrarian Communist society they proposed to establish. Rightly or 
wrongly, they regarded Kampuchea's entire urban population as being 
objectively hostile to the creation of the new political order. This per-
ception was consistent with the Marxist idea that the bourgeois class is 
destined to disappear with the coming of socialism. Not content to let 
this process take its course nonviolently, the regime determined upon the 
immediate elimination through genocidal measures of all those who were 
regarded as either incapable of fitting into the new system or of being 
objectively committed to its destruction. to In the aftermath of the Rus-
sian Revolution, a very similar logic compelled the departure from the 
Soviet Union of millions of "objective enemies" of the new system. 
Similarly, the Cuban revolution resulted in the enforced emigration of 
over a million Cubans who could not fit into Fidel Castro's system, 
primarily to the United States. 
A related development is currently taking place in South Africa. 
Because of the overwhelming number of blacks and their indispensa-
bility to the functioning of the economic order, it is impossible for the 
Afrikaners to eliminate them. Indeed, save for some ultra-rightist 
groups, there is no evidence of any Afrikaner interest in so doing. 
Nevertheless, the Afrikaners have answered the question "Who shall 
have a voice in the political community?" by excluding non-whites. Of 
crucial importance is the consistent refusal of the Afrikaners to admit the 
blacks to any meaningful kind of suffrage. Apartheid and the denial of 
electoral rights are attempts to define membership in the political com-
munity without resort to outright mass murder. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to recognize that all of the policies cited above-segregation, 
concentration camp incarceration, expulsion, and genocide-are attempts 
to cope with a common problem. 
Gunter Remmling's discussion of the progressive steps taken by the 
Third Reich to deny legal rights to the Jews is especially helpful in 
acquiring an overview of the process by which Jews were stripped of 
membership in the German political community until finally even the 
right to life itself was denied them. The question "Who is to have a 
voice in the political community?" was absolutely decisive for National 
Socialism. The political emancipation of the Jews in Europe in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bestowed upon the Jews a voice in 
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the political communities in which they were domiciled. With the dour 
wisdom of historical hindsight, the extermination of the Jews can be 
seen as an unintended consequence of their emancipation. Emancipation 
made membership of the Jews in Europe's political communities a 
political issue for the first time. Emancipation was opposed by all who 
believed such membership should be restricted to Christians. An 
important reason why so little was done to assist the Jews during World 
War II, both in Germany and in the occupied countries, was the almost 
universal European acceptance of the National Socialist objective of 
excluding the Jews from membership in the political communities in 
which they were domiciled. This certainly was true of the mainstream 
Protestant and Catholic churches, which everywhere saw the denial of 
political rights to the Jews as a beneficial step toward the creation of a 
Europe that was culturally, intellectually, socially, and politically 
Christian. The fundamental difference between Hitler and the churches 
was that Hitler had no illusions concerning the measures necessary to 
carry out such a program. The churches never faced frankly the question 
of implementation. Nevertheless, one must ask whether the silence of 
the overwhelming majority of Europe's church leaders during World 
War II concerning the Holocaust may have been at least partly due to the 
fact that church leaders fully understood that extermination was the only 
viable means of eliminating the Jews. Having no direct responsibility 
for carrying out the process of elimination, they preferred to wash their 
hands of the question of implementation. In any event, it is now clear 
that the insistent calls for the elimination of the Jews from membership in 
the body politic of the European nations was in fact a demand for their 
extermination. 
The question of uniqueness looms large in the discussions of the 
place of the Holocaust in the larger subject of genocide. Surprisingly, 
none of the writers discusses one aspect of the Holocaust which was 
absolutely unique. In no other instance of genocide in the twentieth 
century was the fate of the victims so profoundly linked to the religio-
mythic inheritance of the perpetrators. In Christianity, the Jews are not 
simply one of the many peoples of the world. They are the people in 
whose midst God himself reigned to be incarnated. According to the 
classic Christian account, instead of being the first to recognize this 
supreme act of divine graciousness, the Jews both rejected God-in-the-
flesh and were responsible for the violent and vicious way in which he 
was removed from the human scene. The Jews are depicted as the God-
bearing and the God-murdering people par excellence. No other religion 
is as hideously defamed in the classic literature of a rival tradition as is 
Judaism by Christianity. Moreover, starting with the fall of Jerusalem in 
70 C.E., Christianity has taken the disasters of the Jewish people to be a 
principal historical confirmation of its own truth. These have been inter-
preted in the classic sources to be God's punishment of a sinful Israel for 
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having rejected Christ. The practical consequences of (a) the ascription 
of a demonic identity to Jews and (b) the interpretation of their misfor-
tunes as just chastisements of a righteous Lord was to cast them out of 
any common universe of moral obligation with the Christians among 
whom they were domiciled. In times of acute social stress, it had the 
practical effect of decriminalizing any assault visited upon them, as Hitler 
and the leading National Socialists fully understood. The implementa-
tion of the Holocaust was greatly facilitated by the deicidal and demonic 
interpretation of the Jewish people in the Christian religious imagination. 
If the Holocaust was to some extent a unique event, its religio-mythic 
dimension constituted a significant component of that uniqueness. 
In addition to the religious aspect of the Holocaust, there was a highly 
significant economic element. The European Jews were a middleman 
minority. The question of the proneness of middleman minorities to 
genocidal assault is raised by Walter P. Zenner. Zenner points out that 
the Armenians were also a middleman minority targeted for extermi-
nation. He also points out that a third middleman minority, the Hoa or 
ethnic Chinese of Vietnam, were the object of a large-scale, state-
sponsored program of population elimination.11 Zenner ends his exami-
nation of middleman minority theory with the conclusion that there is no 
necessary connection between middleman minority status and genocide. 
Nevertheless, he concedes that such a status can be a precondition for 
genocide if other factors are present. According to Zenner, middleman 
minority theory has yet to face the question of why "economically inte-
grated non-wage labor groups" are more likely to be victimized, while 
wage laborers, the marginalized, and the poor are not usually targets. In 
actuality, middleman minorities are permitted domicile in a community in 
order to do work that, for some reason, is not being done by the in-
digenous population. Their presence as strangers is tolerated because 
they constitute an economically or vocationally complementary popula-
tion. They are most likely to be targeted for elimination when their roles 
can be filled either by the state or by members of the indigenous popula-
tion. When this development talces place, the minority members become 
competitors of members of the majority. Usually, they compete against 
one of the most dangerous and potentially unstable groups within the 
larger population, the majority middle class. In the case of indigenous 
wage workers, the marginalized, or the poor, the same bitter rivalry with 
a dangerous class does not arise. When political leaders perceive voca-
tionally redundant members of the majority to be a source of social or 
political instability, they have encouraged emigration, as was the case in 
Western and Central Europe during much of the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, there is usually some residual sense that, even when they 
become redundant, the marginalized or the poor remain to some extent 
part of the community's shared universe of moral obligation. This is not 
the case with middleman minorities, especially when they are outside of 
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the majority religious consensus. They are often tolerated only as long 
as they are needed. Moreover, in premodern societies it was not socially 
or economically functional for middleman minorities to share a common 
religion with the majority. The impersonal, objective attitudes necessary 
for successful commerce were less likely to develop between people who 
considered themselves to be kin with the same gods. Commerce rested 
on an in-group, out-group double standard. It was only with the rise of 
Protestantism that the personalized ethics of tribal brotherhood gave way 
to universal otherhood and a universal money economy could come into 
being.12 
Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to show that the situation of 
Europe's Jews became progressively more hopeless as the economies of 
Western and Eastern Europe were modernized.13 For example, as the 
agriculture of Eastern Europe was rationalized, large numbers of Polish 
and Russian peasants were dispossessed of their holdings and forced to 
seek scarce wage labor in the villages and cities. Desperate for any kind 
of work under conditions of massive unemployment and underemploy-
ment, members of the former peasant class began to compete with the 
Jews for wage labor and those middle-class slots which had previously 
been predominantly Jewish. In seeking to displace the Jews, the dis-
possessed peasants and their urbanized offspring had the support of the 
Tsarist government, which, after 1881, made the Jews the targets of one 
of the most highly successful state-sponsored programs of population 
elimination in all of history. From 1881to1917, the fundamental objec-
tive of the Tsarist government vis-a-vis the Jews differed little from that 
of the National Socialist regime in Germany. Both sought the elimi-
nation of the Jews as a demographic presence in the areas under their 
control. Most American Jews are alive today because the two regimes 
did not share a common method of implementation. 
In addition to serving as a method of radically redefining and restruc-
turing society, genocide has since ancient times been the most unremit-
ting kind of warfare. According to Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk, 
genocide began in ancient times when warring peoples realized that their 
victories were only temporary. Elimination of a potential future threat 
became a powerful reason for wars of genocide. Undoubtedly, the 
human cost to the perpetrator played an important role in determining 
when a war was carried to such an extreme. After total defeat, the cost 
to the victor of eliminating a future threat was minimal. Since the enemy 
was outside of the victor's universe of moral obligation, defeat removed 
the only practical impediment to genocide. As long as an enemy retained 
the power to injure, a would-be perpetrator had to weigh the relative 
costs of a precarious peace against those involved in genocide. If neither 
side had the power to achieve a decisive victory, there was no possibility 
of a "final solution." In the case of the Holocaust, the Jews were 
perceived as a defenseless enemy with no significant capacity to retaliate. 
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The problems involved in their extermination were reduced to the bu-
reaucratic management, transport, and elimination of the target popula-
tion. A principal Jewish motive for the establishment of the state of 
Israel was to escalate the cost of killing at least those Jews who are 
Israeli citizens. There is little doubt that the cost now includes nuclear 
retaliation. 
Irving Louis Horowitz points out that genocide very frequently fol-
lows military defeat. An important element in the decision of the Young 
Turk regime to initiate the program of extermination against its Armenian 
Christian minority was Turkey's defeat by Bulgaria in 1912. Similarly, 
Germany's defeat in World War I created the conditions in which a 
radically anti-Semitic, revolutionary, revisionist National Socialist move-
ment could come to dominate German politics. As a consequence of 
defeat, the fringe became the center. 
Horowitz also argues that the most massive destruction of Jews 
during World War II began in earnest in 1942 after Stalingrad. When 
German defeat appeared inevitable, extermination of the Jews became a 
paramount goal. In a similar vein, Barbara Harff suggests that a lost war 
sometimes leads to genocide against defenseless minorities regarded as 
enemies. While Harff stresses the element of battered national pride, a 
related element may be that military defeat intensifies the urgency with 
which the question of membership in the community is posed. As noted 
above, a fundamental issue in genocide is the question of who can be 
trusted in a life-and-death struggle. All minorities suffer some discrimi-
nation and experience some degree of resentment and incomplete identi-
fication with the majority, a situation which is as obvious to the majority 
as to the minority. In normal times, such tensions can be held in check. 
In the aftermath of catastrophic military defeat, they can get out of hand. 
Aggressive energies can achieve cheap victories over a defenseless 
minority. The reality of defeat itself can be denied and responsibility for 
the misfortunes of war ascribed to the minority's hidden "stab in the 
back." The accusation of secret treachery can legitimate genocide against 
the minority. If such a group is perceived as bringing about national 
catastrophe, while appearing to be loyal, it can become a matter of the 
greatest public urgency to eliminate them from the body politic. 
Almost from the moment Germany lost World War I, the Jews were 
accused of bringing about its defeat through treachery, an accusation that 
appeared ludicrous in view of the extremely high proportion of German 
Jews who had served as front-line soldiers and who had made the ulti-
mate sacrifice for what they regarded as their Fatherland. Elsewhere, 
this writer has argued that the tradition of Judas betraying Jesus with a 
token of love, a kiss, provided an enormously powerful religio-mythic 
identification of the Jew with betrayal to German Christians.14 Since the 
identification of the Jew with Judas takes place in earliest childhood and 
is constantly reinforced by religious tradition, it is more deeply rooted 
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and less subject to rational criticism than beliefs acquired at a later stage 
in the life cycle. When Hitler and the German right ascribed Germany's 
defeat to the Jews, they had working for them this immensely powerful 
pre-theoretical archetype. Here too, we discern a unique religio-mythic 
element of enormous power that sets the Holocaust apart from other 
instances of genocide in our times. 
Given the presence of religio-mythic elements in the Holocaust, it is 
not surprising that many scholars have argued that the Holocaust was 
irrational in its objective if not in its method. Barbara Harff has argued 
that though the Holocaust may have been a "rational choice of the 
Nazis," the utility of its implementation was thoroughly irrational. 
Robert G .L. Waite, a historian of preeminent rank, concludes that there 
is no adequate explanation for the Holocaust. By contrast, Roger Smith 
argues that genocide is a "rational instrument to achieve an end." In 
order to understand the force of Smith's argument, it is important not to 
confuse that which is humane with instrumental rationality. The experi-
ence of our era should leave no doubt concerning the enormous potential 
for inhumanity present in autonomous practical reason. 
Ronald Aronson argues that the Holocaust systematically outraged the 
norms of the "normal world." He insists that the Holocaust was a 
product of madness, which he defines as a systematic derangement of 
perception, a seeing what is not there. The National Socialists saw the 
Jews as the source of Germany's problems and their riddance as a major 
element in the solution. Aronson argues that when rulers organize a 
society against false enemies and propagate the view that society is being 
mortally threatened by them when it is not, we may speak of madness as 
much as when an individual behaves in the same manner. 
Aronson's arguments summarize the thesis he presents with greater 
force and detail in his book, The Dialectics of Disaster.IS It is not sur-
prising that Aronson and Roger Smith do not agree on the rationality of 
genocide. Smith sees genocide as a violent means of determining who is 
to have a voice in a community. Aronson stresses the patently false 
character of the defamation of the intended victim and of the analysis of 
society as mortally endangered by his presence. However, Aronson 
does not deal with the underlying reason why the question of "who shall 
have a voice in the community" is raised in the first place. A community 
is more than a congeries of individuals living in close proximity. As 
noted above, it is a group whose members may have to sacrifice their 
lives in a life-and-death struggle with external enemies in a crisis. When 
the group regards itself as secure, it can afford to take a relatively benign 
view of the presence of a limited number of strangers in its midst. How-
ever, in times of acute national stress, such as war, economic disloca-
tion, or military defeat, the group is likely to view strangers with sus-
picion and hostility. In an extreme situation, it may decide upon the total 
elimination of strangers. 
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Aronson insists that the Nazi attempt wholly to eliminate the Jews as a 
demographic presence first in Germany and then in all of Europe was 
insane because the Jews in no way constituted the threat the National 
Socialists alleged them to be. The issue of the truth of National Socialist 
defamations is, however, irrelevant to the crucial fact that the over-
whelming majority of Germans regarded even the most assimilated Jews 
as aliens whose elimination would be a positive benefit. The Germans 
were not duped by mendacious Nazi propaganda. They wanted the 
volkisch homogeneity Hitler promised them. When it was all over, 
some of them regretted the methods employed but not the fact that 
Europe was largely free of Jews. 
If Aronson were right, it would be irrational to want an ethnically or 
religiously homogeneous community consisting of those with whom one 
shares a sense of kinship and trust.. In reality, there is nothing irrational 
about the desire for such a community. One wonders whether Aronson 
considers the colonization of the Americas and Australia, which was 
largely achieved through genocide, to be instances of madness. It is not 
the irrationality of such communities that is the problem, but the extreme 
cruelty and inhumanity which all too frequently attend their creation. 
Neither Hitler's ends nor his methods were irrational. They were ob-
scenely cruel and graphically demonstrate what citizens of one of the 
world's most advanced civilizations were willing to do to other human 
beings for the sake of national homogeneity. 
Finally, there is the issue of genocide and national sovereignty. 
Roger Smith observes that the United Nations never detected a single 
instance of genocide by a member nation. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank 
Chalk argue that the sovereignty of the perpetrator is the practical prob-
lem in cases of deportation and extermination because the nation-state is 
both the most dangerous violator and the ultimate guardian of human 
rights. Elsewhere, this writer has argued that National Socialist 
Germany probably committed no crime at Auschwitz.16 It was under no 
circumstances this author's intention to mitigate the inhumanity and the 
obscenity of what the Germans did, but to point to one of the most ur-
gent moral dilemmas involved in the notion of political sovereignty in 
our era. Crime is a violation of behavioral norms defined by political 
authority. Homicide, for example, is only a crime when the victim is 
protected by the state's laws. Even in National Socialist Germany, there 
were actually a very small number of SS officers who were punished for 
the unauthorized murder of Jews during World War II. The state deter-
mined when homicide was an offense against its law and when it con-
stituted the implementation of those same laws. 
If it be argued that the National Socialist state was by its very nature a 
criminal state because it violated God's laws or the laws of nature, one 
must ask what practical difference such violations made to the perpe-
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trators. As long as the leaders of National Socialist Germany were free 
to exercise sovereignty, no superordinate system of norms constituted 
any kind of restraint on their behavior. As is well known, neither the 
German churches nor the Vatican ever asserted that the genocidal pro-
gram of the National Socialist state was a violation of God's law, 
although the program was well known. In reality, there are no human 
rights there are only political rights. That is why the question "Who is to 
have a voice in the political community?" is the fundamental human 
question. Membership in a political community is no absolute guarantee 
of safety. Nevertheless, to the extent that men and women have any 
rights whatsoever, it is as members of a political community with the 
power to guarantee those rights. This was clearly evident in the fate of 
the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and the Jews of Europe 
during World War II. Genocide is the ultimate expression of absolute 
rightlessness. 
While highlighting the extreme moral limitations of contemporary 
civilization, genocide is nevertheless an intrinsic expression of that 
civilization. Genocide is most likely to occur when men and women 
refuse to extend the benefits and protection of their societies to strangers 
whom they cannot or will not trust. Obviously, that perception is highly 
subjective and may very well be in error. Nevertheless, one of the privi-
leges of power is the ability to define social reality. The objective facts 
are of far less practical consequence than the subjective perceptions of 
the majority. 
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